Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ESecACME)

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2018-10-21
Replaced by draft-fiebig-security-acme
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Expired & archived
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at


By now, most Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates are issued via the ACME protocol. Recently, several attacks against domain validation (DV) have been published, including IP-use-after- free, (forced) on-path attacks, and attacks on protocols used for validation. In general, these attacks can be mitigated by (selectively) requirering additional challenges, e.g., DNS validation, proof of prior-key-ownership, or in severe cases even extended validation (EV) instead of DV. This document provides a list of critical cases and describes which mitigations can be used to reduce the threat of issuing a certificate to an unauthorized party.


Tobias Fiebig (t.fiebig@tudelft.nl)
Kevin Borgolte (kevinbo@iseclab.org)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)