A Voucher Artifact for Onboarding Protocols
draft-ietf-anima-rfc8366bis-37
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (anima WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Kent Watsen , Michael Richardson , Esko Dijk , Toerless Eckert , Qiufang Ma | ||
| Last updated | 2026-10-05 | ||
| Replaces | draft-richardson-anima-rfc8366bis | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | |||
| Yang Validation | 0 errors, 2 warnings | ||
| Reviews |
SECDIR Early Review due 2026-04-21
Incomplete
|
||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Sheng Jiang | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2026-01-31 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation::AD Followup | |
| Action Holder | |||
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
(None)
Has enough positions to pass. |
||
| Responsible AD | Mahesh Jethanandani | ||
| Send notices to | shengjiang@bupt.edu.cn | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
| IANA expert review state | Expert Reviews OK | ||
| IANA expert review comments | The IETF XML Registry and SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) reference updates and the IETF YANG-SID Module registration have been approved. |
draft-ietf-anima-rfc8366bis-37
ANIMA Working Group K. Watsen
Internet-Draft Watsen Networks
Obsoletes: 8366 (if approved) M. Richardson, Ed.
Updates: 8995 (if approved) Sandelman Software
Intended status: Standards Track E. Dijk
Expires: 8 April 2027 IoTconsultancy.nl
T. Eckert
Futurewei Technologies Inc.
Q. Ma
Huawei
5 October 2026
A Voucher Artifact for Onboarding Protocols
draft-ietf-anima-rfc8366bis-37
Abstract
This document defines a strategy to securely assign a candidate
device (Pledge) to an Owner using a digital artifact signed, directly
or indirectly, by the Pledge's manufacturer. This artifact is known
as a "Voucher".
This document defines an artifact format as a YANG-defined JSON or
CBOR document that has been signed using a variety of cryptographic
systems.
The Voucher Artifact is normally generated by the Pledge's
manufacturer which is represented by the Manufacturer Authorized
Signing Authority (MASA).
This document obsoletes RFC8366: it includes a number of desired
extensions into the YANG module. The Voucher Request YANG module
defined in RFC8995 is also updated and now included in this document,
as well as other YANG extensions needed for variants of RFC8995.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-rfc8366bis/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the anima Working Group
mailing list (mailto:anima@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/anima/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima/.
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Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/anima-wg/voucher.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 April 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Onboarding without a Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Staging as a remedy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Onboarding with a Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. What the Voucher does and does not provide . . . . . . . 8
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Survey of Voucher Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Changes since RFC8366 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Motivation for revising RFC8366 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. History of New Protocols Since RFC8366 . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. Challenges with revisions to YANG . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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5.4. Detailed changes since RFC8366 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Updates to RFC8995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1. Updates to the use of idevid-issuer . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2. Clarifications on the use of idevid-issuer . . . . . . . 18
6.3. Clarifications on the format of idevid-issuer . . . . . . 19
6.4. Errata closed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Signature mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. CMS Format Voucher Artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. Voucher Artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.1. Algorithm Choices for Voucher Artifacts . . . . . . . . . 22
8.2. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.4. YANG Module "ietf-voucher" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8.5. ietf-voucher SID values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.6. Voucher Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.7. Manufacturer Proprietary Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . 36
9. Voucher Request Artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
9.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
9.2. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
9.3. YANG Module "ietf-voucher-request" . . . . . . . . . . . 38
9.4. ietf-voucher-request SID values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
10.1. Renewals Instead of Revocations . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
10.2. Change of a Pinned Trust Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10.3. Voucher Per Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.4. Signed, Not Encrypted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
11.1. Clock Accuracy in a Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
11.2. Nonceless Vouchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
11.3. Protecting the MASA Signing Key and the MASA CA Key . . 48
11.4. Test Domain Certificate Validity When Signing . . . . . 49
11.5. YANG Module Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 49
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
12.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
12.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
12.3. The Media Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
12.4. The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry . 51
12.5. The Voucher Extensions Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
12.6. The IETF YANG-SID Ranges Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 52
12.7. The IETF YANG-SID Modules Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 52
13. YANG references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.1. Key pairs associated with examples . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.2. Example CMS-signed Voucher Request . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.3. Example CMS-signed Voucher from MASA . . . . . . . . . . 67
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A.4. Example JWS-signed Voucher from MASA . . . . . . . . . . 68
Appendix B. SID Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B.1. SID Allocations for Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B.2. SID Allocations for Voucher Request . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1. Introduction
This document defines a strategy to securely assign a candidate
device (Pledge) to an Owner using a digital artifact signed, directly
or indirectly, by the Pledge's manufacturer. This artifact is known
as the "Voucher". Its purpose is to securely convey to the Pledge a
trust anchor that represents the authority of the Owner. The
Pledge's manufacturer is represented by the Manufacturer Authorized
Signing Authority (MASA), the entity that has digitally signed the
Voucher Artifact. Capitalized terms such as Pledge, Owner, Domain,
Onboarding and MASA are defined in Section 3.
Section 2 explains why Onboarding protocols need such an artifact and
why alternative approaches are undesirable.
This document defines the Voucher Artifact and the Voucher Request
Artifact only. How these artifacts are conveyed and details of their
security parameters are not defined here, but rather in the
Onboarding protocols that use them. Such protocols include [SZTP],
[BRSKI], [PRM] and [cBRSKI].
The Voucher Artifact is a JSON [RFC8259] or CBOR [CBOR] document that
conforms with a data model described by YANG [RFC7950]. It is
encoded using the rules defined in [RFC7951] or [RFC9254], and is
signed using (by default) a CMS structure [RFC5652].
This document obsoletes [RFC8366] and updates [BRSKI]. It adds the
Attributes needed by the variants of [BRSKI] that were developed
since [RFC8366] was published into the Voucher YANG module, it
includes and updates the Voucher Request YANG module that was defined
in [BRSKI], and it adds a mechanism for future extensions that avoids
further revisions of the YANG modules. The motivation for these
changes, and the detailed list of changes, are given in Section 5.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 3
defines the terms that are used throughout. Section 4 surveys the
information that a Voucher can carry, and the combinations of that
information that constitute different types of Voucher. Section 5
and Section 6 detail the changes relative to [RFC8366] and [BRSKI].
Section 7 describes the default signature mechanism (CMS) for Voucher
Artifacts. Section 8 and Section 9 give the normative definitions of
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the two artifacts, including their tree diagrams, YANG modules and
SID values. Section 10 and Section 11 discuss the design
considerations and the security considerations, respectively.
2. Motivation
This section is informative. It explains the problems that Voucher-
based Onboarding solves, and why the alternative approaches are
undesirable.
2.1. Onboarding without a Voucher
When a device is sold to a new owner, the device normally has no way
to verify the identity of that new owner, nor to limit its own
configurability to that new owner. Instead, such devices (Pledges)
employ one or more of the following problematic mechanisms:
1. They permit configuration without any security or password, or
they require a well-known "default" password.
2. They limit configuration to mechanisms that require some degree
of physical control over the device, such as permitting
configuration only across a serial "console" port, or requiring
pairing via Bluetooth.
3. They are delivered with some form of "bearer token", such as a
unique QR or similar code that is delivered together with the
device and that has to be scanned to authenticate against the
device.
All these mechanisms expose various security or operational problems,
making them insufficient for the typical professional deployment of
equipment such as is required in industrial, enterprise, defense and
other markets for networking equipment or other IoT equipment.
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In these deployment scenarios, physical installation has to be
performed by non-experts. This limits installation to physical
wiring (power and possibly networking), without any knowledge of
network configuration or digital security. Such installers should
not be required to handle Bluetooth pairing, which is often
physically difficult or impossible once the device is in its target
location, nor should the Pledge be expected to have the open network
connectivity that pairing may require. They should not need to
locate, understand and safely retain bearer tokens, which are placed
at arbitrary positions in or on packaging that has most likely
already been discarded. They should not need to determine whether a
network connection is free of harmful (e.g., attacking or spying)
software that discovers and invades unconfigured devices via their
default passwords, and so on.
In one evaluation, professional video surveillance cameras deployed
at scale cost $500 on average, but required installation by
networking/security experts cost more than $1000 on average. By
comparison, simple physical installation by non-experts into a
building network that was potentially infested with harmful software
cost less than $500.
2.2. Staging as a remedy?
To overcome the provisioning limitations of pre-voucher protocol
solutions, a common approach in the industry is so-called "staging".
Instead of being shipped directly from the manufacturer or seller to
the ultimate deployment location, Pledges are shipped to a so-called
"staging" location, where they are provisioned by networking/security
experts. There, the Pledge is connected only to a staging network
that is known to be free of attackers, and is provisioned with the
configuration necessary to operate at the target deployment location
-- at least to the extent that subsequent attacks or unintentional
misconfiguration by a non-owner are no longer possible.
Staging is expensive and slow. It is also considered impractical in
many market segments, not only because of the number of low-cost
Pledges and the high ratio of installation cost to Pledge cost (as in
the surveillance camera example above), but also because of
international shipping, certification and import/export issues for
hardware. For example, specialized equipment for networking,
security and other business purposes is often not shipped
internationally at all. Instead, it is composed of locally sourced
standard hardware components, such as "x86" hardware with well-
defined secure hardware such as a TPM and IDevID, and this generic
hardware is then "personalized" to become the specialized device
through automated, online download of the complete product software
suite over international network connections. This leaves only the
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problem of initial, mutually trusted connectivity between such a
Pledge and the remote provisioning system to be solved -- which is
exactly what protocols using Vouchers aim to achieve.
2.3. Onboarding with a Voucher
The Voucher is a digital artifact (a digital data structure) that is
created and cryptographically signed by an agent of the Pledge's
manufacturer, called the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority
(MASA).
The Voucher's most important element is a trust anchor that
identifies the intended Owner of the Pledge. This trust anchor is
typically a certificate (the 'pinned-domain-cert' Attribute), but it
can also be a hash of a certificate, or a raw public key in
constrained use cases. Securely communicating this trust anchor to
the Pledge is the job of the Voucher Artifact, and the act of
communicating it is known as pinning the trust anchor.
The rationale for this approach is that the only trust anchors an
unconfigured Pledge can be expected to carry in its software are
those of the manufacturer, or of third-party entities designated by
the manufacturer to support the Voucher process. Consequently, a
Voucher identifying the Owner has to be signed by such a MASA. How
the MASA determines who the Owner of a Pledge is, is left to the
Onboarding protocol mechanisms using the Voucher.
Once the Pledge has received such a Voucher via some protocol
utilizing a Voucher, the Pledge can permit configuration only by
entities that can cryptographically authenticate themselves as
belonging to the Owner, for example by proving ownership of the
pinned trust anchor, or of a certificate signed by the trust anchor
either directly or via an intermediate CA. The collection of all
devices that share the same Owner's trust anchor is known as the
Domain. [RFC8994] explains how the pinned trust anchor is used to
form an overlay management Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) network,
using authenticated IPsec (or other) tunnels. IoT devices can use it
for mutually authenticated (D)TLS or EDHOC connections, although
authorization is best left to mechanisms such as [RFC9200].
The Voucher itself does not specify the procedures by which it is
communicated. That is the responsibility of the Onboarding protocols
that use Voucher Artifacts.
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In "Secure Zero Touch Provisioning" [SZTP], protocol mechanisms are
defined through which a Pledge can automatically discover an SZTP
server and "register" with it. The Pledge accepts configuration from
that SZTP server only after the server has presented a valid Voucher
identifying the Pledge's Owner.
In "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure" [BRSKI] and its
derivative protocols, the Pledge discovers and connects to a BRSKI
"Registrar" belonging to the Owner and requests a Voucher using a
variant of the Voucher called a "Voucher Request" artifact, which is
also defined in this document. Having received a Voucher in return,
the Pledge can authenticate the Registrar as its new Owner. The
Pledge then expects to be "enrolled" with keying material: it
receives the trust anchors of the Owner's PKI Domain, as well as a
so-called LDevID certificate (operational certificate) from that
Domain.
SZTP and BRSKI are only two examples of existing protocol families
that use Vouchers. They follow different design philosophies and
thereby illustrate why the Voucher is not tied to, and not specified
solely within, a single protocol family.
2.4. What the Voucher does and does not provide
Use of the Voucher as specified in this document does not guarantee
interoperability between an arbitrary Pledge and an arbitrary
configuration/provisioning/enrollment/Onboarding server; that is
instead the responsibility of the protocols using Vouchers.
What the use of a Voucher-based Onboarding protocol does enable is
the ability to enroll and provision Pledges without the operational
and security challenges of pre-voucher i.e. legacy mechanisms.
Pledges supporting Voucher-based protocols can be physically
installed by personnel who are neither security experts nor
networking experts and who only need to know how to wire up and
physically install the Pledge. Network-based (i.e., non-physical)
attacks that rely on taking control of an unconfigured Pledge are
eliminated, as is the non-malicious enrollment of a Pledge into a
non-Owner network, which is a common problem in multi-tenant and
multi-dwelling environments.
3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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This document uses and defines the following terms, which are also
used in related documents. The terms are listed in alphabetical
order.
Artifact: See "Voucher Artifact".
Attribute: A single named data element that can be stored in Voucher
Data. The element's name and data type are defined by one of the
YANG models as defined in this document.
