Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE)
RFC 10021
| Document | Type | RFC - Proposed Standard (November 2026) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | M. Tiloca , G. Selander , F. Palombini , J. Preuß Mattsson , R. Höglund | ||
| Last updated | 2026-11-19 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| IESG | Responsible AD | Mike Bishop | |
| Send notices to | (None) |
RFC 10021
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Tiloca
Request for Comments: 10021 RISE AB
Category: Standards Track G. Selander
ISSN: 2070-1721 F. Palombini
J. Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson AB
R. Höglund
RISE AB
November 2026
Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group
OSCORE)
Abstract
This document defines the security protocol Group Object Security for
Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE), providing end-to-end
security of messages exchanged with the Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP) between members of a group, e.g., sent over IP
multicast. In particular, Group OSCORE provides protection and
source authentication for group requests sent from a client to
multiple servers and for the corresponding responses. Group OSCORE
also defines a pairwise mode where each member of the group can
efficiently derive symmetric pairwise keys to use with another member
of the group for pairwise-protected communication. Group OSCORE can
be used between endpoints communicating with CoAP or CoAP-mappable
HTTP.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Terminology
2. Security Context
2.1. Common Context
2.1.1. AEAD Algorithm
2.1.2. HKDF Algorithm
2.1.3. ID Context
2.1.4. Common IV
2.1.5. Authentication Credential Format
2.1.6. Group Manager Authentication Credential
2.1.7. Group Encryption Algorithm
2.1.8. Signature Algorithm
2.1.9. Signature Encryption Key
2.1.10. Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm
2.2. Sender Context and Recipient Context
2.3. Establishment of Security Context Parameters
2.4. Authentication Credentials
2.5. Pairwise Keys
2.5.1. Derivation of Pairwise Keys
2.5.2. ECDH with Montgomery Coordinates
2.5.3. Usage of Sequence Numbers
2.5.4. Security Context for Pairwise Mode
2.6. Update of Security Context
2.6.1. Loss of the Varying Part of the Security Context
2.6.2. Exhaustion of Sender Sequence Number Space
2.6.3. Retrieving New Security Context Parameters
3. The COSE Object
3.1. Countersignature
3.1.1. Clarifications on Using a Countersignature
3.2. The 'kid' and 'kid context' Parameters
3.3. Nonce Computation
3.4. Additional Authenticated Data
4. OSCORE Header Compression
4.1. Encoding of the OSCORE Option Value and Group OSCORE
Payload
4.2. Keystream Derivation for Countersignature Encryption/
Decryption
4.3. Examples of Compressed COSE Objects
4.3.1. Examples in Group Mode
4.3.2. Examples in Pairwise Mode
5. Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness, and Replay
Protection
5.1. Supporting Multiple Responses in Long Exchanges
5.2. Freshness
5.3. Replay Protection
5.3.1. Replay Protection of Responses
6. Message Reception
7. Message Processing in Group Mode
7.1. Protecting the Request
7.2. Verifying the Request
7.3. Protecting the Response
7.4. Verifying the Response
7.5. External Signature Checkers
8. Message Processing in Pairwise Mode
8.1. Preconditions
8.2. Main Differences from OSCORE
8.3. Protecting the Request
8.4. Verifying the Request
8.5. Protecting the Response
8.6. Verifying the Response
9. Challenge-Response-Based Freshness and Replay Window Recovery
10. Implementation Compliance
11. Web Linking
12. The Group Manager
12.1. Setup of New Endpoints
12.2. Management of Group Keying Material
12.2.1. Recycling of Identifiers
12.3. Support for Signature Checkers
13. Security Considerations
13.1. Security of the Group Mode
13.1.1. Example of Need for Proof of Group Membership
13.2. Security of the Pairwise Mode
13.3. Uniqueness of (key, nonce)
13.4. Management of Group Keying Material
13.4.1. Denial of Service
13.5. Update of Security Context and Key Rotation
13.5.1. Late Update on the Sender
13.5.2. Late Update on the Recipient
13.6. Collision of Group Identifiers
13.7. Cross-Group Message Injection
13.7.1. Attack Description
13.7.2. Attack Prevention in Group Mode
13.8. Prevention of Group Cloning Attack
13.9. Group OSCORE for Unicast Requests
13.10. End-to-End Protection
13.11. Master Secret
13.12. Replay Protection
13.13. Message Ordering
13.14. Message Freshness
13.15. Client Aliveness
13.16. Cryptographic Considerations
13.17. Message Segmentation
13.18. Privacy Considerations
14. IANA Considerations
14.1. OSCORE Flag Bits Registry
14.2. Target Attributes Registry
15. References
15.1. Normative References
15.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Assumptions and Security Objectives
A.1. Assumptions
A.2. Security Objectives
Appendix B. List of Use Cases
Appendix C. Example of Group Identifier Format
Appendix D. Responsibilities of the Group Manager
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] is a web
transfer protocol specifically designed for constrained devices and
networks [RFC7228]. Group communication for CoAP [RFC10020]
addresses use cases where deployed devices benefit from a group
communication model, for example, to reduce latencies, improve
performance, and reduce bandwidth utilization. Use cases include
lighting control, integrated building control, software and firmware
updates, parameter and configuration updates, commissioning of
constrained networks, and emergency multicast (see Appendix B).
Group communication for CoAP [RFC10020] mainly uses UDP/IP multicast
as the underlying data transport.
Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)
[RFC8613] is a security protocol that protects CoAP messages. OSCORE
builds on CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC9052]
[RFC9053] and provides end-to-end encryption, integrity, replay
protection, and binding of response to request between a sender and a
recipient, independent of the transport layer also in the presence of
intermediaries. To this end, a CoAP message is protected by
including its payload (if any), certain options, and header fields
into a COSE object, which is conveyed within the CoAP payload and the
CoAP OSCORE Option of the protected message, thereby replacing those
message fields with an authenticated and encrypted object.
This document defines Group OSCORE, a security protocol for group
communication with CoAP [RFC10020] and for CoAP-mappable HTTP
requests and responses, providing the same end-to-end security
properties as OSCORE also in the case where requests have multiple
recipients. In particular, Group OSCORE provides protection and
source authentication for group requests sent from a client to
multiple servers and for the corresponding responses. Group OSCORE
also defines a pairwise mode where each member of the group can
efficiently derive symmetric pairwise keys to use with another member
of the group for pairwise-protected communication. Just like OSCORE,
Group OSCORE is independent of the transport layer and works wherever
CoAP does.
As with OSCORE, it is possible to combine Group OSCORE with
communication security on other layers. One example is the use of
transport layer security, such as DTLS [RFC9147], between one client
and one proxy, or between one proxy and one server. This prevents
observers from accessing addressing information conveyed in CoAP
options that would not be protected by Group OSCORE, but would be
protected by DTLS. These options include Uri-Host, Uri-Port, and
Proxy-Uri. Note that DTLS does not define how to secure messages sent
over IP multicast and cannot be used for end-to-end protection over a
proxy. Group OSCORE is also intended to work with OSCORE-capable
proxies [OSCORE-PROXIES], thereby enabling, for example, nested
OSCORE operations with OSCORE-protected communication between a CoAP
client and a proxy, carrying messages that are additionally protected
with Group OSCORE between the CoAP client and the target CoAP
servers.
Group OSCORE defines two modes of operation that can be used
independently or together:
* In the group mode, Group OSCORE requests and responses are
digitally signed with the private key of the sender and the
signature is embedded in the protected CoAP message. The group
mode supports all COSE signature algorithms as well as signature
verification by intermediaries. This mode is defined in
Section 7.
* In the pairwise mode, two group members exchange OSCORE requests
and responses (typically) over unicast, and the messages are
protected with symmetric keys not known by the other group
members. These symmetric keys are derived from Diffie-Hellman
shared secrets, which are calculated with the asymmetric keys of
the sender and recipient, allowing for shorter integrity tags and
therefore lower message overhead. This mode is defined in
Section 8.
Both modes provide source authentication of CoAP messages. The
application decides what mode to use, potentially on a per-message
basis. Such decisions can be based, for instance, on preconfigured
policies or dynamic assessing of the target recipient and/or
resource, among other things. One important case is when requests
are protected in group mode and responses are protected in pairwise
mode. Since such responses convey shorter integrity tags instead of
bigger, full-fledged signatures, this significantly reduces the
message overhead in the case of many responses to one request.
A special deployment of Group OSCORE consists in using the pairwise
mode only. For example, consider the case of a constrained-node
network [RFC7228] with a large number of CoAP endpoints and the
objective to establish secure communication between any pair of
endpoints with a small provisioning effort and message overhead.
Since the total number of security associations that needs to be
established grows with the square of the number of endpoints, it is
desirable to restrict the amount of secret keying material provided
to each endpoint. Moreover, a key establishment protocol would need
to be executed for each security association. One solution to this
issue is to deploy Group OSCORE, with the endpoints being part of a
group, and to use the pairwise mode. This solution offers the
benefit of providing a single shared secret while distributing only
the public keys of group members or a subset of those. After that, a
CoAP endpoint can locally derive the keying material to use with the
other endpoint in the group and protect CoAP communications with very
low overhead [CoAP-SEC-PROT].
In some circumstances, Group OSCORE messages may be transported in
HTTP, e.g., when they are protected with the pairwise mode and target
a single recipient, or when they are protected with the group mode
and target multiple CoAP recipients through cross-protocol
translators such as HTTP-to-CoAP proxies [RFC8075]
[CoAP-GROUP-PROXY]. The use of Group OSCORE with HTTP is as defined
for OSCORE in Section 11 of [RFC8613].
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
described in CoAP [RFC7252], including "endpoint", "client",
"server", "sender", and "recipient"; group communication for CoAP
[RFC10020]; Observe [RFC7641]; Concise Binary Object Representation
(CBOR) [RFC8949]; Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610];
COSE [RFC9052] [RFC9053]; and related countersignatures [RFC9338].
Readers are also expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
for protection and processing of CoAP messages through OSCORE, such
as "Security Context" and "Master Secret", defined in [RFC8613].
Terminology for constrained environments, such as "constrained
device" and "constrained-node network", is defined in [RFC7228].
This document also refers to the following terminology.
Keying material: Data that is necessary to establish and maintain
secure communication among endpoints. This includes, for
instance, keys and IVs [RFC4949].
Authentication credential: Information associated with an entity,
including that entity's public key and parameters associated with
the public key. Examples of formats of authentication credentials
are CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) and CWT Claims Sets (CCSs) [RFC8392],
X.509 certificates [RFC5280], and C509 certificates [C509-CERT].
Further details about authentication credentials are provided in
Section 2.4.
Group: A set of endpoints that share group keying material and
security parameters (Common Context; see Section 2). That is,
unless otherwise specified, the term "group" used in this document
refers to a "security group" (see Section 2.1 of [RFC10020]), not
to be confused with "CoAP group" or "application group".
Group Manager: An entity responsible for a group. A Group Manager
is not required to be an actual group member or to participate in
group communication. The operations of the Group Manager are
defined in Section 12, and its responsibilities are listed in
Appendix D.
Silent server: A member of a group that performs only group mode
processing on incoming requests and never sends responses
protected with Group OSCORE. For CoAP group communications,
requests are normally sent without necessarily expecting a
response. A silent server may send unprotected responses as error
responses to report a Group OSCORE error.
Group Identifier (Gid): An identifier that is assigned to the group
and is unique within the set of groups of a given Group Manager.
The Gid value changes every time the group is rekeyed (see
Section 12.2).
Birth Gid: With respect to a group member, the Gid obtained by that
group member upon (re-)joining the group.
Key Generation Number: An integer value identifying the current
version of the keying material used in a group.
Source authentication: Evidence that a received message in the group
originated from a specific identified group member. This also
provides assurance that the message was not tampered with by
anyone, be it a different legitimate group member or an endpoint
that is not a group member.
Group request: A CoAP request message sent by a client in the group
to servers in that group.
Long exchange: An exchange of messages associated with a request
that is a group request and/or an Observe request [RFC7641].
In either case, multiple responses can follow from the same server
to the request associated with the long exchange, even if the
request is not an Observe request (see Section 3.1.6 of
[RFC10020]). The client terminates a long exchange when freeing
up the CoAP Token value used for the associated request, for which
no further responses will be accepted afterwards.
2. Security Context
This document refers to a group as a set of endpoints sharing keying
material and security parameters for executing the Group OSCORE
protocol; see Section 1.1. All members of a group maintain a
Security Context as defined in this section.
How the Security Context is established by the group members is out
of scope for this document, but if there is more than one Security
Context applicable to a message, then the endpoints MUST be able to
determine which Security Context was latest established. The
management of information about the group (i.e., identifiers, OSCORE
input parameters, and keying material) is described in terms of a
Group Manager (see Section 12).
An endpoint of the group may use the group mode (see Section 7), the
pairwise mode (see Section 8), or both, depending on the modes it
supports and the parameters of the Security Context. The Security
Context of Group OSCORE extends the OSCORE Security Context defined
in Section 3 of [RFC8613] as follows (see Figure 1).
* One Common Context shared by all the endpoints in the group and
extended as defined below.
- The new parameter Authentication Credential Format (see
Section 2.1.5), specifying the format of authentication
credentials used in the group (see Section 2.4).
- The new parameter Group Manager Authentication Credential,
specifying the authentication credential of the Group Manager
responsible for the group (see Section 2.1.6).
- For the group mode, the Common Context is extended with the
following new parameters.
o Group Encryption Algorithm, specifying the algorithm used
for encrypting and decrypting messages protected in group
mode (see Section 2.1.7).
o Signature Algorithm, specifying the algorithm used for
computing and verifying the countersignature of messages
protected in group mode (see Section 2.1.8).
o Signature Encryption Key, specifying the symmetric key used
for deriving a keystream, which, in turn, is used for
encrypting and decrypting the countersignature of messages
protected in group mode (see Section 2.1.9).
- For the pairwise mode, the Common Context is extended with a
Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm (see Section 2.1.10) used for
the agreement on a static-static Diffie-Hellman shared secret
from which pairwise keys are derived (see Section 2.5.1).
The content of the Common Context is long-term, as it is meant to
be stable once the Common Context is established.
* One Sender Context extended with the following new parameters.
- The endpoint's own private key used to sign messages protected
in group mode (see Section 7) or for deriving pairwise keys
used with the pairwise mode (see Section 2.5).
- The endpoint's own authentication credential containing its
public key (see Section 2.4).
- For the pairwise mode, the Sender Context is extended with the
Pairwise Sender Keys associated with the other endpoints (see
Section 2.5).
Except for the Sender Sequence Number defined in Section 3.1 of
[RFC8613], the content of the Sender Context is long-term, as it
is meant to be stable once the Sender Context is established.
If the endpoint is configured exclusively as a silent server (see
Section 1.1), then the Sender Context is omitted.
* One Recipient Context for each other endpoint from which messages
are received. It is not necessary to maintain Recipient Contexts
associated with endpoints from which messages are not (expected to
be) received.
- Each Recipient Context is extended with the authentication
credential of the other endpoint, which is used to verify the
signature of messages protected in group mode or to derive the
pairwise keys used with the pairwise mode (see Section 2.5).
- For the pairwise mode, each Recipient Context is extended with
the Pairwise Recipient Key associated with the other endpoint
(see Section 2.5).
Except for the Replay Window defined in Section 3.1 of [RFC8613],
the content of each Recipient Context is long-term, as it is meant
to be stable once the Recipient Context is established.
The varying part of the Group OSCORE Security Context is composed of
the Sender Sequence Number in the Sender Context and the Replay
Windows in the different Recipient Contexts.
+-------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| Context Component | New Information Elements |
+-------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| Common Context | Authentication Credential Format |
| | Group Manager Authentication Credential |
| | * Group Encryption Algorithm |
| | * Signature Algorithm |
| | * Signature Encryption Key |
| | ^ Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm |
+-------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| Sender Context | Endpoint's own private key |
| | Endpoint's own authentication credential |
| | ^ Pairwise Sender Keys for the other endpoints |
+-------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| Each | Other endpoint's authentication credential |
| Recipient Context | ^ Pairwise Recipient Key for the other endpoint |
+-------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: Additions to the OSCORE Security Context
Note: The elements labeled with * and with ^ are relevant only for
the group mode and only for the pairwise mode, respectively.
2.1. Common Context
The following sections specify how the Common Context is used and
extended compared to [RFC8613]. The Common Context may be acquired
from the Group Manager (see Section 12).
2.1.1. AEAD Algorithm
The Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) Algorithm
(see Section 3.1 of [RFC8613]) identifies the COSE AEAD algorithm to
use for encryption and decryption when messages are protected using
the pairwise mode (see Section 8). This algorithm MUST provide
integrity protection. If this parameter is not set, the pairwise
mode is not used in the group.
2.1.2. HKDF Algorithm
The HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF) Algorithm (see
Section 3.1 of [RFC8613]) identifies the used key derivation
function, which MUST be one of the HKDF [RFC5869] algorithms defined
for COSE to use HMAC as the underlying PRF (see Section 5.1 of
[RFC9053]) and registered at [COSE.Algorithms].
2.1.3. ID Context
The ID Context parameter (see Sections 3.1 and 3.3 of [RFC8613])
contains the Gid of the group. The choice of the Gid format is
application-specific. An example of specific formatting of the Gid
is given in Appendix C. The application needs to specify how to
handle potential collisions between Gids (see Section 13.6).
2.1.4. Common IV
The Common IV parameter (see Section 3.1 of [RFC8613]) identifies the
Common IV used in the group. Differently from OSCORE, the length of
the Common IV is determined as follows:
* If only one among the AEAD Algorithm and the Group Encryption
Algorithm is set (see Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.7), the length of the
Common IV is the nonce length for the set algorithm.
* If both the AEAD Algorithm and the Group Encryption Algorithm are
set, the length of the Common IV is the greatest nonce length
among those of the two algorithms.
If the Group Encryption Algorithm is A128CTR, A192CTR, or A256CTR
(see Section 4 of [RFC9459]), then the length of the nonce used by
that algorithm is 12 bytes (see Section 2.1.7).
2.1.5. Authentication Credential Format
The new parameter Authentication Credential Format specifies the
format of authentication credentials used in the group.
2.1.6. Group Manager Authentication Credential
The new parameter Group Manager Authentication Credential specifies
the authentication credential of the Group Manager, including the
Group Manager's public key. The endpoint MUST achieve proof of
possession of the corresponding private key. As an example, such
proof of possession is possible to achieve during the join process
provided by the realization of Group Manager specified in
[ACE-KEY-GROUP-OSCORE]. Further details on the provisioning of the
Group Manager's authentication credential to the group members are
out of the scope of this document.
2.1.7. Group Encryption Algorithm
The new parameter Group Encryption Algorithm identifies the algorithm
to use for encryption and decryption when messages are protected in
group mode (see Section 7). This algorithm MAY provide integrity
protection. If it does not, integrity protection is still provided
by the countersignature added to the message due to the use of the
group mode. If this parameter is not set, the group mode is not used
in the group.
In order to be eligible to use as Group Encryption Algorithm, a non-
authenticated algorithm MUST ensure that the same key is not reused
with the same IV or intermediate values used in the algorithm, e.g.,
for algorithms that increment the IV internally. If a non-
authenticated algorithm does not fulfill the requirement above, that
algorithm MUST NOT be used as Group Encryption Algorithm.
Examples of non-authenticated algorithms that can be used as Group
Encryption Algorithm are A128CTR, A192CTR, and A256CTR (see Section 4
of [RFC9459]). When either of those three algorithms is used, the
following applies:
* A 12-byte nonce MUST be computed as defined in Section 3.3.
* The Initialization Vector (IV) used in Section 4 of [RFC9459] is
equivalent to the nonce above (12 bytes) concatenated with
0x00000000 (4 bytes) in this order.
* The algorithm MUST NOT be used to encrypt a plaintext or decrypt a
ciphertext whose length is larger than 64 GB (i.e., 2^36 bytes).
The non-authenticated algorithms A128CBC, A192CBC, and A256CBC (see
Section 5 of [RFC9459]) MUST NOT be used as Group Encryption
Algorithm.
Future specifications can admit alternative non-authenticated
algorithms that can be used as Group Encryption Algorithm. When
doing so, it MUST be defined how to securely compose the IV and
possible intermediate values used in the algorithm, building on the
nonce computed as defined in Section 3.3. Absent such a
specification, alternative non-authenticated algorithms MUST NOT be
used as Group Encryption Algorithm.
2.1.8. Signature Algorithm
The new parameter Signature Algorithm identifies the digital
signature algorithm used for computing and verifying the
countersignature on the COSE object (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of
[RFC9338]) when messages are protected in group mode (see Section 7).
If this parameter is not set, the group mode is not used in the
group.
2.1.9. Signature Encryption Key
The new parameter Signature Encryption Key specifies the symmetric
key for deriving a keystream to encrypt/decrypt a countersignature
(see Section 4.2) when a message is protected in group mode (see
Section 7).
The Signature Encryption Key is derived as defined for Sender Keys
and Recipient Keys in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613] with the following
differences:
* The 'id' element of the 'info' array is the empty byte string.
* The 'alg_aead' element of the 'info' array specifies the Group
Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.7),
encoded as a CBOR integer or text string, consistently with the
"Value" field in the "COSE Algorithms" registry for this
algorithm.
* The 'type' element of the 'info' array is "SEKey". The label is
an ASCII string and does not include a trailing NUL byte.
* L and the 'L' element of the 'info' array are the size of the key
for the Group Encryption Algorithm specified in the Common Context
(see Section 2.1.7) in bytes. While the obtained Signature
Encryption Key is never used with the Group Encryption Algorithm,
its length was chosen to obtain a matching level of security.
2.1.10. Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm
The new parameter Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm identifies the
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm used to derive a
static-static Diffie-Hellman shared secret, from which pairwise keys
are derived (see Section 2.5.1) to protect messages with the pairwise
mode (see Section 8). If this parameter is not set, the pairwise
mode is not used in the group.
When two endpoints compute their Diffie-Hellman shared secret, the
Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm takes the static-static Diffie-
Hellman keys of the two endpoints as input. The lifetime of those
keys is the same as the lifetime of the authentication credentials
that the two endpoints use in the group. As detailed in
Section 2.5.1, the derivation of the pairwise keys takes not only the
Diffie-Hellman shared secret as input, but also group keying material
from the latest established Security Context.
