Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ESecACME)
draft-fiebig-acme-esecacme-00
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Tobias Fiebig , Kevin Borgolte | ||
| Last updated | 2018-10-21 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-fiebig-security-acme | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-fiebig-security-acme | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
By now, most Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates are issued via the ACME protocol. Recently, several attacks against domain validation (DV) have been published, including IP-use-after- free, (forced) on-path attacks, and attacks on protocols used for validation. In general, these attacks can be mitigated by (selectively) requirering additional challenges, e.g., DNS validation, proof of prior-key-ownership, or in severe cases even extended validation (EV) instead of DV. This document provides a list of critical cases and describes which mitigations can be used to reduce the threat of issuing a certificate to an unauthorized party.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)