Bootstrapping: See "Onboarding". This term was used in [RFC8366],
but has been supplanted by the term Onboarding.
Domain: The set of entities or infrastructure under common
administrative control, sharing the trust anchor that is conveyed
by the Voucher. The goal of the Onboarding protocol is to enable
a Pledge to join a Domain and obtain domain-specific security
credentials. This term is not related to "DNS domain" [RFC9499]
although a Domain might be associated to a specific DNS domain.
IDevID (Initial Device Identifier): A device identity credential,
defined by [DEVID], that is installed (i.e. imprinted) in the
Pledge by its manufacturer during production and that the Pledge
uses to identify itself to a Domain that it attempts to join. It
consists of an X.509 certificate [RFC5280] that contains the
Pledge's serial number, together with the associated private key.
Join Registrar (and Coordinator): A representative of the Domain
that is configured to decide whether a new device is allowed to
join the Domain. The administrator of the Domain interfaces with
a Join Registrar (and Coordinator) to control this process.
Typically, a Join Registrar is "inside" its Domain. For
simplicity, this document often refers to this as just
"Registrar".
LDevID (Locally Significant Device Identifier): A secure device
identity credential, defined by [DEVID], that is issued to the
Pledge by the Domain that it has joined and that the Pledge uses
to identify itself within that Domain. It is also called an
operational certificate.
MASA (Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority): The entity that,
for the purpose of this document, issues and signs the Vouchers
for a manufacturer's Pledges and keeps logs of Pledge ownership.
In some Onboarding protocols, the MASA may have an Internet
presence and be integral to the Onboarding process, whereas in
other protocols the MASA may be an offline service that has no
active role in the Onboarding process.
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Malicious Registrar: An on-path active attacker that presents itself
as a legitimate Registrar towards the Pledge. This attacker's
goal is to trick the Pledge to trust its malicious Domain and let
it onboard into that Domain. The attacker then has control over
the Pledge and may then perform various follow-up actions such as
operating the device at another location in a network under the
attacker's control, or attempting further device exploits to
compromise its software. After the software is compromised, the
Pledge could be instructed by the attacker to onboard another time
but now with a real Registrar of a target Domain being attacked.
This way, a compromised Pledge could become trusted in the
attacker's target Domain. Section 11.4 of [BRSKI] describes more
details of this attack and its mitigations.
Onboarding: Onboarding describes the process to provide necessary
operational data to a Pledge and to complete the process of
bringing the Pledge into an operational state. This data may
include configuration data, but the specific focus of this
document is providing data that identifies a Domain-specific trust
anchor that the Pledge can trust for it to carry out the remainder
of the onboarding process (see also: Pinning). Application-
specific security credentials or network access credentials may
also be provided during the onboarding process. When [RFC8366]
was first published, the industry had not yet concluded on a term
to describe this process and a number of terms were used, among
which the term "bootstrapping" that [RFC8366] used. The industry
has since preferred the term "onboarding", and this document uses
that term.
Owner: The entity that controls the private key of the trust anchor
conveyed by the Voucher. Typically, the Owner is indicated by the
'pinned-domain-cert' Attribute.
Pinning: The act of securely communicating a trust anchor to a
Pledge by conveying it in a Voucher. The trust anchor that is
communicated this way is said to be pinned.
Pledge: The prospective component/device attempting to find and
securely join a Domain. When shipped or in factory reset mode, it
only trusts authorized representatives of the manufacturer.
Pledge Voucher Request (PVR): A signed artifact sent from the Pledge
to the Registrar. It is a specific form of Voucher Request.
Registrar: See Join Registrar. This term is not related to the term
DNS Registrar [RFC9499].
Registrar Voucher Request (RVR): A signed artifact sent from the
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Registrar to the MASA. It is a specific form of Voucher Request.
TOFU (Trust on First Use): When a Pledge makes no security decisions
but rather simply trusts the first Domain entity it is contacted
by. Used similarly to [RFC7435]. This is also known as the
"resurrecting duckling" model [Stajano99theresurrecting].
Trust Anchor: A public key, or a certificate that contains a public
key, that a Pledge is configured to trust as an authoritative
source when it validates the credentials that other entities
present to it; see also [RFC6024]. The Voucher conveys the trust
anchor of the Owner's Domain to the Pledge.
Voucher: A Voucher Artifact that is a signed statement from the MASA
service that indicates to a Pledge the cryptographic identity of
the Domain it should trust. When clarity is needed, it may be
preceded by the type of the signature, such as CMS, JWS or COSE.
Voucher Artifact: Used throughout this document to represent a
Voucher or Voucher Request as instantiated in the form of a signed
datastructure. The payload of the signed datastructure is called
the Voucher Data.
Voucher Data: The raw (serialized) representation of the YANG data
elements of a Voucher (Request) without any enclosing signature.
Current serialization formats include JSON and CBOR.
Voucher Request: A signed artifact sent from the Pledge to the
Registrar, or from the Registrar to the MASA, for Voucher
acquisition. When clarity is needed, it may be preceded by the
type of the signature, such as CMS, JWS or COSE.
Zero-touch: Describes an Onboarding process that requires no manual
configuration of the Pledge at its deployment location, beyond the
physical installation of the Pledge.
4. Survey of Voucher Types
This section is informative. It surveys the information that a
Voucher can carry, and the combinations of that information -- the
"Voucher types" -- that existing Onboarding protocols use. The
normative definition of the Voucher Artifact, and of the Attributes
that are mentioned here, is given in Section 8.
A Voucher is a cryptographically protected statement to the Pledge
authorizing a Zero-touch Onboarding with the Join Registrar of the
Domain. The specific information a Voucher provides is influenced by
the Onboarding use case.
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The Voucher can convey the following information to the Join
Registrar and to the Pledge:
Assertion Basis: Indicates the method that protects the Onboarding.
This is distinct from the Voucher signature that protects the
Voucher itself. Methods include manufacturer-asserted ownership
verification, assured logging operations, or reliance on Pledge
behavior such as secure boot or measured boot (which is an
attested boot process involving 'measurements' as defined by
[RFC9334].) The Join Registrar uses this information to make a
determination as to whether to accept the Pledge into the network.
Only some methods are normatively defined in this document. Other
methods are left for future work.
Authentication of Join Registrar: Indicates how the Pledge can
authenticate the Join Registrar. This document defines a
mechanism to pin the Domain certificate, or a raw public key.
Pinning a symmetric key, or CN-ID ([RFC6125]) or DNS-ID
information (as defined in [RFC9525]) is left for future work.
Anti-Replay Protections: Time- or nonce-based information to
constrain the Voucher to specific time periods or Onboarding
attempts.
Voucher lifetimes vary between Onboarding protocols. Some protocols
include a nonce in the Voucher, restricting it to a single use,
whereas Vouchers in other protocols have an indicated lifetime. When
longer validity periods are important, this document recommends using
short lifetimes with programmatic renewal, see Section 10.1. How
short the lifetimes can be depends upon the means of conveyance of
the Voucher, so the exact times are specified in the Onboarding
protocol itself.
A number of Onboarding scenarios can be met using differing
combinations of this information. All scenarios address the primary
threat of an on-path active attacker (or MiTM) impersonating the
Registrar. If successful, the attacker would gain control over the
Pledge. The following combinations are "types" of Vouchers:
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+=========+===========+========+===========+========+========+=====+
|Voucher | Assertion | | Registrar | |Validity| |
|Type | | | ID | | | |
+=========+===========+========+===========+========+========+=====+
| | Logged |Verified| Trust |CN-ID or| RTC|Nonce|
| | | | Anchor | DNS-ID| | |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
|Audit | X | | X | | | X|
|Voucher | | | | | | |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
|Nonceless| X | | X | | X| |
|Audit | | | | | | |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
|Owner | X | X| X | | X| X|
|Audit | | | | | | |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
|Owner ID | | X| X | X| X| |
|Voucher | | | | | | |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
|Bearer | X | | wildcard |wildcard|optional| opt|
|Voucher | | | | | | |
+---------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+--------+-----+
Table 1: Overview of Voucher types
NOTE: The "RTC" column denotes Voucher validation using a Real-Time
Clock.
NOTE: All Voucher types include a "Pledge ID serial-number" (column
not shown for space reasons).
Audit Voucher: An audit Voucher is named after the logging assertion
mechanisms that the Registrar then "audits" to enforce its local
policy. The Registrar mitigates the risk of a Malicious Registrar
by auditing that no unknown Registrar, or known Malicious
Registrar, appears in the MASA's log entries for the Pledge. This
does not directly prevent a Malicious Registrar but provides a
response mechanism that ensures the on-path attack is
unsuccessful. An advantage is that actual ownership knowledge
(i.e., sales integration providing an indication of who purchased
the device) is not required on the MASA service.
Nonceless Audit Voucher: An audit Voucher with a validity period
statement, but no guarantee of freshness. Fundamentally, it is
the same as an audit Voucher except that it can be issued in
advance to support network partitions or to provide a permanent
Voucher for remote deployments. Being issued in advance of the
Pledge being online, the Pledge cannot rely on a nonce to be
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included for freshness. This compromise in reducing the freshness
allows for the resulting Voucher to be carried across air-gapped
infrastructure. In addition, if the validity period has been set
sufficiently long, the Voucher can be used after the manufacturer
(and its delegates) has gone out of business.
Ownership Audit Voucher: An audit Voucher where the MASA service has
verified the Registrar as the authorized Owner. The MASA service
mitigates a MiTM Registrar by refusing to generate audit Vouchers
for unauthorized Registrars. The Registrar uses audit techniques
to supplement the MASA. This provides an ideal sharing of policy
decisions and enforcement between the vendor and the Owner.
Ownership ID Voucher: Named after inclusion of the Pledge's CN-ID or
DNS-ID within the Voucher. The MASA service mitigates a MiTM
Registrar by identifying the specific Registrar (via PKIX
[RFC5280]) authorized to own the Pledge.
Bearer Voucher: A bearer Voucher is named after the inclusion of a
Registrar ID wildcard. Because the Registrar identity is not
indicated, this Voucher type must be treated as a secret and
protected from exposure as any 'bearer' of the Voucher can claim
the Pledge. This variation is included in the above table in
order to clearly show how other Voucher types differ. This
specification does not support bearer Vouchers at this time.
There are other specifications in the industry which are
equivalent though. Publishing a nonceless bearer Voucher
effectively turns the specified Pledge into a TOFU device with
minimal mitigation against MiTM Registrars. Bearer Vouchers are
therefore out of scope.
5. Changes since RFC8366
This document obsoletes [RFC8366].
5.1. Motivation for revising RFC8366
[RFC8366] originally defined the Voucher as the only Voucher
Artifact, leaving the Voucher Request that is used in BRSKI to be
defined in [BRSKI]. This document includes both Voucher and Voucher
Request thereby obsoleting [RFC8366], and Updating [BRSKI].
A number of variations of [BRSKI] have been developed since the
publication of [RFC8366], and these variations require new Attributes
be added to the Voucher and Voucher Request. At the low-level, that
is the JSON (or CBOR) mechanical level, this was thought to be
trivial as the artifacts are JSON (or CBOR) maps, and adding new keys
seemed easy.
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However, the use of YANG for the information model does not make it
as trivial as was thought. In the end, YANG is not easily extended
except by updating the YANG module definition, and that update is the
major reason for the publication of this document. The process that
led to this conclusion is described in Section 5.2.
This document introduces a mechanism to support future extensions
without requiring the YANG module to be revised. This includes both
a new IETF standard mechanism for extensions modeled after the
mechanism present in [RFC8520], as well as a facility for
manufacturer proprietary extensions.
5.2. History of New Protocols Since RFC8366
[RFC8366] was published in 2018 during the development of [BRSKI],
[SZTP] and other work-in-progress efforts. Since then the industry
has matured significantly, and the in-the-field activity which this
document supports has become known as _Onboarding_ rather than
_Bootstrapping_.
The focus of [BRSKI] was Onboarding of ISP and Enterprise owned wired
routing and switching equipment, with IoT devices being a less
important aspect. [SZTP] has focused upon Onboarding of CPE
equipment like cable modems and other larger IoT devices, again with
smaller IoT devices being of lesser importance.
Since [BRSKI] was published there is now a mature effort to do
application-level Onboarding of constrained IoT devices defined by
the Thread Group and the Fairhair Alliance (now OCF) [fairhair]. The
[cBRSKI] document has defined a version of [BRSKI] that is usable
over constrained IEEE 802.15.4 6LoWPAN networks using CoAP and DTLS,
while [I-D.ietf-lake-authz] provides for using CoAP and EDHOC on even
more constrained devices with very constrained networks.
[PRM] has created a new methodology for Onboarding that does not
depend upon a synchronous connection between the Pledge and the
Registrar. This mechanism uses a mobile Registrar agent that works
to collect and transfer signed artifacts via physical travel from one
network to another.
[cBRSKI] uses the serialization mechanism described in [RFC9254] to
produce significantly more compact artifacts.
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5.3. Challenges with revisions to YANG
When the process to define [cBRSKI] and [PRM] was started, there was
a belief that the appropriate process was to use the [RFC7950]
_augment_ mechanism to further extend both the Voucher Request
[BRSKI] and Voucher [RFC8366] artifacts. However, [PRM] needs to
extend an enumerated type with additional values and _augment_ cannot
do this, so that was initially the impetus for this document.
