6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol
draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-00
6tisch Working Group M. Richardson
Internet-Draft Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Informational B. Damm
Expires: March 1, 2018 Silver Spring Networks
August 28, 2017
6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol
draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-00
Abstract
This document describes a zero-touch mechanism to enroll a new device
(the "pledge") into a IEEE802.15.4 TSCH network using the 6tisch
signaling mechanisms. The resulting device will obtain a domain
specific credential that can be used with either 802.15.9 per-host
pair keying protocols, or to obtain the network-wide key from a
coordinator. The mechanism describe her is an augmentation to the
one-touch mechanism described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 1, 2018.
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Internet-Draft 6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol August 2017
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Other Bootstrapping Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Architectural Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Secure Imprinting using Vouchers . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Initial Device Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. Lack of realtime clock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5. Cloud Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.1. Proxy Discovery Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.2. Registrar Discovery Protocol Details . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar . . . . . . . 10
3.3. Registrar Requests Voucher from MASA . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4. Voucher Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4.1. Completing authentication of Provisional TLS
connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5. Voucher Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.6. MASA authorization log Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.6.1. MASA authorization log Response . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.7. EST Integration for PKI bootstrapping . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.7.1. EST Distribution of CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 14
3.7.2. EST CSR Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.7.3. EST Client Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.7.4. Enrollment Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.7.5. EST over CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Reduced security operational modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. Pledge security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. Registrar security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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