Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ESecACME)
draft-fiebig-acme-esecacme-00

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2018-10-21
Replaced by draft-fiebig-security-acme
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-fiebig-acme-esecacme-00.txt

Abstract

By now, most Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates are issued via the ACME protocol. Recently, several attacks against domain validation (DV) have been published, including IP-use-after- free, (forced) on-path attacks, and attacks on protocols used for validation. In general, these attacks can be mitigated by (selectively) requirering additional challenges, e.g., DNS validation, proof of prior-key-ownership, or in severe cases even extended validation (EV) instead of DV. This document provides a list of critical cases and describes which mitigations can be used to reduce the threat of issuing a certificate to an unauthorized party.

Authors

Tobias Fiebig (t.fiebig@tudelft.nl)
Kevin Borgolte (kevinbo@iseclab.org)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)