An attempt was then made to determine what would happen if one wanted
to have a constrained version of the [PRM] Voucher Artifact. The
result was invalid YANG, with multiple definitions of the core
Attributes from the [RFC8366] Voucher Artifact. After some
discussion, it was determined that the _augment_ mechanism did not
work for this use case, nor did it work better when the [RFC8040]
"yang-data" extension was replaced with the [RFC8791] "structure"
extension.
After significant discussion the decision was made to simply roll all
of the needed extensions into this document.
5.4. Detailed changes since RFC8366
[cBRSKI], [CLOUD] and [PRM] require extensions to the Voucher Request
and the resulting Voucher. New Attributes are required to carry the
additional data and describe the extended semantics. The following
Attributes are new, and the document that they support is noted:
To the Voucher Request:
agent-signed-data: [PRM]
agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert: [PRM]
agent-sign-cert: [PRM]
assertion(agent-proximity): [PRM]
proximity-registrar-pubk: [cBRSKI]
proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256: [cBRSKI]
To the Voucher:
additional-configuration-url: [CLOUD]
est-domain: [CLOUD]
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extensions: Added to aid in future extensions
manufacturer-proprietary: Added to allow for controlled experiments
and custom extensions
pinned-domain-pubk: [cBRSKI]
pinned-domain-pubk-sha256: [cBRSKI]
6. Updates to RFC8995
This document represents a merge of YANG definitions of the Voucher
from [RFC8366], the Voucher Request from [BRSKI], and extensions to
each of these from [cBRSKI], [CLOUD] and [PRM]. The difficulty with
this approach is that the semantics of the definitions needed for the
other documents are not included in this document, but rather in the
respective other documents.
6.1. Updates to the use of idevid-issuer
The voucher-request module definition that was in [BRSKI] Sections
3.2 (tree diagram) and 3.4 (YANG module) is now included in this
document. There is a change to it: the 'idevid-issuer' Attribute
MUST be included in a Registrar Voucher Request (RVR). Like the
'serial-number' value in the RVR, the 'idevid-issuer' value in the
RVR is to be taken from the Pledge's (IDevID) client certificate. In
some variations of BRSKI, such as [PRM], there is no direct TLS
connection between Pledge and Registrar. Therefore, the Pledge's
IDevID certificate cannot be extracted from the TLS connection, so
those variations define a different channel binding process and may
deviate from the above requirement.
A Registrar MUST apply the following rules for the value of the
'idevid-issuer' Attribute in the given order:
1. If the Authority Key Identifier (AKI) field is present in the
Pledge's (IDevID) client certificate, the Registrar copies the
full data element as specified in Section 6.3.
2. Otherwise, the Registrar generates the full data element in the
format specified in Section 6.3, using the SHA-1 hash of the
public key of the Pledge's IDevID client certificate. This is
defined as method 1 in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280].
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6.2. Clarifications on the use of idevid-issuer
[RFC8366] and [BRSKI] define the 'idevid-issuer' Attribute for the
'voucher' and 'voucher-request' modules (respectively), but they only
summarily explain when to use it, and why it is used.
The 'idevid-issuer' Attribute is provided so that the serial number
to which the issued Voucher pertains can be relative to the entity
that issued the Pledge's IDevID. In most cases there is a one to one
relationship between the trust anchor that signs Vouchers (and is
trusted by the Pledge), and the Certification Authority that signs
the IDevID. In that case, the 'serial-number' in the Voucher Data
must refer to the same device as the serial number that is in the
IDevID certificate (in the 'serialNumber' element of type
'X520SerialNumber' per Section 2.3.1 of [BRSKI]).
However, there are situations where the one to one relationship may
be broken. This occurs whenever a manufacturer has a common MASA,
but different products (on different assembly lines) are produced
with identical serial numbers. A system of serial numbers which is
just a simple counter is a good example of this. A system of serial
numbers where there is some prefix relating the product type does not
fit into this, even if the lower digits are a counter.
Another situation occurs when multiple manufacturers share a common
MASA. In this case, any given serial number in the IDevID
certificate may not be unique across all manufacturers.
It is not possible for the Pledge or the Registrar to know which
situation applies. And because one of the situations may apply, or
may occur in the future, there needs to be a contingency to allow
uniquely identifying a Pledge regardless of the current or future
situation. This is realized by the 'idevid-issuer' Attribute.
It is clarified next, whether or not to include the 'idevid-issuer'
in the PVR, in the RVR and in the Voucher.
Analysis of the situation shows that the Pledge never needs to
include 'idevid-issuer' Attribute in its PVR, because the Pledge's
IDevID certificate is available to the Registrar, and the Authority
Key Identifier needed to fill this Attribute is contained within that
IDevID certificate. The Pledge therefore has no need to repeat this.
For the RVR, Section 6.1 now normatively requires that the 'idevid-
issuer' Attribute be included.
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For the Voucher, as detailed in Section 8.4, the 'idevid-issuer'
Attribute MUST be included by a MASA in case the MASA issues a
Voucher with a serial number that is known to be not unique within
the scope of all the serial numbers represented by the MASA. If this
rule does not apply, the MASA SHOULD NOT include the 'idevid-issuer'
Attribute in order to achieve a smaller Voucher size.
6.3. Clarifications on the format of idevid-issuer
[RFC8366] and [BRSKI] were not fully clear on the required binary
format of the 'idevid-issuer' Attribute. This gave rise to
incompatible implementations.
This section clarifies the format of the 'idevid-issuer' Attribute,
which contains the full Authority Key Identifier from an IDevID
certificate. The entire Authority Key Identifier object from the
certificate i.e. the 'extnValue' OCTET STRING is to be included,
comprising the ASN.1 DER encoding of the 'AuthorityKeyIdentifier'
structure as defined in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280]. This includes
the ASN.1 DER encoding of the SEQUENCE as well as the OCTET STRING
element (tagged 0) that is named 'keyIdentifier' with type
'KeyIdentifier'.
Note that per [DEVID], only the first optional element named
'keyIdentifier' is expected to be found in an IDevID certificate, not
the 'authorityCertIssuer' or the 'authorityCertSerialNumber'.
However, because of the above requirement to include the full
'extnValue' OCTET STRING, even if the non-expected elements would be
present, they would be included in the 'idevid-issuer' value in a
Voucher Request or Voucher.
6.4. Errata closed
The above updates to [BRSKI] addresses errata [eid7263].
7. Signature mechanisms
Three signature systems have been defined for Voucher Artifacts.
[cBRSKI] defines a mechanism that uses COSE [COSE], with the Voucher
Data encoded using YANG-CBOR [RFC9254]. However, as the SID
[RFC9254] allocation process requires up-to-date YANG, the SID values
for this mechanism are presented in this document.
[jBRSKI] defines a mechanism that uses JSON [RFC8259] and [JWS].
The CMS signing mechanism first defined in [RFC8366] continues to be
defined in this document.
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7.1. CMS Format Voucher Artifact
The CMS data structure consists of the ContentInfo defined in
Section 3 of [RFC5652], which contains a single SignedData structure.
The SignedData structure is specified by Section 5.1 of [RFC5652],
encoded using ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), as specified
in ITU-T X.690 [ITU-T.X690].
The SignedData structure contains a single EncapsulatedContentInfo
structure, defined in Section 5.2 of [RFC5652]. An object identifier
(OID) [ITU-T.X680] for JSON-encoded Voucher Data is allocated in
Section 12.4. This OID is placed in the 'eContentType' field in the
EncapsulatedContentInfo, with the OID defined as follows:
id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }
id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
id-ct-animaJSONVoucher OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 40 }
The use of PKCS#7 (CMSVersion=1) in the SignedData structure is
deprecated by this document.
Section 9.1 of [RFC5652] mandates that SignedAttributes MUST be
present when the content type is not 'id-data'. This mitigates
attacks on CMS as described in
[I-D.vangeest-lamps-cms-euf-cma-signeddata]. Decoders MUST verify
that SignedAttributes is present.
To facilitate interoperability, per Section 12.3 the media type
"application/voucher-cms+json" and the filename extension ".vcj" were
registered by [RFC8366].
The CMS SignedData structure MUST contain a 'signerInfo' structure,
as described in Section 5.1 of [RFC5652], containing the signature
generated over the content using a private key trusted by the
recipient. In a Voucher, the recipient is the Pledge and the signer
is the MASA. In the Voucher Request, the signer is the Pledge (in
the PVR), or the Registrar (in the RVR).
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Note that Section 5.1 of [RFC5652] includes a discussion about how to
validate a CMS object. This object may have a particular CMSVersion
(see Section 10.2.5 of [RFC5652]). Intermediate systems (such as the
Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures [BRSKI] Registrar)
that might need to evaluate the object in flight MUST be prepared for
any version of this format. No signaling of the format version
(CMSVersion) is necessary, as the manufacturer knows the capabilities
of the Pledge and will use an appropriate format Voucher for each
Pledge.
The CMS structure SHOULD also contain all of the certificates leading
up to and including the signer's trust anchor certificate known to
the recipient. The inclusion of the trust anchor is unusual in many
applications, but third parties cannot accurately audit the
transaction without it.
The CMS structure MAY also contain revocation objects for any
intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) between the Voucher
issuer and the trust anchor known to the recipient. However, the use
of CRLs and other validity mechanisms is discouraged, as the Pledge
is unlikely to be able to perform online checks and is unlikely to
have a trusted clock source. As described in the next section, the
use of short-lived Vouchers and/or a Pledge-provided nonce provides a
freshness guarantee.
8. Voucher Artifact
The Voucher's primary purpose is to securely assign a Pledge to an
Owner. The Voucher informs the Pledge which entity it should
consider to be its Owner.
This document defines a Voucher Artifact that is a CMS-signed
encoding of the JSON-encoded Voucher Data as defined by the YANG
module Section 8.4. Also, this document defines Voucher Data that is
CBOR-encoded based on the same YANG model. The CBOR-encoded (signed)
Voucher based on this CBOR Voucher Data is defined in [cBRSKI].
The Voucher Data format is described here as a practical basis for
some uses (such as in NETCONF), but more to clearly indicate what
Vouchers look like in practice. This description also serves to
validate the YANG data model.
[RFC8366] defined a media type and a filename extension for the CMS-
encoded JSON type. The media type for JOSE format Vouchers is
defined in [jBRSKI] and the media type for COSE format Vouchers is
defined in [cBRSKI]. Both include respective filename extensions.
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The media type is used by the Pledge (requesting to the Registrar)
and by the Registrar (requesting to the MASA) to signal what Voucher
format is expected. Other aspects of the Voucher, such as it being
nonceless or which kind of pinned anchor is used, are not part of the
media type.
Only the format of Voucher that is expected is signaled in the form
of a (MIME) media type in the HTTP "Accept" header [RFC9110].
For Vouchers stored/transferred via methods like a USB storage device
(USB key), the Voucher format is usually signaled by a filename
extension.
The Attributes pinned-domain-pubk (proximity-registrar-pubk for a
PVR) and pinned-domain-pubk-sha256 (proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256
for a PVR) are involved in the process of pinning/identifying a raw
public key, instead of a certificate, for such devices.
Should the SHA-256 hash algorithm ever need to be replaced in the
future, then a new YANG module will be published with new leafs,
obsoleting the pinned-domain-pubk-sha256 and proximity-registrar-
pubk-sha256 Attributes.
In the event that more than one of pinned-domain-pubk-sha256, pinned-
domain-pubk or pinned-domain-cert Attributes are present in a
Voucher, then the Pledge SHALL prioritize the matching proximity-*
entry which it used in its voucher-request artifact, ignoring the
others.
If the Voucher is nonceless, then the Pledge SHALL consider the first
of the above Attributes that it understands, in the order given
above.
8.1. Algorithm Choices for Voucher Artifacts
When designing Pledge devices, manufacturers choose algorithms and
signature formats - which they also need to support in their MASA.
As explained in [BRSKI], Section 2.5, the Pledge is a creation of the
manufacturer, and thus the manufacturer (represented by the MASA) has
knowledge of the capabilities of the Pledge. Specifically, the
manufacturer knows what signature algorithm the Pledge is going to
use (to sign a PVR or to validate a Voucher), and can verify this,
thus there is no need (or opportunity) to negotiate the algorithm or
signature (CMS, JWS, COSE) scheme.
The exact choice of format (CMS, JWS or CBOR) and algorithm depends
upon the target operational community for the Voucher. For that
reason, this document does not specify any mandatory to implement
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algorithms but leaves that specification to the Onboarding protocols
that make use of Voucher Artifacts. [RFC8994], Section 6.2 specifies
mandatory to implement algorithms for current Autonomic Network
Infrastructure (ANI) uses. [I-D.richardson-anima-quantum-safe-4ani]
is future work for quantum-safe (PQ) [RFC9958] algorithms for ANIs.
[cBRSKI] and [I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile] specify mandatory to
implement algorithms for IoT use cases involving constrained devices.
A certain class of constrained devices defined in [cBRSKI] minimizes
the code size of the code for ASN.1 processing, PKIX [RFC5280]
processing and Voucher/PVR processing, which determines and
constrains the algorithm and format choices. Another class of cBRSKI
constrained devices minimizes just the sizes of Voucher and PVR, a
benefit on constrained networks, and these devices have different
constraints on the algorithm and format choices.
