Resolution of Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) Conflicts among Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Clients
RFC 4703
Revision differences
Document history
Date | Rev. | By | Action |
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2012-08-22
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12 | (System) | post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Scott Hollenbeck |
2012-08-22
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12 | (System) | post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Sam Hartman |
2012-08-22
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12 | (System) | post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Brian Carpenter |
2012-08-22
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12 | (System) | post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for David Kessens |
2012-08-22
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12 | (System) | post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Russ Housley |
2006-11-04
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12 | (System) | This was part of a ballot set with: draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-fqdn, draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option, draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr |
2006-11-04
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12 | Amy Vezza | State Changes to RFC Published from RFC Ed Queue by Amy Vezza |
2006-11-04
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12 | Amy Vezza | [Note]: 'RFC 4703' added by Amy Vezza |
2006-10-25
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12 | (System) | RFC published |
2006-03-28
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12 | Amy Vezza | State Changes to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent by Amy Vezza |
2006-03-24
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12 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent |
2006-03-24
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12 | Amy Vezza | IESG has approved the document |
2006-03-24
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12 | Amy Vezza | Closed "Approve" ballot |
2006-03-24
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12 | Margaret Cullen | State Changes to Approved-announcement to be sent from Approved-announcement to be sent::Point Raised - writeup needed by Margaret Wasserman |
2006-03-23
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12 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-12.txt |
2006-03-17
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12 | (System) | Removed from agenda for telechat - 2006-03-16 |
2006-03-16
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12 | Amy Vezza | State Changes to Approved-announcement to be sent::Point Raised - writeup needed from IESG Evaluation by Amy Vezza |
2006-03-16
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12 | (System) | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Bert Wijnen has been changed to no from error by IESG Secretary |
2006-03-16
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12 | David Kessens | [Ballot Position Update] Position for David Kessens has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by David Kessens |
2006-03-16
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12 | Bert Wijnen | [Ballot comment] In: draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-12.txt - sect 3.6.1. client.example.com. A 10.0.0.1 IP address in examples ought to be from 192.0.2.0/24 … [Ballot comment] In: draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-12.txt - sect 3.6.1. client.example.com. A 10.0.0.1 IP address in examples ought to be from 192.0.2.0/24 range as per RFC3330 - sect 3.6.2 A DHCP server allocates the IPv4 address 10.0.12.99 to a client which and chi.example.com. A 10.0.12.99 Same here, IP address should be from 192.0.2.0/24 range as per RFC3330 - Sect 3.6.4 A DHCP server allocates the IPv6 address 2000::1234:5678 to a client and chi.example.com. A 10.0.12.99 IPv6 addresses in examples should be in the 2001:DB8::/32 range as per RFC3849. |
2006-03-16
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12 | Bert Wijnen | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Undefined, has been recorded for Bert Wijnen by Bert Wijnen |
2006-03-16
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12 | Alex Zinin | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alex Zinin by Alex Zinin |
2006-03-16
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12 | David Kessens | [Ballot discuss] I received a few very detailed reviews from the DNS review team. The number of isssues is that large that I believe that … [Ballot discuss] I received a few very detailed reviews from the DNS review team. The number of isssues is that large that I believe that a revised ID is warranted. However, I don't believe that any issue in itself is enough to block this document, there are just too many of them that can easily fixed with RFC editor notes or in 48 hours. Therefore, my DISCUSS is as follows: --- Please consider the reviews form the DNS review team and update the documents where you believe it makes sense. I explicitly am not requiring you to make the proposed changes, I only want you to consider them and make the updates where you believe it makes sense. I actually ran out of space in the COMMENTs section to include all reviews so I am going to forward them to you seperately. I am also willing to clear my DISCUSS with the condition that the shepherding AD will take this issue up and deal with the revised ID. ---- |
2006-03-16
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12 | David Kessens | [Ballot discuss] adsa |
2006-03-16
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12 | David Kessens | [Ballot Position Update] Position for David Kessens has been changed to Discuss from No Objection by David Kessens |
2006-03-16
