A Common Operational Problem in DNS Servers: Failure to Communicate
RFC 8906



Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        M. Andrews
Request for Comments: 8906                                     R. Bellis
BCP: 231                                                             ISC
Category: Best Current Practice                           September 2020
ISSN: 2070-1721

  A Common Operational Problem in DNS Servers: Failure to Communicate

Abstract

   The DNS is a query/response protocol.  Failing to respond to queries,
   or responding incorrectly, causes both immediate operational problems
   and long-term problems with protocol development.

   This document identifies a number of common kinds of queries to which
   some servers either fail to respond or respond incorrectly.  This
   document also suggests procedures for zone operators to apply to
   identify and remediate the problem.

   The document does not look at the DNS data itself, just the structure
   of the responses.

Status of This Memo

   This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8906.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Consequences
   3.  Common Kinds of Queries That Result in No or Bad Responses
     3.1.  Basic DNS Queries
       3.1.1.  Zone Existence
       3.1.2.  Unknown/Unsupported Type Queries
       3.1.3.  DNS Flags
       3.1.4.  Unknown DNS Opcodes
       3.1.5.  TCP Queries
     3.2.  EDNS Queries
       3.2.1.  EDNS Queries: Version Independent
       3.2.2.  EDNS Queries: Version Specific
       3.2.3.  EDNS Options
       3.2.4.  EDNS Flags
       3.2.5.  Truncated EDNS Responses
       3.2.6.  DO=1 Handling
       3.2.7.  EDNS over TCP
   4.  Firewalls and Load Balancers
   5.  Packet Scrubbing Services
   6.  Whole Answer Caches
   7.  Response Code Selection
   8.  Testing
     8.1.  Testing: Basic DNS
       8.1.1.  Is the server configured for the zone?
       8.1.2.  Testing Unknown Types
       8.1.3.  Testing Header Bits
       8.1.4.  Testing Unknown Opcodes
       8.1.5.  Testing TCP
     8.2.  Testing: Extended DNS
       8.2.1.  Testing Minimal EDNS
       8.2.2.  Testing EDNS Version Negotiation
       8.2.3.  Testing Unknown EDNS Options
       8.2.4.  Testing Unknown EDNS Flags
       8.2.5.  Testing EDNS Version Negotiation with Unknown EDNS
               Flags
       8.2.6.  Testing EDNS Version Negotiation with Unknown EDNS
               Options
       8.2.7.  Testing Truncated Responses
       8.2.8.  Testing DO=1 Handling
       8.2.9.  Testing EDNS Version Negotiation with DO=1
       8.2.10. Testing with Multiple Defined EDNS Options
     8.3.  When EDNS Is Not Supported
   9.  Remediation
   10. Security Considerations
   11. IANA Considerations
   12. References
     12.1.  Normative References
     12.2.  Informative References
   Acknowledgements
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   The DNS [RFC1034] [RFC1035] is a query/response protocol.  Failing to
   respond to queries or responding incorrectly causes both immediate
   operational problems and long-term problems with protocol
   development.

   Failure to respond to a query is indistinguishable from packet loss
   without doing an analysis of query-response patterns.  Additionally,
   failure to respond results in unnecessary queries being made by DNS
   clients and introduces delays to the resolution process.

   Due to the inability to distinguish between packet loss and
   nameservers or middleboxes dropping Extension Mechanisms for DNS
   (EDNS) [RFC6891] queries, packet loss is sometimes misclassified as
   lack of EDNS support, which can lead to DNSSEC validation failures.

   The existence of servers that fail to respond to queries results in
   developers being hesitant to deploy new standards.  Such servers need
   to be identified and remediated.

   The DNS has response codes that cover almost any conceivable query
   response.  A nameserver should be able to respond to any conceivable
   query using them.  There should be no need to drop queries because a
   nameserver does not understand them.

   Unless a nameserver is under attack, it should respond to all DNS
   requests directed to it.  When a nameserver is under attack, it may
   wish to drop packets.  A common attack is to use a nameserver as an
   amplifier by sending spoofed packets.  This is done because response
   packets are bigger than the queries and large amplification factors
   are available, especially if EDNS is supported.  Limiting the rate of
   responses is reasonable when this is occurring, and the client should
   retry.  However, this only works if legitimate clients are not being
   forced to guess whether or not EDNS queries are accepted.  As long as
   there is still a pool of servers that don't respond to EDNS requests,
   clients have no way to know if the lack of response is due to packet
   loss, EDNS packets not being supported, or rate limiting due to the
   server being under attack.  Misclassification of server behaviour is
   unavoidable when rate limiting is used until the population of
   servers that fail to respond to well-formed queries drops to near
   zero.

   Nameservers should respond to queries even if the queried name is not
   for any name the server is configured to answer for.  Misconfigured
   nameservers are a common occurrence in the DNS, and receiving queries
   for zones that the server is not configured for is not necessarily an
   indication that the server is under attack.  Parent zone operators
   are advised to regularly check that the delegating NS records are
   consistent with those of the delegated zone and to correct them when
   they are not (Section 4.2.2 of [RFC1034], Paragraph 3).  Doing this
   regularly should reduce the instances of broken delegations.

   This document does not try to identify all possible errors nor does
   it supply an exhaustive list of tests.

