The Incident Object Description Exchange Format Version 2
draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis-26

[Ballot comment]

Thanks for handling my discuss.

- comments below were on -22, I didn't check if they'd been
addressed or not. (Happy to chat more if that's useful)

- My review is based on [1]
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=rfc5070&url2=draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis-22

- "cyber" galore - yuk! Which of the fourteen (14!) uses
of that ill-defined marketing term are useful or even
well defined?  RFC5070 had zero uses of such terms. Why
is it a good plan for us to damage the RFC series via the
use of such marketing nonsense? Someone may answer that
this is accepted in industry these days, and that is
true, but is nonetheless not a good enough reason for us
to assist with the promulgation of anti-scientific
non-concepts. My suggestion is to try s/cyber//g and then
to see what if anything is less clear - perhaps we'll
find that things are more clear. (And yes, it's a bit of
a bugbear of mine:-) The use of "cyber indicator" instead
of just "indicator" in 3.19 is a good example of how that
phrase makes the spec less clear.

- 2.5.1, does base64 need a reference and aren't there
multiple variants (url-encoded, etc, sorry for being
vague - I have to look that stuff up afresh every time I
need to write code to handle it;-)

- 2.8: So you don't like leap-seconds? It's often good to
be clear if that bit of ABNF is expected to be enforced
along with schema validation or not.

- 2.12: What about EAI?

- 3.13.1 - is CoA expanded somewhere? (See, I just looked
at the diff:-)

- 3.18.1 - I think it'd be good to refer to the RFC for
wriing down IPv6 addresses and prefixes. I forget it's
number though:-) And who uses ipv6-net-mask? Don't we all
use prefixes?

- 3.21 - the hash and signature data are underspecified.
You could mean any of pgp, smime or dkim. Or you could
mean this is just a crypto binary value and you don't
care about semantics, just pattern matching.

- 4.3 - I also think that recommending schema validation
of input documents is a bad plan. (Even if that was
already in 5070.)

- section 9: defining how to format privacy sensitive
data means that this spec absolutely does introduce
privacy issues.

- 9.1: you could not here the DoS and possible other
attacks (e.g. spoofed .xsd files loaded over port 80)
that follow on from on-line schema

- 9.2: Have there been any cases of people using IODEF
for bad reasons? I mean that e.g. sending info about
attacks or phish emails is good. But using this format to
send information about tracking an individual for
marketing purposes would be bad. Has the latter occurred
though?  (Just wondering, I don't know.) validation.

[Ballot discuss]


(1) 3.6: Does one confidence value apply to all of these?
That seems wrong. And over-confidence is attributing
threat actor identity is a real issue with real
consequences, hence the discuss to make sure we bottom out
on this. I think it's just too error-prone to be ablve to
associate one confidence value with two things about
which one can have very different concreteness. Mixing up
high confidence in a campaign with a lack of confidence
in threat actor identification is precisely the kind of
thing that goes wrong, or that could be deliberately
manipulated (for eventual media/marketing reasons).
(This overlaps with but isn't quite the same as Alissa's
2nd discuss point. In this case, I'm explicitly worried
about the threat actor identity confidence, as that has
possibly severe impacts, so the resolution here could
differ from what results from Alissa's discuss.)

(2) Cleared

[Ballot comment]

- comments below were on -22, I didn't check if they'd been
addressed or not. (Happy to chat more if that's useful)

- My review is based on [1]
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=rfc5070&url2=draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis-22

- "cyber" galore - yuk! Which of the fourteen (14!) uses
of that ill-defined marketing term are useful or even
well defined?  RFC5070 had zero uses of such terms. Why
is it a good plan for us to damage the RFC series via the
use of such marketing nonsense? Someone may answer that
this is accepted in industry these days, and that is
true, but is nonetheless not a good enough reason for us
to assist with the promulgation of anti-scientific
non-concepts. My suggestion is to try s/cyber//g and then
to see what if anything is less clear - perhaps we'll
find that things are more clear. (And yes, it's a bit of
a bugbear of mine:-) The use of "cyber indicator" instead
of just "indicator" in 3.19 is a good example of how that
phrase makes the spec less clear.

- 2.5.1, does base64 need a reference and aren't there
multiple variants (url-encoded, etc, sorry for being
vague - I have to look that stuff up afresh every time I
need to write code to handle it;-)

- 2.8: So you don't like leap-seconds? It's often good to
be clear if that bit of ABNF is expected to be enforced
along with schema validation or not.

- 2.12: What about EAI?

