Remove ECC-GOST from active use within DNSSEC
draft-hardaker-dnsop-must-not-ecc-gost-00

Network Working Group                                        W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft                                                   USC/ISI
Intended status: Standards Track                               W. Kumari
Expires: 30 August 2024                                           Google
                                                        27 February 2024

             Remove ECC-GOST from active use within DNSSEC
               draft-hardaker-dnsop-must-not-ecc-gost-00

Abstract

   This document retires the use of ECC-GOST within DNSSEC.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 August 2024.

Copyright Notice

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Deprecating ECC-GOST algorithms in DNSSEC . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Appendix B.  Current algorithm usage levels . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Appendix C.  Github Version of this document  . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   The security of the ECC-GOST algorithm [RFC5933] has been slowly
   diminishing over time as various forms of attacks have weakened its
   cryptographic underpinning.  Thus, the use of ECC-GOST is no longer
   needed and is not recommend for use in DNSSEC [RFC4033] [RFC4034]
   [RFC4035].

   This document retires the use of ECC-GOST within DNSSEC.

1.1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Deprecating ECC-GOST algorithms in DNSSEC

   The ECC-GOST [RFC5933] algorithm MUST NOT be used when creating DS
   records.  Validating resolvers MUST treat DS records as insecure.  If
   no other DS records of accepted cryptographic algorithms are
   available, the DNS records below the delegation point MUST be treated
   as insecure.

   The ECC-GOST [RFC5933] algorithm MUST NOT be used when creating
   DNSKEY and RRSIG records.  Validating resolvers MUST treat RRSIG
   records created from DNSKEY records using these algorithms as
   insecure.  If no other RRSIG records of accepted cryptographic
   algorithms are available, the validating resolver MUST consider the
   associated resource records as Bogus.

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3.  Security Considerations

   This document increases the security of the DNSSEC ecosystem by
   deprecating algorithms that make use of older algorithms with ECC-
   GOST derived uses.

4.  Operational Considerations

   Zone owners currently making use of ECC-GOST based algorithms should
   immediate switch to algorithms with stronger cryptographic strengths,
   such as those listed in the introduction.  DNS registries [RFC8499]
   should prohibit their clients to upload and publish ECC-GOST based DS
   records.

5.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to set the "DNSSEC Validation" of the "Digest
   Algorithms" registry [DS-IANA] for ECC-GOST (3) to MUST NOT.

   IANA is requested to set the "Recommended for DNSSEC Validation"
   column of the DNS Security Algorithm Numbers registry [DNSKEY-IANA]
   for ECC-GOST (23) to MUST NOT:

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [DNSKEY-IANA]
              IANA, "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Algorithm
              Numbers", n.d., <https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-
              alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml>.

   [DS-IANA]  IANA, "Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type
              Digest Algorithms", n.d.,
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033>.

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   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4034>.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4035>.

   [RFC5933]  Dolmatov, V., Ed., Chuprina, A., and I. Ustinov, "Use of
              GOST Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource
              Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5933, DOI 10.17487/RFC5933, July
              2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5933>.

   [RFC8080]  Sury, O. and R. Edmonds, "Edwards-Curve Digital Security
              Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 8080,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8080, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8080>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8499]  Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
              Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8499>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   TBD

Appendix B.  Current algorithm usage levels

   The DNSSEC scanning project by Viktor Dukhovni and Wes Hardaker
   highlights the current deployment of various algorithms on the
   https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/ website.

   [RFC Editor: please delete this section upon publication]

Appendix C.  Github Version of this document

   While this document is under development, it can be viewed, tracked,
   fill here:

   https://github.com/hardaker/draft-hardaker-dnsop-must-not-sha1

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Authors' Addresses

   Wes Hardaker
   USC/ISI
   Email: ietf@hardakers.net

   Warren Kumari
   Google
   Email: warren@kumari.net

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