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12 | David Kessens | [Ballot comment] I received a few very detailed reviews from the DNS review team. The number of isssues is that large that I believe that … [Ballot comment] I received a few very detailed reviews from the DNS review team. The number of isssues is that large that I believe that a revised ID is warranted. However, I don't believe that any issue in itself is enough to block this document, there are just too many of them that can easily fixed with RFC editor notes or in 48 hours. Therefore, my DISCUSS is as follows: --- Please consider the reviews form the DNS review team and update the documents where you believe it makes sense. I explicitly am not requiring you to make the proposed changes, I only want you to consider them and make the updates where you believe it makes sense. I actually ran out of space here to include all reviews so I am going to forward them to you seperately. I am also willing to clear my DISCUSS with the condition that the shepherding AD will take this issue up and deal with the revised ID. ---- I received the following comments from the DNS review team by Roy Arends that you might want to consider: This is a review of draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-12: In general, an informative reference needs to be fixed. Terminology and examples need to be fixed, and the input construction for the digest algorithm is not clear. Review of draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-11: There is some wording that needs to be fixed, i.e. "update query" and the likes. Some references need to be fixed. Review of DRAFT-IETF-DHC-FQDN-OPTION-12: In general, draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-fqdn-04.txt is mostly the same as this document. As I only review this wrt DNS, my comments will apply to both documents. --- Detailed review draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-12: 1. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [2]. please put terminology after intro. The DHCID RR is defined with mnemonic DHCID and type code [TBD]. The DHCID RR is only defined in the IN class. DHCID RRs cause no additional section processing. The DHCID RR is not a singleton type. The term "singleton type" is not a DNS term. Where is it defined ? In DNS master files, the RDATA is represented as a single block in base 64 encoding identical to that used for representing binary data in RFC 3548 [7]. There are two alphabets in RFC3548 for base 64. Which one is used here ? The DHCID RR Digest Type Code is an identifier for the digest algorithm used. The digest is calculated over an identifier and the canonical FQDN as described in the next section. Is it ? How do I exactly calculate the digest ? See next section for more comments. The input to the digest hash function is defined to be: digest = SHA-256(< identifier > < FQDN >) what is ? This is terribly unclear. The FQDN is represented in the buffer in unambiguous canonical form "unambiguous canonical form" is a pleonasm. Please use "Canonical Wire Format" as described in RFC 4034 [8], section 6.1. RFC 4034 section 6.1 deals with canonical ordering of names. Please refer to 6.2. The identifier type code and the identifier are related as specified in Section 3.3: the identifier type code describes the source of the identifier. A DHCPv4 updater uses the 0x0002 type code if a Client Identifier option is present in the DHCPv4 messages and it is encoded as specified in [12]. [12] is informative, not normative. If one is required to know the encoding to determine a type-code, please refer to the encoding as normative. the client. The DHCID RDATA is composed by setting the two type octets to zero, the 1-octet digest type to 1 for SHA-256, and performing an SHA-256 hash computation across a buffer containing the Ethernet MAC type octet, What is the Ethernet Mac type octet ? is that "htype, chaddr from a DHCPv4 client's DHCPREQUEST" ? If the DHCID RR type is not supported, the RDATA would be encoded [13] as: \# 35 ( 000001c4b9a5b249651343158dde7bcc77169841f7a4243a572b5c283 fffedeb3f75e6 ) I tried to this, and this is my result: \# 35 000001457811a1e592b6f52a81e6a7767281fb4b1379fbf2cc9645d5a2ffc9b1dd54f7 The input I used, exactly following the description in the example is as follows (base 16 string): 00000101020304050606636c69656e74076578616d706c6503636f6d00 Which breaks down to 0000 identifier type code 01 digest type 010203040506 The six octets of the mac address and the wireformat of client.example.com, which is (6)c l i e n t(7)e x a m p l e(3)c o m(0) 06636c69656e74076578616d706c6503636f6d00 When I follow the construction as specified in the previous chapter, I do not need to use the identifier type code and the digest type as input for the hash function. I tried that too, but again, different results from what you have: \# 35 0000016388f0e5221a5faa6b109dab9bdd4c2f1a3408d59c3c60b8fb45c5b6e4f0ed94 Please tell me what I did wrong. type to 1 for SHA-256, and performing a SHA-256 hash computation across a buffer containing the seven octets from the client-id option and the FQDN (represented as specified in Section 3.5). In this example, the input buffer does not contain the identifier type and the digest type, which seems correct to me. chi.example.com. A 10.0.12.99 chi.example.com. DHCID ( AAEBOSD+XR3Os/0LozeXVqcNc7FwCfQdW L3b/NaiUDlW2No= ) If the DHCID RR type is not supported, the RDATA would be encoded [13] as: \# 35 ( 0001013920fe5d1dceb3fd0ba3379756a70d73b17009f41d58bddbfcd 6a2503956d8da ) Okay, perfect. I got the same result. ========================================================================= Detailed review draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-12: of the DNS data is entirely dependent on the accuracy of the configuration procedure. Sites that deploy Secure DNS [11] may [11] (rfc 2535) reference is updated by rfc 4033/4034/4035 configure credentials for each client and its assigned FQDN in a way that is more error-resistant, as both the FQDN and credentials must match. rfc 2535 and its replacements deal with origin authentication and data integrity. This is, the actual DNS data. If you mean "transaction security" such as SIG(0) and TSIG for dynamic updates, please refer to Secure Dynamic Update [10]. Certain RCODEs defined in RFC 2136 [3] indicate that the destination Nit: Don't use names and references together. please just say "Certain RCODEs defined in [3] indicate that the destination" Because these errors may indicate a misconfiguration of the updater or of the DNS server, the updater MAY attempt to signal to its administrator that an error has occurred, e.g. through a log message. What about errorcodes specific for TSIG or SIG(0) ? 