Last Call Review of draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-19

Request Review of draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 21)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2014-02-18
Requested 2014-02-06
Authors David Borman, Robert Braden, Van Jacobson, Richard Scheffenegger
Draft last updated 2014-02-19
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -19 by Scott Brim (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -20 by Scott Brim (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -19 by Kathleen Moriarty (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -19 by Fred Baker (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Kathleen Moriarty 
State Completed
Review review-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-19-secdir-lc-moriarty-2014-02-19
Reviewed rev. 19 (document currently at 21)
Review result Has Issues
Review completed: 2014-02-19


I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.



draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-19 is mostly ready.  Discussion of the possible DoS attacks that could occur from the technique described in section 5.3 should be included in this section and mentioned in the security considerations section as well.


Suppose again that segments: A.1, B.1, C.1, ..., Z.1 have been

      sent in sequence and that segment B.1 has been lost.  Furthermore,

      suppose delivery of some of C.1, ...  Z.1 is delayed until *after*

      the retransmission B.2 arrives at the receiver.  These delayed

      segments will be discarded unnecessarily when they do arrive,

      since their timestamps are now out of date.



Thank you,