2.  Consequences

   Failure to follow the guidance in relevant DNS RFCs has multiple
   adverse consequences.  Some are caused directly by the non-compliant
   behaviour and others as a result of workarounds forced on recursive
   servers.  Addressing known issues now will reduce future
   interoperability issues as the DNS protocol continues to evolve and
   clients make use of newly introduced DNS features.  In particular,
   the base DNS specification [RFC1034] [RFC1035] and the EDNS
   specification [RFC6891], when implemented, need to be followed.

   Some examples of known consequences include the following:

   *  The AD (Authenticated Data) bit in a response cannot be trusted to
      mean anything, as some servers incorrectly copy the flag bit from
      the request to the response [RFC1035] [RFC4035].  The use of the
      AD bit in requests is defined in [RFC6840].

   *  Widespread non-response to EDNS queries has led to recursive
      servers having to assume that EDNS is not supported and that
      fallback to plain DNS is required, potentially causing DNSSEC
      validation failures.

   *  Widespread non-response to EDNS options requires recursive servers
      to decide whether to probe to see if it is the specific EDNS
      option or the use of EDNS in general that is causing the non-
      response.  In the limited amount of time required to resolve a
      query before the client times out, this is not possible.

   *  Incorrectly returning FORMERR to an EDNS option being present
      leads to the recursive server not being able to determine if the
      server is just broken in the handling of the EDNS option or if it
      doesn't support EDNS at all.

   *  Mishandling of unknown query types has contributed to the
      abandonment of the transition of the SPF type.

   *  Mishandling of unknown query types has slowed up the development
      of DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) and resulted
      in additional rules being specified to reduce the probability of
      interacting with a broken server when making TLSA queries.

   The consequences of servers not following the RFCs will only grow if
   measures are not put in place to remove non-compliant servers from
   the ecosystem.  Working around issues due to non-compliance with RFCs
   is not sustainable.

   Most (if not all) of these consequences could have been avoided if
   action had been taken to remove non-compliant servers as soon as
   people were aware of them, i.e., to actively seek out broken
   implementations and servers and inform their developers and operators
   that they need to fix their servers.

3.  Common Kinds of Queries That Result in No or Bad Responses

   This section is broken down into Basic DNS requests and EDNS
   requests.

3.1.  Basic DNS Queries

3.1.1.  Zone Existence

   If a zone is delegated to a server, that server should respond to a
   SOA query for that zone with an SOA record.  Failing to respond at
   all is always incorrect, regardless of the configuration of the
   server.  Responding with anything other than an SOA record in the
   answer section indicates a bad delegation.

3.1.2.  Unknown/Unsupported Type Queries

   Some servers fail to respond to unknown or unsupported types.  If a
   server receives a query for a type that it doesn't recognise, or
   doesn't implement, it is expected to return the appropriate response
   as if it did recognise the type but does not have any data for that
   type, i.e., either NOERROR or NXDOMAIN.  The exceptions to this are
   queries for Meta-RR types, which may return NOTIMP.

3.1.3.  DNS Flags

   Some servers fail to respond to DNS queries with various DNS flags
   set, regardless of whether they are defined or still reserved.  At
   the time of writing, there are servers that fail to respond to
   queries with the AD flag set to 1 and servers that fail to respond to
   queries with the last reserved flag set.

   Servers should respond to such queries.  If the server does not know
   the meaning of a flag, it must not copy it to the response
   (Section 4.1.1 of [RFC1035]).  If the server does not understand the
   meaning of a request, it should reply with a FORMERR response with
   unknown flags set to zero.

3.1.3.1.  Recursive Queries

   A non-recursive server is supposed to respond to recursive queries as
   if the Recursion Desired (RD) bit is not set [RFC1034].

3.1.4.  Unknown DNS Opcodes

   The use of previously undefined opcodes is to be expected.  Since the
   DNS was first defined, two new opcodes have been added, UPDATE and
   NOTIFY.

   NOTIMP is the expected rcode to an unknown or unimplemented opcode.

      |  NOTE: while new opcodes will most probably use the current
      |  layout structure for the rest of the message, there is no
      |  requirement that anything other than the DNS header match.

3.1.5.  TCP Queries

   All DNS servers are supposed to respond to queries over TCP
   [RFC7766].  While firewalls should not block TCP connection attempts,
   those that do should cleanly terminate the connection by sending TCP
   RESET or sending ICMP/ICMPv6 Administratively Prohibited messages.
   Dropping TCP connections introduces excessive delays to the
   resolution process.

3.2.  EDNS Queries

   EDNS queries are specified in [RFC6891].

3.2.1.  EDNS Queries: Version Independent

   Identifying servers that fail to respond to EDNS queries can be done
   by first confirming that the server responds to regular DNS queries,
   followed by a series of otherwise identical queries using EDNS, then
   making the original query again.  A series of EDNS queries is needed,
   as at least one DNS implementation responds to the first EDNS query
   with FORMERR but fails to respond to subsequent queries from the same
   address for a period until a regular DNS query is made.  The EDNS
   query should specify a UDP buffer size of 512 bytes to avoid false
   classification of not supporting EDNS due to response packet size.