5.3. Adding A and/or AAAA RRs to DNS When a DHCP client or server intends to update A and/or AAAA RRs, it starts with the update query in Section 5.3.1. A DNS message is either a Request or Response. The Request has an opcode. This opcode can be UPDATE or QUERY. So update query is confusing. This should be update request. =========================================================== Detailed review DRAFT-IETF-DHC-FQDN-OPTION-12: This document specifies a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv4, DHCPv4, option which can be used to exchange information about a DHCPv4 client's fully-qualified domain name and about responsibility for updating the DNS RR related to the client's address assignment. I understand this option already exists, and this document updates and extends its use. I would rephrase this to: This document updates and extends the DHCP Client FQDN option for the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol IPv4. This option can be used to exchange information about the a DHCPv4 client's fully qualified domain name. This information includes the FQDN and information about the responsibility for updating the DNS RR related to the client's address assignment. Please put terminology after the introduction. 1. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1]. In any case, whether a site permits all, some, or no DHCP servers and clients to perform DNS updates into the zones which it controls is entirely a matter of local administrative policy. Please rephrase to: It is considered local policy to permit DHCP clients and servers to perform DNS updates to zones. This document does not require any specific administrative policy, and does not propose one. Yet, the document continues to specify a range of possible policies: > The range of possible policies is very broad, from sites where only the DHCP servers have been given credentials that the DNS servers will accept, to sites where each individual DHCP client has been configured with credentials which allow the client to modify its own domain name. Compliant implementations may support some or all of these possibilities. Furthermore, I'd delete the previous paragraph. This document describes a new DHCP option which a client can use to Is it new ? If it is new, why are there deprecated elements ? convey all or part of its domain name to a DHCP server. Site- specific policy determines whether DHCP servers use the names that clients offer or not, and what DHCP servers may do in cases where clients do not supply domain names. Note that a 'part of its domain name' is not a FQDN. client sends the Client FQDN option in its DHCPDISCOVER message, it MUST send the option in subsequent DHCPREQUEST messages though the contents of the option MAY change. Only one Client FQDN option MAY appear in a message. What if a client has more than one name ? It is possible to have more than one PTR per address. The code for this option is 81. Its minimum length is 3 (octets). To avoid ambiguity, please specify that the length is excluding the Code and Len field. Code Len Flags RCODE1 RCODE2 Domain Name +------+------+------+------+------+------+-- | 81 | n | | | | ... +------+------+------+------+------+------+-- Please state somewhere that the above convention restrict name lengths to 253. In DNS, a name has a maximum length of 255. MUST send the option in subsequent DHCPREQUEST messages though the contents of the option MAY change. Only one Client FQDN option MAY appear in a message. What if a client has more than one name ? It is possible to have more than one PTR per address. The format of the Client FQDN option is: Code Len Flags RCODE1 RCODE2 Domain Name +------+------+------+------+------+------+-- | 81 | n | | | | ... +------+------+------+------+------+------+-- Please state somewhere that the above convention restrict name lengths to 253. In DNS, a name has a maximum length of 255. The format of the 1-octet Flags field is: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | MBZ |N|E|O|S| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The order of the flags below is not as it appears in the field. Does "S" indicate "Server" ? Please be consistent in using "Flags" or "Bits" in the reply from the server indicates the action to be taken by the server; if 1, the server has taken responsibility for A RR updates for the FQDN. Does "O" indicate "Override" ? The "O" bit indicates whether the server has overridden the client's preference for the "S" bit. A client MUST set this bit to 0. A server MUST set this bit to 1 if the "S" bit in its reply to the client does not match the "S" bit received from the client. What does "N" indicate ? |
2006-03-16
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12 | David Kessens | [Ballot comment] I received the following comments from the DNS review team by Roy Arends that you might want to consider: This is a review … [Ballot comment] I received the following comments from the DNS review team by Roy Arends that you might want to consider: This is a review of draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-12: In general, an informative reference needs to be fixed. Terminology and examples need to be fixed, and the input construction for the digest algorithm is not clear. Review of draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-11: There is some wording that needs to be fixed, i.e. "update query" and the likes. Some references need to be fixed. Review of DRAFT-IETF-DHC-FQDN-OPTION-12: In general, draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-fqdn-04.txt is mostly the same as this document. As I only review this wrt DNS, my comments will apply to both documents. --- Detailed review draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-12: 1. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [2]. please put terminology after intro. The DHCID RR is defined with mnemonic DHCID and type code [TBD]. The DHCID RR is only defined in the IN class. DHCID RRs cause no additional section processing. The DHCID RR is not a singleton type. The term "singleton type" is not a DNS term. Where is it defined ? In DNS master files, the RDATA is represented as a single block in base 64 encoding identical to that used for representing binary data in RFC 3548 [7]. There are two alphabets in RFC3548 for base 64. Which one is used here ? The DHCID RR Digest Type Code is an identifier for the digest algorithm used. The digest is calculated over an identifier and the canonical FQDN as described in the next section. Is it ? How do I exactly calculate the digest ? See next section for more comments. The input to the digest hash function is defined to be: digest = SHA-256(< identifier > < FQDN >) what is ? This is terribly unclear. The FQDN is represented in the buffer in unambiguous canonical form "unambiguous canonical form" is a pleonasm. Please use "Canonical Wire Format" as described in RFC 4034 [8], section 6.1. RFC 4034 section 6.1 deals with canonical ordering of names. Please refer to 6.2. The identifier type code and the identifier are related as specified in Section 3.3: the identifier type code describes the source of the identifier. A DHCPv4 updater