Bootstrapped TLS Authentication with Proof of Knowledge (TLS-POK)
draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls-11

[Ballot comment]
Thanks for addressing my previous DISCUSS and (most) COMMENTs. Restating the ones that don't appear to have changed, but these are non-blocking.

Given that knowledge of the "public" key is being used as an identity proof on the network's part, it's inherently not public. Consider rephrasing throughout to use the term "asymmetric" since both keys are semi-secret, and using names other than public and private? Referring to a key pair as a "key" (in BSK) is also somewhat confusing -- consider perhaps "Bootstrap Keypair" and the same abbreviation?

===NITS FOLLOW===
2: "to identity" => "to identify"

[Ballot discuss]
Hi Owen and Dan,

Thank you for the effort put into this specification.

I have a concern with this text:

CURRENT:
  Thus, the intention is that DPP is the
  RECOMMENDED mechanism for bootstrapping against Wi-Fi networks, and
  TLS-POK is the RECOMMENDED mechanism for bootstrapping against wired
  networks.

I guess these recommendations target network operators. It is not clear to me why are we making a recommendation about DPP. Also, not sure this document is the place to self-promote the proposed TLS-POK.

Rather than trying to formulate any recommendations, I think that it is more appropriate to simply set the applicability scope of the proposal.

Cheers,
Med

[Ballot discuss]
Hi Owen and Dan,

Thank you for the effort put into this specification.

I have a concern with this text:

CURRENT:
  Thus, the intention is that DPP is the
  RECOMMENDED mechanism for bootstrapping against Wi-Fi networks, and
  TLS-POK is the RECOMMENDED mechanism for bootstrapping against wired
  networks.

I guess these recommendations targets network operators. It is not clear to me why are we making a recommendation about DPP. Also, not sure this document is the place to self-promote the proposed TLS-POK.

Rather than trying to formulate any recommendations, I think that it is more appropriate to simply set the applicability scope of the proposal.

Cheers,
Med

[Ballot discuss]
** Section 1.
  Thus, the intention is that DPP is the
  RECOMMENDED mechanism for bootstrapping against Wi-Fi networks, and
  TLS-POK is the RECOMMENDED mechanism for bootstrapping against wired
  networks.

-- Normative language is being used for [DPP], making it a normative reference

-- Why is the EMU WG specifying normative requirement “against Wi-Fi networks” for a standard not specified by the IETF? 

-- Since normative behavior is being specified for DPP, what are DPP’s security considerations?

[Ballot comment]
** Section 2.
  In this model,
  physical possession of the device implies legitimate ownership.

What does “legitimate ownership” mean in this context?  Isn’t it just “physical control of the system”?

[Ballot discuss]
This is hopefully easy to resolve. In Section 3.2, the document makes the following normative statement:

CURRENT: "When clients use the [duckling] form of authentication, they MAY forgo...."

[duckling] is an informative reference, and so cannot be the condition of a normative statement. As it's not a specification, I wouldn't think the solution is to make it a normative reference. Perhaps the specific behavior that's involved can be normatively stated here?

CONSIDER: "When clients are configured to trust the first network which proves possession of their public key (as in [duckling]), they MAY forgo...."

[Ballot comment]
The colloquial term "catch-22" might not be accessible to all readers. If you retain it, consider an informative reference such as https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catch-22_(logic); it might perhaps be better to reword away from this term. Maybe "circular dependency"?

Given that knowledge of the "public" key is being used as an identity proof on the network's part, it's inherently not public. Consider rephrasing throughout to use the term "asymmetric" since both keys are semi-secret, and using names other than public and private? Referring to a key pair as a "key" (in BSK) is also somewhat confusing -- consider perhaps "Bootstrap Keypair" and the same abbreviation?

In Section 3, embedding the name of the RFC doesn't really improve clarity:

CURRENT: the client must use [RFC7250] Using Raw Public Keys in TLS and DTLS in order to present the BSK as raw public key.

CONSIDER: the client must present the BSK as a raw public key as described in [RFC7250].

In Section 3.1, this sentence is probably correct but reads awkwardly:

CURRENT: A performance versus storage tradeoff a server can choose is to precompute....

CONSIDER: A server can choose to precompute.... Doing so represents a tradeoff between performance and storage.

=== NITS FOLLOW ===
Abstract and 1.1: Consider adding a "/" in "public private key pair" as is done in the Introduction.
2: "to identity" => "to identify"
3.2: "and client" => "and the client", "is knows" => "it knows"
4: "the server received" => "the server receives"

[Ballot comment]
Finally a specification I understand!  :^) 

While these comments are non-blocking, I'd like to see them addressed.