   If the server responds to the first and last queries but fails to
   respond to most or all of the EDNS queries, it is probably faulty.
   The test should be repeated a number of times to eliminate the
   likelihood of a false positive due to packet loss.

   Firewalls may also block larger EDNS responses, but there is no easy
   way to check authoritative servers to see if the firewall is
   misconfigured.

3.2.2.  EDNS Queries: Version Specific

   Some servers respond correctly to EDNS version 0 queries but fail to
   respond to EDNS queries with version numbers that are higher than
   zero.  Servers should respond with BADVERS to EDNS queries with
   version numbers that they do not support.

   Some servers respond correctly to EDNS version 0 queries but fail to
   set QR=1 when responding to EDNS versions they do not support.  Such
   responses may be discarded as invalid (as QR is not 1) or treated as
   requests (when the source port of the original request was port 53).

3.2.3.  EDNS Options

   Some servers fail to respond to EDNS queries with EDNS options set.
   The original EDNS specification left this behaviour undefined
   [RFC2671], but the correct behaviour was clarified in [RFC6891].
   Unknown EDNS options are supposed to be ignored by the server.

3.2.4.  EDNS Flags

   Some servers fail to respond to EDNS queries with EDNS flags set.
   Servers should ignore EDNS flags they do not understand and must not
   add them to the response [RFC6891].

3.2.5.  Truncated EDNS Responses

   Some EDNS-aware servers fail to include an OPT record when a
   truncated response is sent.  An OPT record is supposed to be included
   in a truncated response [RFC6891].

   Some EDNS-aware servers fail to honour the advertised EDNS UDP buffer
   size and send oversized responses [RFC6891].  Servers must send UDP
   responses no larger than the advertised EDNS UDP buffer size.

3.2.6.  DO=1 Handling

   Some nameservers incorrectly only return an EDNS response when the
   DNSSEC OK (DO) bit [RFC3225] is 1 in the query.  Servers that support
   EDNS should always respond to EDNS requests with EDNS responses.

   Some nameservers fail to copy the DO bit to the response despite
   clearly supporting DNSSEC by returning an RRSIG records to EDNS
   queries with DO=1.  Nameservers that support DNSSEC are expected to
   copy the DO bit from the request to the response.

3.2.7.  EDNS over TCP

   Some EDNS-aware servers incorrectly limit the TCP response sizes to
   the advertised UDP response size.  This breaks DNS resolution to
   clients where the response sizes exceed the advertised UDP response
   size despite the server and the client being capable of sending and
   receiving larger TCP responses, respectively.  It effectively defeats
   setting TC=1 in UDP responses.

4.  Firewalls and Load Balancers

   Firewalls and load balancers can affect the externally visible
   behaviour of a nameserver.  Tests for conformance should to be done
   from outside of any firewall so that the system is tested as a whole.

   Firewalls and load balancers should not drop DNS packets that they
   don't understand.  They should either pass the packets or generate an
   appropriate error response.

   Requests for unknown query types are normal client behaviour and
   should not be construed as an attack.  Nameservers have always been
   expected to be able to handle such queries.

   Requests for unknown query classes are normal client behaviour and
   should not be construed as an attack.  Nameservers have always been
   expected to be able to handle such queries.

   Requests with unknown opcodes are normal client behaviour and should
   not be construed as an attack.  Nameservers have always been expected
   to be able to handle such queries.

   Requests with unassigned flags set (DNS or EDNS) are expected client
   behaviour and should not be construed as an attack.  The behaviour
   for unassigned flags is to ignore them in the request and to not set
   them in the response.  Dropping DNS/EDNS packets with unassigned
   flags makes it difficult to deploy extensions that make use of them
   due to the need to reconfigure and update firewalls.

   Requests with unknown EDNS options are expected client behaviour and
   should not be construed as an attack.  The correct behaviour for
   unknown EDNS options is to ignore their presence when constructing a
   reply.

   Requests with unknown EDNS versions are expected client behaviour and
   should not be construed as an attack.  The correct behaviour for
   unknown EDNS versions is to return BADVERS along with the highest
   EDNS version the server supports.  Dropping EDNS packets breaks EDNS
   version negotiation.

   Firewalls should not assume that there will only be a single response
   message to a request.  There have been proposals to use EDNS to
   signal that multiple DNS messages be returned rather than a single
   UDP message that is fragmented at the IP layer.

   DNS, and EDNS in particular, are designed to allow clients to be able
   to use new features against older servers without having to validate
   every option.  Indiscriminate blocking of messages breaks that
   design.

   However, there may be times when a nameserver mishandles messages
   with a particular flag, EDNS option, EDNS version field, opcode, type
   or class field, or combination thereof to the point where the
   integrity of the nameserver is compromised.  Firewalls should offer
   the ability to selectively reject messages using an appropriately
   constructed response based on all these fields while awaiting a fix
   from the nameserver vendor.  Returning FORMERR or REFUSED are two
   potential error codes to return.

5.  Packet Scrubbing Services

   Packet scrubbing services are used to filter out undesired traffic,
   including but not limited to denial-of-service traffic.  This is
   often done using heuristic analysis of the traffic.

   Packet scrubbing services can affect the externally visible behaviour
   of a nameserver in a similar way to firewalls.  If an operator uses a
   packet scrubbing service, they should check that legitimate queries
   are not being blocked.

