Deprecation of AS_SET in BGP
draft-ietf-idr-deprecate-as-set-confed-set-09
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Warren "Ace" Kumari , Kotikalapudi Sriram , Lilia Hannachi , Jeffrey Haas | ||
| Last updated | 2022-10-23 | ||
| Replaces | draft-kumari-deprecate-as-set-confed-set | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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draft-ietf-idr-deprecate-as-set-confed-set-09
Network Working Group W. Kumari
Internet-Draft Google, Inc.
Obsoletes: 6472 (if approved) K. Sriram
Updates: 4271 5065 (if approved) L. Hannachi
Intended status: Standards Track USA NIST
Expires: 26 April 2023 J. Haas
Juniper Networks, Inc.
23 October 2022
Deprecation of AS_SET in BGP
draft-ietf-idr-deprecate-as-set-confed-set-09
Abstract
BCP 172 (i.e., RFC 6472) recommends not using AS_SET and
AS_CONFED_SET in the Border Gateway Protocol. This document advances
this recommendation to a standards requirement in BGP; it proscribes
the use of the AS_SET type of path segments in the AS_PATH. This is
done to simplify the design and implementation of BGP and to make the
semantics of the originator of a route clearer. This will also
simplify the design, implementation, and deployment of various BGP
security mechanisms. This document (if approved) updates RFC 4271
and RFC 5065, and obsoletes RFC 6472.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 April 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Updates to Existing RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. BGP AS_PATH "Brief" Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Issues with "Brief" AS_PATH Aggregation and RPKI-ROV . . 5
4.3. Recommendations to Mitigate Unpredictable AS_PATH origins
for RPKI-ROV Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
BCP 172 [RFC6472] makes a recommendation for not using AS_SET (see
[RFC4271]) and AS_CONFED_SET (see [RFC5065]) in the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP). This document advances the BCP recommendation to a
standards requirement in BGP; it proscribes the use of the AS_SET
types of path segments in the AS_PATH. The purpose is to simplify
the design and implementation of BGP and to make the semantics of the
originator of a route clearer. This will also simplify the design,
implementation, and deployment of various BGP security mechanisms.
In particular, the proscription of AS_SETs removes the possibility of
ambiguity about origin AS in RPKI-based route origin validation
(RPKI-ROV) [RFC6811] [RFC6907] [RFC9319].
The AS_SET path segment in the AS_PATH attribute (Sections 4.3 and
5.1.2 of [RFC4271]) is created by a router that is performing route
aggregation and contains an unordered set of Autonomous Systems
(ASes) that contributing prefixes in the aggregate have traversed.
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By performing aggregation, a router is combining multiple BGP routes
for more specific destinations into a new route for a less specific
destination ([RFC4271], Section 9.1.2.2.). Aggregation may blur the
semantics of the origin AS for the prefix being announced by
producing an AS_SET. AS_SETs can cause operational issues, such as
not being able to authenticate a route origin for the aggregate
prefix in new BGP security technologies such as those that take
advantage of X.509 extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers
([RFC3779], [RFC6480], [RFC6811], [RFC6907], [RFC9319], [RFC8205]).
This in turn could result in reachability problems for the aggregated
prefix and its components; i.e., more specific prefixes.
From analysis of historical Internet routing data, it is apparent
that aggregation that involves AS_SETs is very seldom used in
practice on the public Internet [Analysis]. When it is used, it is
often used incorrectly; only a single AS in the AS_SET are by far the
most common cases. Also, very often the same AS appears in the
AS_SEQUENCE and the AS_SET in the BGP update. The occurrence of
reserved AS numbers ([IANA-SP-ASN]) is also somewhat frequent.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Recommendations
BGP speakers conforming to this document (i.e., conformant BGP
speakers) SHOULD NOT locally generate BGP UPDATE messages containing
AS_SET. Conformant BGP speakers SHOULD NOT send BGP UPDATE messages
containing AS_SETs. Upon receipt of such messages, conformant BGP
speakers SHOULD use the "Treat-as-withdraw" error handling behavior
as per [RFC7606].
