DNS DOTS considerations
draft-zhang-dots-dns-considerations-00
Internet Engineering Task Force H. Zhang
Internet-Draft P. Zuo
Intended status: Informational Y. Sun
Expires: January 27, 2021 M. Yuan
CNNIC
July 26, 2020
DNS DOTS considerations
draft-zhang-dots-dns-considerations-00
Abstract
DDoS Open Threat Signaling(DOTS) described in [RFC8612] is a
standardized method to coordinate a real-time response among involved
operators. This document focus on the considerations regard to the
use of DOTS to mitigate DNS-Related DDoS attacks.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 27, 2021.
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Internet-Draft DNS DOTS considerations July 2020
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1. Introduction
Domain Name System(DNS) is one of the most foundational and essential
services on the Internet, the security and robustness of DNS are of
great significance. However, the stable operation of DNS has been
threatened by Distributate Denial of Service(DDoS) for quiet a long
time. In addition, DNS is often used to implement amplification
attacks, reflection attacks, etc.
DDoS Open Threat Signaling(DOTS) described in [RFC8612] is a
standardized method to coordinate a real-time response among involved
operators. This document focus on the considerations regard to the
use of DOTS to mitigate DNS-Related DDoS attacks.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the terminologies defined in [RFC8612] and [I-
D.ietf-dots-use-cases].
3. DNS DOTS considerations
3.1. DOTS Server
DOTS Server described in RFC 8612 is responsible for handling
messages from DOTS client. In order to provide more effective and
comprehensive mitigation, the DOTS server should have the ability to
filter DNS messages based on different transfer protocols. At the
time of this writing, the majority of DNS traffic is transmitted in
plain text via UDP. As some new DNS protocols like DoT[RFC 7858],
DoH[RFC8484] are introduced, encrypted DNS traffic transmitted via
TLS and HTTPS is growing. As the normal deep packet inspection
method is not easy to detect encrypted traffic, port filtering or
deep learning methods can be considered to identify abnormal traffic
in the case of DoT or DoH.
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3.2. Filter
Filters described in RFC 8612 should be extended to filter DNS
traffic based on DNS message characteristics. For example, DNS
packets can be filtered by domain name queried. Based on the
telemetry of the attack, filter can drop or transmit DNS packages
according to specific domain names or other DNS characteristics. In
addition, filter should support bidirectional filtering of DNS
traffic. For example, for the use of DNS to implement amplification
attacks, the filter can drop the DNS response from the DNS server
side.
3.3. Data channel
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