If the HKDF Algorithm specified in the Common Context is "HKDF SHA-
256" (identified as "HMAC 256/256"), then the Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm is "ECDH-SS + HKDF-256" (COSE algorithm encoding: -27).
If the HKDF Algorithm specified in the Common Context is "HKDF SHA-
512" (identified as "HMAC 512/512"), then the Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm is "ECDH-SS + HKDF-512" (COSE algorithm encoding: -28).
Note that the HKDF Algorithm in the Common Context is denoted by the
corresponding COSE HMAC Algorithm. For example, the HKDF Algorithm
"HKDF SHA-256" is specified as the HMAC Algorithm "HMAC 256/256".
More generally, if Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm is set, it MUST
identify a COSE algorithm such that i) it performs a direct ECDH
Static-Static key agreement, and ii) it indicates the use of the same
HKDF Algorithm used in the group as specified in the Common Context.
2.2. Sender Context and Recipient Context
The Sender ID SHALL be unique for each endpoint in a group with a
certain triplet (Master Secret, Master Salt, Group Identifier); see
Section 3.3 of [RFC8613].
The maximum length of a Sender ID in bytes equals L minus 6, where L
is determined as follows.
* If only one among the AEAD Algorithm and the Group Encryption
Algorithm is set (see Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.7), then L is the
nonce length for the set algorithm.
* If both the AEAD Algorithm and the Group Encryption Algorithm are
set, then L is the smallest nonce length among those of the two
algorithms.
With the exception of the authentication credential of the sender
endpoint, a receiver endpoint can derive a complete Security Context
from a received Group OSCORE message and the Common Context (see
Section 2.3).
The authentication credentials in the Recipient Contexts and other
information (e.g., the Sender IDs) associated with group members can
be retrieved from the Group Manager upon joining the group (see
Section 12). An authentication credential and other information
associated with a group member can alternatively be acquired from the
Group Manager at a later time, for example, the first time a message
is received from a particular endpoint in the group (see Sections 7.2
and 7.4).
For severely constrained devices, it may be infeasible to
simultaneously handle the ongoing processing of a recently received
message in parallel with the retrieval of the sender endpoint's
authentication credential. Such devices can be configured to drop a
received message for which there is no (complete) Recipient Context
and retrieve the sender endpoint's authentication credential in order
to have it available to verify subsequent messages from that
endpoint.
An endpoint may admit a maximum number of Recipient Contexts for the
same Security Context, e.g., due to memory limitations. After
reaching that limit, the endpoint has to delete a current Recipient
Context to install a new one (see Section 2.6.1.2). It is up to the
application to define the maximum number of Recipient Contexts for
the same Security Context as well as policies for deleting Recipient
Contexts.
2.3. Establishment of Security Context Parameters
OSCORE defines the derivation of Sender Context and Recipient Context
(specifically, of Sender Keys and Recipient Keys) and of the Common
IV from a set of input parameters (see Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]).
The derivation of Sender Keys, Recipient Keys, and Common IV defined
in OSCORE applies also to Group OSCORE with the following
modifications compared to Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613]:
* If Group Encryption Algorithm in the Common Context is set (see
Section 2.1.7), then the 'alg_aead' element of the 'info' array
MUST specify Group Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context as
a CBOR integer or text string, consistently with the "Value" field
in the "COSE Algorithms" registry for this algorithm.
* If Group Encryption Algorithm in the Common Context is not set,
then the 'alg_aead' element of the 'info' array MUST specify AEAD
Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1), as per
Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613].
* When deriving the Common IV, the 'L' element of the 'info' array
MUST specify the length of the Common IV in bytes, which is
determined as defined in Section 2.1.4.
2.4. Authentication Credentials
The authentication credentials of the endpoints in a group MUST be
encoded according to the format used in the group as indicated by the
Authentication Credential Format parameter in the Common Context (see
Section 2.1.5). The authentication credential of the Group Manager
SHOULD be encoded according to that same format in order to limit the
number of formats that the group members have to support and handle,
unless it is infeasible or impractical for the particular realization
or instance of the Group Manager to have an own authentication
credential encoded in that same format.
The format of authentication credentials MUST provide the public key
and a comprehensive set of information related to the public key
algorithm, including, e.g., the used elliptic curve (when
applicable). If Group Encryption Algorithm in the Common Context is
not set (see Section 2.1.7), then the public key algorithm is the
Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm used in the group (see
Section 2.1.10); otherwise, the Signature Algorithm used in the group
(see Section 2.1.8).
Examples of formats of authentication credentials are CWTs and CCSs
[RFC8392], X.509 certificates [RFC5280], and C509 certificates
[C509-CERT].
If the authentication credentials are X.509 certificates or C509
certificates, the public key algorithm is identified by the
"algorithm" field of the "SubjectPublicKeyInfo" structure and by the
"subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm" element, respectively.
If authentication credentials are CWTs or CCSs, then a COSE Key
structure and its "kty" and "crv" parameters identify the types of
pertinent public key algorithms. For example, the pair ("crv" =
X25519, "kty" = OKP) indicates that the public key is meant to be
used with X25519 ECDH key agreement; the pair ("crv" = Ed25519, "kty"
= OKP) indicates that the public key is meant to be used with the
Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA); and the pair
("crv" = P-256, "kty" = EC2) indicates that the public key is meant
to be used with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA) and/or with P-256 ECDH key agreement.
Authentication credentials are used to derive pairwise keys (see
Section 2.5.1) and are included in the external Additional
Authenticated Data (AAD) when processing messages (see Section 3.4).
In both of these cases, an endpoint in a group MUST treat
authentication credentials as opaque data, i.e., by considering the
same binary representation made available to other endpoints in the
group, possibly through a designated trusted source (e.g., the Group
Manager).
For example, an X.509 certificate is provided as its direct binary
serialization. If C509 certificates or CWTs are used as
authentication credentials, each is provided as the binary
serialization of a (possibly tagged) CBOR array. If CCSs are used as
authentication credentials, each is provided as the binary
serialization of a (possibly tagged) CBOR map.
If authentication credentials are CWTs or CCSs, then the untagged CWT
or CCS associated with an entity is stored in the Security Context
and used as authentication credential for that entity.
If authentication credentials are X.509/C509 certificates, CWTs, or
CCSs and the authentication credential associated with an entity is
provided within a chain or a bag, then only the end-entity
certificate or end-entity untagged CWT/CCS is stored in the Security
Context and used as authentication credential for that entity.
Storing whole authentication credentials rather than only a subset of
those may result in a non-negligible storage overhead. On the other
hand, it also ensures that authentication credentials are correctly
used in a simple, flexible, and non-error-prone way, also taking into
account future credential formats as entirely new or extending
existing ones. In particular, it is ensured that:
* When used to derive pairwise keys and when included in the
external AAD, authentication credentials can also specify possible
metadata and parameters related to the included public key.
Besides the public key algorithm, these comprise other relevant
pieces of information such as key usage, expiration time, issuer,
and subject.
* All endpoints using another endpoint's authentication credential
use exactly the same binary serialization, as obtained and
distributed by the credential provider (e.g., the Group Manager),
and as originally crafted by the credential issuer. In turn, this
does not require to define and maintain canonical subsets of
authentication credentials and their corresponding encoding and
spares endpoints from error-prone re-encoding operations.
Depending on the particular deployment and the intended group size,
limiting the storage overhead of endpoints in a group can be an
incentive for system/network administrators to prefer using a compact
format of authentication credentials in the first place.
2.5. Pairwise Keys
In certain Elliptic Curve Cryptographic schemes, it is possible to
use public/private key pairs with both signature operations (ECDSA or
EdDSA) and key agreement operations (ECDH). This section specifies
the derivation of "pairwise keys" for use in the pairwise mode
defined in Section 8.
Group OSCORE keys used for both signature operations and key
agreement operations MUST be used only for purposes related to Group
OSCORE. These include the processing of messages with Group OSCORE,
as well as performing proof of possession of private keys, e.g., upon
joining a group through the Group Manager (see Section 12).
2.5.1. Derivation of Pairwise Keys
Using the Group OSCORE Security Context (see Section 2), a group
member can derive AEAD keys to protect point-to-point communication
between itself and each other endpoint X in the group by means of the
AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1).
Analogous to the construction used by OSCORE in Section 3.2.1 of
[RFC8613], the key derivation of these so-called pairwise keys relies
on an HKDF Algorithm and is as defined below:
Pairwise Sender Key = HKDF(Sender Key, IKM-Sender, info, L)
Pairwise Recipient Key = HKDF(Recipient Key, IKM-Recipient, info, L)
with
IKM-Sender = Sender Auth Cred | Recipient Auth Cred | Shared Secret
IKM-Recipient = Recipient Auth Cred | Sender Auth Cred | Shared Secret
where:
* The Pairwise Sender Key is the AEAD key for processing outgoing
messages addressed to endpoint X.
* The Pairwise Recipient Key is the AEAD key for processing incoming
messages from endpoint X.
* HKDF is the OSCORE HKDF Algorithm [RFC8613] from the Common
Context.
* The Sender Key from the Sender Context is used as salt in the HKDF
when deriving the Pairwise Sender Key.
* The Recipient Key from the Recipient Context associated with
endpoint X is used as salt in the HKDF, when deriving the Pairwise
Recipient Key.
* Sender Auth Cred is the endpoint's own authentication credential
from the Sender Context.
* Recipient Auth Cred is the endpoint X's authentication credential
from the Recipient Context associated with endpoint X.
* The Shared Secret is computed as a cofactor Diffie-Hellman shared
secret (see Section 5.7.1.2 of [NIST-800-56A]) using the Pairwise
Key Agreement Algorithm. The endpoint uses its private key from
the Sender Context and the other endpoint's public key included in
Recipient Auth Cred. Note the requirement of validation of public
keys in Section 13.16.
If the other endpoint's public key has COSE Key Type "EC2"
[RFC9053] (e.g., for the curves P-256, P-384, and P-521), then the
public key is used as is. If the other endpoint's public key has
COSE Key Type "OKP" [RFC9053], the procedure is described in
Section 5 of [RFC7748]. In particular, if the public key is for
X25519 or X448, it is used as is. Otherwise, if the public key is
for the curve Ed25519 or Ed448, it is first mapped to Montgomery
coordinates (see Section 2.5.2).
* IKM-Sender is the Input Keying Material (IKM) used in the HKDF for
the derivation of the Pairwise Sender Key. IKM-Sender is the byte
string concatenation of Sender Auth Cred, Recipient Auth Cred, and
the Shared Secret. The authentication credentials Sender Auth
Cred and Recipient Auth Cred are binary-encoded as defined in
Section 2.4.
* IKM-Recipient is the IKM used in the HKDF for the derivation of
the Pairwise Recipient Key. IKM-Recipient is the byte string
concatenation of Recipient Auth Cred, Sender Auth Cred, and the
Shared Secret. The authentication credentials Recipient Auth Cred
and Sender Auth Cred are binary-encoded as defined in Section 2.4.
* info and L are as defined in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613]. That is:
- The 'alg_aead' element of the 'info' array takes the value of
AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1).
- L and the 'L' element of the 'info' array are the size of the
key for the AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context (see
Section 2.1.1) in bytes.
If EdDSA asymmetric keys are used, the Edward coordinates are mapped
to Montgomery coordinates using the maps defined in Sections 4.1 and
4.2 of [RFC7748] before using the X25519 or X448 function defined in
Section 5 of [RFC7748]. For further details, see Section 2.5.2.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) asymmetric keys in Montgomery or
Weierstrass form are used directly in the key agreement algorithm
without coordinate mapping.
As long as any two group members preserve the same asymmetric keys,
their Diffie-Hellman shared secret does not change across updates of
the group keying material. The lifetime of those keys is the same as
the lifetime of the authentication credentials Sender Auth Cred and
Recipient Auth Cred.
After establishing a partially or completely new Security Context
(see Sections 2.6 and 12.2), the old pairwise keys MUST be deleted.
Since new Sender/Recipient Keys are derived from the new group keying
material (see Section 2.2), every group member MUST use the new
Sender/Recipient Keys when deriving new pairwise keys.
2.5.2. ECDH with Montgomery Coordinates
2.5.2.1. Curve25519
The y-coordinate of the other endpoint's Ed25519 public key is
decoded as specified in Section 5.1.3 of [RFC8032]. The Curve25519
u-coordinate is recovered as u = (1 + y) / (1 - y) (mod p) following
the map in Section 4.1 of [RFC7748]. Note that the mapping is not
defined for y = 1, and that y = -1 maps to u = 0, which corresponds
to the neutral group element and thus will result in a degenerate
shared secret. Therefore, implementations MUST abort if the
y-coordinate of the other endpoint's Ed25519 public key is 1 or -1
(mod p).
The private signing key byte strings (i.e., the lower 32 bytes used
for generating the public key; see Step 1 of Section 5.1.5 of
[RFC8032]) are decoded the same way for signing in Ed25519 and scalar
multiplication in X25519. Hence, in order to compute the shared
secret, the endpoint applies the X25519 function to the Ed25519
private signing key byte string and the encoded u-coordinate byte
string as specified in Section 5 of [RFC7748].
2.5.2.2. Curve448
The y-coordinate of the other endpoint's Ed448 public key is decoded
as specified in Section 5.2.3 of [RFC8032]. The Curve448
u-coordinate is recovered as u = y^2 * (d * y^2 - 1) / (y^2 - 1) (mod
p) following the map from "edwards448" in Section 4.2 of [RFC7748],
and also using the relation x^2 = (y^2 - 1)/(d * y^2 - 1) from the
curve equation. Note that the mapping is not defined for y = 1 or
-1. Therefore, implementations MUST abort if the y-coordinate of the
peer endpoint's Ed448 public key is 1 or -1 (mod p).
The private signing key byte strings (i.e., the lower 57 bytes used
for generating the public key, see Step 1 of Section 5.2.5 of
[RFC8032]) are decoded the same way for signing in Ed448 and scalar
multiplication in X448. Hence, in order to compute the shared
secret, the endpoint applies the X448 function to the Ed448 private
signing key byte string and the encoded u-coordinate byte string as
specified in Section 5 of [RFC7748].
2.5.3. Usage of Sequence Numbers
When using any of its Pairwise Sender Keys, a sender endpoint
including the 'Partial IV' parameter in the protected message MUST
use the current fresh value of the Sender Sequence Number from its
Sender Context (see Section 2.2). That is, the same Sender Sequence
Number space is used for all outgoing messages protected with Group
OSCORE, thus limiting both storage and complexity.
When combining communications with the group mode and the pairwise
mode, this may result in the Partial IV values moving forward more
often than when using OSCORE [RFC8613]. This can happen when a
client engages in frequent or long sequences of one-to-one exchanges
with servers in the group, by sending requests over unicast. In
turn, this contributes to a sooner exhaustion of the Sender Sequence
Number space of the client, which would then require to take actions
for deriving a new Sender Context before resuming communications in
the group (see Section 2.6.2).
2.5.4. Security Context for Pairwise Mode
If the pairwise mode is supported, the Security Context additionally
includes the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm and the pairwise keys
as described at the beginning of Section 2.
The pairwise keys, as well as the shared secrets used in their
derivation (see Section 2.5.1), may be stored in memory or recomputed
every time they are needed. The shared secret only changes when a
public/private key pair used for its derivation changes, which
results in the pairwise keys also changing. Additionally, the
pairwise keys change if the Sender ID changes or if a new Security
Context is established for the group (see Section 2.6.3). In order
to optimize protocol performance, an endpoint may store the derived
pairwise keys for easy retrieval.
In the pairwise mode, the Sender Context includes the Pairwise Sender
Keys to use with the other endpoints (see Figure 1). In order to
identify the right key to use, the Pairwise Sender Key for endpoint X
may be associated with the Recipient ID of endpoint X, as defined in
the Recipient Context (i.e., the Sender ID from the point of view of
endpoint X). In this way, the Recipient ID can be used to lookup for
the right Pairwise Sender Key. This association may be implemented in
different ways, e.g., by storing the pair (Recipient ID, Pairwise
Sender Key) or linking a Pairwise Sender Key to a Recipient Context.
2.6. Update of Security Context
It is RECOMMENDED that the long-term part of the Security Context is
stored in non-volatile memory, or that it can otherwise be reliably
accessed throughout the operation of the group, e.g., after device
reboots. However, data in the long-term part of the Security Context
may also need to be updated, for example, due to scheduled key
renewal, new or re-joining members in the group, or the fact that the
endpoint changes Sender ID (see Section 2.6.3).
The data in the varying part of the Security Context are updated by
the endpoint when executing the security protocol but may be lost
(see Section 2.6.1) or become outdated by exhaustion of Sender
Sequence Numbers (see Section 2.6.2).
2.6.1. Loss of the Varying Part of the Security Context
An endpoint may lose the varying part of its Security Context due to
accidental events, e.g., if a reboot occurred in an unprepared way
(see Section 2.6.1.1) or due to a deliberately deleted Recipient
Context (see Section 2.6.1.2).
If it is not feasible or practically possible to store and maintain
up-to-date the varying part in non-volatile memory (e.g., due to
limited number of write operations), the endpoint MUST be able to
detect a loss of the varying part of the Security Context in order to
prevent the reuse of a nonce with the same key and to handle incoming
replayed messages.
2.6.1.1. Accidental Loss of Sender Context and/or Recipient Contexts
In the case that a loss of the Sender Context and/or of the Recipient
Contexts is detected (e.g., if a reboot occurred in an unprepared
way), the endpoint MUST NOT protect further messages using this
Security Context to avoid reusing a nonce with the same key.
Before resuming its operations in the group, the endpoint MUST
retrieve new Security Context parameters from the Group Manager (see
Section 2.6.3) and use them to derive a new Sender Context and new
Recipient Contexts (see Section 2.2). Since the new Sender Context
includes newly derived encryption keys, an endpoint will not reuse
the same pair (key, nonce), even when it is a server using the
Partial IV of (old re-injected) requests to build the nonce for
protecting the responses.
From then on, the endpoint MUST use the latest installed Sender
Context to protect outgoing messages. Newly derived Recipient
Contexts will have a Replay Window that is initialized as valid.
If an endpoint is not configured as a silent server and is not able
to establish an updated Sender Context, e.g., because of lack of
connectivity with the Group Manager, then the endpoint MUST NOT
protect further messages using the current Security Context and MUST
NOT accept incoming messages from other group members, as it is
currently unable to detect possible replays.
If an endpoint is configured as a silent server and is not able to
establish an updated Security Context, e.g., because of lack of
connectivity with the Group Manager, then the endpoint MUST NOT
accept incoming messages from other group members, as it is currently
unable to detect possible replays.
2.6.1.2. Deliberately Deleted Recipient Contexts
The Security Context may contain a large and variable number of
Recipient Contexts. While Group OSCORE does not establish a maximum
number of Recipient Contexts, there are circumstances by which
implementations might choose to discard Recipient Contexts or have to
do so in accordance with enforced application policies. Such
circumstances include the need to reclaim memory or other resources
on the node hosting the endpoint, for example, because the predefined
maximum number of Recipient Contexts has been reached in the Security
Context (see Section 2.2). Implementations can provide means for the
application to gain knowledge about the deliberate deletion of
Recipient Contexts, e.g., through notifications sent to the
application and/or logs made available to the application.
When a Recipient Context is deleted, this not only results in losing
information about previously received messages from the corresponding
other endpoint, but it also results in the inability to be aware of
the Security Contexts from which information has been lost.
Therefore, if the Recipient Context is derived again from the same
Security Context, there is a risk that a replayed message is not
detected. If any Recipient Context associated with any peer has ever
been deleted from the current Security Context, then the Replay
Window of any new Recipient Context in this Security Context MUST be
initialized as invalid. An exception applies when the deleted
Recipient Context was created upon receiving a message and that
message was not verified successfully (see Sections 7.2, 7.4, 8.4,
and 8.6). Messages associated with a Recipient Context that has an
invalid Replay Window MUST NOT be delivered to the application.
If the endpoint receives a message to be processed with any such new
Recipient Context whose Replay Window is invalid, then the endpoint
MUST take one of the following courses of action:
* The endpoint discards the message.
* The endpoint follows the procedure based on the CoAP Echo Option
[RFC9175] and specified in Section 9 in order to establish a valid
Replay Window. In particular, the endpoint MUST use its Partial
IV when generating the nonce and MUST include the Partial IV in
the response message conveying the Echo Option. If the endpoint
supports the CoAP Echo Option, then it is RECOMMENDED to take this
course of action.
* The endpoint retrieves or waits for new Security Context
parameters from the Group Manager and derives new Sender and
Recipient Contexts as defined in Section 2.6.1.1. In this case,
the Replay Windows of all Recipient Contexts become valid if they
are not already. In particular, any invalid Replay Window is re-
initialized as valid and with 0 as its current lower limit.
2.6.2. Exhaustion of Sender Sequence Number Space
Since an endpoint increments its Sender Sequence Number for each new
outgoing message including a Partial IV, an endpoint can eventually
exhaust the Sender Sequence Number space.
Implementations MUST be able to detect an exhaustion of Sender
Sequence Number space after the endpoint has consumed the largest
usable value. This may be influenced by additional limitations
besides the mere 40-bit size limit of the Partial IV.
Upon exhausting the Sender Sequence Number space, the endpoint MUST
NOT use this Security Context to protect further messages including a
Partial IV.
When approaching the exhaustion of the Sender Sequence Number space,
the endpoint SHOULD inform the Group Manager, retrieve new Security
Context parameters from the Group Manager (see Section 2.6.3), and
use them to derive a new Sender Context (see Section 2.2). It is
RECOMMENDED that the endpoint takes this course of action with some
margin, i.e., well before exhausting the Sender Sequence Number
space, in order to avoid a period of inability to protect messages
including a Partial IV.
From then on, the endpoint MUST use its latest installed Sender
Context to protect outgoing messages.
2.6.3. Retrieving New Security Context Parameters
The Group Manager can assist an endpoint with an incomplete Sender
Context to retrieve missing data of the Security Context and thereby
become fully operational in the group again. The two main options
for the Group Manager are i) assignment of a new Sender ID to the
endpoint (see Section 2.6.3.1), and ii) establishment of a new
Security Context for the group (see Section 2.6.3.2). The update of
the Replay Window in each of the Recipient Contexts is discussed in
Section 2.6.1.