Public keys in the pinned-domain-pubk or proximity-registrar-pubk
Attributes are encoded as a DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo
structure, as specified in [RFC7250], Section 3. This structure
identifies the key's algorithm by an OID, so it can carry any public
key type for which a SubjectPublicKeyInfo encoding is defined.
Examples are RSA and ECDSA as listed in [RFC7250], EdDSA [RFC8032]
[RFC8410] and ML-DSA [RFC9881].
Should a manufacturer decide to stop supporting some algorithm that
their manufactured Pledges rely on, they will need to execute a
transition operation for any inventory (Pledges) that exists in
warehouses or within the supply chain, to ensure that these devices
can still be onboarded in the new situation. One transition strategy
is to recall these Pledges, replace the firmware and update the
IDevID certificates present in the recalled devices. This is not
ideal; a better transition strategy could be defined as part of an
Onboarding protocol such that a physical recall is not required.
8.2. Tree Diagram
The following tree diagram illustrates a high-level view of a Voucher
document. The notation used in this diagram is described in
[RFC8340]. Each node in the diagram is fully described by the YANG
module in Section 8.4. Please review the YANG module for a detailed
description of the Voucher format.
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module: ietf-voucher
structure voucher:
+-- created-on? yang:date-and-time
+-- extensions* union
+-- manufacturer-proprietary? binary
+-- assertion? enumeration
+-- serial-number string
+-- idevid-issuer? binary
+-- pinned-domain-cert? binary
+-- pinned-domain-pubk? binary
+-- pinned-domain-pubk-sha256? binary
+-- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+-- last-renewal-date? yang:date-and-time
+-- expires-on? yang:date-and-time
+-- nonce? binary
+-- est-domain? ietf:uri
+-- additional-configuration-url? ietf:uri
8.3. Examples
This section provides Voucher Data examples for illustration
purposes. These examples conform to the JSON encoding rules defined
in [RFC8259].
The following example illustrates an ephemeral Voucher (uses a
nonce). The MASA generated this Voucher using the 'logged' assertion
type, knowing that it would be suitable for the Pledge making the
request.
{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",
"assertion": "logged",
"serial-number": "JADA123456789",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"nonce": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
}
The following example illustrates a non-ephemeral Voucher (containing
no nonce, or "nonceless"). While the Voucher itself expires after
two weeks, it presumably can be renewed for up to a year. The MASA
generated this Voucher using the 'verified' assertion type, which
should satisfy all Pledges.
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{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",
"expires-on": "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z",
"assertion": "verified",
"serial-number": "JADA123456789",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"domain-cert-revocation-checks": true,
"last-renewal-date": "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z"
}
}
The final two examples illustrate a Voucher that includes an
(example) extension per Section 8.6. The hypothetical YANG module
name of the extension is 'example-my-extension'. First, a JSON
serialization is shown.
{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",
"assertion": "logged",
"serial-number": "JADA123456789",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"nonce": "base64encodedvalue==",
"extensions": ["example-my-extension"],
"extension:example-my-extension": {
"my-ext-leaf1": "my-ext-leaf1-data"
}
}
}
Next, a CBOR serialization is shown in CBOR diagnostic notation.
This uses again the extension module 'example-my-extension' and
refers to it using its SID value 305823299950. Note that for this
example, long binary strings are abbreviated using the ellipsis (...)
notation.
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{
2451: { / ietf-voucher:voucher /
2: "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z", / created-on /
1: 1, / assertion (logged) /
11: "JADA123456789", / serial-number /
5: h'04183016 ... 1736C3E0', / idevid-issuer /
8: h'30820122 ... 12328CFF', / pinned-domain-cert /
7: h'831D5198A6CA2C7F', / nonce /
17: [305823299950], / extensions /
47(305823299950): { / example-my-extension /
1: "my-ext-leaf1-data" / my-ext-leaf1 /
}
}
}
[jBRSKI], Section 8 contains examples of Vouchers encoded in JSON,
and signed with [JWS]. [cBRSKI], Section 9 contains examples of
Vouchers encoded in CBOR, and signed with [COSE].
Further examples of CMS-signed Vouchers are given in Appendix A.
8.4. YANG Module "ietf-voucher"
During development of this merged YANG module, advice was given to
better organize mutually exclusive Attributes such as 'pinned-domain-
cert' vs 'pinned-domain-pubk', or 'expires-on' vs 'nonce'.
Unfortunately, [CORESID] does not explain how and why choice
statements are assigned SID values, and the tooling as of the end of
2025 is inconsistent with both the document, and the intuitive
notions as to how this should work. As the simplest way forward, the
no choice statements are used, allowing the SID values to be
generated correctly. Normative requirements are instead included in
the description of the Attributes in the YANG files. As a result,
the SID values presented in Section 8.5 and Section 9.4 are to be
considered normative, rather than relying exclusively on the ".sid"
file [CORESID] generated from the YANG modules. The presented SID
values are believed to be correct, but future reprocessing of the
YANG module to a ".sid" file could result in changes as the tooling
is fixed. Any such changes will be recorded as errata on this
document.
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-voucher@2025-12-18.yang"
module ietf-voucher {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher";
prefix vch;
import ietf-yang-types {
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prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 9911: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix ietf;
reference
"RFC 9911: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-yang-structure-ext {
prefix sx;
reference
"RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions";
}
organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Author: Michael Richardson
<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Author: Toerless Eckert
<mailto:tte@cs.fau.de>
Author: Qiufang Ma
<mailto:maqiufang1@huawei.com>
Author: Esko Dijk
<mailto:esko.dijk@iotconsultancy.nl>";
description
"This module defines the format for a Voucher, which is
produced by a Pledge's manufacturer or delegate (MASA)
to securely assign a Pledge to an 'owner', so that the
Pledge may establish a secure connection to the owner's
network infrastructure.
Copyright (c) 2023-2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
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(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself
for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
// RFCEDITOR: please replace XXXX in this entire code fragment
// with the RFC number assigned and remove this notice.
// Please also update references in the description {{}} to the
// RFC numbers for the documents.
revision 2025-12-18 {
description
"Updates and additions described by RFC XXXX,
includes mechanism for constrained BRSKI
{{I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher}},
Pledge in Responder Mode {{I-D.ietf-anima-brski-prm}},
and BRSKI-CLOUD {{I-D.ietf-anima-brski-cloud}}";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A Voucher Artifact for Onboarding Protocols";
}
revision 2018-05-09 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC 8366: Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols";
}
grouping voucher-artifact {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
leaf created-on {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"A value indicating the date this Voucher was created.
This node is primarily for human consumption and auditing.
Future work MAY create verification requirements based on
this node.";
}
leaf-list extensions {
type union {
type uint64; // when serialized to CBOR with SID
type string; // when serialized to CBOR or JSON
}
description
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"A list of extension names that are used in this Voucher
file. Typically, names are registered with the IANA.
Standard extensions are described in an RFC, while vendor
proprietary ones are not.";
}
leaf manufacturer-proprietary {
type binary;
description
"In CBOR serialization, this is a CBOR bstr containing any
valid CBOR that the manufacturer wishes to share with its
Pledge. In JSON serializations, this contains additional
JSON instead, and it is base64URL encoded.
Since a Voucher could be logged or stored by a Registrar
or another intermediate, this Attribute MUST NOT contain
any data that requires confidentiality.";
}
leaf assertion {
type enumeration {
enum verified {
value 0;
description
"Indicates that the ownership has been positively
verified by the MASA (e.g., through sales channel
integration).";
}
enum logged {
value 1;
description
"Indicates that the Voucher has been issued after
minimal verification of ownership or control. The
issuance has been logged for detection of
potential security issues (e.g., recipients of
Vouchers might verify for themselves that unexpected
Vouchers are not in the log). This is similar to
unsecured trust-on-first-use principles but with the
logging providing a basis for detecting unexpected
events.";
}
enum proximity {
value 2;
description
"Indicates that the Voucher has been issued after
the MASA verified a proximity proof provided by the
device and target domain. The issuance has been
logged for detection of potential security issues.";
}
enum agent-proximity {
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value 3;
description
"Mostly identical to proximity, but
indicates that the Voucher has been issued
after the MASA has verified a statement that
a Registrar agent has made contact with the device.";
}
}
description
"The assertion is a statement from the MASA regarding how
the owner was verified. This statement enables Pledges
to support more detailed policy checks. Pledges MUST
ensure that the assertion provided is acceptable, per
local policy, before processing the Voucher.";
}
leaf serial-number {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The serial-number of the hardware. When processing a
Voucher, a Pledge MUST ensure that its serial-number
matches this value. If no match occurs, then the
Pledge MUST NOT process this Voucher.";
}
leaf idevid-issuer {
type binary;
description
"The Authority Key Identifier OCTET STRING (as defined in
Section 4.2.1.1 of RFC 5280) from the Pledge's IDevID
certificate. In the Voucher, it is optional
as some manufacturers know that all serial-numbers
are unique within the scope of a MASA. In the Voucher
Request, whether it is mandatory or optional depends on
which protocol is used, such as RFC8995 and variations.
When processing a Voucher, a Pledge MUST ensure that its
IDevID Authority Key Identifier matches this value. If no
match occurs, then the Pledge MUST NOT process this
Voucher.
When issuing a Voucher, the MASA MUST ensure that this
field is populated for serial-numbers that are not
otherwise unique within the scope of the MASA.";
}
// The MASA typically includes only one of the below
// pinned-domain-* Attributes in a Voucher.
leaf pinned-domain-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by
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RFC 5280, using Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
encoding, as defined in [ITU-T.X690].
This certificate is used by a Pledge to trust a Public Key
Infrastructure in order to verify a domain certificate
supplied to the Pledge separately by the onboarding
protocol. The domain certificate MUST have this
certificate somewhere in its chain of certificates.
This certificate MAY be an end-entity certificate,
including a self-signed entity.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T.X690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
leaf pinned-domain-pubk {
type binary;
description
"The pinned-domain-pubk may replace the
pinned-domain-cert in constrained uses of
the Voucher. The pinned-domain-pubk
is the Raw Public Key of the Registrar.
This field is encoded as a Subject Public Key Info block
as specified in RFC7250, in section 3.";
}
leaf pinned-domain-pubk-sha256 {
type binary;
description
"The pinned-domain-pubk-sha256 is a second
alternative to pinned-domain-cert. In many cases the
public key of the domain has already been transmitted
during the key agreement process, and it is wasteful
to transmit the public key another two times.
The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA
public key, but is only a minor savings compared to
a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.
Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this
specification which can define a new leaf for another
hash type.";
}
// End of pinned-domain-* Attributes block
leaf domain-cert-revocation-checks {
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type boolean;
description
"A processing instruction to the Pledge that it MUST (true)
or MUST NOT (false) verify the revocation status for the
pinned domain certificate. If this field is not set, then
normal PKIX behavior applies to validation of the domain
certificate.";
}
leaf last-renewal-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
must '../expires-on';
description
"The date that the MASA projects to be the last date
it will renew a Voucher on. This field is merely
informative; it is not processed by Pledges.
Circumstances may occur after a Voucher is generated that
may alter a Voucher's validity period. For instance,
a vendor may associate validity periods with support
contracts, which may be terminated or extended
over time.";
}
// The MASA MUST NOT include both of the below
// Attributes expires-on and nonce in a Voucher.
leaf expires-on {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"A value indicating when this Voucher expires. The node is
optional as not all Pledges support expirations, such as
Pledges lacking a reliable clock.
If this field exists, then the Pledges MUST ensure that
the expires-on time has not yet passed. A Pledge without
an accurate clock cannot meet this requirement.
The expires-on value MUST NOT exceed the expiration date
of any of the listed 'pinned-domain-cert' certificates.
A MASA that includes this Attribute MUST NOT include the
'nonce' Attribute.";
}
leaf nonce {
type binary {
length "8..32";
}
description
"A value that can be used by a Pledge in some onboarding
protocols to enable anti-replay protection. This node is
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optional because it is not used by all onboarding
protocols.
When present, the Pledge MUST compare the provided nonce
value with another value that the Pledge randomly
generated and sent to a bootstrap server in an earlier
onboarding message. If the value is present, but
the values do not match, then the Pledge MUST NOT process
this Voucher.
A nonce value MUST be a cryptographically strong random
value as detailed in RFC 4086.
A MASA that includes this Attribute MUST NOT include the
'expires-on' Attribute.";
}
// End of expires-on / nonce Attributes block
leaf est-domain {
type ietf:uri;
description
"The est-domain is a URL from which the Pledge should
continue doing enrollment rather than with the
cloud Registrar.
The pinned-domain-cert contains a trust-anchor
which is to be used to authenticate the server
found at this URI.";
}
leaf additional-configuration-url {
type ietf:uri;
description
"The additional-configuration Attribute contains a
URL to which the Pledge can retrieve additional
configuration information.
The contents of this URL are manufacturer specific.
This is intended to do things like configure
a VoIP phone to point to the correct hosted
PBX, for example.
The URL MUST NOT contain any data (such as authen-
tication tokens) that requires confidentiality.";
}
}
// Top-level statement
sx:structure voucher {
uses voucher-artifact;
}
}
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<CODE ENDS>
8.5. ietf-voucher SID values
[RFC9254] explains how to serialize YANG into CBOR, and for this a
series of SID values are required. The below SID values are assigned
to the 'ietf-voucher' YANG module elements and are considered
normative.
