Last Call Review of draft-ietf-roll-dao-projection-31
review-ietf-roll-dao-projection-31-secdir-lc-wierenga-2023-03-05-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-roll-dao-projection-31 |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | 31 (document currently at 40) | |
| Type | IETF Last Call Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2023-03-14 | |
| Requested | 2023-01-05 | |
| Requested by | Ines Robles | |
| Authors | Pascal Thubert , Rahul Jadhav , Michael Richardson | |
| I-D last updated | 2026-02-27 (Latest revision 2025-03-11) | |
| Completed reviews |
Rtgdir IETF Last Call review of -32
by Susan Hares
(diff)
Secdir IETF Last Call review of -31 by Klaas Wierenga (diff) Tsvart Telechat review of -36 by Michael Scharf (diff) Opsdir Telechat review of -39 by Ran Chen (diff) |
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| Comments |
Hello, ROLL WG kindly request for a routing directorate review and security directorate review of draft-ietf-roll-dao-projection-31. The review deadline is 22 of January. If you need more time please let us know. Abstract: "This document extends RFC 6550, RFC 6553, and RFC 8138 to enable a RPL Root to install and maintain Projected Routes within its DODAG, along a selected set of nodes that may or may not include itself, for a chosen duration. This potentially enables routes that are more optimized or resilient than those obtained with the classical distributed operation of RPL, either in terms of the size of a Routing Header or in terms of path length, which impacts both the latency and the packet delivery ratio." Many thanks, Ines. |
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| Assignment | Reviewer | Klaas Wierenga |
| State | Completed | |
| Request | IETF Last Call review on draft-ietf-roll-dao-projection by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
| Posted at | https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/PaOtWCbSZp8Z7BHBzqn2saMaXOQ | |
| Reviewed revision | 31 (document currently at 40) | |
| Result | Ready | |
| Completed | 2023-03-05 |
review-ietf-roll-dao-projection-31-secdir-lc-wierenga-2023-03-05-00
Hi, I believe the authors adequately described the different attack vectors when P-DAOs are introduced. The mitigating measures like requiring that only the root can send P-DAO and validation of VIO seem reasonable. Klaas