IETF PANA working Group liaison to:
Gavin Young, DSL Forum Technical Committee Chair
Alper Yegin, IETF PANA WG co-chair, email@example.com
Basavaraj Patil, ITEF PANA WG co-chair, firstname.lastname@example.org
Date: December 12, 2007
Subject: Information about PANA as an applicable protocol for
subscriber authentication in DSL networks
The PANA (Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access)
Working Group in the IETF is chartered to work on defining a link-layer
type independent network access authentication protocol. WG has
completed its work on specifying the PANA protocol and the
specification is now in the RFC editors queue for publication as a
Earlier this year, the DSL Forum had sent a liaison statement to the
IETF requesting information about a protocol or work in the IETF which
would meet the DSL Forumâ€™s requirements for subscriber authentication
in the context of the evolution of the DSL architecture. DSL Forumâ€™s
migration away from PPP has been identified as one of the candidate
deployments for PANA from the early days of the WG as documented in RFC
4058 (http://ietf.org/rfc/rfc4058.txt). Additionally, the specific DSLF
requirements were discussed at the PANA WG meeting at IETF70 in
Vancouver (Dec 5, 2007) and on the PANA WG mailing list afterwards. WG
believes that PANA is applicable to the current requirements presented
by DSLF. The PANA WGâ€™s analysis is presented below.
We would like to request the DSL Forumâ€™s technical committee to
review the suitability of PANA for addressing your requirements
especially in view of the fact that the protocol is now lined up to be
published as a proposed standard RFC by the IETF. If you have further
questions or need clarifications, please do not hesitate to contact the
Alper Yegin (PANA WG co-chair) Basavaraj Patil (PANA WG co-chair)
IPAuth-1: Authentication must not depend on the use of any given
eg web browser.
Explanation: PANA implementation does not rely on other applications.
IPAuth-2: Must re-use existing SP Authentication infrastructure (use
Database) and allow mixed mode operation (eg PPP and IP)
same L3 edge device
Explanation: PANA does not require any changes on the AAA database. It
be used over IP networks that co-exist with PPP networks.
IPAuth-3: Must offer L3 edge device (BRAS) subscriber policy
via pull and push methods, ie L3 edge must be aware of
authentication status and any subscriber credentials
Explanation: PANA Authentication Agent (PAA) can be implemented on the
IPAuth-4: Must allow for authorization purposes the use of any
identifiers that may be available, eg MAC address,
Explanation: MAC address is already available on the IP messages that
PANA. PANA does not prevent use of Option 82 with DHCP.
IPAuth-5: Should allow for subscriber nomadicity and support
changes to location.
Explanation: PANA allows establishing a new session or maintaining the
session upon mobility/nomadicity.
IPAuth-6: Must fit into TR-101 operational model
Explanation: Although we do not see any issues there, IETF does not
expertise to fully evaluate this requirement.
IPAuth-7: Must support revoking authentication
Explanation: PANA Termination message is explicitly designed for that
IPAuth-8: Must handle L3 CPE device authentication and end-device
based authentication (likely with L2 CPEs in the latter
Explanation: PANA Client (PaC) can be implemented on both CPEs and
IPAuth-9: Should be simple to implement on client (PC or CPE)
Explanation: Implementation does not require changes to the operating
Open source implementation available.
IPAuth-10: Must be independent of medium type (eg Fixed Ethernet,
PON, WiFi, WiMax, etc)
Explanation: This is the original design goal of PANA.
IPAuth-11: Must not require major re-work for IPv6. None ideally.
Explanation: Same protocol can be used for both IPv4 and IPv6.
IPAuth-12: Must be resilient to attacks on the subscriber, eg against
brute-force challenge attacks, or spoofing of an
Explanation: Rate limiting, message validation, message authentication
against such threats.
IPAuth-13: Must offer authenticator edge device resiliency, eg not be
DOS authentication attacks
Explanation: Stateless handshake and rate limiting are used against
IPAuth-14: Must allow for authentication and download of subscriber
profile before service IP address is assigned
Explanation: PANA requires an IP address be configured prior to
(a IPv4/IPv6 link-local, or a short-lease DHCP address),
the â€œservice IP addressâ€? be assigned after
IPAuth-15: Must offer an option to re-authenticate periodically or on
Explanation: Both the client-side and network-side are capable of
IPAuth-16: At an absolute minimum, must provide equivalent or better
than PPP CHAP/MD5 does today. Must include the ability to
more secure authentication methods over time.
Explanation: Supports any EAP method (including CHAP/MD5 equivalent of
IPAuth-17: Should offer authentication fail/success reason message
subscriber from authenticator .
Explanation: Supports explicit authentication and authorization result
IPAuth-18: Must allow for multiple authenticated subscribers on same
or logical interface.
Explanation: PANA Session-ID can demultiplex multiple authenticated
over the same physical/logical interface.
IPAuth-19: Must offer scalable subscriber management, eg not rely on
subscriber credentials configured on the authenticator
Explanation: PANA is independent of any backend protocol (RADIUS,
LDAP, etc.) that may or may not be used by the
IPAuth-20: Must have a logical path towards standardization
Explanation: PANA specification is already approved by IESG and
IETF RFC queue.
IPAuth-21: Must scale to 10000s of subscribers per L3 edge device
be conservative in use of resources)
Explanation: See PANA Session Attributes in the spec.