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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-

Request Review of draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 10)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2011-04-26
Requested 2011-04-06
Authors Geoff Huston , George G. Michaelson
Draft last updated 2011-04-30
Completed reviews Secdir Last Call review of -?? by Shawn M Emery
Assignment Reviewer Shawn M Emery
State Completed
Review review-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-secdir-lc-emery-2011-04-30
Completed 2011-04-30
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 

ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. 

These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security 

area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these 

comments just like any other last call comments.

This informational draft describes how a Route Origin Authorization 

(ROA) is interpreted in respect to a consumer of the Resource Public Key 

Infrastructure (RPKI).  This interpretation is used in turn to validate 

the origination of routes advertised by the Border Gateway Protocol.

The security considerations section does exist and gives guidance on 

various validation implications in regards to prefix lengths, issuance 

sequence, and aggregation.  After reading draft-ietf-sidr-arch, 

draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate, et. al., I didn't find any additional 


General comments:


Editorial comments: