Route Leak Detection and Filtering using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-eotr-policy-01

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Network Working Group                                          A. Azimov
Internet-Draft                                              E. Bogomazov
Intended status: Standards Track                             Qrator Labs
Expires: March 18, 2018                                          R. Bush
                                               Internet Initiative Japan
                                                                K. Patel
                                                            Arrcus, Inc.
                                                      September 14, 2017

   Route Leak Detection and Filtering using Roles in Update and Open
                                messages
                   draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-eotr-policy-01

Abstract

   [draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy] defines a BGP OPEN capability and
   consequent route marking which enforces a valley-free peering
   relationship.  This document defines an eOTC (external Only To
   Customer) transitive BGP attribute which propagates the specific
   marking to automatically detect route leaks.  The goal is to allow a
   distant AS to determine a violation of valley-free peering.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
   appear in all upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed
   case as English words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 18, 2018.

Azimov, et al.           Expires March 18, 2018                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Route Leak Detection and Filtering     September 2017

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  BGP External Only To Customer attribute . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Compatibility with BGPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   For the purpose of this document, BGP route leaks are when a BGP
   route was learned from transit provider or peer is announced to
   another provider or peer.  See [RFC7908].  These are usually the
   result of misconfigured or absent BGP route filtering or lack of
   coordination between two BGP speakers.

   [I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] describes a method of
   marking and detecting leaks which relies on operator maintained
   markings.  Unfortunately, in most cases, a leaking router will likely
   also be misconfigured to mark incorrectly.

   It has been suggested to use white list filtering, relying on knowing
   the prefixes in the peer's customer cone as import filtering, in
   order to detect route leaks.  Unfortunately, a large number of medium
   transit operators use a single prefix list as only the ACL for export
   filtering, without community tagging and without paying attention to
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