ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2
RFC 8442

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       J. Mattsson
Request for Comments: 8442                                    D. Migault
Category: Standards Track                                       Ericsson
ISSN: 2070-1721                                           September 2018

            ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites
                        for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2

Abstract

   This document defines several new cipher suites for version 1.2 of
   the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and version 1.2 of the
   Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol.  These cipher
   suites are based on the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with
   Pre-Shared Key (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the
   Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms
   AES-GCM and AES-CCM.  PSK provides light and efficient
   authentication, ECDHE provides forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and
   AES-CCM provide encryption and integrity protection.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8442.

Mattsson & Migault           Standards Track                    [Page 1]
RFC 8442           ECDHE_PSK with AEAD for (D)TLS 1.2     September 2018

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................2
   2. Requirements Notation ...........................................3
   3. ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites ................3
   4. IANA Considerations .............................................4
   5. Security Considerations .........................................4
   6. References ......................................................5
      6.1. Normative References .......................................5
      6.2. Informative References .....................................6
   Acknowledgements ...................................................7
   Authors' Addresses .................................................7

1.  Introduction

   This document defines new cipher suites that provide Pre-Shared Key
   (PSK) authentication, Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), and
   Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD).  The cipher
   suites are defined for version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol [RFC5246] and version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport
   Layer Security (DTLS) protocol [RFC6347].

   PSK authentication is widely used in many scenarios.  One deployment
   is 3GPP networks where pre-shared keys are used to authenticate both
   subscriber and network.  Another deployment is Internet of Things
   where PSK authentication is often preferred for performance and
   energy efficiency reasons.  In both scenarios, the endpoints are
   owned and/or controlled by a party that provisions the pre-shared
   keys and makes sure that they provide a high level of entropy.

   Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is a strongly recommended feature in
   security protocol design and can be accomplished by using an
   ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange method.  Ephemeral Elliptic

Mattsson & Migault           Standards Track                    [Page 2]
RFC 8442           ECDHE_PSK with AEAD for (D)TLS 1.2     September 2018

   Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) provides PFS with excellent performance
   and small key sizes.  ECDHE is mandatory to implement in both HTTP/2
   [RFC7540] and the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252].

   AEAD algorithms that combine encryption and integrity protection are
   strongly recommended for (D)TLS [RFC7525], and TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]
   forbids the use of non-AEAD algorithms.  The AEAD algorithms
   considered in this document are AES-GCM and AES-CCM.  The use of
   AES-GCM in TLS is defined in [RFC5288], and the use of AES-CCM is