The right column shows the schema-node path expression for the YANG
data node to which the SID value is assigned.
SID Assigned to
---- --------------------------------------------------
2450 module ietf-voucher
2451 data /ietf-voucher:voucher
2452 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/assertion
2453 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/created-on
2454 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/domain-cert-revocation-checks
2455 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/expires-on
2456 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/idevid-issuer
2457 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/last-renewal-date
2458 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/nonce
2459 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/pinned-domain-cert
2460 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/pinned-domain-pubk
2461 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/pinned-domain-pubk-sha256
2462 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/serial-number
2463 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/additional-configuration-url
2464 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/est-domain
2465 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/manufacturer-proprietary
2466 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/extensions
The 'assertion' Attribute is an enumerated type in [RFC8366], but no
values were provided as part of the enumeration. This document
provides enumerated values as part of the YANG module.
In the JSON serialization, the literal strings from the enumerated
types are used so there is no ambiguity.
In the CBOR serialization, a small integer is used, and the
enumeration values are repeated here for convenience. However, the
YANG module should be considered authoritative. No IANA registry is
provided or necessary because the YANG module (and this document)
would be extended when there are new entries required.
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+==============+=================+
| CBOR Integer | Assertion Type |
+==============+=================+
| 0 | verified |
+--------------+-----------------+
| 1 | logged |
+--------------+-----------------+
| 2 | proximity |
+--------------+-----------------+
| 3 | agent-proximity |
+--------------+-----------------+
Table 2: CBOR integers for the
'assertion' Attribute enum
value
8.6. Voucher Extensions
An unstated assumption in [RFC8366] was that Vouchers could be
extended in proprietary ways by manufacturers. This allows for
manufacturers to communicate new things from the MASA to the Pledge,
and since both are under control of the same entity, it seemed
perfectly fine, even though it would violate the strict definition of
the YANG model.
The JSON serialization of Vouchers implicitly accommodates the above,
since the Voucher is just a map (or dictionary). Map keys are just
strings, and creating unique strings is easy to do by including the
manufacturer's DNS domain name.
In CBOR serialization [RFC9254], the situation is not so easy when
SID keys are used. An extension might need to use "Private range"
[CORESID] SID values, or acquire SID values for their own use.
Where the process has become complex is when making standard
extensions, as has happened recently, resulting in this document.
The processes which were anticipated to be useful (the YANG "augment"
mechanism), turned out not to be, see Section 5.1.
Instead, a process similar to what was done by [RFC8520] has been
adopted. In the Voucher Data, any extensions are listed in a list
Attribute named 'extensions'. In JSON serialization, these
extensions each require a unique name, and therefore an IANA
registration for these names is provided and FQDN-based uniqueness is
used in certain cases (see Section 12.5). The name MUST be the same
as the YANG extension module name. The 'extensions' list Attribute
allows for new standard extensions to be defined without changes to
the 'ietf-voucher' YANG module. Items within that list are either
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strings (in JSON serialization), or integers (in CBOR serialization
using SIDs). If the extension is registered with IANA, then both
name and SID are always defined in the Voucher Extensions registry
(see Section 12.5).
Extensions are full YANG modules, which are subject to the SID
allocation process described in [RFC9254]. When an extension is
serialized, the extension is placed in a sub-map in the value of a
new key/value pair in the 'voucher' container element. In JSON
serialization, the corresponding key is the name of the extension,
prefixed by the string "extension:". In CBOR serialization, the
corresponding key is the SID which is allocated as the YANG extension
module SID. This will typically require the absolute SID value
Tag(47) to be applied to this key (see Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9254] or
the final example in Section 8.3).
Note that this differs from the mechanism described in [RFC8520]:
there, a sub-map is not used. Instead, keys are created by combining
the module name and the Attribute as a string, as a result of using
the YANG "augment" mechanism. The [RFC8520] mechanism uses more
bytes, but is also not easily translatable to CBOR.
As the Voucher Request YANG module is created by YANG augment of the
Voucher YANG module, any extension defined for the Voucher is also
valid for a Voucher Request.
8.7. Manufacturer Proprietary Extensions
A manufacturer might need to communicate content in the Voucher (or
in the Voucher Request), which are never subject to standardization.
While they can use the Voucher extensions mechanism defined in
Section 8.6, it does require allocation of a SID value in order to do
minimal-sized encoding in case of CBOR Voucher Data. Note that
[RFC9254] does not strictly require use of SIDs: instead of a SID
value, the full string name can always be used. But this would
significantly increase the size of the Voucher Data.
Instead, a manufacturer MAY use the 'manufacturer-proprietary'
Attribute to put any content they wish, as long as this content does
not require confidentiality. In CBOR serialization, if a plain CBOR
map would be used, it would be subject to delta encoding: so use of
this Attribute requires that the contents are bstr-encoded
Section 3.1 of RFC 8949 [CBOR] (Major type 2). In JSON
serialization, delta encoding does not get in the way, and the
manufacturer MAY use any encoding that is convenient for them, but
base64URL encoding [RFC4648], Section 5 is RECOMMENDED.
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9. Voucher Request Artifact
[BRSKI], Section 3 defined a "voucher-request" Artifact as an
augmented Artifact from the "voucher" Artifact originally defined in
[RFC8366]. That definition has been moved to this document, and
translated from the "yang-data" extension [RFC8040] to the
"sx:structure" extension [RFC8791].
In the event that more than one of the Attributes proximity-
registrar-pubk-sha256, proximity-registrar-pubk or proximity-
registrar-cert are present in a Voucher Request, then the Registrar
and MASA SHALL consider them in the order presented here.
The presence of more than one of these Attributes is legal as it may
allow a Pledge to operate in both constrained and non-constrained
networks. However, on constrained networks it wastes significant
amounts of space, and it is discouraged in those environments.
9.1. Tree Diagram
The following tree diagram illustrates a high-level view of a Voucher
Request document. The notation used in this diagram is described in
[RFC8340]. Each node in the diagram is fully described by the YANG
module in Section 9.3.
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module: ietf-voucher-request
structure voucher:
+-- created-on? yang:date-and-time
+-- extensions* union
+-- manufacturer-proprietary? binary
+-- assertion? enumeration
+-- serial-number string
+-- idevid-issuer? binary
+-- pinned-domain-cert? binary
+-- pinned-domain-pubk? binary
+-- pinned-domain-pubk-sha256? binary
+-- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+-- last-renewal-date? yang:date-and-time
+-- expires-on? yang:date-and-time
+-- nonce? binary
+-- est-domain? ietf:uri
+-- additional-configuration-url? ietf:uri
+-- prior-signed-voucher-request? binary
+-- proximity-registrar-cert? binary
+-- proximity-registrar-pubk? binary
+-- proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256? binary
+-- agent-signed-data? binary
+-- agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert? binary
+-- agent-sign-cert? binary
9.2. Example
An example of a CMS-signed Voucher Request is given in Appendix A.
9.3. YANG Module "ietf-voucher-request"
The 'ietf-voucher-request' YANG module is derived from the 'ietf-
voucher' module.
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-voucher-request@2025-12-18.yang"
module ietf-voucher-request {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher-request";
prefix vcr;
import ietf-yang-structure-ext {
prefix sx;
reference
"RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions";
}
import ietf-voucher {
prefix vch;
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description
"This module defines the format for a Voucher,
which is produced by a Pledge's manufacturer or
delegate (MASA) to securely assign a Pledge to
an 'Owner', so that the Pledge may establish a secure
connection to the Owner's network infrastructure";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A Voucher Artifact for
Onboarding Protocols";
}
organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Author: Michael Richardson
<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Author: Toerless Eckert
<mailto:tte@cs.fau.de>
Author: Qiufang Ma
<mailto:maqiufang1@huawei.com>
Author: Esko Dijk
<mailto:esko.dijk@iotconsultancy.nl>";
description
"This module defines the format for a Voucher Request.
It is a superset of the Voucher itself.
It provides content to the MASA for consideration
during a Voucher request procedure and subsequent
Voucher creation.
Copyright (c) 2023-2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself
for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
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NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
// RFCEDITOR: please replace XXXX in this entire code fragment
// with the RFC number assigned and remove this notice.
// Please also update references in the description {{}} to the
// RFC numbers for the documents.
revision 2025-12-18 {
description
"Updates and additions described by RFC XXXX,
includes mechanism for constrained BRSKI
{{I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher}},
Pledge in Responder Mode {{I-D.ietf-anima-brski-prm}},
and BRSKI-CLOUD {{I-D.ietf-anima-brski-cloud}}";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A Voucher Artifact for Onboarding Protocols";
}
revision 2021-05-20 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC 8995: Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure
(BRSKI)";
}
grouping voucher-request {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
uses vch:voucher-artifact {
refine "last-renewal-date" {
description
"A last-renewal-date field
MUST NOT be present in a Voucher Request,
and any occurrence MUST be ignored";
}
refine "domain-cert-revocation-checks" {
description
"The domain-cert-revocation-checks field
MUST NOT be present in a Voucher Request,
and any occurrence MUST be ignored";
}
refine "assertion" {
description
"Any assertion included in Registrar Voucher
Requests SHOULD be ignored by the MASA.";
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}
refine "idevid-issuer" {
description
"The idevid-issuer field MUST be included in
a Registrar Voucher Request (RVR) (unless
specified otherwise) per Section 6.1 of
RFC XXXX.";
}
}
leaf prior-signed-voucher-request {
type binary;
description
"If it is necessary to change a Voucher, or re-sign and
forward a Voucher Request that was previously provided
along a protocol path, then the previously signed
Voucher SHOULD be included in this field.
For example, a Pledge might sign a Voucher Request
with a proximity-registrar-cert, and the Registrar
then includes it as the prior-signed-voucher-request
field. This is a simple mechanism for a chain of
trusted parties to change a Voucher Request, while
maintaining the prior signature information.
The Registrar and MASA MAY examine the prior signed
Voucher Request information for the
purposes of policy decisions. The MASA SHOULD remove
all prior-signed-voucher-request information when
signing a Voucher for onboarding so as to minimize
the final Voucher size and to ensure privacy/security
sensitive information does not leak into the Voucher.";
}
leaf proximity-registrar-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by
RFC 5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in [ITU-T.X690].
The first certificate in the Registrar TLS server
certificate_list sequence (the end-entity TLS
certificate, see RFC 9846) presented by the Registrar
to the Pledge.
This MUST be populated in a Pledge's Voucher Request
when a proximity assertion is requested.";
}
leaf proximity-registrar-pubk {
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type binary;
description
"The proximity-registrar-pubk replaces
the proximity-registrar-cert in constrained uses of
the Voucher Request.
The proximity-registrar-pubk is the
Raw Public Key of the Registrar. This field is encoded
as specified in RFC7250, section 3.";
}
leaf proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256 {
type binary;
description
"The proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256
is an alternative to both
proximity-registrar-pubk and pinned-domain-cert.
In many cases the public key of the domain has already
been transmitted during the key agreement protocol,
and it is wasteful to transmit the public key another
two times.
The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA
public key, but is only a minor savings compared to
a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.
Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this
specification which may define a new leaf for another
hash type.";
}
leaf agent-signed-data {
type binary;
description
"The agent-signed-data field contains a data artifact
provided by the Registrar-Agent to the Pledge for
inclusion into the Voucher Request.
This artifact is signed by the Registrar-Agent and contains
data, which can be verified by the Pledge and the Registrar.
This data contains the Pledge's serial-number and a
created-on information of the agent-signed-data.
The format is intentionally defined as binary to allow
the document using this leaf to determine the encoding.";
}
leaf agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by
RFC 5280, Section 4, encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
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in [ITU-T.X690].
The first certificate in the Registrar TLS server
certificate_list sequence (the end-entity TLS
certificate; see RFC 9846) presented by the
Registrar to the Registrar-agent and provided to
the Pledge.
This MUST be populated in a Pledge's Voucher Request
when an agent-proximity assertion is requested.";
reference
"ITU-T.X690: Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding
rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)
RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile
RFC 9846: The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.3";
}
leaf agent-sign-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by
RFC 5280, Section 4, encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in [ITU-T.X690].
This certificate can be used by the Pledge,
the Registrar, and the MASA to verify the signature
of agent-signed-data. It is an optional component
for the Pledge's Voucher Request.
This MUST be populated in a Registrar's
Voucher Request when an agent-proximity assertion
is requested.";
reference
"ITU-T.X690: Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding
rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)
RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile";
}
}
// Top-level statement: called "voucher" to match RFC8995
sx:structure voucher {
uses voucher-request;
}
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}
<CODE ENDS>
9.4. ietf-voucher-request SID values
[RFC9254] explains how to serialize YANG into CBOR, and for this a
series of SID values are required. The below SID values are assigned
to the 'ietf-voucher-request' YANG module elements and are considered
normative.
The right column shows the schema-node path expression for the YANG
data node to which the SID value is assigned.
