Verification of AS_PATH Using the Resource Certificate Public Key Infrastructure and Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-azimov-sidrops-aspa-verification-01

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Network Working Group                                          A. Azimov
Internet-Draft                                              E. Bogomazov
Intended status: Standards Track                             Qrator Labs
Expires: April 25, 2019                                          R. Bush
                                               Internet Initiative Japan
                                                                K. Patel
                                                            Arrcus, Inc.
                                                             J. Snijders
                                                                     NTT
                                                        October 22, 2018

   Verification of AS_PATH Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
      Infrastructure and Autonomous System Provider Authorization
               draft-azimov-sidrops-aspa-verification-01

Abstract

   This document defines the semantics of an Autonomous System Provider
   Authorization object in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to
   verify the AS_PATH attribute of routes advertised in the Border
   Gateway Protocol.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.

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Internet-Draft            AS_PATH Verification              October 2018

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Anomaly Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Autonomous System Provider Authorization  . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Customer-Provider Verification Procedure  . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  AS_PATH Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Disavowal of Provider Authorizaion  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Siblings (Complex Relations)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) was designed with no mechanisms to
   validate BGP attributes.  Two consequences are BGP Hijacks and BGP
   Route Leaks [RFC7908].  BGP extensions are able to partially solve
   these problems.  For example, ROA-based Origin Validation [RFC6483]
   can be used to detect and filter accidental mis-originations, and
   [I-D.ymbk-idr-bgp-eotr-policy] can be used to detect accidental route
   leaks.  While these upgrades to BGP are quite useful, they still rely
   on transitive BGP attributes, i.e. AS_PATH, that can be manipulated
   by attackers.

   BGPSec [RFC8205] was designed to solve the problem of AS_PATH
   validation.  Unfortunately, strict cryptographic validation brought
   unaffordable computational overhead for BGP routers.  BGPSec also
   proved to be vulnerable to downgrade attacks that can nullify all the
   work of AS_PATH signing.  As a result, to abuse the AS_PATH or any

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