IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard
RFC 6105
Document | Type |
RFC - Informational
(February 2011; No errata)
Updated by RFC 7113
|
|
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Authors | Gunter Van de Velde , János Mohácsi , Eric Levy-Abegnoli , Chip Popoviciu | ||
Last updated | 2015-10-14 | ||
Stream | IETF | ||
Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | (None) | |
Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 6105 (Informational) | |
Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Ron Bonica | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) E. Levy-Abegnoli Request for Comments: 6105 G. Van de Velde Category: Informational Cisco Systems ISSN: 2070-1721 C. Popoviciu Technodyne J. Mohacsi NIIF/Hungarnet February 2011 IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard Abstract Routed protocols are often susceptible to spoof attacks. The canonical solution for IPv6 is Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND), a solution that is non-trivial to deploy. This document proposes a light-weight alternative and complement to SEND based on filtering in the layer-2 network fabric, using a variety of filtering criteria, including, for example, SEND status. Status of This Memo This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6105. Levy-Abegnoli, et al. Informational [Page 1] RFC 6105 IPv6 RA-Guard February 2011 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................3 2. Model and Applicability .........................................3 3. Stateless RA-Guard ..............................................5 4. Stateful RA-Guard ...............................................6 4.1. State Machine ..............................................6 4.2. SEND-Based RA-Guard ........................................8 5. RA-Guard Use Considerations .....................................8 6. Security Considerations .........................................9 7. Acknowledgements ................................................9 8. References ......................................................9 8.1. Normative References .......................................9 8.2. Informative References .....................................9 Levy-Abegnoli, et al. Informational [Page 2] RFC 6105 IPv6 RA-Guard February 2011 1. Introduction When operating IPv6 in a shared layer-2 (L2) network segment without complete SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) support by all devices connected or without the availability of the infrastructure necessary to support SEND [RFC3971], there is always the risk of facing operational problems due to rogue Router Advertisements (RAs) generated maliciously or unintentionally by unauthorized or improperly configured routers connecting to the segment. There are several examples of work done on this topic that resulted in related studies and code, including [NDPMON] [KAME] [IPv6-SAMURAIS]. This document describes a solution framework forShow full document text