uses the 0x0002 type code if a Client Identifier option is present in the DHCPv4 messages and it is encoded as specified in [12]. [12] is informative, not normative. If one is required to know the encoding to determine a type-code, please refer to the encoding as normative. the client. The DHCID RDATA is composed by setting the two type octets to zero, the 1-octet digest type to 1 for SHA-256, and performing an SHA-256 hash computation across a buffer containing the Ethernet MAC type octet, What is the Ethernet Mac type octet ? is that "htype, chaddr from a DHCPv4 client's DHCPREQUEST" ? If the DHCID RR type is not supported, the RDATA would be encoded [13] as: \# 35 ( 000001c4b9a5b249651343158dde7bcc77169841f7a4243a572b5c283 fffedeb3f75e6 ) I tried to this, and this is my result: \# 35 000001457811a1e592b6f52a81e6a7767281fb4b1379fbf2cc9645d5a2ffc9b1dd54f7 The input I used, exactly following the description in the example is as follows (base 16 string): 00000101020304050606636c69656e74076578616d706c6503636f6d00 Which breaks down to 0000 identifier type code 01 digest type 010203040506 The six octets of the mac address and the wireformat of client.example.com, which is (6)c l i e n t(7)e x a m p l e(3)c o m(0) 06636c69656e74076578616d706c6503636f6d00 When I follow the construction as specified in the previous chapter, I do not need to use the identifier type code and the digest type as input for the hash function. I tried that too, but again, different results from what you have: \# 35 0000016388f0e5221a5faa6b109dab9bdd4c2f1a3408d59c3c60b8fb45c5b6e4f0ed94 Please tell me what I did wrong. type to 1 for SHA-256, and performing a SHA-256 hash computation across a buffer containing the seven octets from the client-id option and the FQDN (represented as specified in Section 3.5). In this example, the input buffer does not contain the identifier type and the digest type, which seems correct to me. chi.example.com. A 10.0.12.99 chi.example.com. DHCID ( AAEBOSD+XR3Os/0LozeXVqcNc7FwCfQdW L3b/NaiUDlW2No= ) If the DHCID RR type is not supported, the RDATA would be encoded [13] as: \# 35 ( 0001013920fe5d1dceb3fd0ba3379756a70d73b17009f41d58bddbfcd 6a2503956d8da ) Okay, perfect. I got the same result. ========================================================================= Detailed review draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-12: of the DNS data is entirely dependent on the accuracy of the configuration procedure. Sites that deploy Secure DNS [11] may [11] (rfc 2535) reference is updated by rfc 4033/4034/4035 configure credentials for each client and its assigned FQDN in a way that is more error-resistant, as both the FQDN and credentials must match. rfc 2535 and its replacements deal with origin authentication and data integrity. This is, the actual DNS data. If you mean "transaction security" such as SIG(0) and TSIG for dynamic updates, please refer to Secure Dynamic Update [10]. Certain RCODEs defined in RFC 2136 [3] indicate that the destination Nit: Don't use names and references together. please just say "Certain RCODEs defined in [3] indicate that the destination" Because these errors may indicate a misconfiguration of the updater or of the DNS server, the updater MAY attempt to signal to its administrator that an error has occurred, e.g. through a log message. What about errorcodes specific for TSIG or SIG(0) ? 5.3. Adding A and/or AAAA RRs to DNS When a DHCP client or server intends to update A and/or AAAA RRs, it starts with the update query in Section 5.3.1. A DNS message is either a Request or Response. The Request has an opcode. This opcode can be UPDATE or QUERY. So update query is confusing. This should be update request. =========================================================== Detailed review DRAFT-IETF-DHC-FQDN-OPTION-12: This document specifies a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv4, DHCPv4, option which can be used to exchange information about a DHCPv4 client's fully-qualified domain name and about responsibility for updating the DNS RR related to the client's address assignment. I understand this option already exists, and this document updates and extends its use. I would rephrase this to: This document updates and extends the DHCP Client FQDN option for the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol IPv4. This option can be used to exchange information about the a DHCPv4 client's fully qualified domain name. This information includes the FQDN and information about the responsibility for updating the DNS RR related to the client's address assignment. Please put terminology after the introduction. 1. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1]. In any case, whether a site permits all, some, or no DHCP servers and clients to perform DNS updates into the zones which it controls is entirely a matter of local administrative policy. Please rephrase to: It is considered local policy to permit DHCP clients and servers to perform DNS updates to zones. This document does not require any specific administrative policy, and does not propose one. Yet, the document continues to specify a range of possible policies: > The range of possible policies is very broad, from sites where only the DHCP servers have been given credentials that the DNS servers will accept, to sites where each individual DHCP client has been configured with credentials which allow the client to modify its own domain name. Compliant implementations may support some or all of these possibilities. Furthermore, I'd delete the previous paragraph. This document describes a new DHCP option which a client can use to Is it new ? If it is new, why are there deprecated elements ? convey all or part of its domain name to a DHCP server. Site- specific policy determines whether DHCP servers use the names that clients offer or not, and what DHCP servers may do in cases where clients do not supply domain names. Note that a 'part of its domain name' is not a FQDN. client sends the Client FQDN option in its DHCPDISCOVER message, it MUST send the option in subsequent DHCPREQUEST messages though the contents of the option MAY change. Only one Client FQDN option MAY appear in a message. What if a client has more than one name ? It is possible to have more than one PTR per address. The code for this option is 81. Its minimum length is 3 (octets). To avoid ambiguity, please specify that the length is excluding the Code and Len field. Code Len Flags RCODE1 RCODE2 Domain Name +------+------+------+------+------+------+-- | 81 | n | | | | ... +------+------+------+------+------+------+-- Please state somewhere that the above