Last Call Review of draft-ietf-pcp-upnp-igd-interworking-07
review-ietf-pcp-upnp-igd-interworking-07-secdir-lc-roca-2013-05-02-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-pcp-upnp-igd-interworking |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 10) | |
| Type | Last Call Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2013-04-23 | |
| Requested | 2013-03-29 | |
| Authors | Mohamed Boucadair , Reinaldo Penno , Dan Wing | |
| Draft last updated | 2013-05-02 | |
| Completed reviews |
Genart Last Call review of -07
by
Peter E. Yee
(diff)
Genart Telechat review of -08 by Peter E. Yee (diff) Secdir Last Call review of -07 by Vincent Roca (diff) |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Vincent Roca |
| State | Completed | |
| Review |
review-ietf-pcp-upnp-igd-interworking-07-secdir-lc-roca-2013-05-02
|
|
| Reviewed revision | 07 (document currently at 10) | |
| Result | Has Issues | |
| Completed | 2013-05-02 |
review-ietf-pcp-upnp-igd-interworking-07-secdir-lc-roca-2013-05-02-00
Hello,
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.
--
1- Authors refer to [IGD2] (which is produced by UPnP), saying that the
authorization framework
defined there SHOULD be used. However I haven't found the description of such a
framework
in [IGD2] (I've looked at the Content Table and searched "Authorization"
keyword). Can you be
more explicit in your reference?
Additionally [IGD2] says (p.10):
"IGD 2 introduces access control features. [IGD2] RECOMMENDS access
control requirements
and authorization levels to be applied by default. However, devices MAY
choose a different
security policy,"
I do not understand the consequences of devices choosing a different security
policy, and how it
relates to your I-D.
then, same page:
"In the 2-box model, where the control point is in the same device that
desires to receive
communication through the NAT, [IGD2] RECOMMENDS that access control is
not needed. But in
the 3-box model, where the control point is configuring NAT port
mappings for a third device,
[IGD2] RECOMMENDS that authentication and authorization is used."
It's not clear to me in which case of [IGD2] your I-D corresponds to.
2- It is said:
"Means to prevent a malicious user from creating mappings on behalf of a third
party must be enabled
as discussed in Section 13.1 of [I-D.ietf-pcp-base]."
What are the means mentioned? If I look at 13.1 of this reference, I see that
the THIRD_PARTY option
"MUST NOT be implemented or used" unless the network is trusted, and the
example of trusted network
is the case where there's an ACL on PCP client/PCP server/network.
Can you be more explicit in your recommendations?
3- You reference [Sec-DCP] but do not provide the URL, nor version number.
Since this is an external
document, it would be great.
Also, the one I found (
http://upnp.org/specs/gw/UPnP-gw-DeviceProtection-v1-Service.pdf
accessible from page
http://upnp.org/specs/gw/deviceprotection1/
) is from Feb. 2011, not 2009.
4- I don't see any threat model in this Security Discussions section.
There's good one in [I-D.ietf-pcp-base], but this is a different protocol,
deployed differently.
What can we say for the IWF itself?
There are some elements in this section, some pointers, but I don't get any
clear idea of the
situation.
--
Otherwise, regardless of any security consideration:
5- Fig. 1 mentions UPnP control point. Other figures of Section 3 mention IGD
control point.
Is it the same? If yes, can you harmonize?
This figure also remains somewhat mysterious to me. Can you add some more text
at the end of
the first paragraph of Introduction. And why does this figure appear after the
"two configurations"
discussion?
6- Introduction: you mention that two configurations are possible. Do you
consider both of them?
What are the consequences of these two configurations on IWF?
As such, reading this introduction did not help me so much understanding the
proposal. Section 3
is much better from that point of view.
Cheers,
Vincent