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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-mpls-sfl-control-04
review-ietf-mpls-sfl-control-04-opsdir-lc-jaeggli-2023-12-16-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-mpls-sfl-control
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 04)
Type Last Call Review
Team Ops Directorate (opsdir)
Deadline 2023-11-27
Requested 2023-11-13
Authors Stewart Bryant , George Swallow , Siva Sivabalan
I-D last updated 2023-12-16
Completed reviews Rtgdir Last Call review of -03 by Stig Venaas (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -04 by Joel Jaeggli
Secdir Last Call review of -04 by Charlie Kaufman
Genart Last Call review of -04 by Ines Robles
Tsvart Last Call review of -04 by Michael Scharf
Assignment Reviewer Joel Jaeggli
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-mpls-sfl-control by Ops Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ops-dir/ea2YuKfjx1CoXZ41g9_-8drvIp4
Reviewed revision 04
Result Ready
Completed 2023-12-16
review-ietf-mpls-sfl-control-04-opsdir-lc-jaeggli-2023-12-16-00
I have reviewed draft-ietf-mpls-sfl-control version 4 on behalf of the ops
directorate.

This draft is ready to proceed.

one note on the privacy considerations section

   This privacy threat may
   be mitigated by encrypting the control protocol packets, regularly
   changing the synonymous labels and by concurrently using a number of
   such labels.

So sure, you could do the suggestions beyond first one (securing communications
between devices in a command admin domain if appropriate to circumstnaces seems
prudent), it doesn't seem realistic or likely that operators would go out of
their way to do more than the minimum amount of signaling merely for the
purpose of obfuscation, that's kinda of like adding noise to your IGP on theory
that it's harder to parse out the topology as a result. LSPs are similarly
privacy identifying in terms of describing a path between two end points but
you wouldn't create more of them as a result.