As group membership changes, or as group members get new Sender IDs
(see Section 2.6.3.1), so do the relevant Recipient IDs that the
other endpoints need to keep track of. As a consequence, group
members may end up retaining stale Recipient Contexts that are no
longer useful to verify incoming secure messages.
The Recipient ID ('kid') SHOULD NOT be considered as a persistent and
reliable identifier of a group member. Such an indication can be
achieved only by using that member's public key, when verifying
countersignatures of received messages (in group mode), or when
verifying messages integrity-protected with pairwise keying material
derived from authentication credentials and associated asymmetric
keys (in pairwise mode).
Furthermore, applications MAY define policies to delete (long-)unused
Recipient Contexts and reduce the impact on storage space, and to
check with the Group Manager that an authentication credential with
the public key included therein is currently the one associated with
a 'kid' value after a number of consecutive failed verifications.
2.6.3.1. New Sender ID for the Endpoint
The Group Manager may assign a new Sender ID to an endpoint, while
leaving the Gid, Master Secret, and Master Salt unchanged in the
group. In this case, the Group Manager assigns a Sender ID that has
not been used in the group since the latest time when the current Gid
value was assigned to the group (see Section 12.2).
Having retrieved the new Sender ID, and potentially other missing
data for the long-term part of the Security Context, the endpoint can
derive a new Sender Context (see Section 2.2). When doing so, the
endpoint resets the Sender Sequence Number in its Sender Context to 0
and derives a new Sender Key. This is, in turn, used to possibly
derive new Pairwise Sender Keys.
From then on, the endpoint MUST use its latest installed Sender
Context to protect outgoing messages.
The assignment of a new Sender ID may be the result of different
processes. The endpoint may request a new Sender ID, e.g., because
of the impending exhaustion of the Sender Sequence Number space (see
Section 2.6.2). An endpoint may request to re-join the group, e.g.,
because of losing the varying part of its Security Context (see
Section 2.6.1), and is provided with a new Sender ID together with
the latest data for the long-term part of the Security Context.
For the other group members, the Recipient Context corresponding to
the old Sender ID becomes stale (see Section 12.2).
2.6.3.2. New Security Context for the Group
The Group Manager may establish a new Security Context for the group
(see Section 12.2). The Group Manager does not necessarily establish
a new Security Context for the group if one member has an outdated
Security Context (see Section 2.6.3.1) unless that was already
planned or required for other reasons.
All the group members need to acquire new Security Context parameters
from the Group Manager. Once having acquired new Security Context
parameters, each group member performs the following actions:
* From then on, it MUST NOT use the current Security Context to
start processing new messages for the considered group.
* It completes any ongoing message processing for the considered
group.
* It derives and installs a new Security Context. In particular:
- It re-derives the keying material stored in its Sender Context
and Recipient Contexts (see Section 2.2). The Master Salt used
for the re-derivations is the updated Master Salt parameter if
provided by the Group Manager, or the empty byte string
otherwise.
- It resets its Sender Sequence Number in its Sender Context to
0.
- It re-initializes the Replay Window of each Recipient Context
as valid and with 0 as its current lower limit.
- For each long exchange where it is a client and that it wants
to keep active, it sets the Response Number of each associated
server as not initialized (see Section 5.1).
From then on, it can resume processing new messages for the
considered group. In particular:
* It MUST use its latest installed Sender Context to protect
outgoing messages.
* It SHOULD use only its latest installed Recipient Contexts to
process incoming messages, unless application policies admit to
temporarily retain and use the old and recent Security Context
(see Section 13.5.1).
The distribution of a new Gid and Master Secret may result in
temporarily misaligned Security Contexts among group members. In
particular, this may result in a group member not being able to
process messages received right after a new Gid and Master Secret
have been distributed. A discussion on practical consequences and
possible ways to address them, as well as on how to handle the old
Security Context, is provided in Section 13.5.
3. The COSE Object
Building on Section 5 of [RFC8613], this section defines how to use
COSE [RFC9052] to wrap and protect data in the original message.
Like OSCORE, Group OSCORE uses the untagged COSE_Encrypt0 structure
with an AEAD algorithm. Unless otherwise specified, the following
modifications to what is defined for OSCORE apply for both the group
mode and the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE.
3.1. Countersignature
When protecting a message in group mode, the 'unprotected' field MUST
additionally include the following parameter:
Countersignature0 version 2: Its value is set to the
countersignature of the COSE object.
The countersignature is computed by the sender as described in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [RFC9338] by using its private key and
according to the Signature Algorithm in the Security Context.
In particular, the Countersign_structure contains the context text
string "CounterSignature0", the external_aad as defined in
Section 3.4 of this document, and the ciphertext of the COSE
object as payload.
3.1.1. Clarifications on Using a Countersignature
The literature commonly refers to a countersignature as a signature
computed by an entity A over a document already protected by a
different entity B.
However, the COSE_Countersignature0 structure belongs to the set of
abbreviated countersignatures defined in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of
[RFC9338], which were designed primarily to deal with the problem of
encrypted group messaging, but where it is required to know who
originated the message.
Since the parameters for computing or verifying the abbreviated
countersignature generated by A are provided by the same context used
to describe the security processing performed by B and to be
countersigned, these structures are applicable also when the two
entities A and B are actually the same one, like the sender of a
Group OSCORE message protected in group mode.
3.2. The 'kid' and 'kid context' Parameters
The value of the 'kid' parameter in the 'unprotected' field of
response messages MUST be set to the Sender ID of the endpoint
transmitting the message if the request was protected in group mode.
That is, unlike in [RFC8613], the 'kid' parameter is always present
in responses to a request that was protected in group mode.
The value of the 'kid context' parameter in the 'unprotected' field
of request messages MUST be set to the ID Context, i.e., the Gid of
the group. That is, unlike in [RFC8613], the 'kid context' parameter
is always present in requests.
3.3. Nonce Computation
The nonce is constructed like in OSCORE, with the difference that
Step 4 in Section 5.2 of [RFC8613] is replaced with:
4. and then XOR with X bytes from the Common IV's start, where X is
the length in bytes of the nonce.
For example, if X = 7 and the Common IV is
0x00112233445566778899aabbcc (13 bytes), then the bytes to XOR are
0x00112233445566 (7 bytes).
The constructed nonce is used both by the AEAD Algorithm (see
Section 2.1.1) and by the Group Encryption Algorithm (see
Section 2.1.7), independent of whether they are AEAD or plain
encryption algorithms. Algorithms that do not use a nonce are not
supported, as per Section 2.1.7.
3.4. Additional Authenticated Data
The external_aad of the AAD is different compared to OSCORE [RFC8613]
and is defined in this section.
The same external_aad structure is used in group mode and pairwise
mode for encryption/decryption (see Section 5.3 of [RFC9052]), as
well as in group mode for computing and verifying the
countersignature (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [RFC9338]).
In particular, the external_aad includes also the Signature
Algorithm, the Group Encryption Algorithm, the Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm, the value of the 'kid context' in the COSE object of the
request, the OSCORE Option of the protected message, the sender's
authentication credential, and the Group Manager's authentication
credential.
The external_aad SHALL be a CBOR array wrapped in a bstr object as
defined below, following the notation of [RFC8610]:
external_aad = bstr .cbor aad_array
aad_array = [
oscore_version : uint,
algorithms : [alg_aead : int / tstr / null,
alg_group_enc : int / tstr / null,
alg_signature : int / tstr / null,
alg_pairwise_key_agreement : int / tstr / null],
request_kid : bstr,
request_piv : bstr,
options : bstr,
request_kid_context : bstr,
OSCORE_option : bstr,
sender_cred : bstr,
gm_cred : bstr
]
Figure 2: external_aad
Compared with Section 5.4 of [RFC8613], the aad_array has the
following differences:
* The 'algorithms' array is extended as follows.
The parameter 'alg_aead' MUST be set to the CBOR simple value null
(0xf6) if the parameter AEAD Algorithm is not set in the Common
Context of the Security Context used (see Section 2.1.1).
Otherwise, regardless of whether the endpoint supports the
pairwise mode or not, this parameter MUST specify AEAD Algorithm
from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1) as per Section 5.4 of
[RFC8613].
Furthermore, the 'algorithms' array additionally includes:
- 'alg_group_enc', which specifies Group Encryption Algorithm
from the Common Context of the Security Context used (see
Section 2.1.7). This parameter MUST be set to the CBOR simple
value null (0xf6) if the parameter Group Encryption Algorithm
in the Common Context is not set. Otherwise, regardless of
whether the endpoint supports the group mode or not, this
parameter MUST specify Group Encryption Algorithm as a CBOR
integer or text string, consistently with the "Value" field in
the "COSE Algorithms" registry for this algorithm.
- 'alg_signature', which specifies Signature Algorithm from the
Common Context of the Security Context used (see
Section 2.1.8). This parameter MUST be set to the CBOR simple
value null (0xf6) if the parameter Signature Algorithm in the
Common Context is not set. Otherwise, regardless of whether
the endpoint supports the group mode or not, this parameter
MUST specify Signature Algorithm as a CBOR integer or text
string, consistently with the "Value" field in the "COSE
Algorithms" registry for this algorithm.
- 'alg_pairwise_key_agreement', which specifies Pairwise Key
Agreement Algorithm from the Common Context of the Security
Context used (see Section 2.1.10). This parameter MUST be set
to the CBOR simple value null (0xf6) if the parameter Pairwise
Key Agreement Algorithm in the Common Context is not set.
Otherwise, regardless of whether the endpoint supports the
pairwise mode or not, this parameter MUST specify Pairwise Key
Agreement Algorithm as a CBOR integer or text string,
consistently with the "Value" field in the "COSE Algorithms"
registry for this algorithm.
* The new element 'request_kid_context' contains the value of the
'kid context' in the COSE object of the request (see Section 3.2).
This enables endpoints to safely keep a long exchange active
beyond a possible change of Gid (i.e., of ID Context), following a
group rekeying (see Section 12.2). In fact, it ensures that every
response within a long exchange cryptographically matches with
only one request (i.e., the request associated with that long
exchange) rather than with multiple requests that were protected
with different keying material but share the same 'request_kid'
and 'request_piv' values.
* The new element 'OSCORE_option', containing the value of the
OSCORE Option present in the protected message, encoded as a
binary string. This prevents the attack described in Section 13.7
when using the group mode, as further explained in Section 13.7.2.
Note for implementation: This construction requires the OSCORE
Option of the message to be generated and finalized before
computing the ciphertext of the COSE_Encrypt0 object (when using
the group mode or the pairwise mode) and before calculating the
countersignature (when using the group mode). Also, the aad_array
needs to be large enough to contain the largest possible OSCORE
Option.
* The new element 'sender_cred', containing the sender's
authentication credential. This parameter MUST be set to a CBOR
byte string, which encodes the sender's authentication credential
in its original binary representation made available to other
endpoints in the group (see Section 2.4).
* The new element 'gm_cred', containing the Group Manager's
authentication credential. This parameter MUST be set to a CBOR
byte string, which encodes the Group Manager's authentication
credential in its original binary representation made available to
other endpoints in the group (see Section 2.4). This prevents the
attack described in Section 13.8.
4. OSCORE Header Compression
Group OSCORE relies on a header compression mechanism similar to the
one used by OSCORE and specified in Section 4.1. Examples are
provided in Section 4.3.
4.1. Encoding of the OSCORE Option Value and Group OSCORE Payload
The OSCORE header compression defined in Section 6 of [RFC8613] is
used for compactly encoding the COSE_Encrypt0 object specified in
Section 3 of this document with the following differences:
* When the Group OSCORE message is protected in group mode, the
message payload SHALL encode the ciphertext of the COSE object,
concatenated with the encrypted countersignature of the COSE
object. That is:
- The plain, original countersignature of the COSE object, namely
SIGNATURE, is specified in the "Countersignature0 version 2"
parameter within the 'unprotected' field of the COSE object
(see Section 3.1).
- The encrypted countersignature, namely ENC_SIGNATURE, is
computed as
ENC_SIGNATURE = SIGNATURE XOR KEYSTREAM
where KEYSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.2.
* When the Group OSCORE message is protected in pairwise mode, the
message payload SHALL encode the ciphertext of the COSE object.
* This document defines the usage of the sixth least significant
bit, called "Group Flag", in the first byte of the OSCORE Option
value containing the OSCORE flag bits. This flag bit is specified
in Section 14.1.
* The Group Flag MUST be set to 1 if the Group OSCORE message is
protected using the group mode (see Section 7).
* The Group Flag MUST be set to 0 if the Group OSCORE message is
protected using the pairwise mode (see Section 8). The Group Flag
MUST also be set to 0 for ordinary OSCORE messages processed
according to [RFC8613].
4.2. Keystream Derivation for Countersignature Encryption/Decryption
This section defines how an endpoint derives the keystream KEYSTREAM,
which is used to encrypt/decrypt the countersignature of an outgoing/
incoming message M protected in group mode.
The keystream SHALL be derived as follows by using the HKDF Algorithm
from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.2) analogously to
Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613], i.e., by composing the HKDF-Extract and
HKDF-Expand steps [RFC5869].
KEYSTREAM = HKDF(salt, IKM, info, L)
The input parameters of HKDF are as follows:
* salt takes as its value the Partial IV (PIV) used to protect M.
Note that, if M is a response, salt takes as its value either the
fresh Partial IV generated by the server and included in the
response or the same Partial IV of the request generated by the
client and not included in the response.
* IKM is the Signature Encryption Key from the Common Context (see
Section 2.1.9).
* info is the serialization of a CBOR array with the structure
defined below, following the notation of [RFC8610]:
info = [
id : bstr,
id_context : bstr,
type : bool,
L : uint
]
where:
* id is the Sender ID of the endpoint that generated PIV.
* id_context is the ID Context (Gid) used when protecting M.
Note that, in the case of group rekeying, a server might use a
different Gid when protecting a response compared to the Gid that
it used to verify (that the client used to protect) the request;
see Section 7.3.
* type is the CBOR simple value true (0xf5) if M is a request or the
CBOR simple value false (0xf4) otherwise.
* L is the size of the countersignature, as per Signature Algorithm
from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.8) in bytes.
4.3. Examples of Compressed COSE Objects
This section covers a list of OSCORE header compression examples of
Group OSCORE used in group mode (see Section 4.3.1) or in pairwise
mode (see Section 4.3.2).
The examples assume that the COSE_Encrypt0 object is set (which means
the CoAP message and cryptographic material is known). Note that the
examples do not include the full CoAP unprotected message or the full
Security Context, but only the input necessary to the compression
mechanism, i.e., the COSE_Encrypt0 object. The output is the
compressed COSE object as defined in Section 4.1 and divided into two
parts, since the object is transported in two CoAP fields: OSCORE
Option and payload.
The examples assume that the plaintext (see Section 5.3 of [RFC8613])
is 6 bytes long, and that the AEAD tag is 8 bytes long, hence
resulting in a ciphertext that is 14 bytes long. When using the
group mode, the COSE_Countersignature0 byte string as described in
Section 3 is assumed to be 64 bytes long.
4.3.1. Examples in Group Mode
Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid = 0x25,
Partial IV = 5, and kid context = 0x44616c.
* Before compression (96 bytes):
[
/ protected / h'',
/ unprotected / {
/ kid / 4 : h'25',
/ Partial IV / 6 : h'05',
/ kid context / 10 : h'44616c',
/ Countersignature0 version 2 / 12 : h'66e6d9b0
db009f3e105a673f8855611726caed57f530f8cae9d0b168
513ab949fedc3e80a96ebe94ba08d3f8d3bf83487458e2ab
4c2f936ff78b50e33c885e35'
},
/ ciphertext / h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
]
* After compression (85 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00111001 = 0x39 (1 byte)
Option Value: 0x39 05 03 44 61 6c 25 (7 bytes)
Payload: 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 de9e ... f1
(14 bytes + size of the encrypted countersignature)
Response with ciphertext = 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b, kid =
0x52, and no Partial IV.
* Before compression (88 bytes):
[
/ protected / h'',
/ unprotected / {
/ kid / 4 : h'52',
/ Countersignature0 version 2 / 12 : h'f5b659b8
24487eb349c5c5c8a3fe401784cade2892725438e8be0fab
daa2867ee6d29f68edb0818e50ebf98c28b923d0205f5162
e73662e27c1a3ec562a49b80'
},
/ ciphertext / h'60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b'
]
* After compression (80 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00101000 = 0x28 (1 byte)
Option Value: 0x28 52 (2 bytes)
Payload: 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b ca1e ... b3
(14 bytes + size of the encrypted countersignature)
4.3.2. Examples in Pairwise Mode
Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid = 0x25,
Partial IV = 5, and kid context = 0x44616c.
* Before compression (29 bytes):
[
/ protected / h'',
/ unprotected / {
/ kid / 4 : h'25',
/ Partial IV / 6 : h'05',
/ kid context / 10 : h'44616c'
},
/ ciphertext / h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
]
* After compression (21 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00011001 = 0x19 (1 byte)
Option Value: 0x19 05 03 44 61 6c 25 (7 bytes)
Payload: 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 (14 bytes)
Response with ciphertext = 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b and no
Partial IV.
* Before compression (18 bytes):
[
/ protected / h'',
/ unprotected / {},
/ ciphertext / h'60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b'
]
* After compression (14 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00000000 = 0x00 (1 byte)
Option Value: 0x (0 bytes)
Payload: 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b (14 bytes)
5. Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness, and Replay Protection
Like OSCORE, Group OSCORE provides message binding of responses to
requests, as well as uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs (see Sections
7.1 and 7.2 of [RFC8613], respectively).
5.1. Supporting Multiple Responses in Long Exchanges
For each of its ongoing long exchanges, a client maintains one
Response Number for each different server. Then, separately for each
server, the client uses the associated Response Number to perform
ordering and replay protection of responses received from that server
within that long exchange (see Section 5.3.1).
That is, the Response Number has the same purpose that the
Notification Number has in OSCORE (see Section 4.1.3.5.2 of
[RFC8613]), but a client uses it for handling any response from the
associated server within a long exchange.
Group OSCORE allows a long exchange to remain active, even if the
group is rekeyed (thus changing the ID Context) or the client obtains
a new Sender ID.
As defined in Section 7, this is achieved by the client and server(s)
storing the 'kid' and 'kid context' used in the original request
throughout the whole duration of the long exchange.
Upon leaving the group or before re-joining the group, a group member
MUST terminate all the ongoing long exchanges that it has started in
the group as a client. This frees up the CoAP Token associated with
the corresponding request.
5.2. Freshness
If the application requires freshness, e.g., according to time- or
event-based policies (see Section 2.5.1 of [RFC9175]), a server can
use the approach in Section 9 as a variant of the Challenge-Response
procedure based on the Echo Option [RFC9175] before delivering
request messages from a client to the application.
Like in OSCORE [RFC8613], assuming an honest server, the message
binding guarantees that a response is not older than the request it
replies to. Therefore, building on Section 7.3 of [RFC8613], the
following properties apply for Group OSCORE:
* The freshness of a response can be assessed if it is received soon
after the request.
For responses within a long exchange, this assessment gets weaker
with time. If such responses are Observe notifications [RFC7641],
it is RECOMMENDED that the client regularly re-registers the
observation.
If the request was neither a group request nor an Observe request,
there is at most a single valid response and only from one
individually targeted server in the group. Thus, freshness can be
assessed depending on when the request was sent.
* It is not guaranteed that a misbehaving server did not create the
response before receiving the request, i.e., Group OSCORE does not
verify server aliveness.
* For requests and responses, the received Partial IV allows a
recipient to determine the relative order of requests or
responses.
5.3. Replay Protection
Like in OSCORE [RFC8613], the replay protection relies on the Partial
IV of incoming messages. A server updates the Replay Window of its
Recipient Contexts based on the Partial IV values in received request
messages, which correspond to the Sender Sequence Numbers of the
clients. Note that there can be large jumps in these Sender Sequence
Number values, e.g., when a client exchanges unicast messages with
other servers. The operation of validating the Partial IV and
performing replay protection MUST be atomic. Sections 2.6.1 and
2.6.3.2 describe the update of Replay Windows after the loss of data
from the Security Context and the retrieving of new Security Context
parameters.
The protection from replay of requests is performed as per
Section 7.4 of [RFC8613] separately for each client and by leveraging
the Replay Window in the corresponding Recipient Context. The
protection from replay of responses in a long exchange is performed
as defined in Section 5.3.1 of this document.
5.3.1. Replay Protection of Responses
A client uses the method defined in this section in order to check
whether a received response is a replay.
This especially applies to responses received within a long exchange
during which multiple such responses can be received from the same
server to the corresponding request. These include Observe
notifications [RFC7641] and non-notification responses as a reply to
a group request, which the client can receive until the CoAP Token
value associated with the group request is freed up (see
Section 3.1.6 of [RFC10020]).
When sending a response (both successful and error), a server MUST
include its Sender Sequence Number as Partial IV in the response
except when sending the first response to the corresponding request,
in which case, the Partial IV in the response MAY be omitted.
In order to protect against replay, the client SHALL maintain for
each ongoing long exchange one Response Number for each different
server. The Response Number is a non-negative integer containing the
largest Partial IV of the responses received from that server during
the long exchange while using the same Security Context.
Then, separately for each server, the client uses the associated
Response Number to perform ordering and replay protection of the
responses from that server during the long exchange by comparing
their Partial IVs with one another and against the Response Number.
For every long exchange, the Response Number associated with a server
is initialized to the Partial IV of the response from that server
such that, within the long exchange, it is the first response from
that server to include a Partial IV and to be successfully verified
with the used Security Context. Note that, when a new Security
Context is established in the group, the client sets the Response
Number of each associated server as not initialized (see
Section 2.6.3.2), hence later responses within the same long exchange
and protected with the new Security Context will result in a new
initialization of Response Numbers. Furthermore, for every long
exchange, a client MUST only accept at most one response without
Partial IV from each server and treat it as the oldest response from
that server within that long exchange.
During a long exchange, a client receiving a response containing a
Partial IV SHALL compare the Partial IV with the Response Number
associated with the replying server within that long exchange. The
client MUST stop processing a response from a server if that response
has a Partial IV that has been previously received from that server
during that long exchange, while using the same Security Context.
