Last Call Review of draft-ietf-bess-evpn-na-flags-05
review-ietf-bess-evpn-na-flags-05-secdir-lc-vucinic-2020-09-01-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-bess-evpn-na-flags
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 06)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2020-08-28
Requested 2020-08-14
Authors Jorge Rabadan, Senthil Sathappan, Kiran Nagaraj, Wen Lin
Draft last updated 2020-09-01
Completed reviews Intdir Last Call review of -05 by Ralf Weber (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -05 by Robert Sparks (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -05 by Mališa Vučinić (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -06 by Mališa Vučinić
Assignment Reviewer Mališa Vučinić
State Completed
Review review-ietf-bess-evpn-na-flags-05-secdir-lc-vucinic-2020-09-01
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/Y2NV9L26ukffr6y1ty8Hvx__Xss
Reviewed rev. 05 (document currently at 06)
Review result Has Nits
Review completed: 2020-09-01

Review
review-ietf-bess-evpn-na-flags-05-secdir-lc-vucinic-2020-09-01

I reviewed this document as part of the Security Directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors. Document authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other IETF Last Call comments.

The document specifies an extension to an Ethernet Virtual Private Network (EVPN) MAC/IP advertisement by defining an EVPN Extended Community carrying flags relevant to the ARP/ND resolution.

The abstract of the document does not include enough background context for it to be useful to the general audience. Otherwise, the document is well written.

The security considerations section should be further elaborated. For instance, the section includes a discussion on a possible misconfiguration of Router (R) /Override (O) flags but the discussion is limited to the fact that the misconfiguration of an IPv6/MAC binding on a given Provider Edge device (PE) will propagate, through the means of IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation messages, to other PEs in the same broadcast domain. I would like to understand better the effect of each flag, i.e. what kind of behavior in the network can an attacker cause by changing one of these flags on a particular device or in transit?