TLS 1.3 Impact on Network-Based Security
draft-camwinget-tls-use-cases-01

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TLS                                                         F. Andreasen
Internet-Draft                                             N. Cam-Winget
Intended status: Informational                                   E. Wang
Expires: September 6, 2018                                 Cisco Systems
                                                           March 5, 2018

                TLS 1.3 Impact on Network-Based Security
                    draft-camwinget-tls-use-cases-01

Abstract

   Network-based security solutions are used by enterprises, public
   sector, and cloud service providers today in order to both complement
   and augment host-based security solutions.  TLS 1.3 introduces
   several changes to TLS 1.2 with a goal to improve the overall
   security and privacy provided by TLS.  However some of these changes
   have a negative impact on network-based security solutions.  While
   this may be viewed as a feature, there are several real-life use case
   scenarios that are not easily solved without such network-based
   security solutions.  In this document, we identify the TLS 1.3
   changes that may impact network-based security solutions and provide
   a set of use case scenarios that are not easily solved without such
   solutions.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Andreasen, et al.       Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft  TLS 1.3 Impact on Network-Based Security      March 2018

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  TLS 1.3 Change Impact Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Inbound Session Change Impacts  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.1.  Removal of Static RSA and Diffie-Hellman Cipher
               Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Outbound Session Change Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.1.  Encrypted Server Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.2.  Resumption and Pre-Shared Key . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.3.  Version Negotiation and Downgrade Protection  . . . .   7
       2.2.4.  SNI Encryption in TLS Through Tunneling . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Inbound Session Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Use Case I1 - Data Center Protection  . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Use Case I2 - Application Operation over NAT  . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Use Case I3 - Compliance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.4.  Use Case I4 - Crypto Security Audit . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Outbound Session Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Use Case O1 - Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Use Case O2 - Malware and Threat Protection . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Use Case O3 - IoT Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.4.  Use Case O4 - Unpatched Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.5.  Use Case O5 - Rapid Containment of New Vulnerability and
           Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.6.  Use Case O6 - End-of-Life Endpoint  . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.7.  Use Case O7 - Compliance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.8.  Use Case O8 - Crypto Security Audit . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
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