LISP Data-Plane Confidentiality
draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-01

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Last updated 2015-05-01
Replaces draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto
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Internet Engineering Task Force                             D. Farinacci
Internet-Draft                                               lispers.net
Intended status: Experimental                                    B. Weis
Expires: November 2, 2015                                  cisco Systems
                                                             May 1, 2015

                    LISP Data-Plane Confidentiality
                       draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-01

Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism for encrypting LISP encapsulated
   traffic.  The design describes how key exchange is achieved using
   existing LISP control-plane mechanisms as well as how to secure the
   LISP data-plane from third-party surveillance attacks.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 2, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Farinacci & Weis        Expires November 2, 2015                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       LISP Data-Plane Confidentiality            May 2015

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Encoding and Transmitting Key Material  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Shared Keys used for the Data-Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Data-Plane Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Procedures for Encryption and Decryption  . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Dynamic Rekeying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.1.  SAAG Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.2.  LISP-Crypto Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix B.  Document Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     B.1.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-01.txt  . . . . . . . .  15
     B.2.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-00.txt  . . . . . . . .  15
     B.3.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-01.txt . . . . . .  15
     B.4.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-00.txt . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   The Locator/ID Separation Protocol [RFC6830] defines a set of
   functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non-
   routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators
   (RLOCs).  LISP ITRs and PITRs encapsulate packets to ETRs and RTRs.
   Packets that arrive at the ITR or PITR are typically not modified.
   Which means no protection or privacy of the data is added.  If the
   source host encrypts the data stream then the encapsulated packets
   can be encrypted but would be redundant.  However, when plaintext
   packets are sent by hosts, this design can encrypt the user payload
   to maintain privacy on the path between the encapsulator (the ITR or
   PITR) to a decapsulator (ETR or RTR).  The encrypted payload is
   unidirectional.  However, return traffic uses the same procedures but
   with different key values by the same xTRs or potentially different
   xTRs when the paths between LISP sites are asymmetric.
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