   Packet scrubbing services, unlike firewalls, are also turned on and
   off in response to denial-of-service attacks.  One needs to take care
   when choosing a scrubbing service.

   Ideally, operators should run these tests against a packet scrubbing
   service to ensure that these tests are not seen as attack vectors.

6.  Whole Answer Caches

   Whole answer caches take a previously constructed answer and return
   it to a subsequent query for the same question.  However, they can
   return the wrong response if they do not take all of the relevant
   attributes of the query into account.

   In addition to the standard tuple of <qname,qtype,qclass>, a non-
   exhaustive set of attributes that must be considered include: RD, AD,
   CD, OPT record, DO, EDNS buffer size, EDNS version, EDNS options, and
   transport.

7.  Response Code Selection

   Choosing the correct response code when responding to DNS queries is
   important.  Response codes should be chosen considering how clients
   will handle them.

   For unimplemented opcodes, NOTIMP is the expected response code.
   Note: newly implemented opcodes may change the message format by
   extending the header, changing the structure of the records, etc.
   Servers are not expected to be able to parse these and should respond
   with a response code of NOTIMP rather than FORMERR (which would be
   expected if there was a parse error with a known opcode).

   For unimplemented type codes, and in the absence of other errors, the
   only valid response is NOERROR if the qname exists and NXDOMAIN
   otherwise.  For Meta-RRs, NOTIMP may be returned instead.

   If a zone cannot be loaded because it contains unimplemented type
   codes that are not encoded as unknown record types according to
   [RFC3597], then the expected response is SERVFAIL, as the whole zone
   should be rejected (Section 5.2 of [RFC1035]).  If a zone loads, then
   Section 4.3.2 of [RFC1034] applies.

   If the server supports EDNS and receives a query with an unsupported
   EDNS version, the correct response is BADVERS [RFC6891].

   If the server does not support EDNS at all, FORMERR is the expected
   error code.  That said, a minimal EDNS server implementation requires
   parsing the OPT records and responding with an empty OPT record in
   the additional section in most cases.  There is no need to interpret
   any EDNS options present in the request, as unsupported EDNS options
   are expected to be ignored [RFC6891].  Additionally, EDNS flags can
   be ignored.  The only part of the OPT record that needs to be
   examined is the version field to determine if BADVERS needs to be
   sent or not.

8.  Testing

   Testing is divided into two sections: "Basic DNS", which all servers
   should meet, and "Extended DNS", which should be met by all servers
   that support EDNS (a server is deemed to support EDNS if it gives a
   valid EDNS response to any EDNS query).  If a server does not support
   EDNS, it should still respond to all the tests, albeit with error
   responses.

   These tests query for records at the apex of a zone that the server
   is nominally configured to serve.  All tests should use the same
   zone.

   It is advisable to run all of the tests below in parallel so as to
   minimise the delays due to multiple timeouts when the servers do not
   respond.  There are 16 queries directed to each nameserver (assuming
   no packet loss) testing different aspects of Basic DNS and Extended
   DNS.

   The tests below use dig from BIND 9.11.0 [ISC].  Replace $zone with
   the name of the zone being used for testing.  Replace $server with
   the name or address of the server being tested.

   When testing, recursive servers set RD=1 and choose a zone name that
   is known to exist and is not being served by the recursive server.
   The root zone (".") is often a good candidate, as it is DNSSEC
   signed.  RD=1, rather than RD=0, should be present in the responses
   for all test involving the opcode QUERY.  Non-authoritative answers
   (AA=0) are expected when talking to a recursive server.  AD=1 is only
   expected if the server is validating responses and one or both AD=1
   or DO=1 is set in the request, otherwise AD=0 is expected.

8.1.  Testing: Basic DNS

   This first set of tests cover Basic DNS server behaviour and all
   servers should pass these tests.

8.1.1.  Is the server configured for the zone?

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with no DNS flag bits set and without EDNS.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to be returned in the answer
   section, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the Authoritative Answer
   (AA) and Query/Response (QR) bits to be set in the header; the
   Recursion Available (RA) bits may also be set [RFC1034].  We do not
   expect an OPT record to be returned [RFC6891].

   Verify the server is configured for the zone:

   dig +noedns +noad +norec soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: the SOA record to be present in the answer section
   expect: flag: aa to be present
   expect: flag: rd to NOT be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present
   expect: the OPT record to NOT be present

8.1.2.  Testing Unknown Types

   Identifying servers that fail to respond to unknown or unsupported
   types can be done by making an initial DNS query for an A record,
   making a number of queries for an unallocated type, then making a
   query for an A record again.  IANA maintains a registry of allocated
   types [IANA-DNS].

   If the server responds to the first and last queries but fails to
   respond to the queries for the unallocated type, it is probably
   faulty.  The test should be repeated a number of times to eliminate
   the likelihood of a false positive due to packet loss.

   Ask for the TYPE1000 RRset at the configured zone's name.  This query
   is made with no DNS flag bits set and without EDNS.  TYPE1000 has
   been chosen for this purpose, as IANA is unlikely to allocate this
   type in the near future and it is not in a range reserved for private
   use [RFC6895].  Any unallocated type code could be chosen for this
   test.

