Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ESecACME)
draft-fiebig-acme-esecacme-00
Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Tobias Fiebig , Kevin Borgolte | ||
Last updated | 2018-10-21 | ||
Replaced by | draft-fiebig-security-acme | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-fiebig-security-acme | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
By now, most Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates are issued via the ACME protocol. Recently, several attacks against domain validation (DV) have been published, including IP-use-after- free, (forced) on-path attacks, and attacks on protocols used for validation. In general, these attacks can be mitigated by (selectively) requirering additional challenges, e.g., DNS validation, proof of prior-key-ownership, or in severe cases even extended validation (EV) instead of DV. This document provides a list of critical cases and describes which mitigations can be used to reduce the threat of issuing a certificate to an unauthorized party.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)