Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection
draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-03

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I2NSF                                                     R. Marin-Lopez
Internet-Draft                                           G. Lopez-Millan
Intended status: Standards Track                    University of Murcia
Expires: April 25, 2019                                 October 22, 2018

     Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection
             draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-03

Abstract

   This document describes how providing IPsec-based flow protection by
   means of a Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller (aka.  Security
   Controller) and establishes the requirements to support this service.
   It considers two main well-known scenarios in IPsec: (i) gateway-to-
   gateway and (ii) host-to-host.  The SDN-based service described in
   this document allows the distribution and monitoring of IPsec
   information from a Security Controller to one or several flow-based
   Network Security Function (NSF).  The NSFs implement IPsec to protect
   data traffic between network resources with IPsec.

   The document focuses in the NSF Facing Interface by providing models
   for Configuration and State data model required to allow the Security
   Controller to configure the IPsec databases (SPD, SAD, PAD) and IKEv2
   to establish security associations with a reduced intervention of the
   network administrator.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.

Marin-Lopez & Lopez-MillaExpires April 25, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     SDN IPsec Flow Protection Services       October 2018

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Objectives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  SDN-based IPsec management description  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Case 1: IKE/IPsec in the NSF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       5.1.1.  Interface Requirements for Case 1 . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Case 2: IPsec (no IKEv2) in the NSF . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       5.2.1.  Interface Requirements for Case 2 . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.3.  Case 1 vs Case 2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.3.1.  Rekeying process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.3.2.  NSF state loss  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.3.3.  NAT Traversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  YANG configuration data models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Security Policy Database (SPD) Model  . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  Security Association Database (SAD) Model . . . . . . . .  13
     6.3.  Peer Authorization Database (PAD) Model . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.4.  Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Model . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  Use cases examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.1.  Host-to-Host or Gateway-to-gateway under the same
           controller  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.2.  Host-to-Host or Gateway-to-gateway under different
           Security controllers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   8.  Implementation notes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     9.1.  Case 1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     9.2.  Case 2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27