Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-08

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (anima WG)
Last updated 2017-10-13
Replaces draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra
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ANIMA WG                                                     M. Pritikin
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track                           M. Richardson
Expires: April 15, 2018                                              SSW
                                                            M. Behringer
                                                                   Cisco
                                                            S. Bjarnason
                                                          Arbor Networks
                                                               K. Watsen
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                        October 12, 2017

        Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
               draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-08

Abstract

   This document specifies automated bootstrapping of a remote secure
   key infrastructure (BRSKI) using vendor installed X.509 certificate,
   in combination with a vendor's authorizing service, both online and
   offline.  Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable
   address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity,
   or on limited/disconnected networks.  Support for lower security
   models, including devices with minimal identity, is described for
   legacy reasons but not encouraged.  Bootstrapping is complete when
   the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is
   successfully deployed to the device but the established secure
   connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the
   device as well.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 15, 2018.

Pritikin, et al.         Expires April 15, 2018                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    BRSKI                     October 2017

Copyright Notice

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Other Bootstrapping Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.3.  Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     1.4.  Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps  . . .   9
   2.  Architectural Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.1.  Behavior of a Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.2.  Secure Imprinting using Vouchers  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.3.  Initial Device Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.4.  Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.4.1.  Architectural component: Pledge . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       2.4.2.  Architectural component: Circuit Proxy  . . . . . . .  16
       2.4.3.  Architectural component: Domain Registrar . . . . . .  16
       2.4.4.  Architectural component: Vendor Service . . . . . . .  16
     2.5.  Lack of realtime clock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     2.6.  Cloud Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     2.7.  Determining the MASA to contact . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   3.  Voucher Request artifact  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     3.1.  Tree Diagram  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     3.2.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.3.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
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