Section 1.4:  NAI? [I'd add this to Section 1.1]

Section 6, third bullet:  SHA-256 is very suitable for this function in the foreseeable future (to address the review comment).  ECDSA for authentication will need to be replaced when CRQCs are readily available (i.e. attack in real time is possible). - no change requested for either.

Section 6 or 7:  I would add, 'The BSK public key MUST NOT be freely available on the network'.  Trust for this method is completely dependent on this, stating this early and often isn't a bad thing.

Section 7:  The compressed ECDSA key pair needs to be correctly generated and validated. I think this could be a simple statement with a reference to FIPS 186-5, section 6.2, while RFC 5480 covers compressed points.

Normative References:  You also need a reference for ECDSA and generation of key pairs.  Possibly: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf

Normative References:  You need a reference for ECDSA w/ compressed points.  Possibly: RFC5480 (I don't think RFC 8813 covers this part).

[Ballot comment]

# Éric Vyncke, INT AD, comments for draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls-08
CC @evyncke

Thank you for the work put into this document.

Please find below some non-blocking COMMENT points/nits (replies would be appreciated even if only for my own education).

Special thanks to Peter Yee for the shepherd's detailed write-up including the WG consensus and the justification of the intended status.

I hope that this review helps to improve the document,

Regards,

-éric

## COMMENTS (non-blocking)

### Abstract

Like Gorry, expanding the less-known DPP would be welcome.

As this I-D is related to EAP, should the terms "EAP peer" and "EAP server" be used ?

"Boostrap" or "on-boarding" for the title ? The latter is clearer IMHO.


### Section 1

`This poses a catch-22` is hard to understand for non-English speakers. Also later in the text.

What about non-wired networks that are not Wi-Fi ? E.g., IEEE 802.15.4

### Section 1.2

Is the usefulness of this document limited to EC only ? I.e., no plain RSA or PQC hybrid systems ?

Who is the "we" in `which we refer to as`? The authors ? The WG ? The IETF ? Please refrain from using "we".

I find the use of "network" in this section rather vague... possibly because could be a layer-2 switch or a BRAS or ... and further text uses "server" (e.g., in section 2), this is somehow confusing. Suggest using only one term and defining it in the terminology section.

### Section 2

Should there be an informative reference to `"entity authentication"`?

### Section 4

`Authenticator on an 802.1X-protected port` another term for "network" (see my related comment about section 1.2); suggest using the terminology section to establish that these terms are related or even identical.

## NITS (non-blocking / cosmetic)

### Use of SVG graphics

To make a much nicer HTML rendering, suggest using the aasvg too to generate SVG graphics. It is worth a try especially if the I-D uses the Kramdown file format ;-)

### Section 7

s/TLS sever on-boarding/TLS server on-boarding/ ? Suggest running a spell checker on the text.

[Ballot comment]
Thank you for prepaing this document. I did not see any transport-related
issues, but have a couple of general comments that might be useful to
address in the next revision:

1. I would encourage expansion of DPP in the abstract to ensure that anyone
scanning the abstract finds and understands the term, e.g.:
Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP)

2. The following text appears before the declaration of RFC 2119 keywords:
  "Thus, the intention is that DPP is the
  RECOMMENDED mechanism for bootstrapping against Wi-Fi networks, and
  TLS-POK is the RECOMMENDED mechanism for bootstrapping against wired
  networks."
- It could be that the RECOMMENDED could be lower case, since this does
not describe interoperability. It could also be possible to move this
text slightly later in the document.

IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

IANA has completed its review of draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls-08. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let us know.

IANA understands that the action requested in the IANA Considerations section of this document is dependent upon the approval of and completion of IANA Actions in another document: draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa

IANA also understands that, upon approval of this document, there is a single action which IANA must complete.

In the EAP Provisioning Identifiers Registry to be created upon IESG approval of draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa in Section 6.2, a single new registration will be made as follows:

NAI: tls-pok-dpp@teap.eap.arpa
Method Type: TEAP
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

As this document requests registrations in an Expert Review or Specification Required (see RFC 8126) registry, we will need to complete the required Expert Review once the new registry has been created and experts designated. This review must be completed before the document's IANA state can be changed to "IANA OK."

IANA understands that this is the only action required to be completed upon approval of this document.

NOTE: The action requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is meant only to confirm the action that will be performed.

