OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations
RFC 6819
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Lodderstedt, Ed.
Request for Comments: 6819 Deutsche Telekom AG
Category: Informational M. McGloin
ISSN: 2070-1721 IBM
P. Hunt
Oracle Corporation
January 2013
OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations
Abstract
This document gives additional security considerations for OAuth,
beyond those in the OAuth 2.0 specification, based on a comprehensive
threat model for the OAuth 2.0 protocol.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Lodderstedt, et al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 6819 OAuth 2.0 Security January 2013
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................6
2. Overview ........................................................7
2.1. Scope ......................................................7
2.2. Attack Assumptions .........................................7
2.3. Architectural Assumptions ..................................8
2.3.1. Authorization Servers ...............................8
2.3.2. Resource Server .....................................9
2.3.3. Client ..............................................9
3. Security Features ...............................................9
3.1. Tokens ....................................................10
3.1.1. Scope ..............................................11
3.1.2. Limited Access Token Lifetime ......................11
3.2. Access Token ..............................................11
3.3. Refresh Token .............................................11
3.4. Authorization "code" ......................................12
3.5. Redirect URI ..............................................13
3.6. "state" Parameter .........................................13
3.7. Client Identifier .........................................13
4. Threat Model ...................................................15
4.1. Clients ...................................................16
4.1.1. Threat: Obtaining Client Secrets ...................16
4.1.2. Threat: Obtaining Refresh Tokens ...................17
4.1.3. Threat: Obtaining Access Tokens ....................19
4.1.4. Threat: End-User Credentials Phished Using
Compromised or Embedded Browser ....................19
4.1.5. Threat: Open Redirectors on Client .................20
4.2. Authorization Endpoint ....................................21
4.2.1. Threat: Password Phishing by Counterfeit
Authorization Server ...............................21
4.2.2. Threat: User Unintentionally Grants Too
Much Access Scope ..................................21
4.2.3. Threat: Malicious Client Obtains Existing
Authorization by Fraud .............................22
4.2.4. Threat: Open Redirector ............................22
4.3. Token Endpoint ............................................23
4.3.1. Threat: Eavesdropping Access Tokens ................23
4.3.2. Threat: Obtaining Access Tokens from
Authorization Server Database ......................23
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