convention restrict name lengths to 253. In DNS, a name has a maximum length of 255. MUST send the option in subsequent DHCPREQUEST messages though the contents of the option MAY change. Only one Client FQDN option MAY appear in a message. What if a client has more than one name ? It is possible to have more than one PTR per address. The format of the Client FQDN option is: Code Len Flags RCODE1 RCODE2 Domain Name +------+------+------+------+------+------+-- | 81 | n | | | | ... +------+------+------+------+------+------+-- Please state somewhere that the above convention restrict name lengths to 253. In DNS, a name has a maximum length of 255. The format of the 1-octet Flags field is: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | MBZ |N|E|O|S| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The order of the flags below is not as it appears in the field. Does "S" indicate "Server" ? Please be consistent in using "Flags" or "Bits" in the reply from the server indicates the action to be taken by the server; if 1, the server has taken responsibility for A RR updates for the FQDN. Does "O" indicate "Override" ? The "O" bit indicates whether the server has overridden the client's preference for the "S" bit. A client MUST set this bit to 0. A server MUST set this bit to 1 if the "S" bit in its reply to the client does not match the "S" bit received from the client. What does "N" indicate ? |
2006-03-16
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12 | David Kessens | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for David Kessens by David Kessens |
2006-03-15
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12 | Allison Mankin | [Ballot comment] The hash function they implemented in the dhcid is fine now (updating my old comment). |
2006-03-07
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12 | Sam Hartman | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Sam Hartman has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Sam Hartman |
2006-03-06
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12 | Brian Carpenter | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Brian Carpenter has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Brian Carpenter |
2006-03-03
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12 | Russ Housley | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Russ Housley has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Russ Housley |
2006-02-27
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12 | Margaret Cullen | State Changes to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for AD Go-Ahead::AD Followup by Margaret Wasserman |
2006-02-27
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12 | Margaret Cullen | Placed on agenda for telechat - 2006-03-16 by Margaret Wasserman |
2006-02-27
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12 | Margaret Cullen | Note field has been cleared by Margaret Wasserman |
2006-02-24
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12 | Scott Hollenbeck | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Scott Hollenbeck has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Scott Hollenbeck |
2006-02-24
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12 | (System) | Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed |
2006-02-24
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11 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-11.txt |
2005-12-01
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12 | Allison Mankin | [Ballot comment] No further objection, but in relation to how you design the hash RR for the DHC ID - I don't understand why the … [Ballot comment] No further objection, but in relation to how you design the hash RR for the DHC ID - I don't understand why the dnsext WG would not sync the dhcid with the NSEC3 RR format since that format will be implemented with hash agility and virtually the same format. Too much compartmentailization? I take Bill's point that DHCP is fearful of the hash agility, but it's actually not the case that DNS knows how to signal a new hash function either, so the hash type field there is for future-proofing really. I think we should push the WG to use its own good design for both RRs. |
2005-12-01
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12 | Allison Mankin | [Ballot comment] No further objection, but in relation to how you design the hash RR for the DHC ID - the dnsext WG is working … [Ballot comment] No further objection, but in relation to how you design the hash RR for the DHC ID - the dnsext WG is working full steam ahead, including testing, on a record with very similar functions that stores hashed addresses, with agility, the NSEC3 RR. It would be good sync up the DHC ID work with this, once the other issues get cleared up. |
2005-12-01
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12 | Allison Mankin | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Allison Mankin by Allison Mankin |
2005-12-01
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12 | Margaret Cullen | State Changes to Waiting for AD Go-Ahead::Revised ID Needed from IESG Evaluation by Margaret Wasserman |
2005-12-01
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12 | Russ Housley | [Ballot discuss] The section 2 of draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-10 says: > > A successful attack of MD5's weakness does not reveal the original > … [Ballot discuss] The section 2 of draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-10 says: > > A successful attack of MD5's weakness does not reveal the original > data that was used to generate the signature, but rather ... > The term "signature" is incorrect. The output of MD5 is referred to as a message digest or a hash value. The section 2 of draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-10 goes on to say: > > Because we are using the MD5 hash to conceal the original data, the > fact that an attacker could produce a different plaintext resulting > in the same MD5 output is not significant concern. > This is not the attack that is of concern in this context. Since the hash value computation does not include any random secret values, the hash value becomes a straightforward way to verify a guess. Once the hash value is fetched from the DNS, the attacker tries various Ethernet MAC address guesses until the data value matches, for example: data = MD5(<0x01>) If the target Ethernet MAC address is known to the attacker, then all of the inputs to the MD5 are readily available to the attacker. The attacker has very little work to do to figure out which FQDN is being used by that target at a particular time. It is unclear to me what work factor is necessary to provide the needed privacy protection, especially given the cooperative nature of the overall resolution mechanism. At a minimum, this work factor needs to be discussed in the security considerations section. Also, the fact that MD5 is more efficient than SHA-1 and SHA-256 means that each guess tested by the attacker is more efficient. The work factor analysis may show that a less efficient function is highly desirable. |
