Timing Parameters in the RPKI based Route Origin Validation Supply Chain
draft-ymbk-rpki-rov-timing-00

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Last updated 2020-04-21
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Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                  Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                               J. Snijders
Expires: October 23, 2020                                            NTT
                                                          April 21, 2020

Timing Parameters in the RPKI based Route Origin Validation Supply Chain
                     draft-ymbk-rpki-rov-timing-00

Abstract

   This document explores, and makes recommendations for, timing of
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure publication, propagation, and use
   of RPKI ROV data in relying parties and routers.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 23, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Bush & Snijders         Expires October 23, 2020                [Page 1]
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Related Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Deployment Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Certification Authority Publishing  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Replying Party Fetching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Router Updating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Alternative Technologies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   As Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) based Route Origin
   Validation (ROV) becomes deployed in the Internet, the quality of the
   routing control plane, and hence timely and accurate delivery of
   packets in the data plane, depend more and more on prompt and
   accurate propagation of the RPKI data from the originating
   Certification Authorities (CAs), to Relying Parties (RPs), to
   External Border Gateway Protocol (eBGP) speaking routers.

   Origination Validation based on stale ROAs allows accidental mis-
   origination.  While delayed ROA propagation to ROV in routers can
   cause loss of good traffic.  Though it may not be reasonable today,
   services such as DDoS cleaners would prefer that ROA publication had
   almost immediate effect on routing.

   This draft is an exploration of, and recommendations for, timing of
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure publication, propagation, and use
   in relying party caches and routers.

   There are the questions of how frequently a CA publishes, how often
   an RP pulls, and how often routers pull from their RP(s).  Overall,
   the router(s) SHOULD react within an hour of to ROA publication.

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   For CAs publishing, a few seconds to a minute seems easily achieved
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