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Telechat Review of draft-ietf-ccamp-l1csm-yang-25

Request Review of draft-ietf-ccamp-l1csm-yang
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 26)
Type Telechat Review
Team Internet Area Directorate (intdir)
Deadline 2024-02-23
Requested 2024-02-15
Requested by Éric Vyncke
Authors Young Lee , Kwang-koog Lee , Haomian Zheng , Oscar Gonzalez de Dios , Daniele Ceccarelli
I-D last updated 2024-02-16
Completed reviews Intdir Telechat review of -25 by Antoine Fressancourt (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -24 by Dan Romascanu (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -24 by Yaron Sheffer (diff)
Yangdoctors Early review of -07 by Robert Wilton (diff)
Yangdoctors Last Call review of -15 by Joe Clarke (diff)
Rtgdir Last Call review of -19 by Adrian Farrel (diff)
Rtgdir Last Call review of -19 by Nicolai Leymann (diff)
As usual, feel free to skip the YANG module itself.
Assignment Reviewer Antoine Fressancourt
State Completed
Request Telechat review on draft-ietf-ccamp-l1csm-yang by Internet Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at
Reviewed revision 25 (document currently at 26)
Result Ready w/nits
Completed 2024-02-16
I am an assigned INT directorate reviewer for
draft-ietf-ccamp-l1csm-yang-25.txt. These comments were written primarily for
the benefit of the Internet Area Directors. Document editors and shepherd(s)
should treat these comments just like they would treat comments from any other
IETF contributors and resolve them along with any other Last Call comments that
have been received. For more details on the INT Directorate, see

Based on my review, if I was on the IESG I would ballot this document as YES

The following are issues I found with this document that SHOULD be corrected
before publication:

* In the Security considerations in Section 5, the authors give a good
description of the possible service disruptions that may occur in case the YANG
module is misused voluntarily or not. Besides the possibility of a service
malfunction, I would argue that a misuse, or more precisely a targeted attack
on the YANG module would allow an attacker to configure the layer 1
connectivity so that it places an eavesdropper for some communications between
two specific entities. I am curious about whether the draft authors have
considered this risk, if they think it is worth mentioning in the draft, or if
this risk is mentioned in other documents and should not make its way in this

* While reading the document, I found it odd that RFC 4847 is only given as an
informative reference, given that it is one of the most cited document in this
draft and that, as a layperson, reading this RFC was necessary for me to get a
proper understanding of the current draft's content. I guess this is related to
the informative status of RFC 4847, but I think it is really strange.

The following are minor issues (typos, misspelling, minor text improvements)
with the document:

* In section 1.2, I would list the key terms you are using from RFC 4847, RFC
5253 and MEF 63.