Applications MAY decide that a client only processes responses within
a long exchange if those have a greater Partial IV than the Response
Number associated with the replying server within that long exchange.
This limits the storage overhead on the client to maintaining one
Response Number per replying server within the long exchange.
Conversely, more permissive applications can allow clients to also
process responses that have a smaller Partial IV than the Response
Number associated with the replying server. For a client, the
ability to detect previously received Partial IVs while admitting the
processing of such responses comes at the cost of additional storage
overhead, for which a reasonable bound has to be defined by the
application. A possible way to achieve that relies on using a
sliding Replay Window uniquely paired with the replying server within
the long exchange, similarly to that used by a server for detecting
replayed requests.
If the verification of the response succeeds, and the received
Partial IV (when included) was greater than the Response Number
associated with the replying server, then the client SHALL overwrite
that Response Number with the received Partial IV.
As long as a server uses the same Security Context to protect its
responses to the same request, the client MUST consider the response
with the highest Partial IV as the freshest response from that server
among those protected with that Security Context, regardless of the
order of arrival. Within a long exchange, implementations need to
make sure that a response without Partial IV is considered the oldest
response from the replying server within that long exchange.
The method defined in this section is not relevant for responses to
requests that are neither group requests nor Observe requests. In
fact, for each of such requests, there is at most one response and
only from one individually targeted server in the group.
6. Message Reception
Upon receiving a protected message, a recipient endpoint retrieves a
Security Context as in [RFC8613]. An endpoint MUST be able to
distinguish between a Security Context to process OSCORE messages as
in [RFC8613] and a Group OSCORE Security Context to process Group
OSCORE messages as defined in this document.
The way to accomplish this distinction is implementation specific.
For example, an endpoint can take into account the different
structure of the Security Context defined in Section 2, e.g., based
on the presence of Signature Algorithm and Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm in the Common Context. Alternatively, at the cost of
increasing storage, implementations can use an additional parameter
in the Security Context to explicitly mark that it is intended for
processing Group OSCORE messages.
If either of the following conditions applies, a recipient endpoint
MUST discard the incoming protected message:
* The Group Flag is set to 0 and the retrieved Security Context is
associated with an OSCORE group, but the endpoint does not support
the pairwise mode or any of the following parameters is not set in
the Security Context: the AEAD Algorithm and the Pairwise Key
Agreement Algorithm.
* The Group Flag is set to 1 and the retrieved Security Context is
associated with an OSCORE group, but the endpoint does not support
the group mode or any of the following parameters is not set in
the Security Context: the Group Encryption Algorithm and the
Signature Algorithm.
* The Group Flag is set to 1, but there is no Security Context
associated with an OSCORE group.
Future specifications may define how to process incoming messages
protected with Security Contexts as in [RFC8613] when the Group
Flag bit is set to 1.
Otherwise, if a Security Context associated with an OSCORE group is
retrieved, the recipient endpoint processes the message with Group
OSCORE using the group mode (see Section 7) if the Group Flag is set
to 1 or the pairwise mode (see Section 8) if the Group Flag is set to
0.
Note that if the Group Flag is set to 0 and the recipient endpoint
retrieves a Security Context that is valid to process the message but
is not associated with an OSCORE group, then the message is processed
according to [RFC8613].
7. Message Processing in Group Mode
When using the group mode, messages are protected and processed as
specified in [RFC8613] with the modifications described in this
section. The security objectives of the group mode are discussed in
Appendix A.2.
The possible use of the group mode is indicated by the Group Manager
as part of the group data provided to new group members when joining
the group, according to which the parameters Group Encryption
Algorithm and Signature Algorithm in the Security Context are set
(see Section 2).
During all the steps of the message processing, an endpoint MUST use
the same Security Context for the considered group. That is, an
endpoint MUST NOT install a new Security Context for that group (see
Section 2.6.3.2) until the message processing is completed.
The group mode SHOULD be used to protect group requests intended for
multiple recipients or for the whole group. This applies to both
requests directly addressed to multiple recipients, e.g., sent by the
client over multicast, as well as requests sent by the client over
unicast to a proxy that forwards them to the intended recipients over
multicast [RFC10020]. Exceptions where the requirement above is not
fulfilled and the pairwise mode is used to protect group requests
include: the efficient discovery of a server's address in the group
(see Section 8.1) or the enabling of simple constructions where a
variation of the pairwise mode protects requests possibly intended to
multiple servers in such a way that the corresponding responses are
effectively cacheable by intermediaries (e.g., see
[CACHEABLE-OSCORE]).
As per [RFC7252] and [RFC10020], group requests sent over multicast
are always Non-confirmable and thus are not retransmitted by the CoAP
messaging layer. Instead, applications should store such outgoing
messages for a predefined, sufficient amount of time in order to
correctly perform potential retransmissions at the application layer.
If performed, these retransmissions are repetitions of previous
protected messages, which the sender endpoint does not protect again
with Group OSCORE.
According to Section 5.2.3 of [RFC7252]:
| If the request message is Non-confirmable, then the response
| SHOULD be returned in a Non-confirmable message as well. However,
| an endpoint MUST be prepared to receive ... a Confirmable response
| in reply to a Non-confirmable request.
Confirmable group requests are acknowledged when sent over non-
multicast transports as specified in [RFC7252].
Furthermore, endpoints in the group locally perform error handling
and processing of invalid messages according to the same principles
adopted in [RFC8613]. In addition, a recipient MUST stop processing
and reject any message that is malformed and that does not follow the
format specified in Section 3 of this document or that is not
cryptographically validated in a successful way as per the processing
defined in Sections 7.2 and 7.4.
In either case, it is RECOMMENDED that a server does not send back
any error message in reply to a received request if either of the
following conditions applies:
* The server is not able to identify whether the received request is
a group request, i.e., as sent to all servers in the group.
* The server identifies the received request as a group request.
This prevents servers from replying with multiple error messages to a
client sending a group request, avoiding the risk of flooding and
possibly congesting the network.
7.1. Protecting the Request
When using the group mode to protect a request, a client proceeds as
described in Section 8.1 of [RFC8613] with the following
modifications.
* In Step 2, the AAD is modified as described in Section 3.4 of this
document.
* In Step 4, the encryption of the COSE object is modified as
described in Section 3 of this document. The encoding of the
compressed COSE object is modified as described in Section 4 of
this document. In particular, the Group Flag MUST be set to 1.
The Group Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST be
used.
* In Step 5, the countersignature is computed and the format of the
OSCORE message is modified as described in Sections 3 and 4 of
this document. In particular, the payload of the Group OSCORE
message includes also the encrypted countersignature.
In addition, the following applies when sending a request that
establishes a long exchange:
* If the client intends to keep the long exchange active beyond a
possible change of Sender ID, the client MUST store the value of
the 'kid' parameter from the request and retain it until the long
exchange is terminated. Even in the case that the client is
individually rekeyed and receives a new Sender ID from the Group
Manager (see Section 2.6.3.1), the client MUST NOT update the
stored 'kid' parameter value associated with the long exchange and
the corresponding request.
* If the client intends to keep the long exchange active beyond a
possible change of ID Context following a group rekeying (see
Section 12.2), then the following applies:
- The client MUST store the value of the 'kid context' parameter
from the request and retain it until the long exchange is
terminated. Upon establishing a new Security Context with a
new Gid as ID Context (see Section 2.6.3.2), the client MUST
NOT update the stored 'kid context' parameter value associated
with the long exchange and the corresponding request.
- The client MUST store an invariant identifier of the group,
which is immutable even if the Security Context of the group is
re-established. For example, this invariant identifier can be
the "group name" in [ACE-KEY-GROUP-OSCORE], where it is used
for joining the group and retrieving the current group keying
material from the Group Manager.
After a group rekeying, the client might have missed both the
rekeying messages and the servers' first responses that are
protected with the new Security Context and include the new ID
Context (Gid) in the 'kid context' parameter (see Section 7.3).
In such a case, while still not knowing the new ID Context
(Gid) used in the group, the client is able to retrieve the
current group keying material from the Group Manager using the
invariant identifier to unambiguously refer to the group.
7.2. Verifying the Request
Upon receiving a protected request with the Group Flag set to 1,
following the procedure in Section 6, a server proceeds as described
in Section 8.2 of [RFC8613] with the following modifications.
* In Step 2, the decoding of the compressed COSE object follows
Section 4 of this document. In particular:
- If the server discards the request due to not retrieving a
Security Context associated with the OSCORE group, the server
MAY respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message. When
doing so, the server MAY set an Outer Max-Age Option with value
zero and MAY include a descriptive string as diagnostic
payload.
- If the received 'kid context' matches an existing ID Context
(Gid) but the received 'kid' does not match any Recipient ID in
this Security Context, then the server MAY create a new
Recipient Context for this Recipient ID and initialize it
according to Section 3 of [RFC8613], and also retrieve the
authentication credential associated with the Recipient ID to
be stored in the new Recipient Context. Such a configuration
is application-specific. If the application does not specify
dynamic derivation of new Recipient Contexts, then the server
SHALL stop processing the request.
* In Step 4, the AAD is modified as described in Section 3.4 of this
document.
* In Step 6, the server also verifies the countersignature by using
the public key from the client's authentication credential stored
in the associated Recipient Context. In particular:
- If the server does not have the public key of the client yet,
the server MUST stop processing the request and MAY respond
with a 5.03 (Service Unavailable) response. The response MAY
include a Max-Age Option, indicating to the client the number
of seconds after which to retry. If the Max-Age Option is not
present, Section 5.10.5 of [RFC7252] specifies a default retry
time of 60 seconds.
- The signature verification as defined below SHOULD be performed
before decrypting the COSE object. An exception applies to
implementations that cannot perform the two steps in this
order. Those implementations MUST ensure that no access to the
plaintext is possible before a successful signature
verification and MUST prevent any possible leak of time-related
information that can yield side-channel attacks.
- The server retrieves the encrypted countersignature
ENC_SIGNATURE from the message payload and computes the
original countersignature SIGNATURE as:
SIGNATURE = ENC_SIGNATURE XOR KEYSTREAM
where KEYSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.2.
- The server verifies the original countersignature SIGNATURE as
described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [RFC9338] by using the
client's public key and according to the Signature Algorithm in
the Security Context.
In particular, the Countersign_structure contains the context
text string "CounterSignature0", the external_aad as defined in
Section 3.4 of this document, and the ciphertext of the COSE
object as payload.
- If the signature verification fails, the server SHALL stop
processing the request, SHALL NOT update the Replay Window, and
MAY respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) response. Such a
response MAY include an Outer Max-Age Option with value zero,
and its diagnostic payload MAY contain a string, which, if
present, MUST be "Decryption failed" as if the decryption of
the COSE object had failed.
- When decrypting the COSE object using the Recipient Key, the
Group Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST be
used.
* Additionally, if the used Recipient Context was created upon
receiving this request and the message is not verified
successfully, the server MAY delete that Recipient Context. When
this behavior is specified by the application, it mitigates
attacks that aim at overloading the server's storage.
If the server deletes the used Recipient Context in this
particular circumstance, then this deletion does not require the
server to initialize the Replay Window of any new Recipient
Context created later within the Security Context as invalid (see
Section 2.6.1.2).
A server SHOULD NOT process a request if the received Recipient ID
('kid') is equal to its own Sender ID in its own Sender Context.
However, in some applications, the server can prepare a request to be
sent to itself (e.g., see [CoAP-MULT-NOTIF]), in which case such
requests would be expected.
In addition, the following applies if the request establishes a long
exchange and the server intends to reply with multiple responses:
* The server MUST store the value of the 'kid' parameter from the
request and retain it until the last response has been sent. The
server MUST NOT update the stored value of the 'kid' parameter
associated with the request, even if the client is individually
rekeyed and starts using a new Sender ID received from the Group
Manager (see Section 2.6.3.1).
* The server MUST store the value of the 'kid context' parameter
from the request and retain it until the last response has been
sent, i.e., beyond a possible change of ID Context following a
group rekeying (see Section 12.2). That is, upon establishing a
new Security Context with a new Gid as ID Context (see
Section 2.6.3.2), the server MUST NOT update the stored value of a
'kid context' parameter associated with the request.
7.3. Protecting the Response
When using the group mode to protect a response, a server proceeds as
described in Section 8.3 of [RFC8613] with the following
modifications.
Note that the server always protects a response with the Sender
Context from its latest Security Context, and that establishing a new
Security Context resets the Sender Sequence Number to 0 (see Sections
2.6.3.1 and 2.6.3.2).
* In Step 2, the AAD is modified as described in Section 3.4 of this
document.
In addition, the following applies if the server intends to reply
with multiple responses within the long exchange established by
the corresponding request:
- The server MUST use the stored value of the 'kid' parameter
from the request (see Section 7.2) as the value for the
'request_kid' parameter in the external_aad (see Section 3.4).
- The server MUST use the stored value of the 'kid context'
parameter from the request (see Section 7.2) as the value for
the 'request_kid_context' parameter in the external_aad (see
Section 3.4).
* In Step 3, if either of the following conditions applies, the
server MUST include its Sender Sequence Number as Partial IV in
the response and use it to build the nonce to protect the
response. This prevents the server from reusing the nonce from
the request together with the same encryption key.
- The response is not the first response that the server sends to
the request.
- The server is using a different Security Context for the
response than the one that was used to verify the request (see
Section 12.2).
* In Step 4, the encryption of the COSE object is modified as
described in Section 3 of this document. The encoding of the
compressed COSE object is modified as described in Section 4 of
this document. In particular, the Group Flag MUST be set to 1.
The Group Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST be
used.
In addition, the following applies:
- If the server is using a different ID Context (Gid) for the
response than the one that was used to verify the request (see
Section 12.2) and this is the first response from the server to
that request, then the new ID Context MUST be included in the
'kid context' parameter of the response.
- The server may be replying to a request that was protected with
an old Security Context. After completing the establishment of
a new Security Context, the server MUST protect all the
responses to that request with the Sender Context of the new
Security Context.
For each ongoing long exchange, the server can help the client
to synchronize by also including the 'kid context' parameter in
responses following a group rekeying, with the value set to the
ID Context (Gid) of the new Security Context.
If there is a known upper limit to the duration of a group
rekeying, the server SHOULD include the 'kid context' parameter
during that time. Otherwise, the server SHOULD include it
until the Max-Age has expired for the last response sent before
the installation of the new Security Context.
- The server can obtain a new Sender ID from the Group Manager
when individually rekeyed (see Section 2.6.3.1) or when re-
joining the group. In such a case, the server can help the
client to synchronize by including the 'kid' parameter in a
response protected in group mode even when the request was
protected in pairwise mode (see Section 8.3).
That is, when responding to a request protected in pairwise
mode, the server SHOULD include the 'kid' parameter in a
response protected in group mode, if it is replying to that
client for the first time since the assignment of its new
Sender ID.
* In Step 5, the countersignature is computed and the format of the
OSCORE message is modified as described in Sections 3 and 4 of
this document. In particular the payload of the Group OSCORE
message includes also the encrypted countersignature (see
Section 4.1).
7.4. Verifying the Response
Upon receiving a protected response with the Group Flag set to 1,
following the procedure in Section 6, a client proceeds as described
in Section 8.4 of [RFC8613] with the following modifications.
Note that a client may receive a response protected with a Security
Context different from the one used to protect the corresponding
request, and that, upon the establishment of a new Security Context,
the client re-initializes its Replay Windows in its Recipient
Contexts (see Section 2.6.3.2).
* In Step 2, the decoding of the compressed COSE object is modified
as described in Section 4 of this document. In particular, a
'kid' may not be present if the response is a reply to a request
protected in pairwise mode. In such a case, the client assumes
the response 'kid' to be the Recipient ID for the server for which
the request protected in pairwise mode was intended.
If the response 'kid context' matches an existing ID Context (Gid)
but the received/assumed 'kid' does not match any Recipient ID in
this Security Context, then the client MAY create a new Recipient
Context for this Recipient ID and initialize it according to
Section 3 of [RFC8613], and also retrieve the authentication
credential associated with the Recipient ID to be stored in the
new Recipient Context. If the application does not specify
dynamic derivation of new Recipient Contexts, then the client
SHALL stop processing the response.
* In Step 3, the AAD is modified as described in Section 3.4 of this
document.
In addition, the following applies if the client processes a
response to a request within a long exchange:
- The client MUST use the stored value of the 'kid' parameter
from the request (see Section 7.1) as the value for the
'request_kid' parameter in the external_aad (see Section 3.4).
- The client MUST use the stored value of the 'kid context'
parameter from the request (see Section 7.1) as the value for
the 'request_kid_context' parameter in the external_aad (see
Section 3.4).
This ensures that, throughout a long exchange, the client can
correctly verify the received responses, even if the client is
individually rekeyed and starts using a new Sender ID received
from the Group Manager (see Section 2.6.3.1), as well as when it
installs a new Security Context with a new ID Context (Gid)
following a group rekeying (see Section 2.6.3.2).
* In Step 5, the client also verifies the countersignature by using
the public key from the server's authentication credential stored
in the associated Recipient Context. In particular:
- The signature verification as defined below SHOULD be performed
before decrypting the COSE object. An exception applies to
implementations that cannot perform the two steps in this
order. Those implementations MUST ensure that no access to the
plaintext is possible before a successful signature
verification and MUST prevent any possible leak of time-related
information that can yield side-channel attacks.
- The client retrieves the encrypted countersignature
ENC_SIGNATURE from the message payload and computes the
original countersignature SIGNATURE as:
SIGNATURE = ENC_SIGNATURE XOR KEYSTREAM
where KEYSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.2.
The client verifies the original countersignature SIGNATURE.
This is analogous to what is defined in Section 7.2 for the
signature verification of a request, with the client using the
server's public key and referring to the present response and
the COSE object conveyed therein.
- If the signature verification fails, the client SHALL stop
processing the response and SHALL NOT update the Response
Number associated with the server.
- After a successful signature verification, the client also
performs the following actions if the request was protected in
pairwise mode (see Section 8.3):
o If the 'kid' parameter is present in the response, the
client checks whether this received 'kid' is equal to the
expected 'kid', i.e., the known Recipient ID for the server
for which the request was intended.
o If the 'kid' parameter is not present in the response, the
client checks whether the server that has sent the response
is the same one for which the request was intended. This
can be done by checking that the public key used to verify
the countersignature of the response is equal to the public
key included in the authentication credential Recipient Auth
Cred, which was taken as input to derive the Pairwise Sender
Key used for protecting the request (see Section 2.5.1).
In either case, if the client determines that the response has
come from a different server than the expected one, then the
client: i) SHALL discard the response and SHALL NOT deliver it
to the application, and ii) SHALL NOT update the Response
Number associated with the server.
Otherwise, the client hereafter considers the received 'kid' as
the current Recipient ID for the server.
* In Step 5, when decrypting the COSE object using the Recipient
Key, the Group Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST
be used.
In addition, the client performs the following actions if the
response is received within a long exchange.
- The ordering and the replay protection of responses received
from the server during the long exchange are performed as per
Section 5.3.1 of this document by using the Response Number
associated with that server within that long exchange. In the
case of unsuccessful decryption and verification of a response,
the client SHALL NOT update the Response Number associated with
the server.
- When receiving the first valid response from the server within
the long exchange, the client MUST store the kid "kid1" of that
server for that long exchange. If the 'kid' field is included
in the OSCORE Option of the response, its value specifies
"kid1". If the request was protected in pairwise mode (see
Section 8.3), the 'kid' field may not be present in the OSCORE
Option of the response (see Section 3.2). In this case, the
client assumes "kid1" to be the Recipient ID for the server for
which the request was intended.
- When receiving another valid response to the same request from
the same server -- which can be identified and recognized
through the same public key used to verify the countersignature
and included in the server's authentication credential -- the
client determines the kid "kid2" of the server as above for
"kid1", and it MUST check whether "kid2" is equal to the stored
"kid1".
If "kid1" and "kid2" are different, the client SHOULD NOT
accept the response as valid to be delivered to the application
and SHOULD NOT update the Response Number associated with the
server. Exceptions can apply as the client can retain the
information required to order the responses, or if the client
application does not require response ordering altogether.
Servers MUST NOT rely on clients tolerating this unless it was
explicitly agreed on (e.g., as part of the group's setup).
Note that, if "kid2" is different from "kid1" and the 'kid' field
is omitted from the response -- which is possible if the request
was protected in pairwise mode -- then the client will compute a
wrong keystream to decrypt the countersignature (i.e., by using
"kid1" rather than "kid2" in the 'id' field of the 'info' array in
Section 4.2), thus subsequently failing to verify the
countersignature and discarding the response.
This ensures that the client remains able to correctly perform the
ordering and replay protection of responses within a long
exchange, even if the server legitimately starts using a new
Sender ID, as received from the Group Manager when individually
rekeyed (see Section 2.6.3.1) or when re-joining the group.
* In Step 8, if the used Recipient Context was created upon
receiving this response and the message is not verified
successfully, the client MAY delete that Recipient Context. When
this behavior is specified by the application, it mitigates
attacks that aim at overloading the client's storage.
If the client deletes the used Recipient Context in this
particular circumstance, then this deletion does not require the
client to initialize the Replay Window of any new Recipient
Context created later within the Security Context as invalid (see
Section 2.6.1.2).
7.5. External Signature Checkers
When a message is protected in group mode, it is possible for
designated external signature checkers to verify the countersignature
of the message. For example, an external signature checker can be an
intermediary gateway that intercepts messages protected in group mode
and ensures that they reach the intended recipients only if it
successfully verifies their countersignatures.
Since they do not join a group as members, external signature
checkers need to retrieve the authentication credentials and other
information (e.g., the Sender IDs) associated with group members from
the Group Manager, together with other selected group data such as
the current Signature Encryption Key (see Section 2.1.9).
Section 12.3 describes how the Group Manager supports signature
checkers.
When receiving a message protected in group mode, a signature checker
proceeds as follows.
* The signature checker retrieves the encrypted countersignature
ENC_SIGNATURE from the message payload and computes the original
countersignature SIGNATURE as:
SIGNATURE = ENC_SIGNATURE XOR KEYSTREAM
where KEYSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.2.
