Transport Layer Security (TLS) Resumption Indication Extension
draft-bhargavan-tls-resumption-indication-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Karthikeyan Bhargavan , Antoine Delignat-Lavaud , Alfredo Pironti , Adam Langley , Marsh Ray | ||
| Last updated | 2014-10-20 (Latest revision 2014-04-18) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
When a TLS session is resumed via an abbreviated handshake, the knowledge of the master secret is used to implicitly mutually authenticate the two peers. However, an attacker can synchronize two different TLS sessions, so that they share the same master secret, breaking the resumption authentication property. This specification defines a TLS extension that cryptographically binds the resumption abbreviated handshake with its original session, thus preventing this attack.
Authors
Karthikeyan Bhargavan
Antoine Delignat-Lavaud
Alfredo Pironti
Adam Langley
Marsh Ray
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)