- 3.13.1 - is CoA expanded somewhere? (See, I just looked
at the diff:-)

- 3.18.1 - I think it'd be good to refer to the RFC for
wriing down IPv6 addresses and prefixes. I forget it's
number though:-) And who uses ipv6-net-mask? Don't we all
use prefixes?

- 3.21 - the hash and signature data are underspecified.
You could mean any of pgp, smime or dkim. Or you could
mean this is just a crypto binary value and you don't
care about semantics, just pattern matching.

- 4.3 - I also think that recommending schema validation
of input documents is a bad plan. (Even if that was
already in 5070.)

- section 9: defining how to format privacy sensitive
data means that this spec absolutely does introduce
privacy issues.

- 9.1: you could not here the DoS and possible other
attacks (e.g. spoofed .xsd files loaded over port 80)
that follow on from on-line schema

- 9.2: Have there been any cases of people using IODEF
for bad reasons? I mean that e.g. sending info about
attacks or phish emails is good. But using this format to
send information about tracking an individual for
marketing purposes would be bad. Has the latter occurred
though?  (Just wondering, I don't know.) validation.

[Ballot discuss]
I will move to yes when the following issue is discussed.

Robert Sparks' SecDir review reminded me: I am concerned by the requirement to automatically download updates from IANA. If many devices or software programs implement IODEF and start doing schema validation, this can cause DDoS attack on IANA infrastructure.

I am still thinking whether the new text about automatic schema updates are reasonable. I will either clear or suggest some extra text in a few days.

[Ballot discuss]


(1) 3.6: Does one confidence value apply to all of these?
That seems wrong. And over-confidence is attributing
threat actor identity is a real issue with real
consequences, hence the discuss to make sure we bottom out
on this. I think it's just too error-prone to be ablve to
associate one confidence value with two things about
which one can have very different concreteness. Mixing up
high confidence in a campaign with a lack of confidence
in threat actor identification is precisely the kind of
thing that goes wrong, or that could be deliberately
manipulated (for eventual media/marketing reasons).
(This overlaps with but isn't quite the same as Alissa's
2nd discuss point. In this case, I'm explicitly worried
about the threat actor identity confidence, as that has
possibly severe impacts, so the resolution here could
differ from what results from Alissa's discuss.)

(2) 3.18.1 - you provide a way to specify e.g. an address
and netmask, or v6 prefix. But you don't specify any way
to say that some of the address (or prefix) bits are not
real or are additionally masked for privacy reasons. E.g.
If everyone in 2001:1:1:beef::/64 is misbehaving, but I
don't (yet) want to specify the exact prefix, I might
want to say " some 2001:1:1:xxxx::/64" is misbehaving,
meaning one /64 in 2001:1:1::/48 is being bad and not the
entire /48. Why is support for that not required?  (IPFIX
does have that as an option, and it's been added to CDNI
too.) Same idea can apply to other address forms too.

[Ballot comment]

- My review is based on [1]
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=rfc5070&url2=draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis-22

- "cyber" galore - yuk! Which of the fourteen (14!) uses
of that ill-defined marketing term are useful or even
well defined?  RFC5070 had zero uses of such terms. Why
is it a good plan for us to damage the RFC series via the
use of such marketing nonsense? Someone may answer that
this is accepted in industry these days, and that is
true, but is nonetheless not a good enough reason for us
to assist with the promulgation of anti-scientific
non-concepts. My suggestion is to try s/cyber//g and then
to see what if anything is less clear - perhaps we'll
find that things are more clear. (And yes, it's a bit of
a bugbear of mine:-) The use of "cyber indicator" instead
of just "indicator" in 3.19 is a good example of how that
phrase makes the spec less clear.

- 2.5.1, does base64 need a reference and aren't there
multiple variants (url-encoded, etc, sorry for being
vague - I have to look that stuff up afresh every time I
need to write code to handle it;-)

- 2.8: So you don't like leap-seconds? It's often good to
be clear if that bit of ABNF is expected to be enforced
along with schema validation or not.

- 2.12: What about EAI?

- 3.13.1 - is CoA expanded somewhere? (See, I just looked
at the diff:-)

- 3.18.1 - I think it'd be good to refer to the RFC for
wriing down IPv6 addresses and prefixes. I forget it's
number though:-) And who uses ipv6-net-mask? Don't we all
use prefixes?

- 3.21 - the hash and signature data are underspecified.
You could mean any of pgp, smime or dkim. Or you could
mean this is just a crypto binary value and you don't
care about semantics, just pattern matching.

- 4.3 - I also think that recommending schema validation
of input documents is a bad plan. (Even if that was
already in 5070.)

