Route-Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC
draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-04
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(grow WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Danny R. McPherson , Shane Amante , Eric Osterweil , Dave Mitchell | ||
| Last updated | 2014-11-10 (Latest revision 2014-04-30) | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Global Routing Operations Working group (GROW) during routing security requirements discussions and subsequent specification.
Authors
Danny R. McPherson
Shane Amante
Eric Osterweil
Dave Mitchell
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)