Minutes IETF100: saag

Meeting Minutes Security Area Open Meeting (saag) AG
Title Minutes IETF100: saag
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Last updated 2017-12-02

Meeting Minutes

SAAG 100 https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/100/materials/agenda-100-saag/

Open Mic:
    Yoav Nir: informal discusison tonight re: short-term certificates
    Jim Fenton: security considerations in recent drafts aren't what I'd like
    to see. Too much normative content there. Kathleen: there's no strict
    guidance on how we structure security considerations. Some experiments. If
    you want to give feedback for a revision of 3552, input welcome.

    Nancy: Get well Russ!

    a. OSCCA Extensions For OpenPGP,  Ron Tse (remote)
          Requesting: AD sponsorship, 3 codepoints in IANA PGP registry;
    Tim: Those codepoints would have to be assigned with IETF review.
    DKG: why are you proposing this now? rather than when there was a WG?
    Ron: I understood OpenPGP would only do revision Barry Lieba told me that.
    Sean Turner: IETF review. or update the registry to allow other
    registration types. Stephen Farrell: adding algorithms would be a mistake.
    Richard Barnes: clarifiying, you're just asking for a codepoint? Ron: Yes.
    RLB: then we should fix the registry assignment process Sean Leonard:
    What's the implementation status? Ron: for OpenPGP to work with these
    algorithms, need the codepoint. SM2 is already used in cert standards
    within China Sean L: I don't see it as harmful. more cryptographic
    diversity is ok. DKG: Do you have OpenPGP implementations? Ron: the
    algorithms are available if implementers want to use them. github open
    source project using experimental codepoints. DKG: for elliptic curves, we
    use OIDs

    Nancy: couple of paths;
    1. do nothing here
    2. find an AD to sponsor
    3. go through IANA registry.

    Tim: implicit in AD review is CFRG
    EKR: As an AD, I'm not going to sponsor a codepoint. Happy to sponsor
    changing the registrry policy.

    Tim: should we pursue a change to IANA policy for OpenPGP?
    @@: could go to CURDLE

    Tim: 1. do nothing; 2. Revise IANA policy for OpenPGP; 3. go to CURDLE
    after CFRG review Yoav: No, CURDLE's algorithms are fixed. Tim: would
    require CURDLE charter change. DKG: registries are one octet; relatively
    small registry.

        1. (few)
        2. moderate
        3. moderate+

        RLB: fix the registry and go to CURDLE. Not mutually exclusive.

        Tim: suggest going to CFRG, then to CURDLE.

     b. TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets, Daniel Migault

          Paul Wouters: isn't this TLS resumption?
          Daniel: No
          DKG: This reminds me of TACK
          Paul: why is this different from HPKP, TACK, etc.
          Daniel: it's a second factor not a side channel; no impact when you
          change your key.

          Tim: decision: is this work something we shoudl be pursuing in IETF?
          Ben: same work presented at IETF 97?
          Daniel: yes.
          DKG: what should the client do if the server doesn't produce new
          pinning proof? Daniel: hard fail DKG: a difficulty with PKP was no
          guidance on key rotation schedules. Do you have that?
Daniel: we have some
          Sean Turner: This WG shoudln't become TLS part 2.
          RLB: we shouldn't do anything. HPKP is being rolled back on the web;
          this isn't right for IETF.

          Tim: spec review would get you a codepoint. Probably not interest in
          a WG. Suggest independent submission. Stephen Farrell: we might
          suggest this ia bad idea. We should have a way to say No EKR: don't
          do it here. and this is how you get a codepoint submission.

          Tim: Hum if you agree we should not pursue it. Louder than "should

     c. Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols,  Nick Sullivan

         Stephen Farrell: Valuable. Ideally, update 4086, at least be aware of
         it. @:
        Nick: this should work with deterministic or non-deterministic
        signatures. Mix with randomness EKR: ECDSA requires random K. Nick:
        only issue with predictable K is if you do multiple sigs, so do only
        one sig per long-term K Leif: have you tested with Linux system to see
        how much entropy you get? Nick statistically, iif system RNG is random,
        this will be as well Rich Salz: Give it to CFRG and have them publish
        it. Tim: CFRG might be the right path. Did you consider that? Nick:
        possibly RLB: higher up the stack than CFRG usually deals with. You
        could AD sponsor or spin up a focused WG for one document.

         Tim: options. 1. send to CFRG; 2. spin up a short-term WG; 3. AD
         sponsor EKR: do you think this is suitable for AD sponsorship?

         Tim: CFRG? hum.
         Focused WG? (silence)
Consider AD sponsorship? weaker hum.

Tim: Great, go to CFRG.

     d. OCSP over DNS, Max Pala

          MT: there's a better caching mechanism. Why not use OCSP stapling.
          Max: you can.
          MT: it doesn't reduce the costs of signing, it creates an externality
          in the DNS. TimW: you can request a DNS RR type. DNSOP will give you
          the advice to use text records. RLB: DNSSEC... Bjorn: OCSP request
          payload needs to carry more than the serial number Sean Leonard:
          support Matt Miller: you're moving caching from CDN to resolvers.

          Tim: ought we to pursue this? (weak hum)
          Not: stronger hum.

     e. EAP usage in 5G, Jari Arkko

         jari: this is wrt EAP-AKA’ (RFC 5448)  (see slides)
         Jari would like a place for this work in the IETF
         km: there's issues with eqp@ mailing list -- also there seems to be
         renewed interest in this work ?: thinks work should occur ? of 3gpp:
         would like drafts to progress in ietf Minpeng of China Mobile: if we
         have more EAP methods the MNO has more options

         1. do u think these drafts are impt enough that should be worked on in
         Sec area?
            loud hum for, none against