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Last Call Review of draft-zern-webp-04
review-zern-webp-04-secdir-lc-kivinen-2021-10-12-00

Request Review of draft-zern-webp
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 15)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2021-10-21
Requested 2021-09-23
Authors James Zern , Pascal Massimino , Jyrki Alakuijala
I-D last updated 2021-10-12
Completed reviews Secdir Last Call review of -13 by Tero Kivinen (diff)
Artart Last Call review of -03 by Henry S. Thompson (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -03 by Thomas Fossati (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -05 by Tim Chown (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -04 by Tero Kivinen (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -09 by Tero Kivinen (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Tero Kivinen
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-zern-webp by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/9BTJr2xWbetSC8mkeLyXVSPaD_w
Reviewed revision 04 (document currently at 15)
Result Has issues
Completed 2021-10-12
review-zern-webp-04-secdir-lc-kivinen-2021-10-12-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.
Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other
last call comments.

This document request webp image format media registration and its security
considerations section do mention some of the security issues (buffer overruns
and uninitialized data usage). Unfortunately graphics libraries have really bad
track record for security, simple search lists about 200-300 CVEs for all
widely used graphics formats (jpeg, png, gif), and even some for webp already
(for which there is reference in security considerations section).

Those issues include integer overflows, resource exhaustion of memory and other
resources (file descriptors etc), extended resource usage (very long running
time), out-of-bounds writes for both to heap and stack, null pointer
references, very large image sizes, zero image sizes and zero width and/or
height images, information leaks from the decoder (memory layout, obtaining
potentially sensitive information), arbitrary memory writes, memory corruptions
etc.

As graphics libraries are used in so many places and used in ways where they
can cause severe security issues both on clients (web browsers, email clients)
and servers (for example when automatically converting uploaded images from one
format to another format on servers) the security issues in them are
widespread, i.e., not only limited to the image processing applications
themselves.

Adding the attack surface even more by adding yet another graphics format with
new libraries will make situation even worse. Also the traditionally graphics
libraries have not been written as being security sensitive, but in the modern
systems they are as integral to the security than the crypto libraries etc.

Adding bit more warnings about those issues to the security considerations
section would be useful.