Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance
draft-iab-privsec-confidentiality-mitigations-08

Document Type Active Internet-Draft
Last updated 2016-10-27
Stream IAB
Intended RFC status Informational
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IAB                                                       T. Hardie, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                          October 27, 2016
Intended status: Informational
Expires: April 30, 2017

         Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance
            draft-iab-privsec-confidentiality-mitigations-08

Abstract

   The IAB has published [RFC7624] in response to several revelations of
   pervasive attack on Internet communications.  This document surveys
   the most plausible mitigations to those threats currently available
   to the designers of Internet protocols.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Hardie                   Expires April 30, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             privsec-mitigations              October 2016

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Available Mitigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.1.  Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.2.  Covert Channel Reduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Auditing Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Metadata Minimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.3.1.  Length Hiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Anonymization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.5.  End-to-End Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Interplay among Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Contributors {Contributors} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   To ensure that the Internet can be trusted by users, it is necessary
   for the Internet technical community to address the vulnerabilities
   exploited in the attacks document in [RFC7258] and the threats
   described in [RFC7624].  The goal of this document is to describe
   more precisely the mitigations available for those threats and to lay
   out the interactions among them should they be deployed in
   combination.

2.  Terminology

   This document makes extensive use of standard security and privacy
   terminology; see [RFC4949] and [RFC6973].  Terms used from [RFC6973]
   include Eavesdropper, Observer, Initiator, Intermediary, Recipient,
   Attack (in a privacy context), Correlation, Fingerprint, Traffic
   Analysis, and Identifiability (and related terms).  In addition, we
   use a few terms that are specific to the attacks discussed in
   [RFC7624].  Note especially that "passive" and "active" below do not
   refer to the effort used to mount the attack; a "passive attack" is
   any attack that accesses a flow but does not modify it, while an
   "active attack" is any attack that modifies a flow.  Some passive
   attacks involve active interception and modifications of devices,
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