Skip to main content

Route-Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC
draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-04

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (grow WG)
Authors Danny R. McPherson , Shane Amante , Eric Osterweil , Dave Mitchell
Last updated 2014-11-10 (Latest revision 2014-04-30)
Stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Expired & archived
plain text xml htmlized pdfized bibtex
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-04.txt

Abstract

This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Global Routing Operations Working group (GROW) during routing security requirements discussions and subsequent specification.

Authors

Danny R. McPherson
Shane Amante
Eric Osterweil
Dave Mitchell

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)