* The signature checker verifies the original countersignature
SIGNATURE according to what is defined in Section 7.2 for requests
and in Section 7.4 for responses by using the public key of the
sender endpoint as included in that endpoint's authentication
credential. The signature checker determines the right
authentication credential based on the ID Context (Gid) and the
Sender ID of the sender endpoint.
Note that the following applies when attempting to verify the
countersignature of a response message:
* The response may not include a Partial IV. In such a case, the
signature checker considers the same value of the Partial IV from
the corresponding request, i.e., the request matching with the
response by CoAP Token value.
* The response may not include an ID Context. In such a case, the
signature checker considers the current ID Context used in the
group. By default, such ID Context has the same value of the ID
Context from the corresponding request, i.e., the request matching
with the response by CoAP Token value.
Since the ID Context (Gid) changes every time the group is rekeyed
(see Section 12.2), the server that originated the response could
have used a different ID Context when protecting the response
compared to the ID Context that it used to verify (that the client
used to protect) the request matching with the response (see
Section 7.3). In particular, Section 7.3 defines the rules for
the inclusion of the ID Context in responses protected in group
mode, e.g., following a group rekeying.
When the signature checker receives a response protected in group
mode that includes an ID Context different from the one known to
be current, the signature checker takes that as an indication that
a group rekeying has occurred. Then, the signature checker
retrieves updated group data from the Group Manager, such as the
current ID Context and Signature Encryption Key used in the group
(see Section 12.3). From then on, the signature checker considers
the ID Context retrieved from the Group Manager as the current ID
Context used in the group.
* The response may not include a Sender ID. This can happen when
the response protected in group mode matches a request protected
in pairwise mode (see Sections 3.2 and 8.3) with a case in point
provided by [CACHEABLE-OSCORE]. In such a case, the signature
checker needs to use other means (e.g., source addressing
information of the server endpoint) to identify the correct
authentication credential including the public key to use for
verifying the countersignature of the response.
The particular actions following a successful or unsuccessful
verification of the countersignature are application-specific and out
of the scope of this document.
8. Message Processing in Pairwise Mode
When using the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE, messages are protected
and processed as in [RFC8613] with the modifications described in
this section. The security objectives of the pairwise mode are
discussed in Appendix A.2.
The possible use of the pairwise mode is indicated by the Group
Manager as part of the group data provided to new group members when
joining the group, according to which the parameters AEAD Algorithm
and Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm in the Security Context are set
(see Section 2).
The pairwise mode takes advantage of an existing Security Context to
establish keying material shared exclusively with each other member.
For encryption and decryption operations in pairwise mode, the AEAD
Algorithm from the Common Context is used (see Section 2.1.1).
In order to use the pairwise mode in a group where the group mode is
also used (i.e., Group Encryption Algorithm and Signature Algorithm
in the Security Context are set), the public/private key pairs used
for signature operations of the group mode MUST be possible to also
use for key agreement operations. For example, this can rely on
signing operations using ECDSA and encryption operations using AES
Counter Mode with CBC-MAC (AES-CCM) with keying material derived
through ECDH.
The pairwise mode does not support external verifiers of source
authentication and message integrity like the group mode does, e.g.,
for external signature checkers (see Section 7.5).
An endpoint implementing only a silent server does not support the
pairwise mode.
Endpoints using the CoAP Echo Option [RFC9175] in a group where the
AEAD Algorithm and Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm are set MUST
support the pairwise mode. When using the challenge-response method
defined in Section 9, this prevents the attack described in
Section 13.9, which leverages requests sent over unicast to a single
group member and protected in group mode.
The pairwise mode cannot be used to protect messages intended for
multiple recipients, as the keying material used for the pairwise
mode is shared only between two endpoints.
However, a sender can use the pairwise mode to protect a message sent
to (but not intended for) multiple recipients, if interested in a
response from only one of them. For instance, this is useful to
support the address discovery service defined in Section 8.1 when a
single 'kid' value is indicated in the payload of a request sent to
multiple recipients, e.g., over multicast.
8.1. Preconditions
In order to protect an outgoing message in pairwise mode, the sender
needs to know the authentication credential and the Recipient ID for
the recipient endpoint as stored in the Recipient Context associated
with that endpoint (see Section 2.5.4).
Typically, the sender endpoint sends the message protected in
pairwise mode over unicast, so that the message is delivered only to
the intended recipient endpoint for which it is protected. This
requires the sender to know the individual address of that recipient
endpoint, which the sender may not know at any given point in time.
For instance, right after having joined the group, a client may know
the authentication credential and Recipient ID for a given server,
but not the addressing information required to reach it with an
individual, one-to-one request.
In order to make addressing information of individual endpoints
available, servers in the group MAY expose a resource to which a
client can send a request targeting a set of servers, identified by
their 'kid' values specified in the request payload, or implicitly if
the request is sent in pairwise mode. Further details of such an
interface are out of scope for this document.
8.2. Main Differences from OSCORE
The pairwise mode protects messages between two members of a group,
essentially following [RFC8613] but with the following notable
differences:
* The 'kid' and 'kid context' parameters of the COSE object are used
as defined in Section 3.2 of this document.
* The external_aad defined in Section 3.4 of this document is used
for the encryption and decryption process.
* The Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys defined in Section 2.5 of this
document are used for the encryption and decryption process,
instead of the Sender Keys and Recipient Keys.
8.3. Protecting the Request
When using the pairwise mode to protect a request, a client SHALL
proceed as described in Section 8.1 of [RFC8613] with the differences
summarized in Section 8.2 of this document.
Furthermore, when sending a request that establishes a long exchange,
what is specified in Section 7.1 of this document applies, with
respect to storing the value of the 'kid' and 'kid context'
parameters and to storing an invariant identifier of the group.
8.4. Verifying the Request
Upon receiving a protected request with the Group Flag set to 0,
following the procedure in Section 6, a server SHALL proceed as
described in Section 8.2 of [RFC8613] with the differences summarized
in Section 8.2 of this document. The following differences also
apply:
* If the server discards the request due to not retrieving a
Security Context associated with the OSCORE group or to not
supporting the pairwise mode, the server MAY respond with a 4.01
(Unauthorized) error message or a 4.02 (Bad Option) error message,
respectively. When doing so, the server MAY set an Outer Max-Age
Option with value zero and MAY include a descriptive string as
diagnostic payload.
* If a new Recipient Context is created for this Recipient ID, new
Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are also derived (see
Section 2.5.1). The new Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are
deleted if the Recipient Context is deleted as a result of the
message not being successfully verified.
* What is specified in Section 7.2 of this document applies with
respect to the following points:
- The possible, dynamic creation and configuration of a Recipient
Context upon receiving the request.
- The possible deletion of a Recipient Context created upon
receiving the request, in the case that the request is not
verified successfully.
- The rule about processing the request where the received
Recipient ID ('kid') is equal to the server's Sender ID.
- The storing of the value of the 'kid' and 'kid context'
parameters from the request if the server intends to reply with
multiple responses within the long exchange established by the
request.
8.5. Protecting the Response
When using the pairwise mode to protect a response, a server SHALL
proceed as described in Section 8.3 of [RFC8613] with the differences
summarized in Section 8.2 of this document. The following
differences also apply:
* What is specified in Section 7.3 of this document applies with
respect to the following points.
- The protection of a response when using a different Security
Context than the one used to verify the corresponding request
(see Section 12.2). That is, the server always protects a
response with the Sender Context from its latest Security
Context, and establishing a new Security Context resets the
Sender Sequence Number to 0 (see Sections 2.6.3.1 and 2.6.3.2).
- The use of the stored value of the 'kid' and 'kid context'
parameters, if the server intends to reply with multiple
responses within the long exchange established by the request.
- The rules for the inclusion of the server's Sender Sequence
Number as Partial IV in a response, as used to build the nonce
to protect the response.
- The rules for the inclusion of the ID Context (Gid) in the 'kid
context' parameter of a response, if the ID Context used for
the response differs from the one used to verify the request
(see Section 12.2), also for helping the client to synchronize.
- The rules for the inclusion of the Sender ID in the 'kid'
parameter of a response to a request that was protected in
pairwise mode, if the server has obtained a new Sender ID from
the Group Manager when individually rekeyed (see
Section 2.6.3.1), thus helping the client to synchronize.
8.6. Verifying the Response
Upon receiving a protected response with the Group Flag set to 0,
following the procedure in Section 6, a client SHALL proceed as
described in Section 8.4 of [RFC8613] with the differences summarized
in Section 8.2 of this document. The following differences also
apply:
* The client may receive a response protected with a Security
Context different from the one used to protect the corresponding
request. Also, upon the establishment of a new Security Context,
the client re-initializes its Replay Windows in its Recipient
Contexts (see Sections 2.2 and 2.6.3).
* The same as described in Section 7.4 applies with respect to
handling the 'kid' parameter of the response, when received as a
reply to a request protected in pairwise mode. In this case too,
the client can check whether the replying server is the expected
one by relying on the server's public key. However, since the
response is protected in pairwise mode, the public key is not used
for verifying a countersignature as in Section 7.4. Instead, the
expected server's authentication credential -- namely Recipient
Auth Cred and including the server's public key -- was taken as
input to derive the Pairwise Recipient Key used to decrypt and
verify the response (see Section 2.5.1).
* If a new Recipient Context is created for this Recipient ID, new
Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are also derived (see
Section 2.5.1). The new Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are
deleted if the Recipient Context is deleted as a result of the
message not being successfully verified.
* What is specified in Section 7.4 of this document applies with
respect to the following points.
- The possible, dynamic creation and configuration of a Recipient
Context upon receiving the response.
- The use of the stored value of the 'kid' and 'kid context'
parameters when processing a response received within a long
exchange.
- The performing of ordering and replay protection for responses
received within a long exchange.
- The possible deletion of a Recipient Context created upon
receiving the response in the case that the response is not
verified successfully.
9. Challenge-Response-Based Freshness and Replay Window Recovery
This section describes how a server endpoint can verify freshness of
a request by means of a challenge-response exchange with a client
using the Echo Option for CoAP specified in Section 2 of [RFC9175].
The same mechanism, with small alterations, is also used by the
server when first processing a request using a Recipient Context
whose Replay Window was initialized as invalid.
If the application requires freshness, e.g., according to time- or
event-based policies (see Section 2.5.1 of [RFC9175]), a server
proceeds as described below upon receiving a request from a
particular client for the first time.
The server processes the message as described in this document but
does not deliver it to the application, even if the message is valid.
Instead, the server replies to the client with a Group OSCORE-
protected 4.01 (Unauthorized) response message, including only the
Echo Option and no diagnostic payload. The server MUST use its
Partial IV when generating the nonce for protecting the response
conveying the Echo Option and MUST include the Partial IV in the
response.
The Echo Option value SHOULD NOT be reused; if it is reused, it MUST
be highly unlikely to have been recently used with this client.
Since this response is protected with the Security Context used in
the group, the client will consider the response valid upon
successfully decrypting and verifying it.
The server stores the Echo Option value included in the response
together with the pair (gid,kid), where 'gid' is the Group Identifier
of the OSCORE group and 'kid' is the Sender ID of the client in the
group. These are specified in the 'kid context' and 'kid' fields of
the OSCORE Option of the request, respectively. After a group
rekeying has been completed and a new Security Context has been
established in the group, which also results in a new Group
Identifier (see Section 12.2), the server MUST delete all the stored
Echo values associated with members of the group.
After receiving a 4.01 (Unauthorized) response that includes an Echo
Option and originates from a verified group member, a subsequent
client request sent to that server and echoing the Echo Option value
MUST be a message sent unicast to that server.
In the group, if the AEAD Algorithm and Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm are set in the Security Context, the client MUST use the
pairwise mode to protect the request as per Section 8.3. Note that,
as defined in Section 8, endpoints that are members of such a group
and that use the Echo Option support the pairwise mode. In a group
where the AEAD Algorithm and Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm are not
set, only the group mode can be used. Hence, requests including the
Echo Option can be protected only with the group mode, with the
caveat due to the risk for those requests to be redirected to a
different server than the intended one as discussed in Section 13.9.
The client does not necessarily resend the same request, but can
instead send a more recent one if the application permits it. This
allows the client to not retain previously sent requests for full
retransmission unless the application explicitly requires otherwise.
In either case, the client uses a fresh Sender Sequence Number value
from its own Sender Context. If the client stores requests for
possible retransmission with the Echo Option, it should not store a
given request for longer than a preconfigured time interval. Note
that the unicast request echoing the Echo Option is correctly treated
and processed since the 'kid context' field including the Group
Identifier of the OSCORE group is still present in the OSCORE Option
as part of the COSE object (see Section 3).
Upon receiving the unicast request including the Echo Option, the
server performs the following verifications:
* If the server does not store an Echo Option value for the pair
(gid,kid), it considers i) the time t1 when it has established the
Security Context used to protect the received request, and ii) the
time t2 when the request has been received. Since a valid request
cannot be older than the Security Context used to protect it, the
server verifies that (t2 - t1) is less than the largest amount of
time acceptable to consider the request fresh.
* If the server stores an Echo Option value for the pair (gid,kid)
associated with that same client in the same group, the server
verifies that the option value equals that same stored value
previously sent to that client.
If the verifications above fail, the server MUST NOT process the
request further and MAY send a 4.01 (Unauthorized) response including
an Echo Option, hence performing a new challenge-response exchange.
If the verifications above are successful, the server considers the
Recipient Context associated with the sender client and proceeds as
follows:
* If the Replay Window is invalid, the steps below occur:
1. The server updates the Replay Window by marking as received
the Sender Sequence Number from the latest received request.
This becomes the lower limit of the Replay Window while all
the greater Sender Sequence Number values within the Replay
Window are marked as not received.
2. The server makes the Replay Window valid and accepts the
request as fresh.
* If the Replay Window is already valid, the server discards the
verification result and accepts the request as fresh or treats it
as a replay according to the existing Replay Window.
A server should not deliver requests from a given client to the
application until one valid request from that same client has been
verified as fresh via an echoed Echo Option included therein. A
server may perform the challenge-response described above at any
time, e.g., after a device reboot occurred in an unprepared way. A
client has to be ready to perform the challenge-response based on the
Echo Option if a server starts it.
Message freshness is further discussed in Section 13.14.
10. Implementation Compliance
Like in [RFC8613], HKDF SHA-256 is the mandatory-to-implement HKDF.
An endpoint may support only the group mode, or only the pairwise
mode, or both.
For endpoints that support the group mode, the following applies:
* For endpoints that use authenticated encryption, the AEAD
algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC9053] is
mandatory to implement as Group Encryption Algorithm (see
Section 2.1.7).
* For endpoints that use non-authenticated encryption, the algorithm
A128CTR defined in Section 4 of [RFC9459] is mandatory to
implement as Group Encryption Algorithm (see Section 2.1.7).
* Section 6 of [RFC9459] mandates that COSE libraries supporting the
AES-CTR algorithm and accepting AAD as input must return an error
if AAD is provided when such a non-AEAD content encryption
algorithm is selected.
If the used Group Encryption Algorithm (see Section 2.1.7) does
not provide integrity protection, the following applies:
When invoking the execution of the Group Encryption Algorithm, the
Group OSCORE implementation MUST NOT provide any AAD to the COSE
library, unless AAD is always expected as input. In the latter
case, the AAD will not be protected by the Group Encryption
Algorithm, which is unable to do so.
If the used COSE library adheres to the mandate in Section 6 of
[RFC9459], then a Group OSCORE implementation requires that the
COSE library supports using the Group Encryption Algorithm without
taking AAD as input.
* For many constrained Internet of Things (IoT) devices, it is
problematic to support more than one signature algorithm. The
following applies with respect to the Signature Algorithm (see
Section 2.1.8).
Less constrained endpoints MUST implement at least one of the
following and SHOULD implement both: the EdDSA signature algorithm
together with the elliptic curve Ed25519 [RFC8032] and/or the
ECDSA signature algorithm together with the elliptic curve P-256.
Constrained endpoints MUST implement at least one of the following
and, if affordable, SHOULD implement both: the EdDSA signature
algorithm together with the elliptic curve Ed25519 [RFC8032] and/
or the ECDSA signature algorithm together with the elliptic curve
P-256.
* Endpoints that implement the ECDSA signature algorithm MAY use
"deterministic ECDSA" as specified in [RFC6979]. Pure
deterministic elliptic-curve signature algorithms such as
deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA have the advantage of not requiring
access to a source of high-quality randomness. However, these
signature algorithms have been shown vulnerable to some side-
channel and fault injection attacks due to their determinism,
which can result in extracting a device's private key. As
suggested in Section 2.1.1 of [RFC9053], this can be addressed by
combining both randomness and determinism [SIGS-WITH-NOISE].
For endpoints that support the pairwise mode, the following applies:
* The AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 defined in Section 4.2 of
[RFC9053] is mandatory to implement as AEAD Algorithm (see
Section 2.1.1).
* The ECDH-SS + HKDF-256 algorithm specified in Section 6.3.1 of
[RFC9053] is mandatory to implement as Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm (see Section 2.1.10).
* The following applies with respect to ECDH curves.
Less constrained endpoints MUST implement at least one of the
following ECDH curves and SHOULD implement both: the X25519 curve
[RFC7748] and/or the P-256 curve.
Constrained endpoints MUST implement at least one of the following
ECDH curves and, if affordable, SHOULD implement both: the X25519
curve [RFC7748] and/or the P-256 curve.
Constrained IoT devices may alternatively represent Montgomery curves
and (twisted) Edwards curves [RFC7748] in the short-Weierstrass form
Wei25519, with which the algorithms ECDSA25519 and ECDH25519 can be
used for signature operations and Diffie-Hellman secret calculation,
respectively [CURVE-REPR].
11. Web Linking
The use of Group OSCORE or OSCORE [RFC8613] MAY be indicated by a
target "gosc" attribute in a web link [RFC8288] to a resource, e.g.,
using a CoRE link-format document [RFC6690] if the resource is
accessible over CoAP.
The "gosc" attribute is a hint indicating that the destination of
that link is only accessible using Group OSCORE or OSCORE, and
unprotected access to it is not supported. Note that this is simply
a hint; it does not include any security context material or any
other information required to run Group OSCORE or OSCORE.
A value MUST NOT be given for the "gosc" attribute; any present value
MUST be ignored by parsers. The "gosc" attribute MUST NOT appear
more than once in a given link-value; occurrences after the first
MUST be ignored by parsers.
When a link-value includes the "gosc" attribute, the link-value MUST
also include the "osc" attribute defined in Section 9 of [RFC8613].
If the endpoint parsing the link-value supports Group OSCORE and
understands the "gosc" attribute, then the parser MUST ignore the
"osc" attribute, which is overshadowed by the "gosc" attribute.
The example in Figure 3 shows a use of the "gosc" attribute: the
client does resource discovery on a server and gets back a list of
resources, one of which includes the "gosc" attribute indicating that
the resource is protected with Group OSCORE or OSCORE. The link-
format notation (see Section 5 of [RFC6690]) is used.
REQ: GET /.well-known/core
RES: 2.05 Content
</sensors/temp>;gosc;osc,
</sensors/light>;if="sensor"
Figure 3: Example of Using the "gosc" Attribute in a Web Link
12. The Group Manager
As with OSCORE, endpoints communicating with Group OSCORE need to
establish the relevant Security Context. Group OSCORE endpoints need
to acquire OSCORE input parameters, information about the group(s),
and information about other endpoints in the group(s).
Every group is associated with a Group Manager that is responsible
for distributing security parameters and keying material within the
group, among other tasks. The details of how the Group Manager
interacts with (candidate) group members or with external entities
like signature checkers, as well as the protocols used for those
interactions, are out of scope.
The Group Manager assigns unique Group Identifiers (Gids) to the
groups under its control. Within each of such groups, the Group
Manager assigns unique Sender IDs (and thus Recipient IDs) to the
respective group members. The maximum length of Sender IDs depends
on the length of the nonce for the algorithms used in the group (see
Section 2.2).
The Gid value assigned to a group is associated with a dedicated
space for the values of Sender ID and Recipient ID of the members of
that group. When an endpoint (re-)joins a group, it is provided with
the current Gid to use in the group. The Group Manager also assigns
an integer Key Generation Number counter to each of its groups,
identifying the current version of the keying material used in that
group. Further details about identifiers and keys are provided in
Section 12.2.
The Group Manager maintains records of the authentication credentials
of endpoints in a group, and provides members of the group with
information about the group and other group members (see
Section 12.1). Optionally, the Group Manager provides information
about the group and its members to external entities with a specific
role, such as signature checkers (see Section 12.3).
The list of responsibilities of the Group Manager is compiled in
Appendix D.
One realization of Group Manager is specified in
[ACE-KEY-GROUP-OSCORE], where the process by which an endpoint
(re-)joins a group is based on the Authentication and Authorization
for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework [RFC9200].
12.1. Setup of New Endpoints
From the Group Manager, an endpoint acquires group data such as the
Gid and OSCORE input parameters including its own Sender ID, with
which it can derive the Sender Context.
When joining the group or later on as a group member, an endpoint can
also retrieve from the Group Manager the authentication credential of
the Group Manager as well as the authentication credentials and other
information (e.g., the Sender IDs) associated with other members of
the group, with which it can derive the corresponding Recipient
Context. An application can configure a group member to
asynchronously retrieve information about Recipient Contexts, e.g.,
by observing [RFC7641] a resource at the Group Manager to get updates
on the group membership.
When endpoints join the group, the Group Manager collects the
endpoints' authentication credentials and MUST verify proof of
possession of the respective private key. As an example, such proof
of possession is possible to achieve during the join process provided
by the realization of Group Manager specified in
[ACE-KEY-GROUP-OSCORE]. Together with the requested authentication
credentials of other group members, the Group Manager MUST provide
the joining endpoints with the Sender ID of the associated group
members and the current Key Generation Number in the group (see
Section 12.2).
An endpoint may join a group, for example, by explicitly interacting
with the responsible Group Manager or by being configured with some
tool performing the tasks of the Group Manager. When becoming
members of a group, endpoints are not required to know how many and
what endpoints are in the same group.
Communications that the Group Manager has with joining endpoints and
group members MUST be secured. Specific details on how to secure
such communications are out of the scope of this document.
