6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol
draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-03
6tisch Working Group M. Richardson
Internet-Draft Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Informational October 22, 2018
Expires: April 25, 2019
6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol
draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-03
Abstract
This document describes a Zero-touch Secure Join (ZSJ) mechanism to
enroll a new device (the "pledge") into a IEEE802.15.4 TSCH network
using the 6tisch signaling mechanisms. The resulting device will
obtain a domain specific credential that can be used with either
802.15.9 per-host pair keying protocols, or to obtain the network-
wide key from a coordinator. The mechanism describe here is an
augmentation to the one-touch mechanism described in
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], and a constrained version of
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.
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Internet-Draft 6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol October 2018
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Prior Bootstrapping Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1. Support environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2. Constrained environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.3. Network Access Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4. Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps . . . 8
1.4.1. Key Distribution Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5. Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI)
devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Architectural Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. Behavior of a Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. Secure Imprinting using Vouchers . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3. Initial Device Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1. Identification of the Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2. MASA URI extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5. Architectural Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.1. Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.2. Stateless IPIP Join Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.3. Domain Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.4. Manufacturer Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5.5. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6. Certificate Time Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6.1. Lack of realtime clock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6.2. Infinite Lifetime of IDevID . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7. Cloud Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.8. Determining the MASA to contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. Voucher-Request artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Proxying details (Pledge - Proxy - Registrar) . . . . . . . . 15
5. Proxy details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Pledge discovery of Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. CoAP connection to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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