If a network operator wishes to consider BGP UPDATE messages with
AS_SETs received from an external BGP peers, they MAY have a feature
(knob) in their implementation to do so on a per-peer basis. The
operator should understand the full implications of choosing this
option.
Network operators SHOULD NOT locally generate any new announcements
containing AS_SETs.
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BGP security technologies (such as those that take advantage of X.509
extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers ([RFC3779], [RFC6480],
[RFC6811], [RFC8205]) might not support routes with AS_SETs or
AS_CONFED_SETs in them. Routes with AS_SETs have no possibility of
ever being considered RPKI-ROV valid [RFC6811] [RFC6907].
4. Updates to Existing RFCs
This document deprecates the origination of BGP routes with AS_SET
(type 1) AS_PATH segments. ([RFC4271], Section 4.3.) BGP speakers
conforming to this document -- i.e., conformant BGP speakers --
SHOULD NOT originate BGP UPDATE messages containing AS_SETs. Upon
receipt of BGP routes containing AS_SETs, conformant BGP speakers
SHOULD use the "Treat-as-withdraw" error handling behavior as per
[RFC7606].
4.1. BGP AS_PATH "Brief" Aggregation
[RFC4271], Sections 9.1.4 and 9.2.2.2, describes BGP aggregation
procedures. [RFC4271], Appendix F.6 describes a generally
unimplemented "Complex AS_PATH Aggregation" procedure.
[RFC4271], Section 5.1.6 describing the ATOMIC_AGGREGATE Path
Attribute notes that:
| When a BGP speaker aggregates several routes for the purpose of
| advertisement to a particular peer, the AS_PATH of the aggregated
| route normally includes an AS_SET formed from the set of ASes from
| which the aggregate was formed. In many cases, the network
| administrator can determine if the aggregate can safely be
| advertised without the AS_SET, and without forming route loops.
|
| If an aggregate excludes at least some of the AS numbers present
| in the AS_PATH of the routes that are aggregated as a result of
| dropping the AS_SET, the aggregated route, when advertised to the
| peer, SHOULD include the ATOMIC_AGGREGATE attribute.
When BGP AS_PATH aggregation is done according to the Section 9.2.2.2
procedures and any resulting AS_SETs are discarded, this is typically
referred to as "brief" aggreation in implementations. This results
in an AS_PATH that has the property (from Section 9.2.2.2):
| determine the longest leading sequence of tuples (as defined
| above) common to all the AS_PATH attributes of the routes to be
| aggregated. Make this sequence the leading sequence of the
| aggregated AS_PATH attribute.
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The ATOMIC_AGGREGATE Path Attribute is subsequently attached to the
BGP route, if AS_SETs are dropped.
4.2. Issues with "Brief" AS_PATH Aggregation and RPKI-ROV
While brief AS_PATH aggregation has the desirable property of not
containing AS_SETs, the resulting aggregated AS_PATH may contain an
unpredictable origin AS. Such an unpredictable origin ASes may
result in RPKI-ROV validation issues:
* Depending on the contributing routes to the aggregate route, the
resulting origin AS may vary.
* The presence of expected contributing routes may be unpredictable
due to route availability from BGP neighbors.
* In the presence of such varying origin ASes, it would be necessary
for the resource holder to register Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs) [RFC6482] for each potential origin AS that may result from
the expected aggregated AS_PATHs.
4.3. Recommendations to Mitigate Unpredictable AS_PATH origins for
RPKI-ROV Purposes
In order to ensure a consistent BGP origin AS is announced for
aggregate BGP routes for implementations of "brief" BGP aggregation,
the implementation should be configured to truncate the AS_PATH after
the right-most instance of the desired origin AS for the aggregate.
