Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation
draft-ymbk-bgpsec-reqs-02
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Steven Bellovin , Randy Bush , David Ward | ||
| Last updated | 2012-01-25 (Latest revision 2011-03-07) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs, RFC 7353 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs, draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes requirements for a future BGP security protocol design to provide cryptographic assurance that the origin AS had the right to announce the prefix and to provide assurance of the AS Path of the announcement.
Authors
Steven Bellovin
Randy Bush
David Ward
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)