Encrypted Key Transport for Secure RTP
draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-00
| The information below is for an old version of the document | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (avtcore WG) | |
| Last updated | 2013-01-10 (latest revision 2012-07-09) | ||
| Replaces | draft-ietf-avt-srtp-ekt | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
pdf
htmlized
bibtex
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| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | Magnus Westerlund | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-00.txt
Abstract
Encrypted Key Transport (EKT) is an extension to Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) that provides for the secure transport of SRTP master keys, Rollover Counters, and other information, within SRTP or SRTCP. This facility enables SRTP to work for decentralized conferences with minimal control. This note defines EKT, and also describes how to use it with SDP Security Descriptions, DTLS-SRTP, and MIKEY. These other key management protocols provide an EKT key to everyone in a session, and EKT coordinates the keys within the session.
Authors
David McGrew
(mcgrew@cisco.com)
Dan Wing
(dwing@cisco.com)
Kai Fischer
(kai.fischer@siemens-enterprise.com)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)