Last Call Review of draft-ietf-tsvwg-source-quench-
review-ietf-tsvwg-source-quench-secdir-lc-moriarty-2012-01-27-00

Hello,

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

The document is straightforward and well written.  I just have a couple of
nits, but think the document is ready otherwise.

Suggest replacing 'must' with 'should' since the discussion is on
interpretation. Change from: Receipt of an ICMP Source Quench message must not
be interpreted as an attempt to attack the receiver. To: Receipt of an ICMP
Source Quench message should not be interpreted as an attempt to attack the
receiver.

It is already clear from the rest of the draft and this section, that there is
no risk by ignoring ICMP source quench messages, which is done by 'virtually
all current implementations of TCP'.   Should this say, virtually all current
implementations of 'IP' or 'TCP' and 'ICMP'?   The discussion covers source
quench being deprecated (RFC1812) by router implementations 20 years ago and
now formally deprecates this within TCP.

Thank you,
Kathleen