Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-14

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (anima WG)
Last updated 2018-04-14
Replaces draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra
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ANIMA WG                                                     M. Pritikin
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track                           M. Richardson
Expires: October 15, 2018                                      Sandelman
                                                            M. Behringer

                                                            S. Bjarnason
                                                          Arbor Networks
                                                               K. Watsen
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                          April 13, 2018

        Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
               draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-14

Abstract

   This document specifies automated bootstrapping of a remote secure
   key infrastructure (BRSKI) using manufacturer installed X.509
   certificate, in combination with a manufacturer's authorizing
   service, both online and offline.  Bootstrapping a new device can
   occur using a routable address and a cloud service, or using only
   link-local connectivity, or on limited/disconnected networks.
   Support for lower security models, including devices with minimal
   identity, is described for legacy reasons but not encouraged.
   Bootstrapping is complete when the cryptographic identity of the new
   key infrastructure is successfully deployed to the device but the
   established secure connection can be used to deploy a locally issued
   certificate to the device as well.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 15, 2018.

Pritikin, et al.        Expires October 15, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    BRSKI                       April 2018

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Prior Bootstrapping Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.3.  Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       1.3.1.  Support environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       1.3.2.  Constrained environments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       1.3.3.  Network Access Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     1.4.  Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps  . . .  11
     1.5.  Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI)
           devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   2.  Architectural Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.1.  Behavior of a Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.2.  Secure Imprinting using Vouchers  . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     2.3.  Initial Device Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       2.3.1.  Identification of the Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       2.3.2.  MASA URI extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     2.4.  Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     2.5.  Architectural Components  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       2.5.1.  Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       2.5.2.  Join Proxy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       2.5.3.  Domain Registrar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       2.5.4.  Manufacturer Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       2.5.5.  Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     2.6.  Certificate Time Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       2.6.1.  Lack of realtime clock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
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