Route-Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC
draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-04

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (grow WG)
Last updated 2014-11-10 (latest revision 2014-04-30)
Stream IETF
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IESG IESG state Expired
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-04.txt

Abstract

This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Global Routing Operations Working group (GROW) during routing security requirements discussions and subsequent specification.

Authors

Danny McPherson (dmcpherson@verisign.com)
Shane Amante (shane@level3.net)
Eric Osterweil (eosterweil@verisign.com)
Dave Mitchell (dave@twitter.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)