2005-12-01
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12 | Russ Housley | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Russ Housley by Russ Housley |
2005-12-01
|
12 | Margaret Cullen | [Note]: '12/1/05: Removed from agenda to deal with IETF LC comments before IESG review.' added by Margaret Wasserman |
2005-12-01
|
12 | Mark Townsley | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Mark Townsley by Mark Townsley |
2005-11-30
|
12 | Bill Fenner | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Bill Fenner by Bill Fenner |
2005-11-30
|
12 | Jon Peterson | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Jon Peterson has been changed to No Objection from Undefined by Jon Peterson |
2005-11-30
|
12 | Jon Peterson | [Ballot comment] nit: dhc-ddns-resolution, Security Considerations, first sentence: "where or not" should be "whether or not"? |
2005-11-30
|
12 | Jon Peterson | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Undefined, has been recorded for Jon Peterson by Jon Peterson |
2005-11-30
|
12 | Brian Carpenter | [Ballot discuss] re draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-10.txt From dialogue between Gen-ART reviewer Harald Alvestrand and author Bernie Volz: >> The document gives three ways in which a DHCID … [Ballot discuss] re draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-10.txt From dialogue between Gen-ART reviewer Harald Alvestrand and author Bernie Volz: >> The document gives three ways in which a DHCID RR >> can be created based on data from a client request. Section 3.4 does not >> specify which of the three to choose. > > I don't believe this is a problem. For DHCPv6, there is only the DUID > that can be used. So, there's no issue here. > > For DHCPv4, all three forms could be used (once > draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt is an RFC and implementations > support it). > > However, the DHCPv4 server knows which format to use as it is using that > same information to associate the client with a lease. > > In general, a DHCPv4 server would: > - Use the DUID format if the client and server both support > draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt and the client presents a > client-identifier option formatted as a DUID. (Note that > draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt documents some issues with migrating > to clients/servers that support > draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt.) > - Use the Client Identifier option from the client if the client > included this option in its messages. > - Use the htype/chaddr otherwise. ... If you include that little list in this document, I'm fine with it... [Harald also noted the MD5 issue that's covered by Sam's DISCUSS] ----------------------- re draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-11.txt Comments from Gen-ART review by Harald Alverstrand: A smaller piece of missing material is this, from section 3.3.1 of the v4 document: Clients and servers SHOULD follow the character-set recommendations of RFC 1034 [2] and RFC 1035 [3]. However, implementers SHOULD also be aware that some client software could be using UTF-8 [10] character encoding. This specification does not require any support for UTF-8. Given DNS experts' insistence that the DNS protocol does not place any limits on character sets, it would be good to have a clearer pointer to what recommendations are intended here. Given that it's in section 3.3.1 (Deprecated ASCII encoding), one can assume that this refers to a character set recommendation for characters in the ASCII encoding; a DNS encoded name should probably be used "as is", no matter what it contains (although it would be good if the doc said so). It's also unclear from the text whether or not there's a trailing dot on the name in the deprecated ASCII encoding (there's no need for one, since a non-FQDN name can only be one component, but other fields of use have done this in the past, so it's best to be clear that this field does not do so). ------------------------- Many lesser comments on the document set at these URLs: http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/reviews/draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-10-alvestrand.txt http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/reviews/draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-10-alvestrand.txt |
2005-11-29
|
12 | Scott Hollenbeck | [Ballot discuss] draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr: Please use "octet" instead of "byte" in section 3.1 and elsewhere. |
2005-11-29
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12 | Scott Hollenbeck | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Scott Hollenbeck has been changed to Discuss from No Objection by Scott Hollenbeck |
2005-11-29
|
12 | Scott Hollenbeck | [Ballot comment] draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution: Reserved domains from RFC 2606 might be better than "org.nil" in the examples. |
2005-11-29
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12 | Scott Hollenbeck | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Scott Hollenbeck by Scott Hollenbeck |
2005-11-29
|
