Security Threats to the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol Version 2 (OLSRv2)
RFC 8116

Document Type RFC - Informational (May 2017; No errata)
Last updated 2017-05-26
Replaces draft-clausen-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats
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Document shepherd Justin Dean
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IESG IESG state RFC 8116 (Informational)
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Responsible AD Alvaro Retana
Send notices to "Justin Dean" <bebemaster@gmail.com>, aretana@cisco.com
IANA IANA review state Version Changed - Review Needed
IANA action state No IC
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        T. Clausen
Request for Comments: 8116
Category: Informational                                       U. Herberg
ISSN: 2070-1721
                                                                   J. Yi
                                                     Ecole Polytechnique
                                                                May 2017

                        Security Threats to the
        Optimized Link State Routing Protocol Version 2 (OLSRv2)

Abstract

   This document analyzes common security threats to the Optimized Link
   State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2) and describes their
   potential impacts on Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) operations.  It
   also analyzes which of these security vulnerabilities can be
   mitigated when using the mandatory-to-implement security mechanisms
   for OLSRv2 and how the vulnerabilities are mitigated.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8116.

Clausen, et al.               Informational                     [Page 1]
RFC 8116                     OLSRv2 Threats                     May 2017

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Clausen, et al.               Informational                     [Page 2]
RFC 8116                     OLSRv2 Threats                     May 2017

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  OLSRv2 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       1.1.1.  Neighborhood Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       1.1.2.  MPR Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       1.1.3.  Link State Advertisement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.2.  Link State Vulnerability Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.3.  OLSRv2 Attack Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Topology Map Acquisition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Attack on Jittering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Hop Count and Hop Limit Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.1.  Modifying the Hop Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.2.  Modifying the Hop Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Effective Topology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Incorrect Forwarding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Wormholes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Sequence Number Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.3.1.  Message Sequence Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.3.2.  Advertised Neighbor Sequence Number (ANSN)  . . . . .  12
     4.4.  Indirect Jamming  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Inconsistent Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.1.  Identity Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  Link Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.2.1.  Inconsistent Topology Maps Due to Link State
               Advertisements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   6.  Mitigation of Security Vulnerabilities for OLSRv2 . . . . . .  19
     6.1.  Inherent OLSRv2 Resilience  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.2.  Resilience by Using RFC 7183 with OLSRv2  . . . . . . . .  20
       6.2.1.  Topology Map Acquisition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       6.2.2.  Effective Topology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
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