Applicability of the QUIC Transport Protocol
draft-ietf-quic-applicability-09
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (quic WG) | |
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| Last updated | 2021-02-04 (Latest revision 2021-01-22) | ||
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draft-ietf-quic-applicability-09
Network Working Group M. Kuehlewind
Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Informational B. Trammell
Expires: 26 July 2021 Google
22 January 2021
Applicability of the QUIC Transport Protocol
draft-ietf-quic-applicability-09
Abstract
This document discusses the applicability of the QUIC transport
protocol, focusing on caveats impacting application protocol
development and deployment over QUIC. Its intended audience is
designers of application protocol mappings to QUIC, and implementors
of these application protocols.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 July 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. The Necessity of Fallback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Zero RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Thinking in Zero RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Here There Be Dragons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Session resumption versus Keep-alive . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Use of Streams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Stream versus Flow Multiplexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Flow Control Deadlocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Packetization and Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Port Selection and Application Endpoint Discovery . . . . . . 11
7. Connection Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Information Exposure and the Connection ID . . . . . . . . . 14
9.1. Server-Generated Connection ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2. Mitigating Timing Linkability with Connection ID
Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.3. Using Server Retry for Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Quality of Service (QoS) and DSCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11. Use of Versions and Cryptographic Handshake . . . . . . . . . 16
12. Enabling New Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
15. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
16. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
QUIC [QUIC] is a new transport protocol providing a number of
advanced features. While initially designed for the HTTP use case,
it provides capabilities that can be used with a much wider variety
of applications. QUIC is encapsulated in UDP. QUIC version 1
integrate TLS 1.3 [TLS13] to encrypt all payload data and most
control information. HTTP operating over QUIC is known as HTTP/3.
This document provides guidance for application developers that want
to use the QUIC protocol without implementing it on their own. This
includes general guidance for applications operating over HTTP/3 or
directly over QUIC. For specific guidance on how to integrate HTTP/3
with QUIC, see [QUIC-HTTP].
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In the following sections we discuss specific caveats to QUIC's
applicability, and issues that application developers must consider
when using QUIC as a transport for their application.
2. The Necessity of Fallback
QUIC uses UDP as a substrate. This enables both userspace
implementation traversal of middleboxes and NAT without requiring
updates.
While there is no evidence of widespread, systematic disadvantage of
UDP traffic compared to TCP in the Internet [Edeline16], somewhere
between three [Trammell16] and five [Swett16] percent of networks
simply block UDP traffic. All applications running on top of QUIC
must therefore either be prepared to accept connectivity failure on
such networks, or be engineered to fall back to some other transport
protocol. In the case of HTTP, this fallback is TLS 1.3 over TCP.
An application that implements fallback needs to consider the
security consequences. A fallback to TCP and TLS 1.3 exposes control
information to modification and manipulation in the network. Further
downgrades to older TLS versions might result in significantly weaker
cryptographic protection. For example, the results of protocol
negotiation [ALPN] only have confidentiality protection if TLS 1.3 is
used.
These applications must operate, perhaps with impaired functionality,
in the absence of features provided by QUIC not present in the
fallback protocol. For fallback to TLS over TCP, the most obvious
difference is that TCP does not provide stream multiplexing and
therefore stream multiplexing would need to be implemented in the
application layer if needed.
Further, TCP implementations and network paths often do not support
the Fast Open option, which is analogous to 0-RTT session resumption.
Even if Fast Open successfully operates end-to-end, it is limited to
a single packet of payload, unlike QUIC 0-RTT.
Note that there is some evidence of middleboxes blocking SYN data
even if TFO was successfully negotiated (see [PaaschNanog]).
Any fallback mechanism is likely to impose a degradation of
performance; however, fallback must not silently violate the
application's expectation of confidentiality or integrity of its
payload data.
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Moreover, while encryption (in this case TLS) is inseparably
integrated with QUIC, TLS negotiation over TCP can be blocked. In
case it is RECOMMENDED to abort the connection, allowing the
application to present a suitable prompt to the user that secure
communication is unavailable.
3. Zero RTT
QUIC provides for 0-RTT connection establishment. This presents
opportunities and challenges for applications using QUIC.
3.1. Thinking in Zero RTT
A transport protocol that provides 0-RTT connection establishment is
qualitatively different than one that does not from the point of view
of the application using it. Relative trade-offs between the cost of
closing and reopening a connection and trying to keep it open are
different; see Section 3.3.
Applications must be slightly rethought in order to make best use of
0-RTT resumption. Using 0-RTT requires an understanding of the
implication of sending application data that might be replayed by an
attacker.
Application protocols that use 0-RTT require a profile that describes
the types of information that can be safely sent. For HTTP, this
profile is described in [HTTP-REPLAY].
3.2. Here There Be Dragons
Retransmission or (malicious) replay of data contained in 0-RTT
packets could cause the server side to receive two copies of the same
data.
Application data sent by the client in 0-RTT packets could be
processed more than once if it is replayed. Applications need to be
aware of what is safe to send in 0-RTT. Application protocols that
seek to enable the use of 0-RTT need a careful analysis and a
description of what can be sent in 0-RTT; see Section 5.6 of
[QUIC-TLS].