- section 9: defining how to format privacy sensitive
data means that this spec absolutely does introduce
privacy issues.

- 9.1: you could not here the DoS and possible other
attacks (e.g. spoofed .xsd files loaded over port 80)
that follow on from on-line schema

- 9.2: Have there been any cases of people using IODEF
for bad reasons? I mean that e.g. sending info about
attacks or phish emails is good. But using this format to
send information about tracking an individual for
marketing purposes would be bad. Has the latter occurred
though?  (Just wondering, I don't know.) validation.

[Ballot comment]
I concur with Alissa's and Alexey's discuss points.

Additionally, I think the rest of the points in Robert Spark's secdir review[1] deserve responses.

The shepherd writeup mentions a desire for more XML review. Did that occur? (I note that it also says the XML had been mechanically verified.)

[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/mile/0Io60Sdn--hRzQWN3Q0keCYIA1w

[Ballot discuss]
I will move to yes when the following issue is discussed.

Robert Sparks' SecDir review reminded me: I am concerned by the requirement to automatically download updates from IANA. If many devices or software programs implement IODEF and start doing schema validation, this can cause DDoS attack on IANA infrastructure.

[Ballot discuss]
The Confidence class as defined in 3.12.5 seems underspecified. It does not specify a max value, so some implementations might use 1 as the max while others might use 100.

It's also hard to understand how a single confidence value is supposed to be applied to elements with multiple fields, as in 3.12 and 3.29. What do I do if I have high confidence in my estimate of SystemImpact but low confidence in my estimate of MonetaryImpact?

[Ballot comment]
(1) Section 1: It would be useful to define "cyber," "cyber indicator" (somewhere before 3.29), "cyber threat," and "cyber event." I chuckled when I wrote that, but I'm serious. The term "cyber" did not appear in RFC 5070. It has clearly taken on some (mythical, perhaps) meaning in venues external to the IETF. I think if this document is going to use the term, it needs to explain what it means. If there are some external definitions to point to or adopt, that would be fine.

(2) Section 3.19.2: If I want to list the admin contact for a particular domain in a Contact element within a DomainContacts element, do I set the role in the Contact to "admin" or to "zone"? I think this is not entirely clear from how the roles are specified in 3.9 since most of the roles are more generic than "zone."

[Ballot comment]
I am out of my depth here…

I noticed that rfc6685 Updated rfc5070, which this document Obsoletes.  rfc6685 just "specifies additional expert reviews for IODEF extensions".  But a similar consideration was not included in the bis.  Is it not needed?

Should this document also Obsolete rfc6685?

[Ballot comment]
I am out of my depth here…

I noticed that rfc6685 Updated rfc5070, which this document Obsoletes.  rfc6685 just "specifies additional expert reviews for IODEF extensions".  But a similar consideration was not included in the bis.  Is it not needed?

Should this document also Obsolete rfc6685?

[Ballot comment]
In 3.29.3.1: there is still a reference to RFC 822 (should be RFC 5322)

In 4.1: it would be good to point to the W3C XML document about rules for escaping special characters. Otherwise readers might just think that all cases are covered in this section.

The following Last Call announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: "IETF-Announce"
CC: rdd@cert.org, mile-chairs@tools.ietf.org, takeshi_takahashi@nict.go.jp, Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com, mile-chairs@ietf.org, mile@ietf.org, draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis@ietf.org
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (The Incident Object Description Exchange Format v2) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the Managed Incident Lightweight
Exchange WG (mile) to consider the following document:
- 'The Incident Object Description Exchange Format v2'
  as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2016-06-01. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) defines a
  data representation for security incident reports and cyber
  indicators commonly exchanged by operational security teams for
  mitigation and watch and warning.  This document describes an updated
  information model for the IODEF and provides an associated data model
  specified with XML Schema.  This new information and data model
  obsoletes Request for Comment (RFC) 5070, "The Incident Object
  Description Exchange Format".




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document
Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)  Why
is this the proper type of RFC  Is this type of RFC indicated in the
title page header

  Standards Track RFC is requested, and this is indicated in the title page header.

  IODEF is defined in 2007 as a standard track RFC in RFC 5070, and this document is an important update that relects the needed changes in present days.
  Moreover, this document works as the core of the MILE techniques studied in the MILE WG, and many other works are based on IODEF.
  Therefore, the WG believes this document should be a standards track RFC.


