Last Call Review of draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-
review-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-secdir-lc-emery-2011-04-30-00

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 


ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. 


These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security 


area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these 


comments just like any other last call comments.






This informational draft describes how a Route Origin Authorization 


(ROA) is interpreted in respect to a consumer of the Resource Public Key 


Infrastructure (RPKI).  This interpretation is used in turn to validate 


the origination of routes advertised by the Border Gateway Protocol.






The security considerations section does exist and gives guidance on 


various validation implications in regards to prefix lengths, issuance 


sequence, and aggregation.  After reading draft-ietf-sidr-arch, 


draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate, et. al., I didn't find any additional 


concerns/limitations.




General comments:

None.

Editorial comments:

None.

Shawn.
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