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Telechat Review of draft-ietf-mboned-mtrace-v2-22
review-ietf-mboned-mtrace-v2-22-tsvart-telechat-trammell-2018-01-24-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-mboned-mtrace-v2
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 26)
Type Telechat Review
Team Transport Area Review Team (tsvart)
Deadline 2018-01-25
Requested 2018-01-22
Requested by Mirja Kühlewind
Authors Hitoshi Asaeda , Kerry Meyer , Weesan Lee
I-D last updated 2018-01-24
Completed reviews Secdir Last Call review of -?? by Dan Harkins
Genart Last Call review of -21 by Meral Shirazipour (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -21 by Derrell Piper (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -22 by Meral Shirazipour (diff)
Tsvart Telechat review of -22 by Brian Trammell (diff)
Comments
Maybe some measurement person (Brian Trammell?) could review this?
Assignment Reviewer Brian Trammell
State Completed
Request Telechat review on draft-ietf-mboned-mtrace-v2 by Transport Area Review Team Assigned
Reviewed revision 22 (document currently at 26)
Result Not ready
Completed 2018-01-24
review-ietf-mboned-mtrace-v2-22-tsvart-telechat-trammell-2018-01-24-00
Greetings,

I've reviewed this document as part of the transport area review team's ongoing
effort to review key IETF documents. These comments were written primarily for
the transport area directors, but are copied to the document's authors for
their information and to allow them to address any issues raised. When done at
the time of IETF Last Call, the authors should consider this review together
with any other last-call comments they receive. Please always CC tsv-art@… if
you reply to or forward this review.

Summary:

The document is not ready for publication as a Standards Track RFC in its
current state.

The protocol appears to make appropriate use of UDP; i.e., it poses no concerns
about congestion safety when implemented and used as designed with
non-malicious clients.

However, I'm concerned about the potential for abuse of mtrace2. Specifically,
replies are larger than queries, so the protocol can be used for amplification,
and the protocol will send replies to a client address which is sent in
cleartext without integrity protection, so the potential for redirection via
spoofing exists.

The first, I think, could be addressed by requiring the initial query to be a
near-maximum-size UDP packet, or at least larger than the reply packets.

The security concept in sections 9.1 and 9.2 seems to assume that client
filtering at a network border is sufficient; however, this does not appear to
address the case of inside an administrative domain spoofing its address.
Section 9.5 acknowledges the potential of the protocol for amplification, but
should provide concrete advice for rate limiting.

One question: this may be a moot question (I did not review mtrace v1), but it
appears that mtrace2 is designed to share a port with mtrace1, and I don't see
any version field in the messages. How is version transition handled by this
protocol? Is it possible to run a mixed network with both mtrace versions and
have the right thing (probably downgrade) happen, or is the assumption that
mtrace version migration is a flag day? A related editorial suggestion: a list
of changes from mtrace v1 to mtrace v2 in an appendix would be useful.

Cheers,

Brian