DTLS as a Transport Layer for RADIUS
draft-dekok-radext-dtls-03
Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Alan DeKok | ||
Last updated | 2012-10-30 (Latest revision 2010-07-26) | ||
Replaced by | draft-ietf-radext-dtls | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-radext-dtls | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The RADIUS protocol [RFC2865] has limited support for authentication and encryption of RADIUS packets. The protocol transports data "in the clear", although some parts of the packets can have "hidden" content. Packets may be replayed verbatim by an attacker, and client-server authentication is based on fixed shared secrets. This document specifies how the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol may be used as a fix for these problems. It also describes how implementations of this proposal can co-exist with current RADIUS systems.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)