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Telechat Review of draft-turner-est-extensions-08
review-turner-est-extensions-08-secdir-telechat-kelly-2017-06-09-00

Request Review of draft-turner-est-extensions
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 11)
Type Telechat Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2017-07-04
Requested 2017-05-22
Authors Sean Turner
I-D last updated 2017-06-09
Completed reviews Genart Telechat review of -08 by Vijay K. Gurbani (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -08 by Scott G. Kelly (diff)
Opsdir Telechat review of -08 by Qin Wu (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Scott G. Kelly
State Completed
Request Telechat review on draft-turner-est-extensions by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Reviewed revision 08 (document currently at 11)
Result Has nits
Completed 2017-06-09
review-turner-est-extensions-08-secdir-telechat-kelly-2017-06-09-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.
 Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other
last call comments.

The summary of the review is ready with nits.

Excerpting from the abstract,

   The EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) protocol defined a Well-
   Known URI (Uniform Resource Identifier): /.well-known/est.  EST also
   defined several path components that clients use for PKI (Public Key
   Infrastructure) services, namely certificate enrollment (e.g.,
   /simpleenroll).

This document describes 6 additional path components, including a Package
Availability List (PAL) that informs clients of packages that are
available/authorized.

The document is clear and well-written. Maybe this sentence

 o /firmware - Some client firmware and software support automatic
       updates mechanism and some do not.

could use a little word-smithing for verb/noun agreement?

The security considerations section lists many RFCs upon which this one
depends, but I was surprised to find it only mentions RFC7030 with respect to
server-generated asymmetric key pairs. My impression is that this doc extends
7030, so all of 7030's security considerations apply here. I guess this is
implicit, but I would state it.

--Scott