12 | Brian Carpenter | [Ballot discuss] re draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-10.txt From dialogue between Gen-ART reviewer Harald Alvestrand and author Bernie Volz: >> The document gives three ways in which a DHCID … [Ballot discuss] re draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-10.txt From dialogue between Gen-ART reviewer Harald Alvestrand and author Bernie Volz: >> The document gives three ways in which a DHCID RR >> can be created based on data from a client request. Section 3.4 does not >> specify which of the three to choose. > > I don't believe this is a problem. For DHCPv6, there is only the DUID > that can be used. So, there's no issue here. > > For DHCPv4, all three forms could be used (once > draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt is an RFC and implementations > support it). > > However, the DHCPv4 server knows which format to use as it is using that > same information to associate the client with a lease. > > In general, a DHCPv4 server would: > - Use the DUID format if the client and server both support > draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt and the client presents a > client-identifier option formatted as a DUID. (Note that > draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt documents some issues with migrating > to clients/servers that support > draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt.) > - Use the Client Identifier option from the client if the client > included this option in its messages. > - Use the htype/chaddr otherwise. ... If you include that little list in this document, I'm fine with it... [Harald also noted the MD5 issue that's covered by Russ's DISCUSS] ----------------------- re draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-11.txt Comments from Gen-ART review by Harald Alverstrand: A smaller piece of missing material is this, from section 3.3.1 of the v4 document: Clients and servers SHOULD follow the character-set recommendations of RFC 1034 [2] and RFC 1035 [3]. However, implementers SHOULD also be aware that some client software could be using UTF-8 [10] character encoding. This specification does not require any support for UTF-8. Given DNS experts' insistence that the DNS protocol does not place any limits on character sets, it would be good to have a clearer pointer to what recommendations are intended here. Given that it's in section 3.3.1 (Deprecated ASCII encoding), one can assume that this refers to a character set recommendation for characters in the ASCII encoding; a DNS encoded name should probably be used "as is", no matter what it contains (although it would be good if the doc said so). It's also unclear from the text whether or not there's a trailing dot on the name in the deprecated ASCII encoding (there's no need for one, since a non-FQDN name can only be one component, but other fields of use have done this in the past, so it's best to be clear that this field does not do so). ------------------------- Many lesser comments on the document set at these URLs: http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/reviews/draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-10-alvestrand.txt http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/reviews/draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-10-alvestrand.txt |
2005-11-29
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12 | Brian Carpenter | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Brian Carpenter by Brian Carpenter |
2005-11-28
|
12 | Margaret Cullen | State Changes to IESG Evaluation from In Last Call by Margaret Wasserman |
2005-11-28
|
12 | Ted Hardie | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Ted Hardie has been changed to No Objection from Undefined by Ted Hardie |
2005-11-28
|
12 | Ted Hardie | [Ballot comment] In the introduction to fqdn-option, the document says: DNS ([2], [3]) maintains (among other things) the information about the mapping between hosts' … [Ballot comment] In the introduction to fqdn-option, the document says: DNS ([2], [3]) maintains (among other things) the information about the mapping between hosts' Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) [8] and IP addresses assigned to the hosts. The information is maintained in two types of Resource Records (RRs): A and PTR. Obviously, there are AAAA records as well. Since they are being treated together, an informative pointer from this document to dhcpv6-fqdn seems like a good idea, especially since the ddns-resolution doc cites consistency among A, AAAA, and PTR records as one of its issues. In draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution, the language in 6.3.2 was hard to follow for the case where a DHC client has multiple interfaces and wishes to associate AAAA or records containing the same fqdn with the v6 or v4 addresses associated with those interfaces. |
2005-11-28
|
12 | Ted Hardie | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Undefined, has been recorded for Ted Hardie by Ted Hardie |
2005-11-27
|
12 | Michelle Cotton | [Note]: '11/21/05:Â Check for last minute IETF LC comments before telechat.' added by Michelle Cotton |
2005-11-27
|
12 | Michelle Cotton | IANA Last Call Comments: No IANA Considerations section. We understand this document to have NO IANA Actions. |
2005-11-27
|
12 | Sam Hartman | [Ballot discuss] I have two problems with this draft. First, md5 should not be used as the mandatory-to-implement hash. Secondly, you need to have hash … [Ballot discuss] I have two problems with this draft. First, md5 should not be used as the mandatory-to-implement hash. Secondly, you need to have hash agility: you need to have some mechanism for deploying a new hash function. The document argues that the only attacks against md5 are collision attacks and that since md5 is being used to hide information this is not a concern. We don't actually have good models for what it means to hide information using a hash function. The first model we have is the primage assumption: is the hash function good enough to prevent you from finding an entire input given an output. That is not affected by the current attacks, but it's also not an appropriate model for this use of md5. The goal is not to prevent the attacker from finding out all the bits of the input: we need to do something stronger and prevent the attacker from finding enough bits to identify and track a client. If the attacker can find out the low order bits in a ethernet MAC, they may well be able to track a client. So, you need a stronger model of information hiding. The only model we have available stronger than preimage resistance is the random oracle model. However the random oracle model is clearly stronger than collision resistance. So, the argument that the collision attacks don't raise concerns about the use of md5 to hide information seems flawed from a security standpoint. Thus, I think the mandatory to implement hash should be sha-1 or sha-256. If you choose sha-1 please confirm first that Russ will not require sha-256. You need to have some mechanism of deploying a new hash function. Here's a sketch about one way to do it. Feel free to adopt a better solution. First, you will need an algorithm identifier to describe which hash function is being used and a registration procedure for new hash functions. Someone proposed using the DS registry; that might work. Then you will need to allow multiple DHCP ID records to exist and describe updater behavior. Updaters should be able to read any hash they understand and should generate at least the current and next new hash. The tricky thing is what to do when an updater is looking at a record for which there is a dhcp id, but for which the updater cannot understand the hash. |