For definitions of IANA review states, please see:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/help/state/draft/iana-review

Thank you,

David Dong
IANA Services Sr. Specialist

The following Last Call announcement was sent out (ends 2025-07-31):

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC: draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls@ietf.org, emu-chairs@ietf.org, emu@ietf.org, paul.wouters@aiven.io, peter@akayla.com
Reply-To: last-call@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (Bootstrapped TLS Authentication with Proof of Knowledge (TLS-POK)) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the EAP Method Update WG (emu) to
consider the following document: - 'Bootstrapped TLS Authentication with
Proof of Knowledge (TLS-POK)'
  as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2025-07-31. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  This document defines a mechanism that enables a bootstrapping device
  to establish trust and mutually authenticate against a network.
  Bootstrapping devices have a public private key pair, and this
  mechanism enables a network server to prove to the device that it
  knows the public key, and the device to prove to the server that it
  knows the private key.  The mechanism leverages existing DPP and TLS
  standards and can be used in an EAP exchange.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.


The document contains these normative downward references.
See RFC 3967 for additional information:
    rfc8773: TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-Based Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key (Experimental - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) stream)

# Document Shepherd Write-Up for Group Documents

*This version is dated 4 July 2022.*

Thank you for your service as a document shepherd. Among the responsibilities is
answering the questions in this write-up to give helpful context to Last Call
and Internet Engineering Steering Group ([IESG][1]) reviewers, and your
diligence in completing it is appreciated. The full role of the shepherd is
further described in [RFC 4858][2]. You will need the cooperation of the authors
and editors to complete these checks.

Note that some numbered items contain multiple related questions; please be sure
to answer all of them.

## Document History

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a
few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

Within the context of the relatively small EMU WG, there was concurrence from major contributors in the WG for the publication of this specification.
2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where
the consensus was particularly rough?

No. The authors have gracefully incorporated feedback from the WG, which is reflected in the current version of the draft.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If
so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the
responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this
questionnaire is publicly available.)

There have been no expressions of extreme discontent.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of
the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated
plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere,
either in the document itself (as RFC 7942 recommends) or elsewhere
(where)?

At least one of the authors has implemented this specification.

## Additional Reviews

5. Do the contents of this document closely interact with technologies in other
IETF working groups or external organizations, and would it therefore benefit
from their review? Have those reviews occurred? If yes, describe which
reviews took place.

Although this specification is an adaption of the Wi-Fi Alliance’s DPP (Device Provisioning Protocol), it is wire bound and in no way supplants DPP for WLAN environments. Thus, it is a novel protocol within its environments and does not interact with the technologies of other IETF working group or external organizations in a manner that would suggest their review be beneficial. Despite containing TLS in the name, this draft is a user of TLS but does not modify it, relying instead on features of RFC 8446, RFC 8773 (to be replaced with RFC 8773bis upon its publication), and secondarily, RFC 7250.

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria,
such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

This document has an IANA registration that is dependent on the EAP Provisioning Identifiers registry defined in draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa. This registry has not yet been created as draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa awaits IESG review. The EAP Provisioning Identifiers registry requires the approval of a Designated Expert for any new entry. It appears that the registration request in draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls meets the requirements of draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa.

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module
been checked with any of the recommended validation tools for syntax and
formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is
the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module
comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified
in RFC 8342?

There is no YANG module in this document.

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the
final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code,
BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

This document does not contain its own formal language sections that require validation. What structured text that is present is imported from an existing RFC (RFC 9258).

## Document Shepherd Checks

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this
document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready
to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

It is the document shepherd’s opinion that this document is needed, clearlyl written, complete, correctly designed, and ready for the ministrations of the responsible Area Director.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled lists of common issues that their
reviewers encounter. For which areas have such issues been identified
and addressed? For which does this still need to happen in subsequent
reviews?

From the ART area, this document lightly touches upon UTF-8 for use in the registered NAI. From the OPS area, this specification touches upon DNS special use names / top-level name. Both of these are covered by the reliance upon draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa, and it does not appear that the NAI in this document contravenes the requirements that are already met by draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa. Overall, the document falls within the Security Area. The Security Considerations section does address the threat model, noting the misappropriation of certain keys and the consequences of such.

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream (Best
Current Practice, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard,
Informational, Experimental or Historic)? Why is this the proper type
of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

This document is intended to be published as a Proposed Standard. Given its basis in an existing industry standard (DPP), it is believed that this adaptation is suitable for publication on the Standards Track.

12. Have reasonable efforts been made to remind all authors of the intellectual
property rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in BCP 79? To
the best of your knowledge, have all required disclosures been filed? If
not, explain why. If yes, summarize any relevant discussion, including links
to publicly-available messages when applicable.

The authors are aware of their IPR disclosure requirements. No disclosures have been filed. A call for IPR disclosures to the EMU WG mailing list elicited no disclosures either.

13. Has each author, editor, and contributor shown their willingness to be
listed as such? If the total number of authors and editors on the front page
is greater than five, please provide a justification.

