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Telechat Review of draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-05
review-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-05-secdir-telechat-harrington-2014-10-30-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 05)
Type Telechat Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2014-10-14
Requested 2014-10-16
Authors Yaron Sheffer , Ralph Holz , Peter Saint-Andre
I-D last updated 2014-10-30
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -04 by Meral Shirazipour (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -04 by Meral Shirazipour (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -05 by David Harrington
Opsdir Last Call review of -04 by David Harrington (diff)
Assignment Reviewer David Harrington
State Completed
Request Telechat review on draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Reviewed revision 05
Result Has nits
Completed 2014-10-30
review-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-05-secdir-telechat-harrington-2014-10-30-00
Hi,

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

Abstract:

Over the last few years there have been several serious attacks on
   Transport Layer Security (TLS), including attacks on its most
   commonly used ciphers and modes of operation.  This document
   summarizes these attacks, with the goal of motivating generic and
   protocol-specific recommendations on the usage of TLS and Datagram
   TLS (DTLS).

I consider this document ready for publication.

This document is an Information draft, summarizing somer of the known attacks
on TLS and DTLS.

I agree with the security considerations section statement that this document
has no security implications.

A few editorial nits:

s/

This attacks summarized/The attacks summarized/

s/

the Klima attack relies on a version-

check oracle is only mitigated by TLS 1.1./

the Klima attack relies on a version-

check oracle and is only mitigated by TLS 1.1./

David Harrington

ietfdbh at comcast.net