The Delegation_Only DNSKEY flag
draft-pwouters-powerbind-01

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Last updated 2018-06-29
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DNSOP                                                    P. Wouters, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                   Red Hat
Updates: 4035 (if approved)                                       L. Xia
Intended status: Informational                                    Huawei
Expires: December 31, 2018                                   W. Hardaker
                                                                 USC/ISI
                                                           June 29, 2018

                    The Delegation_Only DNSKEY flag
                      draft-pwouters-powerbind-01

Abstract

   This document introduces a new DNSKEY flag called DELEGATION_ONLY
   that indicates that the particular zone will never sign zone data
   across a label.  That is, every label (dot) underneath is considered
   a zone cut and must have its own (signed) delegation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Wouters, et al.         Expires December 31, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Delegation Only DNSKEYs               June 2018

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Deep Link State problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Limiting the scope of a DNSKEY RRset to just delegations  . .   3
   5.  Parental Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Marking the root key DELEGATION_ONLY  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Marking TLD keys DELEGATION_ONLY  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   8.  Migrating to and from DELEGATION_ONLY . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   9.  Similarities to the Public Suffix List  . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   10. Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   13. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   The DNS Security Extensions [DNSSEC] use public key cryptography to
   create an hierarchical trust base with the DNSSEC root public keys at
   the top, followed by Top Level domain (TLD) keys one level
   underneath.  While the root and TLD zones are asumed to be almost
   exclusively delegation-only zones, there is currently no method to
   audit these zones to ensure they behave as a delegation-only zone.
   This creates an attractive target for malicious use of these zones -
   either by their owners or through coercion.  For example, the DNSSEC
   root key could simply sign an A record and TLSA record for
   "www.example.com", overriding the authority of "com" and
   "example.com".  If such a change is done in a targetted attack, the
   attack would be near impossible to detect without prior knowledge of
   what zone contents are legitimate within a given zone.  This document
   defines a mechanism for zone owners, at DNSKEY creation time, to
   indicate they will only delegate the remainder of the tree to lower-
   level zones, allowing easier logging and auditing of DNS responses
   they serve.

   This document introduces a new DNSKEY flag allowing zone owners to
   commit that the zone will never sign any DNS data that traverses a
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