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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-19
review-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-19-secdir-lc-moriarty-2014-02-19-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 21)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2014-02-18
Requested 2014-02-06
Authors David Borman , Robert T. Braden , Van Jacobson , Richard Scheffenegger
I-D last updated 2014-02-19
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -19 by Scott W. Brim (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -20 by Scott W. Brim (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -19 by Kathleen Moriarty (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -19 by Fred Baker (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Kathleen Moriarty
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Reviewed revision 19 (document currently at 21)
Result Has issues
Completed 2014-02-19
review-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-19-secdir-lc-moriarty-2014-02-19-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.





draft-ietf-tcpm-1323bis-19 is mostly ready.  Discussion of the possible DoS
attacks that could occur from the technique described in section 5.3 should be
included in this section and mentioned in the security considerations section
as well.



Suppose again that segments: A.1, B.1, C.1, ..., Z.1 have been

      sent in sequence and that segment B.1 has been lost.  Furthermore,

      suppose delivery of some of C.1, ...  Z.1 is delayed until *after*

      the retransmission B.2 arrives at the receiver.  These delayed

      segments will be discarded unnecessarily when they do arrive,

      since their timestamps are now out of date.





Thank you,

Kathleen