Network Device Attestation Workflow
draft-fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation-00

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RATS Working Group                                      G. Fedorkow, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                    Juniper Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                       J. Fitzgerald-McKay
Expires: January 1, 2020                        National Security Agency
                                                           June 30, 2019

                  Network Device Attestation Workflow
           draft-fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation-00

Abstract

   This document describes a workflow for network device attestation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 1, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Fedorkow & Fitzgerald-McKExpires January 1, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Network Device Attestation Workflow         June 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.4.  Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.5.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       1.5.1.  Out of Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       1.5.2.  Why Remote Integrity Verification?  . . . . . . . . .   8
       1.5.3.  Network Device Attestation Challenges . . . . . . . .   8
       1.5.4.  Why is OS Attestation Different?  . . . . . . . . . .   9
   2.  Solution Outline  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.1.  2.1 RIV Software Configuration Attestation using TPM  . .  10
     2.2.  RIV Keying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.3.  RIV Information Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.4.  RIV Simplifying Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       2.4.1.  DevID Alternatives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.4.2.  Additional Attestation of Platform Characteristics  .  14
       2.4.3.  Root of Trust for Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.4.4.  Reference Integrity Measurements (RIMs) . . . . . . .  15
       2.4.5.  Attestation Logs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   3.  Standards Components  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     3.1.  Reference Models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       3.1.1.  IETF Reference Model for Challenge-Response Remote
               Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     3.2.  RIV Workflow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     3.3.  Layering Model for Network Equipment Attester and
           Verifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   4.  Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.  Appendix  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.1.  Implementation Notes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.2.  Comparison with TCG PTS / IETF NEA  . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   8.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29

1.  Introduction

   There are many components to consider in fielding a trusted computing
   device, from operating systems to applications.  Part of that is a
   trusted supply chain, where manufacturers can certify that the
   product they intended to build is actually the one that was installed
   at a customer's site.