2005-11-27
|
12 | Sam Hartman | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Sam Hartman by Sam Hartman |
2005-11-23
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12 | Margaret Cullen | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Margaret Wasserman |
2005-11-23
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12 | Margaret Cullen | Ballot has been issued by Margaret Wasserman |
2005-11-23
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12 | Margaret Cullen | Created "Approve" ballot |
2005-11-21
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12 | Margaret Cullen | Placed on agenda for telechat - 2005-12-01 by Margaret Wasserman |
2005-11-21
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12 | Margaret Cullen | [Note]: '11/21/05: Check for last minute IETF LC comments before telechat.' added by Margaret Wasserman |
2005-11-14
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12 | Amy Vezza | Last call sent |
2005-11-14
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12 | Amy Vezza | State Changes to In Last Call from Last Call Requested by Amy Vezza |
2005-11-11
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12 | Margaret Cullen | Last Call was requested by Margaret Wasserman |
2005-11-11
|
12 | (System) | Ballot writeup text was added |
2005-11-11
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12 | (System) | Last call text was added |
2005-11-11
|
12 | (System) | Ballot approval text was added |
2005-11-11
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12 | Margaret Cullen | State Changes to Last Call Requested from AD Evaluation by Margaret Wasserman |
2005-11-04
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12 | Margaret Cullen | State Changes to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested by Margaret Wasserman |
2005-10-31
|
12 | Dinara Suleymanova | State Changes to Publication Requested from AD is watching by Dinara Suleymanova |
2005-10-31
|
12 | Dinara Suleymanova | [Note]: 'The following documents need to be coordinated: � draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-06.txt � draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-05.txt � draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-05.txt There is on-going mailing list discussion now (2003-06-05)' added by Dinara … [Note]: 'The following documents need to be coordinated: � draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-06.txt � draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-05.txt � draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-05.txt There is on-going mailing list discussion now (2003-06-05)' added by Dinara Suleymanova |
2005-09-02
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10 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-10.txt |
2005-06-29
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09 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-09.txt |
2005-05-13
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12 | (System) | This document has been resurrected |
2005-05-13
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12 | Margaret Cullen | I-D Resurrection was requested by Margaret Wasserman |
2004-10-12
|
08 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-08.txt |
2004-07-20
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07 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-07.txt |
2003-10-27
|
06 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-06.txt |
2003-10-14
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12 | Margaret Cullen | [Note]: 'The following documents need to be coordinated: draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-06.txt draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-05.txt draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-05.txt There is on-going mailing list discussion now (2003-06-05)' added by Margaret Wasserman |
2003-10-14
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12 | Margaret Cullen | Shepherding AD has been changed to Margaret Wasserman from Thomas Narten |
2003-06-23
|
12 | Thomas Narten | State Changes to AD is watching from AD Evaluation by Narten, Thomas |
2003-06-23
|
12 | Thomas Narten | Ralph & I and others had private discussion on getting issues out on the table. Result is set of mail messages to mailing list on … Ralph & I and others had private discussion on getting issues out on the table. Result is set of mail messages to mailing list on 2003-06-05. |
2003-04-21
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12 | Thomas Narten | State Changes to AD Evaluation :: AD Followup from Publication Requested by Narten, Thomas |
2003-04-21
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12 | Natalia Syracuse | State Changes to Publication Requested from AD Evaluation by Syracuse, Natalia |
2003-04-21
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12 | Thomas Narten | The following documents need to be coordinated: draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-06.txt draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-05.txt draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-05.txt Previous issues raised by AD still need to be resolved. |
2003-04-21
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12 | Thomas Narten | State Changes to AD Evaluation :: AD Followup from AD Evaluation by Narten, Thomas |
2003-04-21
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12 | Thomas Narten | State Changes to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested by Narten, Thomas |
2003-04-11
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12 | Thomas Narten | Draft Added by Narten, Thomas |
2002-11-05
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05 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-05.txt |
2002-06-21
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04 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-04.txt |
2001-11-29
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03 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-03.txt |
2001-07-26
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02 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-02.txt |
2001-03-07
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01 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-01.txt |
2000-07-24
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00 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-00.txt |