   We expect no records to be returned in the answer section, the rcode
   to be set to NOERROR, and the AA and QR bits to be set in the header;
   RA may also be set [RFC1034].  We do not expect an OPT record to be
   returned [RFC6891].

   Check that queries for an unknown type work:

   dig +noedns +noad +norec type1000 $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: an empty answer section.
   expect: flag: aa to be present
   expect: flag: rd to NOT be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present
   expect: the OPT record to NOT be present

8.1.3.  Testing Header Bits

8.1.3.1.  Testing CD=1 Queries

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with only the CD DNS flag bit set, with all other DNS bits clear, and
   without EDNS.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to be returned in the answer
   section, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the AA and QR bits to be
   set in the header.  We do not expect an OPT record to be returned.

   If the server supports DNSSEC, CD should be set in the response
   [RFC4035]; otherwise, CD should be clear [RFC1034].

   Check that queries with CD=1 work:

   dig +noedns +noad +norec +cd soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: the SOA record to be present in the answer section
   expect: flag: aa to be present
   expect: flag: rd to NOT be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present
   expect: the OPT record to NOT be present

8.1.3.2.  Testing AD=1 Queries

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with only the AD DNS flag bit set, with all other DNS bits clear, and
   without EDNS.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to be returned in the answer
   section, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the AA and QR bits to be
   set in the header.  We do not expect an OPT record to be returned.
   The purpose of this query is to detect blocking of queries with the
   AD bit present, not the specific value of AD in the response.

   Check that queries with AD=1 work:

   dig +noedns +norec +ad soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: the SOA record to be present in the answer section
   expect: flag: aa to be present
   expect: flag: rd to NOT be present
   expect: the OPT record to NOT be present

   AD use in queries is defined in [RFC6840].

8.1.3.3.  Testing Reserved Bit

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with only the final reserved DNS flag bit set, with all other DNS
   bits clear, and without EDNS.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to be returned in the answer
   section, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the AA and QR bits to be
   set in the header; RA may be set.  The final reserved bit must not be
   set [RFC1034].  We do not expect an OPT record to be returned
   [RFC6891].

   Check that queries with the last unassigned DNS header flag work and
   that the flag bit is not copied to the response:

   dig +noedns +noad +norec +zflag soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: the SOA record to be present in the answer section
   expect: MBZ to NOT be in the response (see below)
   expect: flag: aa to be present
   expect: flag: rd to NOT be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present
   expect: the OPT record to NOT be present

   MBZ (Must Be Zero) is a dig-specific indication that the flag bit has
   been incorrectly copied.  See Section 4.1.1 of [RFC1035]:

   "Z  Reserved for future use.  Must be zero in all queries and
      responses."

8.1.3.4.  Testing Recursive Queries

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with only the RD DNS flag bit set and without EDNS.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to be returned in the answer
   section, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the AA, QR and RD bits
   to be set in the header; RA may also be set [RFC1034].  We do not
   expect an OPT record to be returned [RFC6891].

   Check that recursive queries work:

   dig +noedns +noad +rec soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: the SOA record to be present in the answer section
   expect: flag: aa to be present
   expect: flag: rd to be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present
   expect: the OPT record to NOT be present

8.1.4.  Testing Unknown Opcodes

   Construct a DNS message that consists of only a DNS header with
   opcode set to 15 (currently not allocated), no DNS header bits set,
   and empty question, answer, authority, and additional sections.

   Check that new opcodes are handled:

   dig +noedns +noad +opcode=15 +norec +header-only @$server

   expect: status: NOTIMP
   expect: opcode: 15
   expect: all sections to be empty
   expect: flag: aa to NOT be present
   expect: flag: rd to NOT be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present
   expect: the OPT record to NOT be present

8.1.5.  Testing TCP

   Whether a server accepts TCP connections can be tested by first
   checking that it responds to UDP queries to confirm that it is up and
   operating, then attempting the same query over TCP.  An additional
   query should be made over UDP if the TCP connection attempt fails to
   confirm that the server under test is still operating.

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with no DNS flag bits set and without EDNS.  This query is to be sent
   using TCP.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to be returned in the answer
   section, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the AA and QR bits to be
   set in the header; RA may also be set [RFC1034].  We do not expect an
   OPT record to be returned [RFC6891].

   Check that TCP queries work:

   dig +noedns +noad +norec +tcp soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: the SOA record to be present in the answer section
   expect: flag: aa to be present
   expect: flag: rd to NOT be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present
   expect: the OPT record to NOT be present

   The requirement that TCP be supported is defined in [RFC7766].

8.2.  Testing: Extended DNS

   The next set of tests cover various aspects of EDNS behaviour.  If
   any of these tests succeed (indicating at least some EDNS support),
   then all of them should succeed.  There are servers that support EDNS
   but fail to handle plain EDNS queries correctly, so a plain EDNS
   query is not a good indicator of lack of EDNS support.

8.2.1.  Testing Minimal EDNS

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with no DNS flag bits set.  EDNS version 0 is used without any EDNS
   options or EDNS flags set.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to be returned in the answer
   section, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the AA and QR bits to be
   set in the header; RA may also be set [RFC1034].  We expect an OPT
   record to be returned.  There should be no EDNS flags present in the
   response.  The EDNS version field should be 0, and there should be no
   EDNS options present [RFC6891].