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
SID Assigned to
---- --------------------------------------------------
2500 module ietf-voucher-request
2501 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher
2502 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/assertion
2503 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/created-on
2504 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/domain-cert-revocation-\
checks
2505 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/expires-on
2506 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/idevid-issuer
2507 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/last-renewal-date
2508 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/nonce
2509 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/pinned-domain-cert
2510 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/prior-signed-voucher-\
request
2511 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/proximity-registrar-cert
2512 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/proximity-registrar-pubk-\
sha256
2513 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/proximity-registrar-pubk
2514 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/serial-number
2515 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/agent-provided-proximity-\
registrar-cert
2516 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/agent-sign-cert
2517 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/agent-signed-data
2518 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/pinned-domain-pubk
2519 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/pinned-domain-pubk-sha256
2520 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/additional-configuration-\
url
2521 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/est-domain
2522 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/extensions
2523 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/manufacturer-proprietary
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The 'assertion' Attribute is an enumerated type, and has values as
defined in Table 2.
10. Design Considerations
10.1. Renewals Instead of Revocations
The lifetimes of Vouchers may vary. In some Onboarding protocols,
the Vouchers may be created and consumed immediately, whereas in
other Onboarding solutions, there may be a significant time delay
between when a Voucher is created and when it is consumed. In cases
when there is a time delay, there is a need for the Pledge to ensure
that the assertions made when the Voucher was created are still
valid.
A revocation artifact (such as an OCSP [RFC6960] staple [RFC9910], or
CRL [RFC5280]) is generally used to verify the continued validity of
an assertion such as a PKIX certificate [RFC5280], web token, or
Voucher. With this approach, a potentially long-lived assertion is
paired with a reasonably fresh revocation status check to ensure that
the assertion is still valid. However, this approach increases
solution complexity, as it introduces the need for additional
protocols and code paths to distribute and process the revocations.
Addressing the shortcomings of revocations, this document recommends
instead the use of lightweight renewals of short-lived non-revocable
Vouchers. That is, rather than issue a long-lived Voucher, where the
'expires-on' Attribute is set to some distant date, the expectation
is for the MASA to instead issue a short-lived Voucher, where the
'expires-on' Attribute is set to a relatively near date, along with a
promise (reflected in the 'last-renewal-date' Attribute) to reissue
the Voucher again when needed. Importantly, while issuing the
initial Voucher may incur heavyweight verification checks ("Are you
who you say you are?" "Does the Pledge actually belong to you?"),
renewal does not repeat all those checks: rather, the checks upon
renewal are to confirm that the relationship established earlier
still holds. The MASA always verifies the RVR, to ensure that the
requesting Registrar still has access to the Domain's private key; it
checks the revocation status of the Domain identity certificate (see
Section 11.4); and it applies any policy that has changed since the
previous Voucher issuance, such as a Domain owner's request to block
further renewals or the expiry of a support contract. Renewal has
therefore lower overhead than the initial issuance and can be fully
automated in most cases.
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The renewal request is created by the Registrar, using a freshly
signed Registrar Voucher Request (RVR), including the old Voucher in
the prior-signed-voucher-request Attribute. The Registrar signs the
new request.
With this approach, there is only the one Artifact, and only one code
path is needed to process it; there is no possibility of a Pledge
choosing to skip the revocation status check because, for instance,
the OCSP Responder ([RFC5280] [RFC6960]) is not reachable.
The exact definition of "short-lived" is up to the different
Onboarding mechanisms.
So, while this document recommends issuing short-lived Vouchers, the
Voucher Artifact does not restrict the ability to create long-lived
Vouchers, if required; however, no revocation method is described.
Note that a Voucher may be signed by a chain of intermediate CAs
leading up to the trust anchor CA known by the Pledge. Even though
the Voucher itself is not revocable, it is still revoked, per se, if
one of the intermediate CA certificates is revoked.
10.2. Change of a Pinned Trust Anchor
A Voucher pins a specific Domain trust anchor, such as a Domain CA or
a specific Registrar, identified by a specific public key. If that
trust anchor changes after the Voucher was issued but before the
Pledge has used it, for example because the Domain CA is rekeyed, the
Voucher can no longer be used to onboard the Pledge into the Domain.
In that case, the remedy is for the Registrar to request a new
Voucher from the MASA that pins the new trust anchor.
With short-lived Vouchers this is handled automatically: a Pledge
that fails its Onboarding attempt would retry later, causing a fresh
Voucher to be generated by the MASA pinning the new Domain trust
anchor. With long-lived Vouchers, the Domain owner needs to track
which outstanding Vouchers pin the old trust anchor and needs to
request the manufacturer/MASA to have these Vouchers re-issued.
Change of the pinned trust anchor in a long-lived Voucher is an
exceptional case: normally, a long-lived Voucher pins always a stable
identity in the domain such as a Domain CA, which is not expected to
change during the Voucher's validity period. However, security-
related concerns may sometimes require the rekeying of a Domain CA
earlier than expected. See Section 11.4 for considerations related
to such cases.
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Note that Section 10.1 recommends using short-lived Vouchers whenever
possible.
10.3. Voucher Per Pledge
The solution described herein originally enabled a single Voucher to
apply to many Pledges, using lists of regular expressions to
represent ranges of serial numbers. However, it was determined that
blocking the renewal of a Voucher that applied to many devices would
be excessive when only the ownership for a single Pledge needed to be
blocked. Thus, the Voucher format now only supports a single serial
number to be listed.
10.4. Signed, Not Encrypted
Voucher Artifacts are, by design, signed but not encrypted. The
security of a Voucher Artifact is based on its authenticity and
integrity, not on the secrecy of its contents. The Voucher Data
Attributes are all designed so that they could be exposed in public
while not compromising the security of the Onboarding process.
Leaving a Voucher Artifact unencrypted also allows parties other than
the Pledge or MASA to inspect it. For example, a Registrar can
verify and log a Voucher before forwarding it to the Pledge, and the
network owner can audit what information is being exchanged between
Pledge and manufacturer.
Confidentiality of Voucher Artifacts in transit, where needed, is the
responsibility of the Onboarding protocol. See Section 11.5 for more
detailed information on the transport security used by the different
Onboarding protocols and related privacy considerations for exposed
Voucher Artifacts.
11. Security Considerations
11.1. Clock Accuracy in a Pledge
An attacker could use an expired nonceless Voucher to gain control
over a device (Pledge) that has no understanding of the current time.
While there are ways to secure Network Time Protocol (NTP), they are
not as yet common, and like unsecured NTP they rely on the device
having access to a network. As the purpose of the Voucher is usually
to onboard the device onto a network, the device cannot make use of
NTP as a time reference until it is onboarded. Even after
Onboarding, the device still cannot rely on unauthenticated NTP, as
the attacker could control the NTP stream.
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There are three defenses against this attack: 1) a device with an
accurate clock is required to verify that the 'expires-on'
Attribute's time has not yet passed, 2) a device without an accurate
clock uses a nonce to get a fresh ephemeral Voucher, and 3) a device
is required to verify that the trust anchor indicated in the Voucher
matches the Registrar it is communicating with.
The third prevents Onboarding into a Domain controlled by an attacker
which is different to the Domain indicated in the Voucher. This
limits attacks to Owners who had valid Vouchers in the past. If a
device can be convinced that it is living in some past, then a former
Owner could "repossess" the device using an expired Voucher.
This document defines a Voucher that optionally contains an
expiration time, which requires an accurate clock on the device in
order to be processed correctly.
Manufacturers issuing Vouchers with an expiration time need to ensure
that the devices targeted have an accurate clock when shipped from
manufacturing facilities and need to take measures to prevent clock
tampering. If it is not possible to ensure clock accuracy and
tamper-proofness, then the expiration time values in Vouchers will
provide little protection.
11.2. Nonceless Vouchers
A nonceless Voucher cannot be validated by a Pledge for freshness,
other than by inspecting the 'expires-on' Attribute and comparing its
value against the Pledge's internal clock. See the previous section
for considerations on the accuracy of this clock and the risks of
relying on NTP for acquiring the current time.
A nonceless Voucher can be reused by a Registrar to answer a Pledge's
PVR any number of times within its validity period. This can be a
benefit for a Domain owner if repeated Onboarding into a Domain is
required, but it equally allows an attacker that came into possession
of a nonceless Voucher to attempt a great number of Onboarding
attempts with the indicated Pledge. Still, such repeated attacks are
unlikely to succeed because the Voucher explicitly identifies only
one Domain where the Pledge can be onboarded into - which is not the
attacker's Domain in this scenario.
11.3. Protecting the MASA Signing Key and the MASA CA Key
As the MASA needs to be able to respond to Voucher signing requests,
its private key used for signing Vouchers is online. This key is
associated to its End-Entity certificate, which is a short-lived
certificate, re-generated frequently.
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The private key MUST be stored such that it cannot be exported and
each use of the key is subject to access control. A hardware
security module (HSM) is one way to achieve this.
There are many ways to organize the PKI that is used to sign
Vouchers. [I-D.ietf-anima-masa-considerations], Section 2 describes
a number of different scenarios. In some of them, there are long-
term keys kept offline, implementing a Certification Authority (CA).
This can be as advanced as an FIPS-certified resin-filled HSM, or as
simple as a USB key stored in a locked cabinet.
The trust anchor configured into the Pledge is the long-term offline
anchor.
11.4. Test Domain Certificate Validity When Signing
If a Domain CA certificate is compromised, then any outstanding
Vouchers for that Domain could be used by an attacker. In this case,
the Domain administrator is clearly expected to initiate revocation
of any Domain identity certificates (as is normal in PKIX [RFC5280]
solutions).
Similarly, they are expected to contact the manufacturer to indicate
that ayn outstanding (presumably short lifetime) Vouchers should be
blocked from automated renewal by the MASA. Protocols doing Voucher
distribution are RECOMMENDED to check for revocation of Domain
identity certificates before doing the signing of Vouchers.
After the above mitigation steps have been taken, Onboarding of
Pledges into the Domain can continue after new Vouchers are issued by
the MASA that pin the new Domain trust anchor, as described in
Section 10.2.
11.5. YANG Module Security Considerations
The YANG modules in this document define only groupings and abstract
data structures using the "sx:structure" extension [RFC8791]. These
are not intended to be accessed via YANG-based management protocols
such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Therefore, per
Section 3.7 of [YANG-GUIDE], the YANG security considerations
template does not apply.
Modules that reuse the groupings defined in this document outside of
a signed Voucher or Voucher Request artifact, need to identify the
corresponding security implications.
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The YANG modules specified in this document define the schema for
data that is subsequently encapsulated by secure signed-data
structures, such as the CMS signed-data described in Section 7.1. As
such, all of the YANG-modeled data is protected from modification.
Implementers should be aware that the signed data is only protected
from external modification; the data is still visible. This
potential disclosure of this information doesn't affect security so
much as privacy.
When used with [BRSKI] or [cBRSKI], all Voucher Artifacts are
conveyed using TLS [RFC9846], so there is no exposure of information
apart from the endpoints of the TLS sessions.
When used with [PRM], information can be exposed in the last hop
between Registrar-Agent and Pledge, where unsecured HTTP can be used.
When a Voucher is in CMS format, it can disclose information via the
signer's certificate chain about which organization a device belongs
to and which CRL Distribution Point and/or OCSP Responder URLs
[RFC6960] are accessed to check the revocation status of
certificates. Note that [PRM] specifies the use of [JWS] format
artifacts rather than CMS, so there are no CRLs to disclose in that
case.
[SZTP] uses a wide variety of transports, some of which offer
physical privacy for data, and others which do not. To mitigate
this, [SZTP], Section 3.4 specifies a way to encrypt using CMS.
12. IANA Considerations
12.1. The IETF XML Registry
This document updates two URIs in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher and
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher-request:
IANA is requested to update this registration to point to THIS-
DOCUMENT.
12.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
IANA is requested to update the ietf-voucher and ietf-voucher-request
registrations in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC6020] [RFC9890]
within the "YANG Parameters" registry group to point to this
document. For the ietf-voucher-request entry, the prefix should be
updated to "vcr".
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12.3. The Media Types Registry
IANA is requested to update the registration of media type:
application/voucher-cms+json to change the Published Specification to
THIS-DOCUMENT.
12.4. The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry
IANA is requested to update the registration for the OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.40, 'id-ct-animaJSONVoucher'. This
registration should be updated to point to this document.
12.5. The Voucher Extensions Registry
IANA is asked to create a registry of Voucher extensions within the
_Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) Parameters_
as follows.
The name is: Voucher Extensions, and the Registration Policy is
Expert Review.
Extension name: UTF-8-encoded string, at most 40 characters.
Extension SID: the YANG module SID value that defines the
extension per Section 8.6.
Reference: an optional document reference (URL, or other pointer)
Note that the Extension SID value is allocated as part of a [CORESID]
process. This may be from a SID range managed by IANA, or from any
other MegaRange. [RFC9997] allows for PEN-based allocations. IANA
does not need to separately allocate a SID value for this column.
Extension name strings for documents in the IETF Document Stream and
IRTF Document Stream are given by the YANG module name: they do not
contain dots.
For vendor proprietary extensions (including Independent Submission
Stream documents), the resulting string still needs to be unique.
This can be done by making the YANG module name unique, basing it on
a fully-qualified domain name (FQDN) [RFC9499]. For example, using a
string "fuubar.example.com-mud-thing" rather than "fuubar-mud-thing"
if the vendor owns the FQDN "fuubar.example.com".