The Group Manager MUST verify that the joining endpoint is authorized
to join the group. To this end, the Group Manager can directly
authorize the joining endpoint or expect it to provide authorization
evidence previously obtained from a trusted entity. Further details
about the authorization of joining endpoints are out of the scope of
this document.
In the case of successful authorization check, the Group Manager
provides the joining endpoint with the keying material to initialize
the Security Context. The actual provisioning of keying material and
parameters to the joining endpoint is out of the scope of this
document.
12.2. Management of Group Keying Material
In order to establish a new Security Context for a group, the Group
Manager MUST generate and assign to the group a new Group Identifier
(Gid) and a new value for the Master Secret parameter. When doing
so, a new value for the Master Salt parameter MAY also be generated
and assigned to the group. When establishing the new Security
Context, the Group Manager SHOULD preserve the current value of the
Sender ID of each group member in order to ensure an efficient key
rollover. Exceptions can apply if there are compelling reasons for
making available again some of the Sender ID values currently used.
The specific group key management scheme used to distribute new
keying material is out of the scope of this document. A simple group
key management scheme is defined in [ACE-KEY-GROUP-OSCORE].
Different group key management schemes rely on different approaches
to compose and deliver rekeying messages, i.e., individually
targeting single recipients, or targeting multiple recipients at once
(e.g., over UDP/IP multicast), or a combination of the two
approaches. As long as it is viable for the specific rekeying
message to be delivered and it is supported by the intended message
recipient(s), using a reliable transport to deliver a rekeying
message should be preferred, as it reduces chances of group members
missing a rekeying instance.
Irrespective of the transport used being reliable or unreliable,
appropriate congestion control MUST be enforced. If the key
distribution traffic uses CoAP over UDP or over other unreliable
transports, mechanisms for enforcing congestion control are specified
in Section 4.7 of [RFC7252] and in Section 3.6 of [RFC10020] for the
case of group communication (e.g., over UDP/IP multicast). If,
irrespective of using CoAP, the key distribution traffic relies on
alternative setups with unreliable transports, one can rely on
general congestion-control mechanisms such as the Datagram Congestion
Control Protocol (DCCP) [RFC4340] or on dedicated congestion-control
mechanisms for the transport specifically used (e.g., those defined
in [RFC9002] for QUIC [RFC9000]).
The set of group members should not be assumed as fixed, i.e., the
group membership is subject to changes, possibly on a frequent basis.
The Group Manager MUST rekey the group without undue delay when one
or more endpoints leave the group. An endpoint may leave the group
on its own initiative or may be evicted from the group by the Group
Manager, e.g., when the endpoint is compromised or is suspected to be
compromised (as determined by the Group Manager through its own means
or based on information that it obtains from a trusted source, such
as an Intrusion Detection System or an issuer of authentication
credentials). In either case, rekeying the group excludes such
endpoints from future communications in the group, and thus preserves
forward security. If a network node is compromised or suspected to
be compromised, the Group Manager MUST evict from the group all the
endpoints hosted by that node that are members of the group and rekey
the group accordingly.
If required by the application, the Group Manager MUST also rekey the
group when one or more new joining endpoints are added to the group,
thus preserving backward security.
The Group Manager MAY also rekey the group for other reasons, e.g.,
according to an application-specific rekeying period or scheduling.
Separately for each group, the value of the Key Generation Number
increases by one each time the Group Manager distributes new keying
material to that group (see below).
The establishment of the new Security Context for the group takes the
following steps.
1. The Group Manager MUST increment the Key Generation Number for
the group by 1. It is up to the Group Manager what actions to
take when a wrap-around of the Key Generation Number is detected.
2. The Group Manager MUST build a set of stale Sender IDs,
including:
* The Sender IDs that have been relinquished since the latest
assignment of the current Gid to the group (see
Section 2.6.3.1).
* The current Sender IDs of the group members that the upcoming
group rekeying aims to exclude from future group
communications, if any.
3. The Group Manager rekeys the group by distributing:
* The new keying material, i.e., the new Master Secret, the new
Gid, and (optionally) the new Master Salt.
* The new Key Generation Number from Step 1.
* The set of stale Sender IDs from Step 2.
Further information may be distributed depending on the specific
group key management scheme used in the group.
When receiving the new group keying material, a group member
considers the received stale Sender IDs and performs the following
actions:
* The group member MUST remove every authentication credential
associated with a stale Sender ID from its list of group members'
authentication credentials used in the group.
* The group member MUST delete each of its Recipient Contexts used
in the group whose corresponding Recipient ID is a stale Sender
ID.
After that, the group member installs the new keying material and
derives the corresponding new Security Context.
A group member might miss one or more consecutive instances of group
rekeying. As a result, the group member will retain old group keying
material with Key Generation Number GEN_OLD. Eventually, the group
member can notice the discrepancy, e.g., by repeatedly failing to
verify incoming messages or by explicitly querying the Group Manager
for the current Key Generation Number. Once the group member gains
knowledge of having missed a group rekeying, it MUST delete the old
keying material it stores.
Then, the group member proceeds according to the following steps.
1. The group member retrieves from the Group Manager the current
group keying material together with the current Key Generation
Number GEN_NEW. The group member MUST NOT install the obtained
group keying material yet.
2. The group member asks the Group Manager for the set of stale
Sender IDs between GEN_OLD and GEN_NEW.
3. If no exact and complete indication can be obtained from the
Group Manager, the group member MUST remove all the
authentication credentials from its list of group members'
authentication credentials used in the group and MUST delete all
its Recipient Contexts used in the group.
Otherwise, the group member MUST remove every authentication
credential associated with a stale Sender ID from its list of
group members' authentication credentials used in the group and
MUST delete each of its Recipient Contexts used in the group
whose corresponding Recipient ID is a stale Sender ID.
4. The group member installs the current group keying material and
derives the corresponding new Security Context.
Alternatively, the group member can re-join the group. In such a
case, the group member MUST take one of the following two actions:
* First, the group member performs Steps 2 and 3 above. Then, the
group member re-joins the group.
* The group member re-joins the group with the same roles it
currently has in the group and, during the re-join process, asks
the Group Manager for the authentication credentials of all the
current group members.
Then, given Z (the set of authentication credentials received from
the Group Manager), the group member removes every authentication
credential that is not present in Z from its list of group
members' authentication credentials used in the group.
Furthermore, it deletes each of its Recipient Contexts used in the
group that does not include any of the authentication credentials
found in Z.
By removing authentication credentials and deleting Recipient
Contexts associated with stale Sender IDs, it is ensured that a
recipient endpoint storing the latest group keying material does not
store the authentication credentials of sender endpoints that are not
current group members. This, in turn, allows group members to rely
on stored authentication credentials to confidently verify the group
membership of sender endpoints when receiving incoming messages
protected in group mode (see Section 7).
Strictness in managing the authentication credentials and Recipient
Contexts associated with other group members is required for two
reasons. First, as further discussed in Section 13.1, it ensures
that the group mode can be used securely, even in a group where the
Group Encryption Algorithm does not provide integrity protection (see
Section 2.1.7) and external signature checkers are used (see
Section 7.5). Second, it ensures that the wrong (old) authentication
credential associated with a group member A is never used with a
Sender ID that used to be associated with A and has been later issued
to a different group member B (see Section 12.2.1.2), thus preventing
the need to recover from an identity mix-up.
12.2.1. Recycling of Identifiers
This section specifies how the Group Manager handles and possibly
reassigns Gid values and Sender ID values in a group.
12.2.1.1. Recycling of Group Identifiers
Since the Gid value changes every time a group is rekeyed, it can
happen that, after several rekeying instances, the whole space of Gid
values has been used for the group in question. When this happens,
the Group Manager has no available Gid values to use that have never
been assigned to the group during the group's lifetime.
The occurrence of such an event and how long it would take to occur
depend on the format and encoding of Gid values used in the group
(see, e.g., Appendix C), as well as on the frequency of rekeying
instances yielding a change of Gid value. Independently for each
group under its control, the Group Manager can take one of the two
following approaches:
* The Group Manager does not reassign Gid values. That is, once the
whole space of Gid values has been used for a group, the Group
Manager terminates the group and may re-establish a new group.
* While the Gid value changes every time a group is rekeyed, the
Group Manager can reassign Gid values previously used during a
group's lifetime. By doing so, the group can continue to exist
even once the whole space of Gid values has been used.
The Group Manager MAY support and use this approach, according to
what is specified in Section 12.2.1.1.1.
12.2.1.1.1. Reassignment of Group Identifiers
If the Group Manager performs the reassignment of Gid values
previously used during a group's lifetime, the Group Manager MUST
take additional actions when handling Gid values and rekeying the
group, as specified below.
When a node (re-)joins the group and it is provided with the current
Gid to use in the group, the Group Manager considers such a Gid as
the Birth Gid of that endpoint for that group. For each group
member, the Group Manager MUST store the latest corresponding Birth
Gid until that member leaves the group. If the endpoint has in fact
re-joined the group, the newly determined Birth Gid overwrites the
one currently stored.
When establishing a new Security Context for the group, the Group
Manager takes the additional following step between Steps 1 and 2 of
Section 12.2.
A. The Group Manager MUST check if the new Gid to be distributed is
equal to the Birth Gid of any of the current group members. If any
of such "elder members" is found in the group, then:
* The Group Manager MUST evict the elder members from the group.
That is, the Group Manager MUST terminate their membership and, in
the following steps, it MUST rekey the group in such a way that
the new keying material is not provided to those evicted elder
members.
This ensures that any response from the same server to the request
of a long exchange can never successfully match against the
request of two different long exchanges.
The excluded elder members could eventually re-join the group,
thus terminating any of their ongoing long exchanges (see
Section 5.1).
Therefore, it is ensured by construction that no client can have
with the same server two ongoing long exchanges, such that the two
respective requests were protected using the same Partial IV, Gid,
and Sender ID.
12.2.1.2. Recycling of Sender IDs
From the moment a Gid is assigned to a group (T_start) until the
moment when a new Gid is assigned to that same group, the following
restrictions apply within the group:
* The Group Manager MUST NOT assign a Sender ID that was already the
Sender ID of an endpoint in the group at T_start.
* The Group Manager MUST NOT assign a given Sender ID more than
once.
That is, under the ongoing use of the current Gid, a given Sender ID
is not reassigned to the same or a different endpoint. This prevents
from reusing a Sender ID ('kid') with the same triple (Gid, Master
Secret, Master Salt). Within these restrictions, the Group Manager
can assign a Sender ID used under an old Gid value (including under a
same, recycled Gid value), thus avoiding Sender ID values to
irrecoverably grow in size.
Even when an endpoint joining a group is recognized as a current
member of that group, e.g., through the ongoing secure communication
association, the Group Manager MUST assign a new Sender ID different
from the one currently used by the endpoint in the group unless the
group is rekeyed first and a new Gid value is established.
12.2.1.3. Relation between Identifiers and Keying Material
Figure 4 gives an overview of the different identifiers and keying
material components, considering their relation and possible reuse
across group rekeying.
Components changed in lockstep
upon a group rekeying
+----------------------------+ * Changing a kid does not
| | need changing the GID
| Master |<--> kid1
| Secret <---> o <---> GID | * A kid is not reassigned
| ^ |<--> kid2 under the ongoing usage of
| | | the current GID
| | |<--> kid3
| v | * Upon changing the GID,
| Master Salt | ... ... every current kid should
| (optional) | be preserved for efficient
| | key rollover
| The Key Generation Number |
| is incremented by 1 | * After changing the GID,
| | an unused kid can be
+----------------------------+ assigned even if it was used
before the GID change
Figure 4: Relations Among Keying Material Components
12.3. Support for Signature Checkers
The Group Manager may serve signature checkers, e.g., intermediary
gateways, which verify countersignatures of messages protected in
group mode (see Section 7.5). These entities do not join a group as
members, but they can retrieve authentication credentials of group
members and other selected group data from the Group Manager.
In order to verify countersignatures of messages in a group, a
signature checker needs to retrieve the following information about
the group from the responsible Group Manager:
* The current ID Context (Gid) used in the group.
* The authentication credentials and other information (e.g., the
Sender IDs) associated with the group members as well as the
authentication credential of the Group Manager.
If the signature checker is provided with a CWT or a CCS for a
given entity, then the authentication credential associated with
that entity is the untagged CWT or CCS.
If the signature checker is provided with a chain or a bag of
X.509/C509 certificates, or of CWTs, or of CCSs for a given
entity, then the authentication credential associated with that
entity is the end-entity certificate or end-entity untagged CWT/
CCS.
* The current Signature Encryption Key used in the group (see
Section 2.1.9).
* The identifiers of the algorithms used in the group (see
Section 2), i.e., i) the HKDF Algorithm, ii) the Group Encryption
Algorithm and Signature Algorithm, and iii) the AEAD Algorithm and
Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, if such parameters are set in
the Common Context (see Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.10).
A signature checker MUST be authorized before it can retrieve such
information, e.g., with the use of [ACE-KEY-GROUP-OSCORE].
13. Security Considerations
The same considerations from Appendix D of [RFC8613] on the security
properties of OSCORE apply for Group OSCORE with the differences
discussed in the following. Those considerations are about the
reference threat model, the support for proxy operations, the
protection of message fields, and the uniqueness of (key, nonce)
pairs (which is further discussed in Section 13.3 of this document).
For Group OSCORE, the Sender Context and Recipient Context
additionally contain asymmetric keys, which are used to provide
source authentication in group mode by means of countersignatures
(see Section 13.1) and in pairwise mode by using Diffie-Hellman (see
Section 13.2). The key pair can, for example, be generated by the
endpoint or provisioned during manufacturing.
Note that, even if an endpoint is authorized to be a group member and
to take part in group communications, there is a risk that it behaves
inappropriately. For instance, it can forward the content of
messages in the group to unauthorized entities. However, in many use
cases, the devices in the group belong to a common authority and are
configured by a commissioner (see Appendix B), which limits this risk
in practice and enables a prompt detection/reaction in the case of
misbehaving.
With respect to unprotected message fields, the following applies.
First, the 'kid context' of request messages is part of the AAD,
making it possible to keep long exchanges active safely beyond a
possible change of ID Context (Gid) following a group rekeying (see
Section 3.4). Second, the countersignature included in a Group
OSCORE message protected in group mode is also computed over the
value of the OSCORE Option, which is also part of the AAD used in the
signing process. This is further discussed in Section 13.7 of this
document.
In accordance with [RFC8613], all elements used in Group OSCORE as
opaque binary values (e.g., Sender ID, ID Context) are not to be
interpreted as text, Unicode, or otherwise. Implementations ought
not to apply encoding transformations to the content of those
elements, e.g., UTF-8 decoding [RFC3629] or normalization.
Information elements that may contain text such as those found within
authentication credentials (e.g., X.509 distinguished names, CWT
claims, or JSON Web Key fields) are to be treated as opaque
structured data and to be interpreted only according to the rules of
the credential format as defined in their respective specifications.
This avoids misinterpretation, Unicode normalization attacks, or
mismatches in identity comparison.
As discussed in Section 6.2.3 of [RFC10020], Group OSCORE addresses
security attacks against CoAP as listed in Sections 11.2 through 11.6
of [RFC7252], especially when run over IP multicast.
Group OSCORE does not aim to meet the following properties:
* Verification of server aliveness, as discussed in Section 5.2.
* Protection of network addressing information, as discussed in
Section 13.9.
* Management of group membership and group keying material, which is
entrusted to the Group Manager (see Section 12). Related security
considerations are discussed in Sections 13.4 and 13.5.
* Confidentiality protection of the OSCORE Option. Related privacy
considerations are discussed in Section 13.18.
The rest of this section first discusses security aspects to be taken
into account when using Group OSCORE. Then, it goes through aspects
covered in the security considerations of OSCORE (see Section 12 of
[RFC8613]) and discusses how they apply when Group OSCORE is used.
13.1. Security of the Group Mode
The group mode defined in Section 7 relies on shared group keying
material to protect communication within a group. Using the group
mode has the implications discussed below. This section uses the
term 'group members' to describe endpoints that possess the latest
version of the group keying material.
* Source authentication of messages sent to a group is ensured
through a countersignature, which is computed by the sender
endpoint using its own private key and then appended to the
message payload. The countersignature is also encrypted using a
keystream derived from the group keying material (see Sections 4.1
and 4.2). This ensures group privacy, i.e., an attacker cannot
track an endpoint over two groups by linking messages between the
two groups unless the attacker is also a member of both groups.
* Messages are encrypted at a group level (group-level data
confidentiality), i.e., they can be decrypted by any member of the
group, but not by an external adversary or other external entities
other than the Group Manager responsible for the group.
* If the used Group Encryption Algorithm provides integrity
protection, then it also ensures group authentication and proof of
group membership, but not source authentication. That is, it
ensures that a message sent to a group has been sent by a member
of that group, but not necessarily by the alleged sender. In
fact, any group member is able to derive the Sender Key used by
the actual sender endpoint, and thus can compute a valid
authentication tag. Therefore, the message content could
originate from any of the current group members.
Furthermore, if the used Group Encryption Algorithm does not
provide integrity protection, then it does not ensure any level of
message authentication or proof of group membership.
On the other hand, proof of group membership is always ensured by
construction through the strict management of the group keying
material (see Section 12.2). That is, the group is rekeyed when
members leave and the current group members are informed of former
group members. Thus, a current group member storing the latest
group keying material does not store the authentication credential
of any former group member.
This allows a recipient endpoint to rely on the stored
authentication credentials and public keys included therein in
order to always confidently verify the group membership of a
sender endpoint when processing an incoming message, i.e., to
verify that the sender endpoint was a group member when it signed
the message. In turn, this prevents a former group member from
possibly re-signing and injecting in the group a stored message
that was protected with old keying material. A case in point is
discussed in Section 13.1.1.
The security properties of the group mode are summarized below.
1. Asymmetric source authentication by means of a countersignature.
2. Symmetric group authentication by means of an authentication tag
(only for Group Encryption Algorithms providing integrity
protection).
3. Symmetric group confidentiality by means of symmetric encryption.
4. Proof of group membership by strictly managing the group keying
material as well as by means of integrity tags when using a Group
Encryption Algorithm that provides also integrity protection.
5. Group privacy by encrypting the countersignature.
The group mode fulfills the security properties above while also
displaying the following benefits. First, the use of a Group
Encryption Algorithm that does not provide integrity protection
results in a minimal communication overhead by limiting the message
payload to the ciphertext without integrity tag together with the
encrypted countersignature. Second, it is possible to deploy semi-
trusted entities such as signature checkers (see Section 12.3), which
can break property 5, but cannot break properties 1, 2, 3, and 4.
13.1.1. Example of Need for Proof of Group Membership
As a case in point, the importance of reliable proof of group
membership is evident in a group where the Group Encryption Algorithm
does not provide integrity protection. Suppose that a group member
leaves the group and, after the group rekeying, associates with the
group as external signature checker (see Section 7.5). When doing
so, it obtains the new Signature Encryption Key from the Group
Manager, from which it can derive keystreams for encrypting and
decrypting the countersignatures of messages protected in group mode.
However, when participating in the group rekeying, the current group
members deleted the Recipient Context and authentication credential
of the former group member. Consequently, the signature checker is
not able to successfully inject messages protected in group mode, as
encrypted with the old group keying material, signed with its own
private key, and with the countersignature encrypted by means of the
latest Signature Encryption Key. That is, if the signature checker
attempts to do that, then the group members will fail to verify the
messages from the signature checker and thus will discard those
messages.
13.2. Security of the Pairwise Mode
The pairwise mode defined in Section 8 protects messages by using
pairwise symmetric keys, derived from the static-static Diffie-
Hellman shared secret computed from the asymmetric keys of the sender
and recipient endpoint (see Section 2.5).
The used AEAD Algorithm MUST provide integrity protection.
Therefore, the pairwise mode ensures both pairwise data
confidentiality and source authentication of messages without using
countersignatures. Furthermore, the recipient endpoint achieves
proof of group membership for the sender endpoint since only current
group members have the required keying material to derive a valid
Pairwise Sender/Recipient Key.
Finally, the pairwise mode ensures group privacy, i.e., an attacker
cannot track an endpoint over two groups by linking messages between
the two groups unless the attacker is also a member of both groups.
This follows from two different groups using different and
uncorrelated group keying material, which yields different and
uncorrelated pairwise keys for the same endpoint in any two groups.
Therefore, the authentication tags generated by an endpoint in a
group have no correlation with those generated by the same endpoint
in another group.
The security properties of the pairwise mode are summarized below.
1. Symmetric source authentication by means of an authentication
tag.
2. Symmetric pairwise confidentiality by means of symmetric
encryption.
3. Proof of group membership by strictly managing the group keying
material, as well as by means of integrity tags.
4. Group privacy by virtue of the uncorrelated pairwise keys used in
any two different groups.
The long-term storing of the Diffie-Hellman shared secret is a
potential security issue. In fact, if the shared secret of two group
members is leaked, a third group member can exploit it to derive
their pairwise keys and use those to impersonate either of the two
group members to the other, or to decrypt previously stored messages
exchanged between those two members and protected with their pairwise
keys. The possibility of such leakage should be considered more
likely than the leakage of a private key, which could be rather
protected at a significantly higher level than generic memory, e.g.,
by using a Trusted Platform Module. Therefore, there is a trade-off
between the maximum amount of time a same shared secret is stored and
the frequency of its re-computing.
13.3. Uniqueness of (key, nonce)
The proof for uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs in Appendix D.4 of
[RFC8613] is also valid in group communication scenarios. That is,
given an OSCORE group:
* Uniqueness of Sender IDs within the group is enforced by the Group
Manager. In fact, from the moment when a Gid is assigned to a
group until the moment when a new Gid is assigned to that same
group, the Group Manager does not reassign a Sender ID within the
group (see Section 12.2.1.2).
* Case A in Appendix D.4 of [RFC8613] concerns all requests as well
as all responses including a Partial IV (e.g., Observe
notifications [RFC7641] or any other subsequent responses after
the first one). In this case, the same considerations from
[RFC8613] apply here as well.
* Case B in Appendix D.4 of [RFC8613] concerns responses not
including a Partial IV (e.g., a single response to a request). In
this case, the same considerations from [RFC8613] apply here as
well.