Yes.

14. Document any remaining I-D nits in this document. Simply running the idnits
tool is not enough; please review the "Content Guidelines" on
authors.ietf.org. (Also note that the current idnits tool generates
some incorrect warnings; a rewrite is underway.)

There are two errors, both downrefs (RFC 5869 and RFC 8773). The former is Informational and is the standard reference for HKDF. It is already normatively referenced by standards such as RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3). The latter of the two downrefs will be replaced by RFC 8773bis, which has already been advanced to the IESG for publication. RFC 8773bis essentially changes that the status of RFC 8773 from Experimental to Proposed Standard by republishing and polishing it. The other two outputs from idnits are an unused reference (a reference to IEEE 802.1X is needed in section 1.1) and a referenced document version mismatch (for draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa, which was recently revised due to IETF LC inputs; this will be addressed by an update to this document that either points to the newer version of draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa or to the eventual RFC.)

Regarding the content guideline revew information, the draft is appropriately named. It contains all of the required sections. It does not contain a Privacy Considerations section, but this may be considered superfluous as the protocol is for one-time use in provisioning a device with no user identity. It does not contain an Implementation Status section, however one could be added. There is at least one known implementation by one of the authors. The document appears to meet the requirements for language and style. The document uses ASCII-art diagrams but does not have SVG versions available. The ASCII diagrams appear to render nicely in HTML. Aside from a small amount of TLS Presentation Language text (see RFC 8446, section 3) that is imported from RFC 9258, the document does not itself use any formal language. The document does appear to meet the requirements of the protocol checklist. None of the examples in this draft impinge upon the requirements for example addresses.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa? See the IESG
Statement on Normative and Informative References.

No. While there is a downref for RFC 5869, this use is found in other RFCs as well.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did
the community have sufficient access to review any such normative
references?

All normative references are to IETF specifications.

17. Are there any normative downward references (see RFC 3967 and BCP
97) that are not already listed in the DOWNREF registry? If so,
list them.

RFC 5869 is already in the downref registry.

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready to be
submitted to the IESG for publication or are otherwise in an unclear state?
If so, what is the plan for their completion?

No. The only normative non-RFC referenced is draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa. This has been submitted to the IESG for publication.

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If
so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs
listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the
introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document
where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No.

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section,
especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document.
Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are
associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm
that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm
that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents,
allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see RFC 8126).

The IANA considerations section was reviewed against the requirements of draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa. It appears to be meet the requirements of draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa, although these are of course subject to change prior to that document’s publication.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for
future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear?
Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

This document not create any IANA registries. It relies on a to-be-created IANA registry that is subject to DE review. That registry is specified in draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa.

# Document Shepherd Write-Up for Group Documents

*This version is dated 4 July 2022.*

Thank you for your service as a document shepherd. Among the responsibilities is
answering the questions in this write-up to give helpful context to Last Call
and Internet Engineering Steering Group ([IESG][1]) reviewers, and your
diligence in completing it is appreciated. The full role of the shepherd is
further described in [RFC 4858][2]. You will need the cooperation of the authors
and editors to complete these checks.

Note that some numbered items contain multiple related questions; please be sure
to answer all of them.

## Document History

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a
few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

Within the context of the relatively small EMU WG, there was concurrence from major contributors in the WG for the publication of this specification.
2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where
the consensus was particularly rough?

No. The authors have gracefully incorporated feedback from the WG, which is reflected in the current version of the draft.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If
so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the
responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this
questionnaire is publicly available.)

There have been no expressions of extreme discontent.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of
the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated
plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere,
either in the document itself (as RFC 7942 recommends) or elsewhere
(where)?

At least one of the authors has implemented this specification.

## Additional Reviews

5. Do the contents of this document closely interact with technologies in other
IETF working groups or external organizations, and would it therefore benefit
from their review? Have those reviews occurred? If yes, describe which
reviews took place.

Although this specification is an adaption of the Wi-Fi Alliance’s DPP (Device Provisioning Protocol), it is wire bound and in no way supplants DPP for WLAN environments. Thus, it is a novel protocol within its environments and does not interact with the technologies of other IETF working group or external organizations in a manner that would suggest their review be beneficial. Despite containing TLS in the name, this draft is a user of TLS but does not modify it, relying instead on features of RFC 8446, RFC 8773 (to be replaced with RFC 8773bis upon its publication), and secondarily, RFC 7250.

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria,
such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

This document has an IANA registration that is dependent on the EAP Provisioning Identifiers registry defined in draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa. This registry has not yet been created as draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa awaits IESG review. The EAP Provisioning Identifiers registry requires the approval of a Designated Expert for any new entry. It appears that the registration request in draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls meets the requirements of draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa.