   Check that plain EDNS queries work:

   dig +nocookie +edns=0 +noad +norec soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: the SOA record to be present in the answer section
   expect: an OPT record to be present in the additional section
   expect: EDNS Version 0 in response
   expect: flag: aa to be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present

   +nocookie disables sending an EDNS COOKIE option, which is otherwise
   enabled by default in BIND 9.11.0 (and later).

8.2.2.  Testing EDNS Version Negotiation

   Ask for the SOA record of a zone the server is nominally configured
   to serve.  This query is made with no DNS flag bits set.  EDNS
   version 1 is used without any EDNS options or EDNS flags set.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to NOT be returned in the
   answer section with the extended rcode set to BADVERS and the QR bit
   to be set in the header; RA may also be set [RFC1034].  We expect an
   OPT record to be returned.  There should be no EDNS flags present in
   the response.  The EDNS version field should be 0 in the response, as
   no other EDNS version has as yet been specified [RFC6891].

   Check that EDNS version 1 queries work (EDNS supported):

   dig +nocookie +edns=1 +noednsneg +noad +norec soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: BADVERS
   expect: the SOA record to NOT be present in the answer section
   expect: an OPT record to be present in the additional section
   expect: EDNS Version 0 in response
   expect: flag: aa to NOT be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present

   +noednsneg has been set, as dig supports EDNS version negotiation,
   and we want to see only the response to the initial EDNS version 1
   query.

8.2.3.  Testing Unknown EDNS Options

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with no DNS flag bits set.  EDNS version 0 is used without any EDNS
   flags.  An EDNS option is present with a value that has not yet been
   assigned by IANA.  We have picked an unassigned code of 100 for the
   example below.  Any unassigned EDNS option code could have been
   chosen for this test.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to be returned in the answer
   section, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the AA and QR bits to be
   set in the header; RA may also be set [RFC1034].  We expect an OPT
   record to be returned.  There should be no EDNS flags present in the
   response.  The EDNS version field should be 0, as EDNS versions other
   than 0 are yet to be specified, and there should be no EDNS options
   present, as unknown EDNS options are supposed to be ignored by the
   server (Section 6.1.1 of [RFC6891]).

   Check that EDNS queries with an unknown option work (EDNS supported):

   dig +nocookie +edns=0 +noad +norec +ednsopt=100 soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: the SOA record to be present in the answer section
   expect: an OPT record to be present in the additional section
   expect: OPT=100 to NOT be present
   expect: EDNS Version 0 in response
   expect: flag: aa to be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present

8.2.4.  Testing Unknown EDNS Flags

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with no DNS flag bits set.  EDNS version 0 is used without any EDNS
   options.  An unassigned EDNS flag bit is set (0x40 in this case).

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to be returned in the answer
   section, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the AA and QR bits to be
   set in the header; RA may also be set [RFC1034].  We expect an OPT
   record to be returned.  There should be no EDNS flags present in the
   response, as unknown EDNS flags are supposed to be ignored.  The EDNS
   version field should be 0, and there should be no EDNS options
   present [RFC6891].

   Check that EDNS queries with unknown flags work (EDNS supported):

   dig +nocookie +edns=0 +noad +norec +ednsflags=0x40 soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: the SOA record to be present in the answer section
   expect: an OPT record to be present in the additional section
   expect: MBZ not to be present
   expect: EDNS Version 0 in response
   expect: flag: aa to be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present

   MBZ (Must Be Zero) is a dig-specific indication that a flag bit has
   been incorrectly copied, as per Section 6.1.4 of [RFC6891].

8.2.5.  Testing EDNS Version Negotiation with Unknown EDNS Flags

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with no DNS flag bits set.  EDNS version 1 is used without any EDNS
   options.  An unassigned EDNS flag bit is set (0x40 in this case).

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to NOT be returned in the
   answer section with the extended rcode set to BADVERS and the QR bit
   to be set in the header; RA may also be set [RFC1034].  We expect an
   OPT record to be returned.  There should be no EDNS flags present in
   the response, as unknown EDNS flags are supposed to be ignored.  The
   EDNS version field should be 0, as EDNS versions other than 0 are yet
   to be specified, and there should be no EDNS options present
   [RFC6891].

   Check that EDNS version 1 queries with unknown flags work (EDNS
   supported):

   dig +nocookie +edns=1 +noednsneg +noad +norec +ednsflags=0x40 soa \
       $zone @$server

   expect: status: BADVERS
   expect: SOA record to NOT be present
   expect: an OPT record to be present in the additional section
   expect: MBZ not to be present
   expect: EDNS Version 0 in response
   expect: flag: aa to NOT be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present

8.2.6.  Testing EDNS Version Negotiation with Unknown EDNS Options

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with no DNS flag bits set.  EDNS version 1 is used.  An unknown EDNS
   option is present.  We have picked an unassigned code of 100 for the
   example below.  Any unassigned EDNS option code could have been
   chosen for this test.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to NOT be returned in the
   answer section with the extended rcode set to BADVERS and the QR bit
   to be set in the header; RA may also be set [RFC1034].  We expect an
   OPT record to be returned.  There should be no EDNS flags present in
   the response.  The EDNS version field should be 0, as EDNS versions
   other than 0 are yet to be specified, and there should be no EDNS
   options present [RFC6891].

