Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisement Problem Statement
RFC 6104
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Chown
Request for Comments: 6104 University of Southampton
Category: Informational S. Venaas
ISSN: 2070-1721 Cisco Systems
February 2011
Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisement Problem Statement
Abstract
When deploying IPv6, whether IPv6-only or dual-stack, routers are
configured to send IPv6 Router Advertisements (RAs) to convey
information to nodes that enable them to autoconfigure on the
network. This information includes the implied default router
address taken from the observed source address of the RA message, as
well as on-link prefix information. However, unintended
misconfigurations by users or administrators, or possibly malicious
attacks on the network, may lead to bogus RAs being present, which in
turn can cause operational problems for hosts on the network. In
this document, we summarise the scenarios in which rogue RAs may be
observed and present a list of possible solutions to the problem. We
focus on the unintended causes of rogue RAs in the text. The goal of
this text is to be Informational, and as such to present a framework
around which solutions can be proposed and discussed.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6104.
Chown & Venaas Informational [Page 1]
RFC 6104 Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisements February 2011
Copyright Notice
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Chown & Venaas Informational [Page 2]
RFC 6104 Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisements February 2011
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................4
2. Bogus RA Scenarios ..............................................4
2.1. Administrator Misconfiguration .............................5
2.2. User Misconfiguration ......................................5
2.3. Malicious Misconfiguration .................................5
3. Methods to Mitigate against Rogue RAs ...........................6
3.1. Manual Configuration .......................................6
3.2. Introducing RA Snooping ....................................6
3.3. Using ACLs on Managed Switches .............................7
3.4. SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) ...........................7
3.5. Router Preference Option ...................................8
3.6. Relying on Layer 2 Admission Control .......................8
3.7. Using Host-Based Packet Filters ............................8
3.8. Using an "Intelligent" Deprecation Tool ....................8
3.9. Using Layer 2 Partitioning .................................9
3.10. Adding Default Gateway/Prefix Options to DHCPv6 ...........9
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