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module
been checked with any of the recommended validation tools for syntax and
formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is
the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module
comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified
in RFC 8342?

There is no YANG module in this document.

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the
final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code,
BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

This document does not contain its own formal language sections that require validation. What structured text that is present is imported from an existing RFC (RFC 9258).

## Document Shepherd Checks

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this
document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready
to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

It is the document shepherd’s opinion that this document is needed, clearlyl written, complete, correctly designed, and ready for the ministrations of the responsible Area Director.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled lists of common issues that their
reviewers encounter. For which areas have such issues been identified
and addressed? For which does this still need to happen in subsequent
reviews?

From the ART area, this document lightly touches upon UTF-8 for use in the registered NAI. From the OPS area, this specification touches upon DNS special use names / top-level name. Both of these are covered by the reliance upon draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa, and it does not appear that the NAI in this document contravenes the requirements that are already met by draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa. Overall, the document falls within the Security Area. The Security Considerations section does address the threat model, noting the misappropriation of certain keys and the consequences of such.

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream (Best
Current Practice, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard,
Informational, Experimental or Historic)? Why is this the proper type
of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

This document is intended to be published as a Proposed Standard. Given its basis in an existing industry standard (DPP), it is believed that this adaptation is suitable for publication on the Standards Track.

12. Have reasonable efforts been made to remind all authors of the intellectual
property rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in BCP 79? To
the best of your knowledge, have all required disclosures been filed? If
not, explain why. If yes, summarize any relevant discussion, including links
to publicly-available messages when applicable.

The authors are aware of their IPR disclosure requirements. No disclosures have been filed. A call for IPR disclosures to the EMU WG mailing list elicited no disclosures either.

13. Has each author, editor, and contributor shown their willingness to be
listed as such? If the total number of authors and editors on the front page
is greater than five, please provide a justification.

Yes.

14. Document any remaining I-D nits in this document. Simply running the idnits
tool is not enough; please review the "Content Guidelines" on
authors.ietf.org. (Also note that the current idnits tool generates
some incorrect warnings; a rewrite is underway.)

There are two errors, both downrefs (RFC 5869 and RFC 8773). The former is Informational and is the standard reference for HKDF. It is already normatively referenced by standards such as RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3). The latter of the two downrefs will be replaced by RFC 8773bis, which has already been advanced to the IESG for publication. RFC 8773bis essentially changes that the status of RFC 8773 from Experimental to Proposed Standard by republishing and polishing it. The other two outputs from idnits are an unused reference (a reference to IEEE 802.1X is needed in section 1.1) and a referenced document version mismatch (for draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa, which was recently revised due to IETF LC inputs; this will be addressed by an update to this document that either points to the newer version of draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa or to the eventual RFC.)

Regarding the content guideline revew information, the draft is appropriately named. It contains all of the required sections. It does not contain a Privacy Considerations section, but this may be considered superfluous as the protocol is for one-time use in provisioning a device with no user identity. It does not contain an Implementation Status section, however one could be added. There is at least one known implementation by one of the authors. The document appears to meet the requirements for language and style. The document uses ASCII-art diagrams but does not have SVG versions available. The ASCII diagrams appear to render nicely in HTML. Aside from a small amount of TLS Presentation Language text (see RFC 8446, section 3) that is imported from RFC 9258, the document does not itself use any formal language. The document does appear to meet the requirements of the protocol checklist. None of the examples in this draft impinge upon the requirements for example addresses.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa? See the IESG
Statement on Normative and Informative References.

No. While there is a downref for RFC 5869, this use is found in other RFCs as well.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did
the community have sufficient access to review any such normative
references?

All normative references are to IETF specifications.

17. Are there any normative downward references (see RFC 3967 and BCP
97) that are not already listed in the DOWNREF registry? If so,
list them.

RFC 5869 is already in the downref registry.

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready to be
submitted to the IESG for publication or are otherwise in an unclear state?
If so, what is the plan for their completion?

No. The only normative non-RFC referenced is draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa. This has been submitted to the IESG for publication.

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If
so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs
listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the
introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document
where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No.

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section,
especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document.
Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are
associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm
that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm
that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents,
allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see RFC 8126).

The IANA considerations section was reviewed against the requirements of draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa. It appears to be meet the requirements of draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa, although these are of course subject to change prior to that document’s publication.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for
future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear?
Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

This document not create any IANA registries. It relies on a to-be-created IANA registry that is subject to DE review. That registry is specified in draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa.