Perfect-Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' PFS)

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (emu WG)
Last updated 2020-05-20 (latest revision 2019-11-17)
Replaces draft-arkko-eap-aka-pfs
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Expired & archived
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Stream WG state WG Document
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IESG IESG state Expired
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at


Many different attacks have been reported as part of revelations associated with pervasive surveillance. Some of the reported attacks involved compromising smart cards, such as attacking SIM card manufacturers and operators in an effort to compromise shared secrets stored on these cards. Since the publication of those reports, manufacturing and provisioning processes have gained much scrutiny and have improved. However, the danger of resourceful attackers for these systems is still a concern. This specification is an optional extension to the EAP-AKA' authentication method which was defined in [I-D.ietf-emu-rfc5448bis]. The extension, when negotiated, provides Perfect Forward Secrecy for the session key generated as a part of the authentication run in EAP- AKA'. This prevents an attacker who has gained access to the long- term pre-shared secret in a SIM card from being able to decrypt any past communications. In addition, if the attacker stays merely a passive eavesdropper, the extension prevents attacks against future sessions. This forces attackers to use active attacks instead.


Jari Arkko (
Karl Norrman (
Vesa Torvinen (

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)