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Problem statement of Inter-domain Traffic Redirection Risks
draft-cheng-idr-redirection-risks-ps-03

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Expired & archived
Authors Weiqiang Cheng , Dan Li , Ce Zheng , Mingqing(Michael) Huang , Fang Gao , Mingxing Liu
Last updated 2024-01-10 (Latest revision 2023-07-09)
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date (None)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:

Abstract

BGP Update includes the destination prefix and AS_PATH that records the AS number through which it passes. The traffic routing to the destination prefix should be forwarded along the AS sequence in AS_PATH. However, due to traffic redirection, route aggregation and etc., the AS path of forwarding and the AS_PATH of BGP Update often do not match. The inconsistency leads to security risks such as black holes, loops in inter-domain forwarding, and the possibility of forwarding through malicious AS that source/upstream AS does not want to pass through.

Authors

Weiqiang Cheng
Dan Li
Ce Zheng
Mingqing(Michael) Huang
Fang Gao
Mingxing Liu

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)