If the resulting AS_PATH would be truncated from the otherwise
expected result of BGP AS_PATH aggregation (an AS_SET would be
generated, or ASes are removed from the "longest leading sequence" of
ASes), the ATOMIC_AGGREGATE Path Attribute SHALL be attached. This
is consistent with the intent of Section 5.1.6 of [RFC4271].
5. Operational Considerations
When aggregating prefixes, network operators MUST use brief
aggregation. In brief aggregation, the AGGREGATOR attribute is
included but the AS_SET attribute is not included.
When doing the above, operators MUST form the aggregate at the border
in the outbound BGP policy and omit any prefixes from the AS that the
aggregate is being advertised to. In other words, an aggregate
prefix MUST NOT be announced to the contributing ASes. Instead, more
specific prefixes (from the aggregate) MUST be announced to each
contributing AS, excluding any that were learned from the
contributing AS in consideration. For illustration, if p1/24 (from
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AS1), p2/24 (from AS2), p3/24 (from AS3) and p4/24 (from AS4) are
aggregated to p/22, then p/22 will not be announced to AS1, AS2, AS3,
or AS4. Instead, as further illustration, p1/24, p2/24 and p4/24 are
announced to AS3. Or, possibly q/23 (aggregate of p1/24 and p2/24)
and p4/24 are announced to AS3.
Operators MUST install egress filters to block data packets when the
destination address belongs to an internal prefix. Similarly, any
known single-homed customer prefix MUST also be included in the
egress filters except on the interface for that customer. This
mitigates looping in the data plane when connection to such an
internal or customer prefix is lost. This mechanism effectively
compensates for the lack of the additional loop detection capability
accorded by AS_SETs (if they were allowed).
6. Security Considerations
This document obsoletes the use of aggregation techniques that create
AS_SETs. Obsoleting these path segment types from BGP and removal of
the related code from implementations would potentially decrease the
attack surface for BGP. Deployments of new BGP security technologies
([RFC6480], [RFC6811], [RFC8205]) benefit greatly if AS_SETs are not
used in BGP.
7. IANA Considerations
This document requires no IANA actions.
8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank John Heasley, Job Snijders, Jared
Mauch, Jakob Heitz, Keyur Patel, Douglas Montgomery, Randy Bush,
Susan Hares, John Scudder, Curtis Villamizar, Danny McPherson, Chris
Morrow, Tom Petch, Ilya Varlashkin, Enke Chen, Tony Li, Florian
Weimer, John Leslie, Paul Jakma, Rob Austein, Russ Housley, Sandra
Murphy, Steve Bellovin, Steve Kent, Steve Padgett, Alfred Hoenes, and
Alvaro Retana for comments and suggestions.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5065>.
9.2. Informative References
[Analysis] Hannachi, L. and K. Sriram, "Detailed analysis of AS_SETs
in BGP updates", NIST Robust Inter-domain Routing Project
Website , October 2019,
<https://github.com/ksriram25/IETF/blob/main/Detailed-
AS_SET-analysis.txt>.
[IANA-SP-ASN]
"Special-Purpose Autonomous System (AS) Numbers",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-as-numbers-special-
registry/iana-as-numbers-special-registry.xhtml>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC6472] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using
AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6472, December 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6472>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
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[RFC6907] Manderson, T., Sriram, K., and R. White, "Use Cases and
Interpretations of Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Objects for Issuers and Relying Parties", RFC 6907,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6907, March 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6907>.
[RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[RFC9319] Gilad, Y., Goldberg, S., Sriram, K., Snijders, J., and B.
Maddison, "The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC 9319,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9319, October 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319>.
Authors' Addresses
Warren Kumari
Google, Inc.
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
United States of America
Phone: +1 571 748 4373
Email: warren@kumari.net
Kotikalapudi Sriram
USA NIST
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America
Phone: +1 301 975 3973
Email: ksriram@nist.gov
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Lilia Hannachi
USA NIST
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America
Phone: +1 301 975 3259
Email: lilia.hannachi@nist.gov
Jeffrey Haas
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
United States of America
Email: jhaas@juniper.net
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