(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the Action announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections

Technical Summary

  The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) defines a
  data representation for security incident reports and cyber
  indicators commonly exchanged by operational security teams for
  mitigation and watch and warning.  This document describes an updated
  information model for the IODEF and provides an associated data model
  specified with XML Schema.  This new information and data model
  obsoletes [RFC5070]

Working Group Summary

  This document updates IODEF version 1, and it is not backward compatible.
  The document can describe wider range of information regarding incident and its hints than previous version, while it still allows users to describe information in a simple manner.
  The document received extensive review from the WG, which refined the output of the document.
  The discussion was structured and managed using the issue tracker.

Document Quality

  Regarding the implementation, we already have a running implementation, i.e., EMC/RSA RID agent, which is described in draft-ietf-mile-implementreport-06 draft.
  More over, several organizations are willing to impelement a tool compatible with this IODEF-bis draft.
  Regarding the document: the acknowledgment section of this draft is appropriately made to acknowledge the contributions during the review phase.

Personnel

  Takeshi Takahashi is the Document Shepherd and Kathleen Moriarty is
  the Responsible Area Director

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd.  If this version of the document is not ready
for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to
the IESG.

  I believe this document is ready for publication.
  The initial version of this draft was proposed on May 5, 2013.
  54 issues are discussed, and these are managed and summarized at the issue tracker.
  Each of the issuue were closed based on discussion in the WG.
  Please see the issue tracker on how each issue was discussed.


(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed

  No. I believe 3 years of review using the issue tracker are good enough.


(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization If so, describe the review that
took place.

  The document has been already reviewed by experts from different areas, but it would be always nice to have more eyes on this.
  Especially, reviews from XML and application area experts are welcomed.


(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd
has with this document that the Responsible Area Director andor the
IESG should be aware of For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable
with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really
is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and
has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here.

  The issues have been thoroughly discussed as we can see in the issue tracker.
  Only the note is the backward incompatibility issue.
  The WG (including I myself) thinks that it is not an issue, but it could worth mentioning.


(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78
and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.

  Yes, the author has declared that "all IPR disclosures have been made."


(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document
If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.

  No.


(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it 

  During three year discussion of this draft, ideas were discussed in the WG in a constructive manner.
  The MILE WG is rather small, and that helped the WG as a whole to understand and agree with it.


(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

  No.


(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits and the Internet-Drafts
Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be
thorough.

  The editor provided revised version(https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis-19.txt) in order to cope with idnits warnings.
  This version still contains minor nits, but the editors will reflect them when coping with IESG comments or RFC-editor.

In the abstract,

Current: [RFC 5070]
->  New: RFC 5070

In Section 3.29.6

  Current: Invalid algebraic expressions while valid XML, MUST not be specified.
  ->  New: Invalid algebraic expressions while valid XML, MUST NOT be specified.

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

  This document does not have any issue that require any external formal review, such as MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.


(13) Have all references within this document been identified as
either normative or informative

  This document has 23 normative references and 9 informative references.


(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for
advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state If such normative
references exist, what is the plan for their completion

  Such normative reference does not exist in this document.

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)
If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in
the Last Call procedure.

  This document refers to an information RFC, i.e., RFC 2781 titled "UTF-16, an encoding of ISO 10646."
  I believe this downward normative reference is within the scope of the allowed exceptions described in Section 2 of RFC 3967.

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any
existing RFCs Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed
in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction If the RFCs are not
listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the
part of the document where the relationship of this document to the
other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document,
explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

This document supersedes the RFC 5070.
This is described properly in the abstract and Section 1.3.

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations
section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the
document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes
are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.
Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly
identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a
detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that
allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a
reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226).

These registries should be mentioned in Section 10.2
      "PostalAddress-type"
      "TimeImpact-metric"

These registries should be mentioned prior to Section 10.2
      "TimeImpact-metrics" (I guess it is just a typo. It should be "TimeImpact-metric"
      "Confidence-rating" (Please review the sentences in Section 3.12.5, or get rid of this registry.)


(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future
allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find
useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

The review requires certain level of knowledge on incident response operations.
Therefore, CSIRT-related people are desirable to be delegated as the IANA Experts.
In addition, participants to MILE, SACM, DOTS are also knowledgeable enough to be able to conduct the review.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

The examples and schema of IODEF version 2, which are mentioned in the document, are checked using XML validators (i.e., MSV and XMLspy).

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document
Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)  Why
is this the proper type of RFC  Is this type of RFC indicated in the
title page header

  Standards Track RFC is requested, and this is indicated in the title page header.

  IODEF is defined in 2007 as a standard track RFC in RFC 5070, and this document is an important update that relects the needed changes in present days.
  Moreover, this document works as the core of the MILE techniques studied in the MILE WG, and many other works are based on IODEF.
  Therefore, the WG believes this document should be a standards track RFC.


