The DELEGATION_ONLY DNSKEY flag
draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-only-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dnsop WG)
Last updated 2020-07-13
Replaces draft-pwouters-powerbind
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DNSOP                                                         P. Wouters
Internet-Draft                                                   Red Hat
Updates: 4035 (if approved)                                  W. Hardaker
Intended status: Informational                                   USC/ISI
Expires: January 14, 2021                                  July 13, 2020

                    The DELEGATION_ONLY DNSKEY flag
                  draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-only-01

Abstract

   This document introduces a new DNSKEY flag called DELEGATION_ONLY
   that indicates that this zone will only produce delegation responses
   for data outside of its own apex (or _underscore labels).  That is,
   the Answer Section for queries that do not involve the apex (or
   _underscore labels) of the zone is empty, and only glue records in
   the Authority Section and Additional Section will be acceptable data
   in the response message.  Additionally, it indicates that it is not
   expected that the parent of this delegation-only zone bypasses or
   removes the delegation to this zone.  DNSSEC Validating Resolvers can
   use this flag to mark any data that violates the DELEGATION_ONLY
   policy as Bogus.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Wouters & Hardaker      Expires January 14, 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Delegation Only DNSKEYs               July 2020

   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Deep Signing problem  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Affected parties and their roles  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  The DELEGATION_ONLY DNSKEY flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  _underscore label exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Parental Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Marking zone keys DELEGATION_ONLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.1.  Marking the Root DNSKEY DELEGATION_ONLY . . . . . . . . .   7
     7.2.  Migrating to and from DELEGATION_ONLY . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   11. Human Rights Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   13. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   The DNS Security Extensions [DNSSEC] use public key cryptography to
   create an hierarchical trust base with the DNSSEC root public keys at
   the top, followed by Top Level domain (TLD) keys one level
   underneath.  While the root and most TLD zones are assumed to be
   exclusively delegation-only zones, there is currently no
   interoperable and automatable mechanism for auditing these zones to
   ensure they behave as a delegation-only zone.  This creates a target
   for malicious use of these zones - either by their owners or through
   coercion.

   This document defines a mechanism for delegation-only zone owners to
   create a DNSKEY that indicates it will only delegate the remainder of
   the DNS tree to lower-level zones.  This allows for easier delegation
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