As a consequence, each message encrypted/decrypted with the same key
is processed by using a different (ID_PIV, PIV) pair. This means
that nonces used by any fixed encrypting endpoint are unique. Thus,
each message is processed with a different (key, nonce) pair.
13.4. Management of Group Keying Material
The protocol described in this document should take into account the
risk of compromise of group members. In particular, this document
specifies that a key management scheme for secure revocation and
renewal of Security Contexts and group keying material MUST be
adopted.
[ACE-KEY-GROUP-OSCORE] specifies a simple rekeying scheme for
renewing the Security Context in a group.
Alternative rekeying schemes that are more scalable with the group
size may be needed in dynamic, large groups where endpoints can join
and leave at any time in order to limit the impact on performance due
to the Security Context and keying material update.
13.4.1. Denial of Service
An adversary may leverage the loss of Sender Contexts and/or
Recipient Contexts as described in Section 2.6.1.1 in order to
perform a Denial of Service attack and prevent some group members
from communicating altogether.
That is, the adversary can first block the communication path between
the Group Manager and some individual group members. This can be
achieved, for instance, by injecting fake responses to DNS queries
for the Group Manager hostname or by removing a network link used for
routing traffic towards the Group Manager.
Then, the adversary can induce an unprepared reboot for some
endpoints in the group, e.g., by triggering a short power outage.
After that, such endpoints that have lost their Sender Context and/or
Recipient Contexts following the reboot would not be able to obtain
new Security Context parameters from the Group Manager as specified
in Section 2.6.1.1. Thus, they would not be able to further
communicate in the group until connectivity with the Group Manager is
restored.
13.5. Update of Security Context and Key Rotation
A group member can receive a message shortly after the group has been
rekeyed and new security parameters and keying material have been
distributed by the Group Manager.
This may result in a client using an old Security Context to protect
a request and a server using a different new Security Context to
protect a corresponding response. As a consequence, clients may
receive a response protected with a Security Context different from
the one used to protect the corresponding request.
In particular, a server may first receive a request protected with
the old Security Context, then install the new Security Context, and
only after that produce a response to send back to the client. In
such a case, as specified in Section 7.3, the server MUST protect the
potential response using the new Security Context. Specifically, the
server MUST include its Sender Sequence Number as Partial IV in the
response and use it to build the nonce to protect the response. This
prevents the nonce from the request from being reused with the new
Security Context.
The client will process that response using the new Security Context,
provided that it has installed the new security parameters and keying
material before the message processing.
If block-wise transfer [RFC7959] is used, the same considerations
from Section 10.3 of [RFC9594] apply.
Furthermore, as described below, a group rekeying may temporarily
result in misaligned Security Contexts between the sender and
recipient of a given message.
13.5.1. Late Update on the Sender
In this case, the sender protects a message using the old Security
Context, i.e., before having installed the new Security Context.
However, the recipient receives the message after having installed
the new Security Context and is thus unable to correctly process it.
A possible way to mitigate this issue is to preserve the old retained
Security Context for a maximum amount of time defined by the
application. By doing so, the recipient can still try to process the
received message using the old retained Security Context.
This makes particular sense when the recipient is a client, as it
enables the client to process incoming responses protected with the
old retained Security Context that was used to protect the associated
request. If, as typically expected, the old Gid is not included in
the response, the client will first fail to process the response
using the latest Security Context and then use the old retained
Security Context as a second attempt.
Instead, a recipient server can immediately process an incoming
request with the old retained Security Context, as signaled by the
old Gid that is always included in requests. However, the server
could simply discard such an incoming request, which is preferable
from a security point of view.
This tolerance preserves the processing of secure messages throughout
a long-lasting key rotation, as group rekeying processes may likely
take a long time to complete, especially in large groups. On the
other hand, a former (compromised) group member can abusively take
advantage of this and send messages protected with the old retained
Security Context. Therefore, a conservative application policy
should not permit the retention of old Security Contexts.
13.5.2. Late Update on the Recipient
In this case, the sender protects a message using the new Security
Context, but the recipient receives that message before having
installed the new Security Context. Therefore, the recipient would
not be able to correctly process the message and hence discards it.
If the recipient installs the new Security Context shortly after that
and the sender endpoint retransmits the message, the former will
still be able to receive and correctly process the message.
In any case, the recipient should actively ask the Group Manager for
an updated Security Context according to an application-defined
policy, e.g., after a given number of unsuccessfully decrypted
incoming messages.
13.6. Collision of Group Identifiers
If endpoints are deployed in multiple groups managed by different
non-synchronized Group Managers, it is possible for Group Identifiers
of different groups to coincide.
This does not impair the security of the AEAD Algorithm and of the
Group Encryption Algorithm. In fact, as long as the Master Secret is
different for different groups and this condition holds over time,
keys are different among different groups.
If multiple groups use the same IP multicast address, the entity
assigning that address may help limiting the chances to experience
such collisions of Group Identifiers. In particular, it may allow
the Group Managers of those groups using the same IP multicast
address to share their respective list of assigned Group Identifiers
currently in use.
13.7. Cross-Group Message Injection
A given endpoint is allowed to and would likely use the same pair
(private key, authentication credential) in multiple OSCORE groups,
possibly administered by different Group Managers.
When a sender endpoint sends a message protected in pairwise mode to
a recipient endpoint in an OSCORE group, a malicious group member may
attempt to inject the message to a different OSCORE group also
including the same endpoints (see Section 13.7.1).
This relies on altering the content of the OSCORE Option in such a
way that the MAC in the ciphertext will still be correctly validated,
which has a success probability depending on the size of the MAC.
As discussed in Section 13.7.2, the attack is practically infeasible
if the message is protected in group mode, thanks to the
countersignature also bound to the OSCORE Option through the AAD used
in the signing process (see Section 3.4).
13.7.1. Attack Description
Consider the following:
* OSCORE groups G1 and G2, with ID Context (Gid) GID1 and GID2,
respectively. Both G1 and G2 use the AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-
16-64-128, i.e., the MAC of the ciphertext is 8 bytes in size.
* A sender endpoint X, which is a member of both G1 and G2 and uses
the same pair (private key, authentication credential) in both
groups. The endpoint X has Sender ID SID1 in G1 and Sender ID
SID2 in G2. The pairs (SID1, GID1) and (SID2, GID2) identify the
same authentication credential of X in G1 and G2, respectively.
* A recipient endpoint Y, which is a member of both G1 and G2 and
uses the same pair (private key, authentication credential) in
both groups. The endpoint Y has Sender ID SID3 in G1 and Sender
ID SID4 in G2. The pairs (SID3, GID1) and (SID4, GID2) identify
the same authentication credential of Y in G1 and G2,
respectively.
* A malicious endpoint Z, which is also a member of both G1 and G2.
Hence, Z is able to derive the Sender Keys used by X in G1 and G2.
When X sends a message M1 addressed to Y in G1 and protected in
pairwise mode, Z can intercept M1 and attempt to forge a valid
message M2 to be injected into G2, making it appear to have been sent
by X to Y and therefore accepted as valid.
In more detail, Z intercepts and stops message M1 and forges a
message M2 by changing the value of the OSCORE Option from M1 as
follows: the 'kid context' is set to GID2 (rather than GID1), and the
'kid' is set to SID2 (rather than SID1). Then, Z injects message M2
as addressed to Y in G2.
Upon receiving M2, there is a probability equal to 2^-64 that Y
successfully verifies the same unchanged MAC by using the Pairwise
Recipient Key associated with X in G2.
Note that Z does not know the pairwise keys of X and Y since it does
not know and is not able to compute their shared Diffie-Hellman
secret. Therefore, Z is not able to check offline if a performed
forgery is actually valid, before sending the forged message to G2.
13.7.2. Attack Prevention in Group Mode
When a Group OSCORE message is protected in group mode, the
countersignature is also computed over the value of the OSCORE
Option, which is part of the AAD used in the signing process (see
Section 3.4).
That is, in addition to the ciphertext, the countersignature is
computed over the ID Context (Gid) and the Partial IV (both of which
are always present in requests), as well as the Sender ID of the
message originator (which is always present in requests and in
responses to requests protected in group mode).
Since the signing process also takes the ciphertext of the
COSE_Encrypt0 object as input, the countersignature is bound not only
to the intended OSCORE group (hence to the triplet composed of Master
Secret, Master Salt, and ID Context), but also to a specific Sender
ID in that group and the specific AEAD key derived from it (hence to
the quartet composed of Master Secret, Master Salt, ID Context, and
Sender ID).
This makes it practically infeasible to perform the attack described
in Section 13.7.1 since it would require the adversary to
additionally forge a valid countersignature that replaces the
original one in the forged message M2.
13.8. Prevention of Group Cloning Attack
When using the group mode or the pairwise mode, the message
protection covers also the Group Manager's authentication credential.
This is included in the AAD used in the signing process and/or in the
integrity-protected encryption process (see Section 3.4).
By doing so, an endpoint X that is a member of a group G1 cannot
perform the following attack.
1. X sets up a group G2 where it acts as Group Manager.
2. X makes G2 a "clone" of G1, i.e., G1 and G2 use the same
algorithms and have the same Master Secret, Master Salt, and ID
Context.
3. X collects a message M sent to G1 and injects it in G2.
4. Members of G2 accept M and believe it to be originated in G2.
The attack above is effectively prevented since message M is
protected by including the authentication credential of G1's Group
Manager in the AAD. Therefore, members of G2 do not successfully
verify and decrypt M since they correctly use the authentication
credential of X as Group Manager of G2 when attempting to.
13.9. Group OSCORE for Unicast Requests
If a request is intended to be sent over unicast as addressed to a
single group member, it is NOT RECOMMENDED for the client to protect
the request by using the group mode as defined in Section 7.1.
This does not include the case where the client sends a request over
unicast to a proxy to be forwarded to multiple intended recipients
over multicast [RFC10020]. In this case, the client typically
protects the request with the group mode, even though it is sent to
the proxy over unicast (see Section 7).
If the client uses the group mode with its own Sender Key to protect
a unicast request to a group member, an on-path adversary can, right
then or later on, redirect that request to one/many different group
member(s) over unicast, or to the whole OSCORE group over multicast.
By doing so, the adversary can induce the target group member(s) to
perform actions intended for one group member only. Note that the
adversary can be external, i.e., the adversary does not need to also
be a member of the OSCORE group.
This is due to the fact that the client is not able to indicate the
single intended recipient in a way that is secure and possible to
process for Group OSCORE on the server side. In particular, Group
OSCORE does not protect network addressing information such as the IP
address of the intended recipient server. It follows that the
server(s) receiving the redirected request cannot verify whether that
was the original intention of the client, and would thus simply
assume so.
The impact of such an attack depends especially on the REST method of
the request, i.e., the Inner CoAP Code of the protected request
message. In particular, safe methods such as GET and FETCH would
trigger (several) unintended responses from the targeted server(s),
while not resulting in destructive behavior. On the other hand, non-
safe methods such as PUT, POST, and PATCH/iPATCH would result in the
target server(s) taking active actions on their resources and
possible cyber-physical environment with the risk of destructive
consequences and possible implications for safety.
Instead, a client can use the pairwise mode as defined in Section 8.3
in order to protect a request sent to a single group member by using
pairwise keying material (see Section 2.5). This prevents the attack
discussed above by construction, as only the intended server is able
to derive the pairwise keying material used by the client to protect
the request.
Before delivering to the application an incoming request protected in
group mode that was sent over unicast, a server should carefully
consider the impact that processing the request would have without
dismissing the possibility that the request reception was in fact the
result of the attack discussed above. This is especially important
for endpoints implementing only a silent server since they do not
support the pairwise mode and thus are able to process only requests
protected in group mode. Application policies can also define
specific exceptional cases where it is safe for a server to deliver
such requests to the application, which can then take a final
decision about whether acting on the request or not. For instance,
such decision can leverage an application-level unique identifier of
the server specified in the payload of the request.
In a group where the AEAD Algorithm and Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm are set in the Security Context, an endpoint supporting the
pairwise mode SHOULD use it to protect requests sent to a single
group member over unicast. Using the group mode to protect such
requests would make the request possible to decrypt and verify for
any other group member; this may sometimes be a desired property
(e.g., see [CoAP-MULT-NOTIF]).
The use of block-wise transfers [RFC7959] with group communication
for CoAP is as discussed in Section 3.8 of [RFC10020]. Note that,
after the first request targeting all servers in the group over
multicast, a client can switch to sending unicast requests for
retrieving further blocks from the servers. In particular, after a
first block-wise request that targets all servers in the group and
includes the CoAP Block2 Option, the retrieval of further blocks can
use unicast requests, which should therefore be protected using the
pairwise mode. Similarly, if the first request that targeted all
servers in the group did not include the CoAP Block2 Option and the
corresponding responses included the Block2 Option at the servers'
own initiative, then the retrieval of further blocks can use unicast
requests, which should therefore be protected using the pairwise
mode.
Additional considerations are discussed in Section 9 with respect to
requests including a CoAP Echo Option [RFC9175] that have to be sent
over unicast, as employed in a challenge-response method for servers
to achieve freshness or to initialize as valid a previously invalid
Replay Window.
13.10. End-to-End Protection
The same considerations from Section 12.1 of [RFC8613] apply for
Group OSCORE.
Additionally, (D)TLS and Group OSCORE can be combined for protecting
message exchanges occurring over unicast. However, it is not
possible to combine (D)TLS and Group OSCORE for protecting message
exchanges where messages are sent over multicast.
13.11. Master Secret
Group OSCORE derives the Security Context using the same construction
used by OSCORE and by using the Group Identifier of a group as the
related ID Context. Hence, the same required properties of the
Security Context parameters discussed in Section 3.3 of [RFC8613]
apply for this document.
With particular reference to the OSCORE Master Secret, it has to be
kept secret among the members of the respective OSCORE group and the
Group Manager responsible for that group. Also, the Master Secret
must have a good amount of randomness, and the Group Manager can
generate it offline using a good random number generator. This
includes the case where the Group Manager rekeys the group by
generating and distributing a new Master Secret.
13.12. Replay Protection
As in OSCORE [RFC8613], Group OSCORE relies on Sender Sequence
Numbers included in the COSE message field 'Partial IV' and used to
build nonces.
Note that the Partial IV of an endpoint does not necessarily grow
monotonically. For instance, upon exhaustion of the endpoint's
Sender Sequence Number space, the endpoint's Partial IV space also
gets exhausted. As discussed in Section 2.6.3, this results in
either the endpoint being individually rekeyed and getting a new
Sender ID or the establishment of a new Security Context in the
group. Therefore, uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs (see
Section 13.3) is preserved when a new Security Context is
established.
Since one-to-many communication such as multicast usually involves
unreliable transports, the simplification of the Replay Window to a
size of 1 suggested in Section 7.4 of [RFC8613] is not viable with
Group OSCORE unless exchanges in the group rely only on unicast
messages.
A server's Replay Window may be initialized as invalid (see
Section 2.6.1). The server can either retrieve a new Group OSCORE
Security Context or make a Replay Window valid (see Section 9) before
accepting further incoming messages from other group members.
13.13. Message Ordering
Assuming that the other endpoint is honest, Group OSCORE provides
relative ordering of received messages. For a given Group OSCORE
Security Context, the received Partial IV (when included) allows the
recipient endpoint to determine the order in which requests or
responses were sent by the other endpoint.
If the Partial IV was omitted in a response, this indicates that it
was the oldest response from the sender endpoint to the corresponding
request (like notification responses in OSCORE, see Section 7.4.1 of
[RFC8613]). A received response is not older than the corresponding
request.
13.14. Message Freshness
As in OSCORE, Group OSCORE provides only the guarantee that the
request is not older than the Group OSCORE Security Context used to
protect it. Other aspects of freshness are discussed in Section 5.2.
The challenge-response approach described in Section 9 provides an
assurance of freshness of the request without depending on the
honesty of the client. However, it can result in an impact on
performance, which is undesirable or unbearable especially in large
groups where many endpoints at the same time might join as new
members.
Endpoints configured as silent servers are not able to perform the
challenge-response described above, as they do not store a Sender
Context to protect the 4.01 (Unauthorized) response to the client.
Thus, silent servers should adopt alternative approaches to make
their Replay Windows valid. For example, a silent server can
retrieve or wait for new Security Context parameters from the Group
Manager and derive new Recipient Contexts. When doing so, the Replay
Windows of all Recipient Contexts become valid if they are not
already. In particular, any invalid Replay Window is re-initialized
as valid and with 0 as its current lower limit.
Since requests including the Echo Option are sent over unicast, a
server can be the victim of the attack discussed in Section 13.9 if
such requests are protected in group mode. Instead, protecting those
requests with the pairwise mode prevents the attack above. In fact,
only the server involved in the challenge-response exchange is able
to derive the pairwise key used by the client to protect the request
including the Echo Option.
In either case, an internal on-path adversary would not be able to
transpose the Echo Option value of two different unicast requests
sent by the same client to any two different servers in the group.
In fact, even if the group mode was used, this would require the
adversary to forge the countersignature of both requests. As a
consequence, each of the two servers remains able to selectively
accept a request with the Echo Option only if it is waiting for that
exact integrity-protected Echo Option value, and is thus the intended
recipient.
13.15. Client Aliveness
Like in OSCORE (see Section 12.5 of [RFC8613]), a server may verify
the aliveness of the client by using the CoAP Echo Option [RFC9175]
as described in Section 9.
In the interest of avoiding otherwise unnecessary uses of such an
approach, the server can exploit the fact that the received request
cannot be older than the Security Context used to protect it. This
effectively allows the server to verify the client aliveness relative
to the installation of the latest group keying material.
13.16. Cryptographic Considerations
The same considerations from Section 12.6 of [RFC8613] about the
maximum Sender Sequence Number apply for Group OSCORE.
As discussed in Section 2.6.2, an endpoint that experiences an
exhaustion of its own Sender Sequence Number space MUST NOT protect
further messages including a Partial IV, until it has derived a new
Sender Context. This prevents the endpoint from reusing the same
nonce with the same encryption key.
In order to renew its own Sender Context, the endpoint SHOULD inform
the Group Manager, which can either renew the whole Security Context
by means of group rekeying or provide only that endpoint with a new
Sender ID value. In either case, the endpoint derives a new Sender
Context, particularly a new Sender Key.
Additionally, the same considerations from Section 12.6 of [RFC8613]
apply for Group OSCORE about building the nonce and the secrecy of
the Security Context parameters.
The group mode uses the "encrypt-then-sign" construction, i.e., the
countersignature is computed over the COSE_Encrypt0 object (see
Section 3.1). This is motivated by enabling signature checkers (see
Section 12.3), which do not join a group as members but are allowed
to verify countersignatures of messages protected in group mode
without being able to decrypt those messages (see Section 7.5).
If the Group Encryption Algorithm used in group mode provides
integrity protection, countersignatures of COSE_Encrypt0 with short
authentication tags do not provide the security properties associated
with the same algorithm used in COSE_Sign (see Section 6 of
[RFC9338]). To provide 128-bit security against collision attacks,
the tag length MUST be at least 256 bits. A countersignature of a
COSE_Encrypt0 with AES-CCM-16-64-128 provides at most 32 bits of
integrity protection.
The derivation of pairwise keys defined in Section 2.5.1 is
compatible with ECDSA and EdDSA asymmetric keys, but is not
compatible with RSA asymmetric keys.
For the public key translation from Ed25519 (Ed448) to X25519 (X448)
specified in Section 2.5.1, variable time methods can be used since
the translation operates on public information. Any byte string of
appropriate length is accepted as a public key for X25519 (X448) in
[RFC7748]. It is therefore not necessary for security to validate
the translated public key (assuming the translation was successful).
The security of using the same key pair for Diffie-Hellman and for
signing (by considering the ECDH procedure in Section 2.5 as a Key
Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM)) is demonstrated in [Degabriele] and
[Thormarker].
Except when using X25519 and X448, applications that use the ECDH-
based KEM in Section 2.5 are assumed to verify that a peer endpoint's
public key is on the expected curve and that the shared secret is not
the point at infinity. The KEM in [Degabriele] checks that the
shared secret is different from the point at infinity, as does the
procedure in Section 5.7.1.2 of [NIST-800-56A], which is referenced
in Section 2.5.1.
By extending Theorem 2 of [Degabriele], [Thormarker] shows that the
same key pair can be used with X25519 and Ed25519 (X448 and Ed448)
for the KEM specified in Section 2.5. By symmetry in the KEM used in
this document, both endpoints can consider themselves to have the
recipient role in the KEM -- as discussed in Section 7 of
[Thormarker] -- and rely on the mentioned proofs for the security of
their key pairs.
Theorem 3 in [Degabriele] shows that the same key pair can be used
for an ECDH-based KEM and ECDSA. The KEM uses a different Key
Derivation Function (KDF) than in Section 2.5, but the proof only
depends on that the KDF has certain required properties, which are
the typical assumptions about HKDF, e.g., that output keys are
pseudorandom. In order to comply with the assumptions of Theorem 3,
received public keys MUST be successfully validated; see
Section 5.6.2.3.4 of [NIST-800-56A]. The validation MAY be performed
by a trusted Group Manager. For [Degabriele] to apply as it is
written, public keys need to be in the expected subgroup. For this,
we rely on cofactor Diffie-Hellman as per Section 5.7.1.2 of
[NIST-800-56A], which is referenced in Section 2.5.1.
HashEdDSA variants of Ed25519 and Ed448 are not used by COSE (see
Section 2.2 of [RFC9053]) and are not covered by the analysis in
[Thormarker]. Hence, they MUST NOT be used with the public keys used
to derive pairwise keys as specified in this document.
13.17. Message Segmentation
The same considerations from Section 12.7 of [RFC8613] apply for
Group OSCORE.
13.18. Privacy Considerations
Group OSCORE ensures end-to-end integrity protection and encryption
of the message payload and of all the CoAP options that are not used
for proxy operations. In particular, CoAP options are processed
according to the same class U/I/E that they have for OSCORE.
Therefore, the same privacy considerations from Section 12.8 of
[RFC8613] apply for Group OSCORE, with the following addition.
* When protecting a message in group mode, the countersignature is
encrypted by using a keystream derived from the group keying
material (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2). This ensures group privacy.
That is, an attacker cannot track an endpoint over two groups by
linking messages between the two groups, unless the attacker is
also a member of those groups.