(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the Action announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections

Technical Summary

  The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) defines a
  data representation for security incident reports and cyber
  indicators commonly exchanged by operational security teams for
  mitigation and watch and warning.  This document describes an updated
  information model for the IODEF and provides an associated data model
  specified with XML Schema.  This new information and data model
  obsoletes [RFC5070]

Working Group Summary

  This document updates IODEF version 1, and it is not backward compatible.
  The document can describe wider range of information regarding incident and its hints than previous version, while it still allows users to describe information in a simple manner.
  The document received extensive review from the WG, which refined the output of the document.
  The discussion was structured and managed using the issue tracker.

Document Quality

  Regarding the implementation, we already have a running implementation, i.e., EMC/RSA RID agent, which is described in draft-ietf-mile-implementreport-06 draft.
  More over, several organizations are willing to impelement a tool compatible with this IODEF-bis draft.
  Regarding the document: the acknowledgment section of this draft is appropriately made to acknowledge the contributions during the review phase.

Personnel

  Takeshi Takahashi is the Document Shepherd and Kathleen Moriarty is
  the Responsible Area Director

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd.  If this version of the document is not ready
for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to
the IESG.

  I believe this document is ready for publication.
  The initial version of this draft was proposed on May 5, 2013.
  54 issues are discussed, and these are managed and summarized at the issue tracker.
  Each of the issuue were closed based on discussion in the WG.
  Please see the issue tracker on how each issue was discussed.


(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed

  No. I believe 3 years of review using the issue tracker are good enough.


(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization If so, describe the review that
took place.

  The document has been already reviewed by experts from different areas, but it would be always nice to have more eyes on this.
  Especially, reviews from XML and application area experts are welcomed.


(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd
has with this document that the Responsible Area Director andor the
IESG should be aware of For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable
with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really
is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and
has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here.

  The issues have been thoroughly discussed as we can see in the issue tracker.
  Only the note is the backward incompatibility issue.
  The WG (including I myself) thinks that it is not an issue, but it could worth mentioning.


(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78
and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.

  Yes, the author has declared that "all IPR disclosures have been made."


(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document
If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.

  No.


(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it 

  During three year discussion of this draft, ideas were discussed in the WG in a constructive manner.
  The MILE WG is rather small, and that helped the WG as a whole to understand and agree with it.


(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

  No.


(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits and the Internet-Drafts
Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be
thorough.

  The editor provided revised version(https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis-19.txt) in order to cope with idnits warnings.
  This version still contains minor nits, but the editors will reflect them when coping with IESG comments or RFC-editor.

In the abstract,

Current: [RFC 5070]
->  New: RFC 5070

In Section 3.29.6

  Current: Invalid algebraic expressions while valid XML, MUST not be specified.
  ->  New: Invalid algebraic expressions while valid XML, MUST NOT be specified.

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

  This document does not have any issue that require any external formal review, such as MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.


(13) Have all references within this document been identified as
either normative or informative

  This document has 23 normative references and 9 informative references.


(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for
advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state If such normative
references exist, what is the plan for their completion

  Such normative reference does not exist in this document.

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)
If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in
the Last Call procedure.

  This document refers to an information RFC, i.e., RFC 2781 titled "UTF-16, an encoding of ISO 10646."
  I believe this downward normative reference is within the scope of the allowed exceptions described in Section 2 of RFC 3967.

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any
existing RFCs Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed
in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction If the RFCs are not
listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the
part of the document where the relationship of this document to the
other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document,
explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

This document supersedes the RFC 5070.
This is described properly in the abstract and Section 1.3.

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations
section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the
document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes
are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.
Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly
identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a
detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that
allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a
reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226).

IANA consideration section is already consistent with the body of the document.
In order to avoid any inconsistency, the IANA consideration section just lists pointers to the related sections of the document.

These registries should be mentioned in Section 10.2
      "PostalAddress-type"
      "TimeImpact-metric"

These registries should be mentioned prior to Section 10.2
      "TimeImpact-metrics" (I guess it is just a typo. It should be "TimeImpact-metric"
      "Confidence-rating" (Please review the sentences in Section 3.12.5, or get rid of this registry.)


(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future
allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find
useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

The review requires certain level of knowledge on incident response operations.
Therefore, CSIRT-related people are desirable to be delegated as the IANA Experts.
In addition, participants to MILE, SACM, DOTS are also knowledgeable enough to be able to conduct the review.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

The examples and schema of IODEF version 2, which are mentioned in the document, are checked using XML validators (i.e., MSV and XMLspy).