Transport Layer Security (TLS) Resumption Indication Extension
draft-bhargavan-tls-resumption-indication-00

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2014-10-20 (latest revision 2014-04-18)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bhargavan-tls-resumption-indication-00.txt

Abstract

When a TLS session is resumed via an abbreviated handshake, the knowledge of the master secret is used to implicitly mutually authenticate the two peers. However, an attacker can synchronize two different TLS sessions, so that they share the same master secret, breaking the resumption authentication property. This specification defines a TLS extension that cryptographically binds the resumption abbreviated handshake with its original session, thus preventing this attack.

Authors

Karthikeyan Bhargavan (karthikeyan.bhargavan@inria.fr)
Antoine Delignat-Lavaud (antoine.delignat-lavaud@inria.fr)
Alfredo Pironti (alfredo.pironti@inria.fr)
Adam Langley (agl@google.com)
Marsh Ray (maray@microsoft.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)