   Check that EDNS version 1 queries with unknown options work (EDNS
   supported):

   dig +nocookie +edns=1 +noednsneg +noad +norec +ednsopt=100 soa \
       $zone @$server

   expect: status: BADVERS
   expect: SOA record to NOT be present
   expect: an OPT record to be present in the additional section
   expect: OPT=100 to NOT be present
   expect: EDNS Version 0 in response
   expect: flag: aa to NOT be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present

8.2.7.  Testing Truncated Responses

   Ask for the DNSKEY records of the configured zone, which must be a
   DNSSEC signed zone.  This query is made with no DNS flag bits set.
   EDNS version 0 is used without any EDNS options.  The only EDNS flag
   set is DO.  The EDNS UDP buffer size is set to 512.  The intention of
   this query is to elicit a truncated response from the server.  Most
   signed DNSKEY responses are bigger than 512 bytes.  This test will
   not give a valid result if the zone is not signed.

   We expect a response, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the AA and
   QR bits to be set.  AD may be set in the response if the server
   supports DNSSEC; otherwise it should be clear; TC and RA may also be
   set [RFC1035] [RFC4035].  We expect an OPT record to be present in
   the response.  There should be no EDNS flags other than DO present in
   the response.  The EDNS version field should be 0, and there should
   be no EDNS options present [RFC6891].

   If TC is not set, it is not possible to confirm that the server
   correctly adds the OPT record to the truncated responses or not.

   dig +norec +dnssec +bufsize=512 +ignore dnskey $zone @$server
   expect: NOERROR
   expect: OPT record with version set to 0

8.2.8.  Testing DO=1 Handling

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone, which does not need to
   be DNSSEC signed.  This query is made with no DNS flag bits set.
   EDNS version 0 is used without any EDNS options.  The only EDNS flag
   set is DO.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to be returned in the answer
   section, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the AA and QR bits to be
   set in the response.  AD may be set in the response if the server
   supports DNSSEC, otherwise it should be clear; RA may also be set
   [RFC1034].  We expect an OPT record to be returned.  There should be
   no EDNS flags other than DO present in the response, which should be
   present if the server supports DNSSEC.  The EDNS version field should
   be 0, and there should be no EDNS options present [RFC6891].

   Check that DO=1 queries work (EDNS supported):

   dig +nocookie +edns=0 +noad +norec +dnssec soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: the SOA record to be present in the answer section
   expect: an OPT record to be present in the additional section
   expect: DO=1 to be present if an RRSIG is in the response
   expect: EDNS Version 0 in response
   expect: flag: aa to be present

8.2.9.  Testing EDNS Version Negotiation with DO=1

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone, which does not need to
   be DNSSEC signed.  This query is made with no DNS flag bits set.
   EDNS version 1 is used without any EDNS options.  The only EDNS flag
   set is DO.

   We expect the SOA record for the zone NOT to be returned in the
   answer section, the extended rcode to be set to BADVERS, and the QR
   bit to be set in the header; RA may also be set [RFC1034].  We expect
   an OPT record to be returned.  There should be no EDNS flags other
   than DO present in the response, which should be there if the server
   supports DNSSEC.  The EDNS version field should be 0, and there
   should be no EDNS options present [RFC6891].

   Check that EDNS version 1, DO=1 queries work (EDNS supported):

   dig +nocookie +edns=1 +noednsneg +noad +norec +dnssec soa \
       $zone @$server

   expect: status: BADVERS
   expect: SOA record to NOT be present
   expect: an OPT record to be present in the additional section
   expect: DO=1 to be present if the EDNS version 0 DNSSEC query test
           returned DO=1
   expect: EDNS Version 0 in response
   expect: flag: aa to NOT be present

8.2.10.  Testing with Multiple Defined EDNS Options

   Ask for the SOA record of the configured zone.  This query is made
   with no DNS flag bits set.  EDNS version 0 is used.  A number of
   defined EDNS options are present (NSID [RFC5001], DNS COOKIE
   [RFC7873], EDNS Client Subnet [RFC7871], and EDNS Expire [RFC7314]).

   We expect the SOA record for the zone to be returned in the answer
   section, the rcode to be set to NOERROR, and the AA and QR bits to be
   set in the header; RA may also be set [RFC1034].  We expect an OPT
   record to be returned.  There should be no EDNS flags present in the
   response.  The EDNS version field should be 0.  Any of the requested
   EDNS options supported by the server and permitted server
   configuration may be returned [RFC6891].

   Check that EDNS queries with multiple defined EDNS options work:

   dig +edns=0 +noad +norec +cookie +nsid +expire +subnet=0.0.0.0/0 \
       soa $zone @$server

   expect: status: NOERROR
   expect: the SOA record to be present in the answer section
   expect: an OPT record to be present in the additional section
   expect: EDNS Version 0 in response
   expect: flag: aa to be present
   expect: flag: ad to NOT be present

8.3.  When EDNS Is Not Supported

   If EDNS is not supported by the nameserver, we expect a response to
   each of the above queries.  That response may be a FORMERR error
   response, or the OPT record may just be ignored.