Furthermore, the following privacy considerations apply about the
OSCORE Option, which may reveal information on the communicating
endpoints.
* The 'kid' parameter, which is intended to help a recipient
endpoint to find the right Recipient Context, may reveal
information about the Sender Endpoint. When both a request and
the corresponding responses include the 'kid' parameter, this may
reveal information about both a client sending a request and all
the possibly replying servers sending their own individual
response.
* The 'kid context' parameter, which is intended to help a recipient
endpoint to find the right Security Context, reveals information
about the sender endpoint. In particular, it reveals that the
sender endpoint is a member of a particular OSCORE group, whose
current GID is indicated in the 'kid context' parameter.
When receiving a group request, each of the recipient endpoints can
reply with a response that includes its Sender ID as the value of the
'kid' parameter. All these responses will be matchable with the
request through the CoAP Token. Thus, even if these responses do not
include a 'kid context' parameter, it becomes possible to understand
that the responder endpoints are in the same group of the requester
endpoint.
Furthermore, using the approach described in Section 9 to make Replay
Windows valid may reveal when a server device goes through a reboot.
This can be mitigated by the server device storing the precise state
of the Replay Window of each known client on a clean shutdown.
Finally, the approach described in Section 13.6 to prevent collisions
of Group Identifiers from different Group Managers may reveal
information about events in the respective OSCORE groups. In
particular, a Group Identifier changes when the corresponding group
is rekeyed. Thus, Group Managers might use the shared list of Group
Identifiers to infer the rate and patterns of group membership
changes triggering a group rekeying, e.g., due to newly joined
members or evicted (compromised) members. In order to alleviate this
privacy concern, it should be hidden from the Group Managers which
exact Group Manager has currently assigned which Group Identifiers in
its OSCORE groups.
14. IANA Considerations
IANA has performed the actions described below.
14.1. OSCORE Flag Bits Registry
IANA has added the following entry to the "OSCORE Flag Bits" registry
within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters"
registry group:
+==========+=======+===================================+===========+
| Bit | Name | Description | Reference |
| Position | | | |
+==========+=======+===================================+===========+
| 2 | Group | For using a Group OSCORE Security | RFC 10021 |
| | Flag | Context, set to 1 if the message | |
| | | is protected with the group mode | |
+----------+-------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
Table 1: OSCORE Flag Bits Registry
14.2. Target Attributes Registry
IANA has added the following entry to the "Target Attributes"
registry within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE)
Parameters" registry group:
+===========+========================+============+============+
| Attribute | Brief Description | Change | Reference |
| Name | | Controller | |
+===========+========================+============+============+
| gosc | Hint: resource only | IETF | RFC 10021, |
| | accessible using Group | | Section 11 |
| | OSCORE or OSCORE | | |
+-----------+------------------------+------------+------------+
Table 2: Target Attributes Registry
15. References
15.1. Normative References
[COSE.Algorithms]
IANA, "COSE Algorithms",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose>.
[NIST-800-56A]
Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R.
Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", National
Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST SP 800-56Ar3,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3, April 2018,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7641] Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8288] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 8288,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8288, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8288>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
[RFC8613] Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
[RFC9053] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053,
August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9053>.
[RFC9175] Amsüss, C., Preuß Mattsson, J., and G. Selander,
"Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP): Echo, Request-
Tag, and Token Processing", RFC 9175,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9175, February 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9175>.
[RFC9338] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Countersignatures", STD 96, RFC 9338,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9338, December 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9338>.
[RFC9459] Housley, R. and H. Tschofenig, "CBOR Object Signing and
Encryption (COSE): AES-CTR and AES-CBC", RFC 9459,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9459, September 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9459>.
[RFC10020] Dijk, E. and M. Tiloca, "Group Communication for the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 10020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC10020, November 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10020>.
15.2. Informative References
[ACE-KEY-GROUP-OSCORE]
Tiloca, M. and F. Palombini, "Key Management for Group
Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(Group OSCORE) Using Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore-21, 14
March 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore-21>.
[C509-CERT]
Mattsson, J. P., Selander, G., Raza, S., Höglund, J.,
Furuhed, M., and L. Liao, "CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates
(C509 Certificates)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-21, 24 September 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
cbor-encoded-cert-21>.
[CACHEABLE-OSCORE]
Amsüss, C. and M. Tiloca, "End-to-End Protected and
Cacheable CoAP Responses using Group Object Security for
Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-cacheable-
oscore-02, 6 July 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-
cacheable-oscore-02>.
[CoAP-GROUP-PROXY]
Tiloca, M. and E. Dijk, "Proxy Operations in Group
Communication for the Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
core-groupcomm-proxy-07, 2 September 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-
groupcomm-proxy-07>.
[CoAP-MULT-NOTIF]
Tiloca, M., Höglund, R., Amsüss, C., and F. Palombini,
"Observe Notifications as CoAP Multicast Responses", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-observe-
multicast-notifications-17, 2 November 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-
observe-multicast-notifications-17>.
[CoAP-SEC-PROT]
Mattsson, J. P., Palombini, F., and M. Vučinić,
"Comparison of CoAP Security Protocols", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-iotops-security-protocol-
comparison-09, 4 June 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-iotops-
security-protocol-comparison-09>.
[CURVE-REPR]
Struik, R., "Alternative Elliptic Curve Representations",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lwig-curve-
representations-23, 21 January 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lwig-
curve-representations-23>.
[Degabriele]
Degabriele, J. P., Lehmann, A., Paterson, K. G., Smart, N.
P., and M. Strefler, "On the Joint Security of Encryption
and Signature in EMV", Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper
2011/615, December 2011,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/615>.
[OSCORE-PROXIES]
Tiloca, M. and R. Höglund, "OSCORE-capable Proxies", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-oscore-
capable-proxies-08, 2 November 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-
oscore-capable-proxies-08>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC4340] Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram
Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.
[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6282] Hui, J., Ed. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6
Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6282, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6282>.
[RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
[RFC7959] Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.
[RFC8075] Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and
E. Dijk, "Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8075,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8075, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8075>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[RFC9002] Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection
and Congestion Control", RFC 9002, DOI 10.17487/RFC9002,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9002>.
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.
[RFC9200] Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments Using the OAuth 2.0 Framework
(ACE-OAuth)", RFC 9200, DOI 10.17487/RFC9200, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9200>.
[RFC9594] Palombini, F. and M. Tiloca, "Key Provisioning for Group
Communication Using Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE)", RFC 9594,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9594, September 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9594>.
[SIGS-WITH-NOISE]
Mattsson, J. P., Thormarker, E., and S. Ruohomaa, "Hedged
ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-05, 3 March
2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-
cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-05>.
[Thormarker]
Thormarker, E., "On using the same key pair for Ed25519
and an X25519 based KEM", Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper
2021/509, April 2021, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/509>.
Appendix A. Assumptions and Security Objectives
This section presents a set of assumptions and security objectives
for the protocol described in this document. The rest of this
section refers to three types of groups:
* Application group, i.e., a set of CoAP endpoints that share a
common pool of resources.
* Security group, as defined in Section 1.1 of this document.
Between security groups and application groups, there can be a
many-to-many, one-to-many, many-to-one, or one-to-one
relationship.
* CoAP group, i.e., a set of CoAP endpoints where each endpoint is
configured to receive one-to-many CoAP requests, e.g., sent to the
group's associated IP multicast address and UDP port as defined in
[RFC10020]. An endpoint may be a member of multiple CoAP groups.
Between CoAP groups and application groups, there can be a many-
to-many, one-to-many, many-to-one, or one-to-one relationship.
Note that a device sending a CoAP request to a CoAP group is not
necessarily a member of that group; it is a member only if it also
has a CoAP server endpoint listening for requests sent to the
group's associated IP multicast address and UDP port. In order to
provide secure group communication, all members of a CoAP group as
well as all further endpoints configured only as clients sending
CoAP (multicast) requests to the CoAP group have to be members of
a security group. Between CoAP groups and security groups, there
can be a many-to-many, one-to-many, many-to-one, or one-to-one
relationship.
A.1. Assumptions
The following points are assumed to be already addressed and are out
of the scope of this document.
Multicast communication topology: This document considers both
1-to-N (one sender and multiple recipients) and M-to-N (multiple
senders and multiple recipients) communication topologies. The
1-to-N communication topology is the simplest group communication
scenario that would serve the needs of a typical Low-Power and
Lossy Network (LLN). Examples of use cases that benefit from
secure group communication are provided in Appendix B.
In a 1-to-N communication model, only a single client transmits
data to the CoAP group in the form of request messages; in an
M-to-N communication model (where M and N do not necessarily have
the same value), M clients transmit data to the CoAP group.
According to [RFC10020], any possible proxy entity is supposed to
know about the clients. Also, every client expects and is able to
handle multiple response messages associated with a same request
sent to the CoAP group.
Group size: Security solutions for group communication should be
able to adequately support different and possibly large security
groups. The group size is the current number of members in a
security group. In the use cases mentioned in this document, the
number of clients (normally the controlling devices) is expected
to be much smaller than the number of servers (i.e., the
controlled devices). A security solution for group communication
that supports 1 to 50 clients would be able to properly cover the
group sizes required for most use cases that are relevant for this
document. The maximum group size is expected to be in the range
of hundreds to thousands of devices, with large groups easier to
manage if including several silent servers. Security groups
larger than that should be divided into smaller independent
groups. One should not assume that the set of members of a
security group remains fixed. That is, the group membership is
subject to changes, possibly on a frequent basis.
Communication with the Group Manager: An endpoint must use a secure
dedicated channel when communicating with the Group Manager, also
in the case that it is not registered as a member of the security
group.
Provisioning and management of Security Contexts: A Security Context
must be established among the members of the security group. A
secure mechanism must be used to generate, revoke, and
(re-)distribute keying material, communication policies, and
security parameters in the security group. The actual
provisioning and management of the Security Context is out of the
scope of this document.
Multicast data security cipher suite: All members of a security
group must use the same cipher suite to provide authenticity,
integrity, and confidentiality of messages in the group. The
cipher suite is specified as part of the Security Context.
Ensuring backward security: A new device joining the security group
should not have access to any old Security Contexts used before
its joining. This ensures that a new member of the security group
is not able to decrypt confidential data sent before it has joined
the security group. The adopted key management scheme should
ensure that the Security Context is updated to ensure backward
confidentiality. The actual mechanism to update the Security
Context and renew the group keying material in the security group
upon a new member's joining has to be defined as part of the group
key management scheme.
Ensuring forward security: Entities that leave the security group
should not have access to any future Security Contexts or message
exchanged within the security group after their leaving. This
ensures that a former member of the security group is not able to
decrypt confidential data sent within the security group anymore.
Also, it ensures that a former member is not able to send
protected messages to the security group anymore. The actual
mechanism to update the Security Context and renew the group
keying material in the security group upon a member's leaving has
to be defined as part of the group key management scheme.
A.2. Security Objectives
The protocol described in this document aims at fulfilling the
following security objectives:
Data replay protection: Request messages or response messages
replayed within the security group must be detected.
Data confidentiality: Messages sent within the security group shall
be encrypted.
Group-level data confidentiality: The group mode provides group-
level data confidentiality since messages are encrypted at a group
level, i.e., in such a way that they can be decrypted by any
member of the security group, but not by an external adversary or
other external entities other than the Group Manager responsible
for the group.
Pairwise data confidentiality: The pairwise mode especially provides
pairwise data confidentiality since messages are encrypted using
pairwise keying material shared between any two group members;
hence, they can be decrypted only by the intended single
recipient.
Source message authentication: Messages sent within the security
group shall be authenticated. That is, it is essential to ensure
that a message is originated by a member of the security group,
and in particular by a specific, identifiable member of the
security group.
Message integrity: Messages sent within the security group shall be
integrity protected. That is, it is essential to ensure that a
message has not been tampered with, either by a group member or by
an external adversary or other external entities that are not
members of the security group.
Message ordering: It must be possible to determine the ordering of
messages coming from a single sender. Like in OSCORE [RFC8613], a
recipient endpoint can determine the relative order of requests or
responses from another sender endpoint by means of their Partial
IV. It is not required to determine ordering of messages from
different senders.
Appendix B. List of Use Cases
Group Communication for CoAP [RFC10020] provides the necessary
background for multicast-based CoAP communication with particular
reference to LLNs and resource-constrained environments. The
interested reader is encouraged to first read [RFC10020] to
understand the non-security related details. This section discusses
a number of use cases that benefit from secure group communication
and refers to the three types of groups from Appendix A. Specific
security requirements for these use cases are discussed in
Appendix A.
Lighting control: Consider a building equipped with IP-connected
lighting devices, switches, and border routers. The lighting
devices acting as servers are organized into application groups
and CoAP groups, according to their physical location in the
building. For instance, lighting devices in a room or corridor
can be configured as members of a single application group and
corresponding CoAP group. Those lighting devices together with
the switches acting as clients in the same room or corridor can be
configured as members of the corresponding security group.
Switches are then used to control the lighting devices by sending
on/off/dimming commands to all lighting devices in the CoAP group,
while border routers connected to an IP network backbone (which is
also multicast-enabled) can be used to interconnect routers in the
building. Consequently, this would also enable logical groups to
be formed even if devices with a role in the lighting application
may be physically in different subnets (e.g., on wired and
wireless networks). Connectivity between lighting devices may be
realized, for instance, by means of IPv6 and (border) routers
supporting 6LoWPAN [RFC4944] [RFC6282]. Group communication
enables synchronous operation of a set of connected lights,
ensuring that the light preset (e.g., dimming level or color) of a
large set of luminaires are changed at the same perceived time.
This is especially useful for providing a visual synchronicity of
light effects to the user. As a practical guideline, events
within a 200 ms interval are perceived as simultaneous by humans,
which is necessary to ensure in many setups. Devices may reply
back to the switches that issue on/off/dimming commands in order
to report about the execution of the requested operation (e.g.,
OK, failure, or error) and their current operational status. In a
typical lighting control scenario, a single switch is the only
entity responsible for sending commands to a set of lighting
devices. In more advanced lighting control use cases, an M-to-N
communication topology would be required, e.g., if multiple
sensors (presence or daylight) are responsible for triggering
events to a set of lighting devices. Especially in professional
lighting scenarios, the roles of client and server are configured
by the lighting commissioner, and devices strictly follow those
roles.
Integrated building control: Enabling Building Automation and
Control Systems (BACSs) to control multiple heating, ventilation,
and air-conditioning units to predefined presets. Controlled
units can be organized into application groups and CoAP groups in
order to reflect their physical position in the building, e.g.,
devices in the same room can be configured as members of a single
application group and corresponding CoAP group. As a practical
guideline, events within intervals of seconds are typically
acceptable. Controlled units may reply back to the BACS issuing
control commands in order to report about the execution of the
requested operation (e.g., OK, failure, or error) and their
current operational status.
Software and firmware updates: Software and firmware updates often
comprise quite a large amount of data. This can overload an LLN
that is otherwise typically used to dealing with only small
amounts of data on an infrequent basis. Rather than sending
software and firmware updates as unicast messages to each
individual device, multicasting such updated data to a larger set
of devices at once displays a number of benefits. For instance,
it can significantly reduce the network load and decrease the
overall time latency for propagating this data to all devices.
Even if the complete update process itself is secured, securing
the individual messages is important, if updates consist of
relatively large amounts of data. In fact, checking individual
received data piecemeal for tampering avoids that devices store
large amounts of partially corrupted data and that they detect
tampering hereof only after all data has been received. Devices
receiving software and firmware updates may reply back in order to
provide feedback about the execution of the update operation
(e.g., OK, failure, or error) and their current operational
status.
Parameter and configuration update: By means of multicast
communication, it is possible to update the settings of a set of
similar devices, both simultaneously and efficiently. Possible
parameters are related, for instance, to network load management
or network access control. Devices receiving parameter and
configuration updates may reply back in order to provide feedback
about the execution of the update operation (e.g., OK, failure, or
error) and their current operational status.
Commissioning of LLN systems: A commissioning device is responsible
for querying all devices in the local network or a selected subset
of them in order to discover their presence and be aware of their
capabilities, default configuration, and operating conditions.
Queried devices displaying similarities in their capabilities and
features or sharing a common physical location can be configured
as members of a single application group and corresponding CoAP
group. Queried devices are expected to reply back to the
commissioning device in order to notify their presence and provide
the requested information and their current operational status.
Emergency multicast: A particular emergency-related information
(e.g., natural disaster) is generated and multicast by an
emergency notifier and relayed to multiple devices. The latter
may reply back to the emergency notifier in order to provide their
feedback and local information related to the ongoing emergency.
This kind of setup should additionally rely on a fault-tolerant
multicast algorithm, such as the Multicast Protocol for Low-Power
and Lossy Networks (MPL).
Appendix C. Example of Group Identifier Format
This section provides an example of how the Group Identifier (Gid)
can be formatted. That is, the Gid can be composed of two parts,
namely a Group Prefix and a Group Epoch.
For each group, the Group Prefix is constant over time and is
uniquely defined in the set of all the groups associated with the
same Group Manager. The choice of the Group Prefix for a given
group's Security Context is application-specific. The size of the
Group Prefix directly impacts the maximum number of distinct groups
under the same Group Manager.
The Group Epoch is set to 0 upon the group's initialization, and is
incremented by 1 each time new keying material, together with a new
Gid, is distributed to the group in order to establish a new Security
Context (see Section 12.2).
As an example, a 3-byte Gid can be composed of i) a 1-byte Group
Prefix '0xb1' interpreted as a raw byte string, and ii) a 2-byte
Group Epoch interpreted as an unsigned integer ranging from 0 to
65535. Then, after having established the Common Context 61532 times
in the group, its Gid will assume value '0xb1f05c'.
Using an immutable Group Prefix for a group with a Group Manager that
does not reassign Gid values (see Section 12.2.1.1) limits the total
number of rekeying instances. With a Group Manager that does
reassign Gid values, it limits the maximum number of rekeying
instances that a long exchange can persist through. In either case,
the Group Epoch size needs to be chosen depending on the expected
rate of rekeying instances.
As discussed in Section 13.6, if endpoints are deployed in multiple
groups managed by different non-synchronized Group Managers, it is
possible that Group Identifiers of different groups coincide at some
point in time. In this case, a recipient has to handle coinciding
Group Identifiers and has to try using different Security Contexts to
process an incoming message until the right one is found and the
message is correctly verified. Therefore, it is favorable that Group
Identifiers from different Group Managers have a size that results in
a small probability of collision. How small this probability should
be is up to system designers.
Appendix D. Responsibilities of the Group Manager
The Group Manager is responsible for performing the following tasks:
1. Creating and managing OSCORE groups. This includes the
assignment of a Gid to every newly created group, ensuring
uniqueness of Gids within the set of its OSCORE groups and
(optionally) the secure recycling of Gids.
2. Defining policies for authorizing the joining of its OSCORE
groups.
3. Handling the join process to add new endpoints as group members.
4. Establishing the Common Context part of the Security Context and
providing it to an authorized group member during the join
process together with the corresponding Sender ID.
5. Updating the Key Generation Number and the Gid of its OSCORE
groups upon renewing the respective Security Context.
6. Generating and managing Sender IDs within its OSCORE groups, as
well as assigning and providing them to new endpoints during the
join process or to current group members upon request of renewal
or re-joining. This includes ensuring that:
* Each Sender ID is unique within each of the OSCORE groups;
* Each Sender ID is not reassigned within the same group since
the latest time when the current Gid value was assigned to
the group. That is, the Sender ID is not reassigned even to
a current group member re-joining the same group, without a
rekeying happening first.
7. Defining communication policies for each of its OSCORE groups
and signaling them to new endpoints during the join process.
8. Renewing the Security Context of an OSCORE group upon membership
change by revoking and renewing common security parameters and
keying material (rekeying).
9. Providing the management keying material that a new endpoint
requires to participate in the rekeying process consistently
with the key management scheme used in the group joined by the
new endpoint.
10. Assisting a group member that has missed a group rekeying
instance to understand which authentication credentials and
Recipient Contexts to delete, as associated with former group
members.
11. Acting as the key repository in order to handle the
authentication credentials of the members of its OSCORE groups
and providing such authentication credentials and information
about the associated group members to other members of the same
group upon request. The actual storage of authentication
credentials may be entrusted to a separate secure storage device
or service.
12. Validating that the format and parameters of authentication
credentials of group members are consistent with the public key
algorithm and related parameters used in the respective OSCORE
group.
The Group Manager specified in [ACE-KEY-GROUP-OSCORE] provides this
functionality.
Acknowledgements
Jiye Park contributed as a coauthor to earlier draft versions of this
document.
The authors sincerely thank Christian Amsüss, Stefan Beck, Mike
Bishop, Rolf Blom, Carsten Bormann, Mohamed Boucadair, Deb Cooley,
Esko Dijk, Gorry Fairhurst, Patrik Fältström, Martin Gunnarsson,
Klaus Hartke, Richard Kelsey, Paul Kyzivat, Joerg Ott, Dave Robin,
Jim Schaad, Ludwig Seitz, Orie Steele, Peter van der Stok, Ketan
Talaulikar, Erik Thormarker, Mališa Vučinić, and Paul Wouters for
their feedback and comments.
The work on this document has been partly supported by the Sweden's
Innovation Agency VINNOVA and the Celtic-Next projects CRITISEC and
CYPRESS; the H2020 projects SIFIS-Home (Grant agreement 952652) and
ARCADIAN-IoT (Grant agreement 101020259); the SSF project SEC4Factory
under the grant RIT17-0032; and the EIT-Digital High Impact
Initiative ACTIVE.
Authors' Addresses
Marco Tiloca
RISE AB
Isafjordsgatan 22
SE-164 40 Kista
Sweden
Email: marco.tiloca@ri.se
Göran Selander
Ericsson AB
Torshamnsgatan 23
SE-16440 Stockholm Kista
Sweden
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
Francesca Palombini
Ericsson AB
Torshamnsgatan 23
SE-16440 Stockholm Kista
Sweden
Email: francesca.palombini@ericsson.com
John Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson AB
Torshamnsgatan 23
SE-16440 Stockholm Kista
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Rikard Höglund
RISE AB
Isafjordsgatan 22
SE-16440 Stockholm Kista
Sweden
Email: rikard.hoglund@ri.se