The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol
draft-ietf-mls-protocol-09

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 9420.
Expired & archived
Authors Richard Barnes , Benjamin Beurdouche , Jon Millican , Emad Omara , Katriel Cohn-Gordon , Raphael Robert
Last updated 2020-09-07 (Latest revision 2020-03-06)
Replaces draft-barnes-mls-protocol
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Formats
txt xml htmlized pdf bibtex bibxml
Reviews
INTDIR Telechat review (of -17) by Suresh Krishnan Ready
TSVART Early review (of -16) by Gorry Fairhurst On the Right Track
ARTART Early review (of -16) by Rich Salz Ready w/nits
OPSDIR Early review (of -16) by Bo Wu Has nits
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state WG Document
Associated WG milestones
May 2018
Initial working group documents for architecture and key management
Sep 2018
Initial working group document adopted for message protection
Sep 2022
Submit key management protocol to IESG as Proposed Standard
Sep 2022
Submit message protection protocol to IESG as Proposed Standard
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to benjamin.beurdouche@ens.fr, karthikeyan.bhargavan@inria.fr, cas.cremers@cs.ox.ac.uk, alan@wire.com, singuva@twitter.com, kwonal@mit.edu, ekr@rtfm.com, thyla.van.der@merwe.tech
Email authors Email WG IPR 1 References Referenced by Nits

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:

txt xml htmlized pdf bibtex bibxml

Abstract

Messaging applications are increasingly making use of end-to-end security mechanisms to ensure that messages are only accessible to the communicating endpoints, and not to any servers involved in delivering messages. Establishing keys to provide such protections is challenging for group chat settings, in which more than two clients need to agree on a key but may not be online at the same time. In this document, we specify a key establishment protocol that provides efficient asynchronous group key establishment with forward secrecy and post-compromise security for groups in size ranging from two to thousands.

Authors

Richard Barnes
Benjamin Beurdouche
Jon Millican
Emad Omara
Katriel Cohn-Gordon
Raphael Robert

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)