   Some nameservers only return an EDNS response when a particular EDNS
   option or flag (e.g., DO=1) is present in the request.  This
   behaviour is not compliant behaviour and may hide other incorrect
   behaviour from the above tests.  Retesting with the triggering
   option/flag present will expose this misbehaviour.

9.  Remediation

   Nameserver operators are generally expected to test their own
   infrastructure for compliance to standards.  The above tests should
   be run when new systems are brought online and should be repeated
   periodically to ensure continued interoperability.

   Domain registrants who do not maintain their own DNS infrastructure
   are entitled to a DNS service that conforms to standards and
   interoperates well.  Registrants who become aware that their DNS
   operator does not have a well-maintained or compliant infrastructure
   should insist that their service provider correct issues and switch
   providers if they do not.

   In the event that an operator experiences problems due to the
   behaviour of nameservers outside their control, the above tests will
   help in narrowing down the precise issue(s), which can then be
   reported to the relevant party.

   If contact information for the operator of a misbehaving nameserver
   is not already known, the following methods of communication could be
   considered:

   *  the RNAME of the zone authoritative for the name of the
      misbehaving server

   *  the RNAME of zones for which the offending server is authoritative

   *  administrative or technical contacts listed in the registration
      information for the parent domain of the name of the misbehaving
      server or for zones for which the nameserver is authoritative

   *  the registrar or registry for such zones

   *  DNS-specific, operational fora (e.g., mailing lists)

   Operators of parent zones may wish to regularly test the
   authoritative nameservers of their child zones.  However, parent
   operators can have widely varying capabilities in terms of
   notification or remediation depending on whether they have a direct
   relationship with the child operator.  Many Top-Level Domain (TLD)
   registries, for example, cannot directly contact their registrants
   and may instead need to communicate through the relevant registrar.
   In such cases, it may be most efficient for registrars to take on the
   responsibility for testing the nameservers of their registrants,
   since they have a direct relationship.

   When notification is not effective at correcting problems with a
   misbehaving nameserver, parent operators can choose to remove NS
   record sets (and glue records below) that refer to the faulty server
   until the servers are fixed.  This should only be done as a last
   resort and with due consideration, as removal of a delegation can
   have unanticipated side effects.  For example, other parts of the DNS
   tree may depend on names below the removed zone cut, and the parent
   operator may find themselves responsible for causing new DNS failures
   to occur.

10.  Security Considerations

   Testing protocol compliance can potentially result in false reports
   of attempts to attack services from Intrusion Detection Services and
   firewalls.  All of the tests are well-formed (though not necessarily
   common) DNS queries.  None of the tests listed above should cause any
   harm to a protocol-compliant server.

   Relaxing firewall settings to ensure EDNS compliance could
   potentially expose a critical implementation flaw in the nameserver.
   Nameservers should be tested for conformance before relaxing firewall
   settings.

   When removing delegations for non-compliant servers, there can be a
   knock-on effect on other zones that require these zones to be
   operational for the nameservers addresses to be resolved.

11.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC3225]  Conrad, D., "Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC",
              RFC 3225, DOI 10.17487/RFC3225, December 2001,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3225>.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.

   [RFC6840]  Weiler, S., Ed. and D. Blacka, Ed., "Clarifications and
              Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC)", RFC 6840,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6840, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6840>.

   [RFC6891]  Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
              for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.

   [RFC6895]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) IANA
              Considerations", BCP 42, RFC 6895, DOI 10.17487/RFC6895,
              April 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6895>.

   [RFC7766]  Dickinson, J., Dickinson, S., Bellis, R., Mankin, A., and
              D. Wessels, "DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
              Requirements", RFC 7766, DOI 10.17487/RFC7766, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7766>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [IANA-DNS] IANA, "Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/>.

   [ISC]      "Internet Systems Consortuim", <https://www.isc.org/>.

   [RFC2671]  Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",
              RFC 2671, DOI 10.17487/RFC2671, August 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2671>.

   [RFC3597]  Gustafsson, A., "Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record
              (RR) Types", RFC 3597, DOI 10.17487/RFC3597, September
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3597>.

   [RFC5001]  Austein, R., "DNS Name Server Identifier (NSID) Option",
              RFC 5001, DOI 10.17487/RFC5001, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5001>.

   [RFC7314]  Andrews, M., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS) EXPIRE
              Option", RFC 7314, DOI 10.17487/RFC7314, July 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7314>.

   [RFC7871]  Contavalli, C., van der Gaast, W., Lawrence, D., and W.
              Kumari, "Client Subnet in DNS Queries", RFC 7871,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7871, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7871>.

   [RFC7873]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and M. Andrews, "Domain Name System (DNS)
              Cookies", RFC 7873, DOI 10.17487/RFC7873, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7873>.

Acknowledgements

   The contributions of Matthew Pounsett and Tim Wicinski are gratefully
   acknowledged.

Authors' Addresses

   M. Andrews
   Internet Systems Consortium
   PO Box 360
   Newmarket, NH 03857
   United States of America

   Email: marka@isc.org

   Ray Bellis
   Internet Systems Consortium
   PO Box 360
   Newmarket, NH 03857
   United States of America

   Email: ray@isc.org