6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol
draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-02

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6tisch Working Group                                       M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Informational                                   B. Damm
Expires: November 1, 2018                         Silver Spring Networks
                                                          April 30, 2018

                 6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol
             draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-02

Abstract

   This document describes a Zero-touch Secure Join (ZSJ) mechanism to
   enroll a new device (the "pledge") into a IEEE802.15.4 TSCH network
   using the 6tisch signaling mechanisms.  The resulting device will
   obtain a domain specific credential that can be used with either
   802.15.9 per-host pair keying protocols, or to obtain the network-
   wide key from a coordinator.  The mechanism describe here is an
   augmentation to the one-touch mechanism described in
   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], and a constrained version of
   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 1, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Richardson & Damm       Expires November 1, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft   6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol       April 2018

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Prior Bootstrapping Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.3.  Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       1.3.1.  Support environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       1.3.2.  Constrained environments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       1.3.3.  Network Access Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     1.4.  Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps  . . .   8
       1.4.1.  Key Distribution Process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     1.5.  Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI)
           devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   2.  Architectural Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.1.  Behavior of a Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.2.  Secure Imprinting using Vouchers  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.3.  Initial Device Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.3.1.  Identification of the Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.3.2.  MASA URI extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.4.  Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.5.  Architectural Components  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       2.5.1.  Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       2.5.2.  Stateless IPIP Join Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       2.5.3.  Domain Registrar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       2.5.4.  Manufacturer Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.5.5.  Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.6.  Certificate Time Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.6.1.  Lack of realtime clock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.6.2.  Infinite Lifetime of IDevID . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.7.  Cloud Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.8.  Determining the MASA to contact . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   3.  Voucher-Request artifact  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.  Proxying details (Pledge - Proxy - Registrar) . . . . . . . .  15
     4.1.  Pledge discovery of Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15