Vendor proprietary extensions do not need to be registered with IANA,
but vendors are encouraged to do so. Note that a 'vendor' may also
be a standards development organization that develops extensions.
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Designated Experts should review the referenced document for clarity
of purpose and to facilitate the checks below. For IETF/IRTF
Document Stream registrations, an expert does not review or change
the registered values themselves, as these are tied to IETF
processes:
* There are no choices in the Extension name: it is always the YANG
module name.
* There is no choice in the Extension SID value: it follows from
another IANA process (as explained above).
For documents outside the IETF/IRTF Document Streams, the Designated
Expert should pay special attention to the stability of the
reference, which may be a concern. For example, a URL pointing to
the website of a standards development organization may change from
time to time. Also, a Designated Expert could suggest a shorter FQDN
in case the Extension name string exceeds the character limit.
The Designated Expert should determine if the work overlaps with an
existing IETF WG effort, suggesting to the registrant how the work
could become part of an (IETF) standard. However, as extension
registration is optional, the Designated Expert should not block any
vendor registrations if no consolidated extension is pursued by the
registrant.
12.6. The IETF YANG-SID Ranges Registry
IANA is requested to register the following entries in the IETF YANG-
SID Ranges registry:
+=============+======+======================+=================+
| Entry Point | Size | Module Name | Reference |
+=============+======+======================+=================+
| 2450 | 50 | ietf-voucher | [This-Document] |
+-------------+------+----------------------+-----------------+
| 2500 | 50 | ietf-voucher-request | [This-Document] |
+-------------+------+----------------------+-----------------+
Table 3: Registered SID ranges
12.7. The IETF YANG-SID Modules Registry
IANA is requested to register the following YANG module in the IETF
YANG-SID Modules registry, per Section 6.5.1 of [CORESID]:
* YANG module name: ietf-voucher
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* URI for the ".yang" file: a pointer to the file defined in
Section 8.4
* URI for the ".sid" file: a pointer to the file defined in
Appendix B.1
* Number of SIDs: 17
and also the following YANG module:
* YANG module name: ietf-voucher-request
* URI for the ".yang" file: a pointer to the file defined in
Section 9.3
* URI for the ".sid" file: a pointer to the file defined in
Appendix B.2
* Number of SIDs: 24
13. YANG references
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
RFC-editor, please remove this section. This section just lists
references present in YANG modules which otherwise do not get
included in the references, like [RFC7250].
Also [RFC9911], Common YANG Data Types.
Also [RFC4086], Randomness Requirements for Security. (Normative
reference)
14. References
14.1. Normative References
[BRSKI] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.
[CBOR] Internet Standard 94,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std94>.
At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
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Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[cBRSKI] Richardson, M., Van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., and E.
Dijk, "Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (cBRSKI)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-31, 8 June
2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
anima-constrained-voucher-31>.
[CLOUD] Friel, O., Shekh-Yusef, R., and M. Richardson,
"Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)
Cloud Registrar", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-anima-brski-cloud-19, 9 September 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-
brski-cloud-19>.
[CORESID] Veillette, M., Ed., Pelov, A., Ed., Petrov, I., Ed.,
Bormann, C., and M. Richardson, "YANG Schema Item
iDentifier (YANG SID)", RFC 9595, DOI 10.17487/RFC9595,
July 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9595>.
[DEVID] IEEE, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identity", 2018,
<https://1.ieee802.org/security/802-1ar/>.
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile]
Tschofenig, H., Fossati, T., Richardson, M., and D.
Migault, "TLS/DTLS 1.3 Profiles for the Internet of
Things", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-uta-
tls13-iot-profile-25, 3 September 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-uta-
tls13-iot-profile-25>.
[ITU-T.X680]
International Telecommunication Union, "Information
Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1):
Specification of basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation
X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1, February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680/>.
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[ITU-T.X690]
International Telecommunication Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1, February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/>.
[jBRSKI] Werner, T. and M. Richardson, "JWS signed Voucher
Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-jws-voucher-16, 15
January 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-anima-jws-voucher-16>.
[PRM] Fries, S., Werner, T., Lear, E., and M. Richardson, "BRSKI
with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm-23, 3
June 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-anima-brski-prm-23>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4086>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6020>.
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[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7250>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7950>.
[RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7951>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[RFC8791] Bierman, A., Björklund, M., and K. Watsen, "YANG Data
Structure Extensions", RFC 8791, DOI 10.17487/RFC8791,
June 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8791>.
[RFC8994] Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An
Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", RFC 8994,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8994, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8994>.
[RFC9254] Veillette, M., Ed., Petrov, I., Ed., Pelov, A., Bormann,
C., and M. Richardson, "Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG
in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)",
RFC 9254, DOI 10.17487/RFC9254, July 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9254>.
[RFC9890] Bierman, A., Boucadair, M., Ed., and Q. Wu, "An Update to
YANG Module Names Registration", RFC 9890,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9890, October 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9890>.
[RFC9911] Schönwälder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 9911,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9911, December 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9911>.
14.2. Informative References
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[COSE] Internet Standard 96,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std96>.
At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Countersignatures", STD 96, RFC 9338,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9338, December 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9338>.
[eid7263] "Errata 7263, RFC8995", n.d.,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7263>.
[fairhair] Open Connectivity Foundation, "Fairhair Specification", 1
November 2019,
<https://openconnectivity.org/developer/specifications/
fairhair/>.
[I-D.ietf-anima-masa-considerations]
Richardson, M. and T. Werner, "Operational Considerations
for Voucher infrastructure for BRSKI MASA", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-masa-
considerations-03, 9 August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-
masa-considerations-03>.
[I-D.ietf-lake-authz]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., Vučinić, M., Fedrecheski,
G., and M. Richardson, "Lightweight Authorization using
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (ELA)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-authz-08, 6 July
2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
lake-authz-08>.
[I-D.richardson-anima-quantum-safe-4ani]
Richardson, M., "Quantum Safe (PQ) Considerations for
Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-anima-quantum-safe-4ani-
00, 12 August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-richardson-
anima-quantum-safe-4ani-00>.
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[I-D.vangeest-lamps-cms-euf-cma-signeddata]
Van Geest, D. and F. Strenzke, "Best Practices for CMS
SignedData with Regards to Signed Attributes", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-vangeest-lamps-cms-euf-
cma-signeddata-02, 20 October 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vangeest-
lamps-cms-euf-cma-signeddata-02>.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3688>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.
[RFC6024] Reddy, R. and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Management
Requirements", RFC 6024, DOI 10.17487/RFC6024, October
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6024>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6125>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6241>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960>.
[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7435>.
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[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8040>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8340>.
[RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
"A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8366>.
[RFC8410] Josefsson, S. and J. Schaad, "Algorithm Identifiers for
Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", RFC 8410,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8410, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8410>.
[RFC8520] Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification", RFC 8520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8520>.
[RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
"Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8792>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9200] Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments Using the OAuth 2.0 Framework
(ACE-OAuth)", RFC 9200, DOI 10.17487/RFC9200, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9200>.
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[RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS)
Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.
[RFC9499] Hoffman, P. and K. Fujiwara, "DNS Terminology", BCP 219,
RFC 9499, DOI 10.17487/RFC9499, March 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9499>.
[RFC9525] Saint-Andre, P. and R. Salz, "Service Identity in TLS",
RFC 9525, DOI 10.17487/RFC9525, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9525>.
[RFC9846] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846>.
[RFC9881] Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B. E.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure --
Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital
Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)", RFC 9881,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9881, October 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9881>.
[RFC9910] Harrison, T. and J. Singh, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Regional Internet Registry (RIR) Search",
RFC 9910, DOI 10.17487/RFC9910, January 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9910>.
[RFC9958] Banerjee, A., Reddy.K, T., Schoinianakis, D., Hollebeek,
T., and M. Ounsworth, "Post-Quantum Cryptography for
Engineers", RFC 9958, DOI 10.17487/RFC9958, June 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9958>.
[RFC9997] Bormann, C., "YANG-CBOR: Allocating SID Ranges for Private
Enterprise Number (PEN) Holders", RFC 9997,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9997, July 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9997>.
[Stajano99theresurrecting]
Stajano, F. and R. Anderson, "The Resurrecting Duckling:
Security Issues for Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks", 1999,
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/dtg/www/files/publications/
public/files/tr.1999.2.pdf>.
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[SZTP] Watsen, K., Farrer, I., and M. Abrahamsson, "Secure Zero
Touch Provisioning (SZTP)", RFC 8572,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8572, April 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8572>.
[YANG-GUIDE]
Bierman, A., Boucadair, M., Ed., and Q. Wu, "Guidelines
for Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG
Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 9907, DOI 10.17487/RFC9907,
March 2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9907>.
Appendix A. Examples
A.1. Key pairs associated with examples
The following Voucher Request has been produced using the IDevID
[DEVID] public (certificate) and private key. They are included so
that other developers can match the same output.
The private RSA key:
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIBHNh6r8QRevRuo+tEmBJeFjQKf6bpFA/9NGoltv+9sNoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAEA6N1Q4ezfMAKmoecrfb0OBMc1AyEH+BATkF58FsTSyBxs0SbSWLx
FjDOuwB9gLGn2TsTUJumJ6VPw5Z/TP4hJw==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
The IDevID certificate (public key):
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The Certification Authority that created the IDevID:
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=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 1016146354 (0x3c9129b2)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN = highway-test.example.com CA
Validity
Not Before: Apr 5 19:36:57 2021 GMT
Not After : May 6 05:36:57 2021 GMT
Subject: CN = highway-test.example.com CA
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (3072 bit)
Modulus:
00:b4:7b:27:42:49:9f:ed:85:47:74:ff:f6:50:cd:
5d:22:1a:64:38:22:f8:09:d2:d6:f3:60:d8:98:7f:
e5:84:52:1e:d9:ce:96:b4:dc:a6:43:74:67:27:d9:
9d:42:7d:bf:1a:43:92:9b:d1:dd:34:9b:41:d2:e3:
d5:59:b3:40:fc:b3:c9:e1:58:84:3f:87:f7:06:45:
25:26:4c:bf:a1:45:72:a0:0a:5b:86:41:d7:8e:be:
d3:38:b5:aa:66:69:bd:3a:fd:e9:b5:b8:a2:79:c4:
f0:a5:3c:9e:91:94:32:1e:9c:b0:7f:25:46:5b:76:
1d:86:23:85:b0:62:45:5c:a8:6f:fb:c5:26:e1:dd:
a8:f2:68:ab:c5:8c:b4:58:b4:2e:96:49:fa:fe:d2:
ea:a5:11:68:c2:8d:f4:58:ab:30:bd:dd:1b:29:97:
00:18:6f:59:40:9c:3a:2a:e4:96:25:bb:12:f4:1a:
11:72:6d:31:f6:b4:e1:cc:d8:9a:0c:aa:a8:aa:a4:
64:e3:f1:06:1c:c0:09:df:62:ba:04:cb:70:b0:c4:
f7:ca:35:22:ea:a9:c7:52:e1:ce:27:fb:6c:52:39:
b7:22:b3:5d:97:cb:0a:9f:75:a3:af:16:ef:e6:b2:
1b:6a:c3:0b:1d:15:fd:b8:d8:e7:8a:f6:f4:99:1c:
23:97:4b:80:e9:79:a3:85:16:f8:dd:bd:77:ef:3a:
3c:8e:e7:75:56:67:36:3a:dd:42:7b:84:2f:64:2f:
13:0e:fa:b0:3b:11:13:7e:ae:78:a6:2f:46:dd:4b:
11:88:e4:7b:19:ab:21:2d:1f:34:ba:61:cd:51:84:
a5:ec:6a:c1:90:20:70:e3:aa:f4:01:fd:0c:6e:cd:
04:47:99:31:70:79:6c:af:41:78:c1:04:2a:43:78:
84:8a:fe:c3:3d:f2:41:c8:2a:a1:10:e0:b7:b4:4f:
4e:e6:26:79:ac:49:64:cf:57:1e:2e:e3:2f:58:bd:
6f:30:00:67:d7:8b:d6:13:60:bf
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
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X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
33:12:45:B7:1B:10:BE:F3:CB:64:E5:4C:50:80:7C:9D:88:\
65:74:40
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
33:12:45:B7:1B:10:BE:F3:CB:64:E5:4C:50:80:7C:9D:88:\
65:74:40
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Value:
05:37:28:85:37:39:71:87:ec:5c:f0:51:19:55:4a:b7:e0:2a:
e6:61:30:d4:e2:2b:ad:7a:db:12:fc:8a:a6:6e:15:82:80:10:
fa:5d:67:60:e8:54:14:e3:89:d6:4e:60:89:98:5b:ab:fe:32:
26:aa:02:35:68:4e:c6:2e:ce:08:36:d1:ea:a0:97:3d:76:38:
6e:9d:4b:6f:33:d2:fa:c2:7e:b0:59:bc:75:97:17:d1:1b:c5:
c4:58:ae:7b:7e:87:e5:87:2b:8b:6b:10:16:70:7c:c8:65:c7:
d0:62:5d:f3:b5:06:af:03:8b:32:dd:88:f0:07:2b:5d:61:58:
61:35:54:a6:ce:95:81:a2:6e:fa:b5:aa:25:e1:41:53:9d:e7:
4b:7e:93:88:79:6b:dd:a3:6e:9a:0d:bd:85:b4:2d:66:b9:cc:
01:13:f1:b5:d5:91:cc:86:5e:a7:c8:4a:8f:4d:9d:f8:17:31:
32:7d:50:d5:c2:79:a0:41:a0:69:83:33:16:14:35:26:10:3b:
23:eb:60:d9:28:68:99:d5:55:61:89:b5:35:5d:8b:fe:b1:96:
32:69:3e:8b:c2:a2:4e:e1:d8:76:04:3c:87:91:5d:66:9e:81:
a5:bf:18:2e:3e:39:da:4f:68:57:46:d2:1d:aa:81:51:3b:33:
72:da:e9:7d:12:b6:a1:fc:c7:1d:c1:9c:bd:92:e8:1b:d2:06:
e8:0b:82:2a:4f:23:5a:7a:fa:7b:86:a0:d7:c1:46:e7:04:47:
77:11:cd:da:7c:50:32:d2:6f:fd:1e:0a:df:cf:b1:20:d2:86:
ce:40:5a:27:61:49:2f:71:f5:04:ac:eb:c6:03:70:a4:70:13:
4a:af:41:35:83:dc:55:c0:29:7f:12:4f:d0:f1:bb:f7:61:4a:
9f:8d:61:b0:5e:89:46:49:e3:27:8b:42:82:5e:af:14:d5:d9:
91:69:3d:af:11:70:5b:a3:92:3b:e3:c8:2a:a4:38:e5:88:f2:
6f:09:f4:e5:04:3b
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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, et al. Expires 8 April 2027 [Page 63]
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NVSmzpWBom76taol4UFTnedLfpOIeWvdo26aDb2FtC1mucwBE/G11ZHMhl6nyEqP
TZ34FzEyfVDVwnmgQaBpgzMWFDUmEDsj62DZKGiZ1VVhibU1XYv+sZYyaT6LwqJO
4dh2BDyHkV1mnoGlvxguPjnaT2hXRtIdqoFROzNy2ul9Erah/McdwZy9kugb0gbo
C4IqTyNaevp7hqDXwUbnBEd3Ec3afFAy0m/9Hgrfz7Eg0obOQFonYUkvcfUErOvG
A3CkcBNKr0E1g9xVwCl/Ek/Q8bv3YUqfjWGwXolGSeMni0KCXq8U1dmRaT2vEXBb
o5I748gqpDjliPJvCfTlBDs=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The private key for the Certification Authority that created the
IDevID:
Watsen, et al. Expires 8 April 2027 [Page 64]
Internet-Draft Voucher Artifact October 2026
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
The MASA certificate that signs the Voucher:
Watsen, et al. Expires 8 April 2027 [Page 65]
Internet-Draft Voucher Artifact October 2026
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBcDCB9qADAgECAgQLhwoxMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMCYxJDAiBgNVBAMMG2hpZ2h3
YXktdGVzdC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSBDQTAeFw0yMTA0MTMyMTQwMTZaFw0yMzA0MTMy
MTQwMTZaMCgxJjAkBgNVBAMMHWhpZ2h3YXktdGVzdC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSBNQVNB
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEqgQVo0S54kT4yfkbBxumdHOcHrps
qbOpMKmiMln3oB1HAW25MJV+gqi4tMFfSJ0iEwt8kszfWXK4rLgJS2mnpaMQMA4w
DAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNpADBmAjEArsthLdRcjW6GqgsGHcbT
YLoyczYl0yOFSYcczpQjeRqeQVUkHRUioUi7CsCrPBNzAjEAhjxns5Wi4uX5rfkd
nME0Mnj1z+rVRwOfAL/QWctRwpgEgSSKURNQsXWyL52otPS5
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The private key for the MASA certificate that signs the Voucher:
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIFhdd0eDdzip67kXx72K+KHGJQYJHNy8pkiLJ6CcvxMGoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAEqgQVo0S54kT4yfkbBxumdHOcHrpsqbOpMKmiMln3oB1HAW25MJV+
gqi4tMFfSJ0iEwt8kszfWXK4rLgJS2mnpQ==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2. Example CMS-signed Voucher Request
Watsen, et al. Expires 8 April 2027 [Page 66]
Internet-Draft Voucher Artifact October 2026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A.3. Example CMS-signed Voucher from MASA
Watsen, et al. Expires 8 April 2027 [Page 67]
Internet-Draft Voucher Artifact October 2026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A.4. Example JWS-signed Voucher from MASA
These examples are folded according to the [RFC8792] Single Backslash
rule.
Watsen, et al. Expires 8 April 2027 [Page 68]
Internet-Draft Voucher Artifact October 2026
{
"payload": "eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXI6dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24iOiJwcm\
94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoiY2FmZmUtOTg3NDUiLCJub25jZSI6IjYyYT\
JlNzY5M2Q4MmZjZGEyNjI0ZGU1OGZiNjcyMmU1IiwiY3JlYXRlZC1vbiI6IjIwMjUtMT\
AtMTVUMDA6MDA6MDBaIiwicGlubmVkLWRvbWFpbi1jZXJ0IjoiTUlJQmd6Q0NBU3FnQX\
dJQkFnSUdBV09XZTBSRk1Bb0dDQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRFV4RXpBUkJnTlZCQW9NQ2sxNV\
FuVnphVzVsYzNNeERUQUxCZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBkR1V4RHpBTkJnTlZCQU1NQmxSbGMzUk\
RRVEFlRncweE9EQTFNalV3T0RRM016QmFGdzB5T0RBMU1qVXdPRFEzTXpCYU1EVXhFek\
FSQmdOVkJBb01DazE1UW5WemFXNWxjM014RFRBTEJnTlZCQWNNQkZOcGRHVXhEekFOQm\
dOVkJBTU1CbFJsYzNSRFFUQlpNQk1HQnlxR1NNNDlBZ0VHQ0NxR1NNNDlBd0VIQTBJQU\
JIOUVCdXVXVjdJS09ya040YjdsYTVJb2J5dFduV1p3Rm5QdHVsMDlhd3dVSEZQZStOWW\
M1WjVwdUo2ZEFuK0FrVzFnY1poQlhWR0JBM0crSXlSV1VXU2pKakFrTUJJR0ExVWRFd0\
VCL3dRSU1BWUJBZjhDQVFBd0RnWURWUjBQQVFIL0JBUURBZ0lFTUFvR0NDcUdTTTQ5Qk\
FNQ0EwY0FNRVFDSURlWlc2SWZjeUsvLzBBVFk2S21NYjRNMFFJU1FTZFVGVjdQNzlLWV\
ZJWVVBaUJRMVYrd0xSM1Uzd2NJWnhHSE1ISGx0N2M3ZzFDaFdNRVkveEFoU1NZaWlnPT\
0ifX0",
"signatures": [
{
"protected": "eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQmNEQ0I5cUFEQWdFQ0FnUUxod294TUFv\
R0NDcUdTTTQ5QkFNQ01DWXhKREFpQmdOVkJBTU1HMmhwWjJoM1lYa3RkR1Z6ZEM1bGVH\
RnRjR3hsTG1OdmJTQkRRVEFlRncweU1UQTBNVE15TVRRd01UWmFGdzB5TXpBME1UTXlN\
VFF3TVRaYU1DZ3hKakFrQmdOVkJBTU1IV2hwWjJoM1lYa3RkR1Z6ZEM1bGVHRnRjR3hs\
TG1OdmJTQk5RVk5CTUZrd0V3WUhLb1pJemowQ0FRWUlLb1pJemowREFRY0RRZ0FFcWdR\
Vm8wUzU0a1Q0eWZrYkJ4dW1kSE9jSHJwc3FiT3BNS21pTWxuM29CMUhBVzI1TUpWK2dx\
aTR0TUZmU0owaUV3dDhrc3pmV1hLNHJMZ0pTMm1ucGFNUU1BNHdEQVlEVlIwVEFRSC9C\
QUl3QURBS0JnZ3Foa2pPUFFRREFnTnBBREJtQWpFQXJzdGhMZFJjalc2R3Fnc0dIY2JU\
WUxveWN6WWwweU9GU1ljY3pwUWplUnFlUVZVa0hSVWlvVWk3Q3NDclBCTnpBakVBaGp4\
bnM1V2k0dVg1cmZrZG5NRTBNbmoxeityVlJ3T2ZBTC9RV2N0UndwZ0VnU1NLVVJOUXNY\
V3lMNTJvdFBTNSJdLCJ0eXAiOiJ2b3VjaGVyLWp3cytqc29uIiwiYWxnIjoiRVMyNTYi\
fQ",
"signature": "s_gJM_4qzz1bxDtqh6Ybip42J_0_Y4CMdrMFb8lpPsAhDHVR\
AESNRL3n6M_F8dGQHm1fu66x83cK9E5cPtEdag"
}
]
}
Figure 1: Example JWS Voucher
Appendix B. SID Allocations
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
It is temporarily included for review purposes, following the
guidelines in Section 6.4.3 of [CORESID].
B.1. SID Allocations for Voucher
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<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-voucher@2025-12-18.sid"
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
"ietf-sid-file:sid-file": {
"module-name": "ietf-voucher",
"module-revision": "2025-12-18",
"sid-file-version": 5,
"sid-file-status": "unpublished",
"dependency-revision": [
{
"module-name": "ietf-yang-types",
"module-revision": "2013-07-15"
},
{
"module-name": "ietf-inet-types",
"module-revision": "2013-07-15"
},
{
"module-name": "ietf-yang-structure-ext",
"module-revision": "2020-06-17"
}
],
"assignment-range": [
{
"entry-point": "2450",
"size": "50"
}
],
"item": [
{
"namespace": "module",
"identifier": "ietf-voucher",
"sid": "2450"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher",
"sid": "2451"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/assertion",
"sid": "2452"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/created-on",
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"sid": "2453"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/domain-cert-revocation-\
checks",
"sid": "2454"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/expires-on",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2455"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/idevid-issuer",
"sid": "2456"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/last-renewal-date",
"sid": "2457"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/nonce",
"sid": "2458"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/pinned-domain-cert",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2459"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/pinned-domain-pubk",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2460"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/pinned-domain-pubk-\
sha256",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2461"
},
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{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/serial-number",
"sid": "2462"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/additional-\
configuration-url",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2463"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/est-domain",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2464"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/manufacturer-\
proprietary",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2465"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher:voucher/extensions",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2466"
}
]
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
B.2. SID Allocations for Voucher Request
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-voucher-request@2025-12-18.sid"
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
"ietf-sid-file:sid-file": {
"module-name": "ietf-voucher-request",
"module-revision": "2025-12-18",
"sid-file-version": 12,
"sid-file-status": "unpublished",
"dependency-revision": [
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{
"module-name": "ietf-yang-structure-ext",
"module-revision": "2020-06-17"
},
{
"module-name": "ietf-voucher",
"module-revision": "2025-12-18"
},
{
"module-name": "ietf-yang-structure-ext",
"module-revision": "2020-06-17"
},
{
"module-name": "ietf-voucher",
"module-revision": "2025-12-18"
}
],
"assignment-range": [
{
"entry-point": "2500",
"size": "50"
}
],
"item": [
{
"namespace": "module",
"identifier": "ietf-voucher-request",
"sid": "2500"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher",
"sid": "2501",
"status": "unstable"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/assertion",
"sid": "2502"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/created-on",
"sid": "2503"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/domain-cert-\
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revocation-checks",
"sid": "2504"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/expires-on",
"sid": "2505"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/idevid-issuer",
"sid": "2506"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/last-renewal-\
date",
"sid": "2507"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/nonce",
"sid": "2508"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/pinned-domain-\
cert",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2509"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/prior-signed-\
voucher-request",
"sid": "2510"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/proximity-\
registrar-cert",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2511"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/proximity-\
registrar-pubk-sha256",
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"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2512"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/proximity-\
registrar-pubk",
"sid": "2513"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/serial-number",
"sid": "2514"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/agent-provided-\
proximity-registrar-cert",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2515"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/agent-sign-cert\
",
"sid": "2516"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/agent-signed-\
data",
"sid": "2517"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/pinned-domain-\
pubk",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2518"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/pinned-domain-\
pubk-sha256",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2519"
},
{
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"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/additional-\
configuration-url",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2520"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/est-domain",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2521"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/extensions",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2522"
},
{
"namespace": "data",
"identifier": "/ietf-voucher-request:voucher/manufacturer-\
proprietary",
"status": "unstable",
"sid": "2523"
}
]
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following people for lively
discussions on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): William
Atwood, Michael H. Behringer, Steffen Fries, Sheng Jiang, Thomas
Werner.
This document received directorate reviews from Tim Wicinski, Thomas
Fossati, and Michal Vaško. It was shepherded by Sheng Jiang.
Max Pritikin and Kent Watsen were instrumental in creating the
original [RFC8366].
Authors' Addresses
Kent Watsen
Watsen Networks
Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net
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Michael C. Richardson (editor)
Sandelman Software
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0773-8388
URI: https://www.sandelman.ca/
Esko Dijk
IoTconsultancy.nl
Email: esko.dijk@iotconsultancy.nl
Toerless Eckert
Futurewei Technologies Inc.
2330 Central Expy
Santa Clara, 95050
United States of America
Email: tte@cs.fau.de
Qiufang Ma
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Nanjing
210012
China
Email: maqiufang1@huawei.com
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