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In some cases, it might be sufficient to limit application data sent
in 0-RTT to that which only causes actions at a server that are known
to be free of lasting effect. Initiating data retrieval or
establishing configuration are examples of actions that could be
safe. Idempotent operations - those for which repetition has the
same net effect as a single operation - might be safe. However, it
is also possible to combine individually idempotent operations into a
non-idempotent sequence of operations.
Once a server accepts 0-RTT data there is no means of selectively
discarding data that is received. However, protocols can define ways
to reject individual actions that might be unsafe if replayed.
Some TLS implementations and deployments might be able to provide
partial or even complete replay protection, which could be used to
manage replay risk.
3.3. Session resumption versus Keep-alive
Because QUIC is encapsulated in UDP, applications using QUIC must
deal with short network idle timeouts. Deployed stateful middleboxes
will generally establish state for UDP flows on the first packet
state, and keep state for much shorter idle periods than for TCP.
[RFC5382] suggests a TCP idle period of at least 124 minutes, though
there is not evidence of widespread implementation of this guideline
in the literature. Short network timeout for UDP, however, is well-
documented. According to a 2010 study ([Hatonen10]), UDP
applications can assume that any NAT binding or other state entry can
expire after just thirty seconds of inactivity. Section 3.5 of
[RFC8085] further discusses keep-alive intervals for UDP: it requires
a minimum value of 15 seconds, but recommends larger values, or
omitting keepalive entirely.
By using a connection ID, QUIC is designed to be robust to NAT
address rebinding after a timeout. However, this only helps if one
endpoint maintains availability at the address its peer uses, and the
peer is the one to send after the timeout occurs.
Some QUIC connections may not be robust to rebinding because the
routing infrastructure (in particular, load balancers) uses the
address/port four-tuple to direct traffic. Furthermore, middleboxes
with functions other than address translation could still affect the
path. In particular, firewalls will often not admit server traffic
for which it has not kept state for corresponding packets from the
client.
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A QUIC application can adjust idle periods to manage the risk of
timeout (noting that idle periods and the network idle timeout is
distinct from the connection idle timeout, defined as the minimum of
the idle timeout parameter in Section 10.1 of [QUIC]), but then there
are three options:
* Ignore it, if the application-layer protocol consists only of
interactions with no or very short idle periods, or the protocol's
resistance to NAT rebinding is sufficient.
* Ensure there are no long idle periods.
* Resume the session after a long idle period, using 0-RTT
resumption when appropriate.
The first strategy is the easiest, but it only applies to certain
applications.
Either the server or the client in a QUIC application can send PING
frames as keep-alives, to prevent the connection and any on-path
state from timing out. Recommendations for the use of keep-alives
are application specific, mainly depending on the latency
requirements and message frequency of the application. In this case,
the application mapping must specify whether the client or server is
responsible for keeping the application alive. While [Hatonen10]
suggests that 30 seconds might be a suitable value for the public
Internet when a NAT is on path, larger values are preferable if the
deployment can consistently survive NAT rebinding, or is known to be
in a controlled environments like e.g. data centres in order to lower
network and computational load.
Sending PING frames more frequently than every 30 seconds over long
idle periods may result in excessive unproductive traffic in some
situations, and to unacceptable power usage for power-constrained
(mobile) devices. Additionally, time-outs shorter than 30 seconds
can make it harder to handle transient network interruptions, such as
VM migration or coverage loss during mobilty.
Alternatively, the client (but not the server) can use session
resumption instead of sending keepalive traffic. In this case, a
client that wants to send data to a server over a connection idle
longer than the server's idle timeout (available from the
idle_timeout transport parameter) can simply reconnect. When
possible, this reconnection can use 0-RTT session resumption,
reducing the latency involved with restarting the connection. This
of course only applies in cases in which 0-RTT data is safe, when the
client is the restarting peer, and when the data to be sent is
idempotent. Using resumption in this way also assumes that the
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protocol does not accumulate any non-persistent state in association
with a connection. State bound to a connection cannot reliably be
transferred to a resumed connection.
The tradeoffs between resumption and keepalive need to be evaluated
on a per-application basis. However, in general applications should
use keepalives only in circumstances where continued communication is
highly likely; [QUIC-HTTP], for instance, recommends using PING
frames for keepalive only when a request is outstanding.
4. Use of Streams
QUIC's stream multiplexing feature allows applications to run
multiple streams over a single connection, without head-of-line
blocking between streams, associated at a point in time with a single
five-tuple. Stream data is carried within Frames, where one QUIC
packet on the wire can carry one or multiple stream frames.
Streams can be unidirectional or bidirectional, and a stream may be
initiated either by client or server. Only the initiator of a
unidirectional stream can send data on it.
Due to encoding limitations on stream offsets and connection flow
control limits, both streams and connections can carry a maximum of
2^62-1 bytes in each direction. In the presently unlikely event that
this limit is reached by an application, a new connection would need
to be established.
Streams can be independently opened and closed, gracefully or by
error. An application can gracefully close the egress direction of a
stream by instructing QUIC to send a FIN bit in a STREAM frame. It
cannot gracefully close the ingress direction without a peer-
generated FIN, much like in TCP. However, an endpoint can abruptly
close the egress direction or request that its peer abruptly close
the ingress direction; these actions are fully independent of each
other.
QUIC does not provide an interface for exceptional handling of any
stream. If a stream that is critical for an application is closed,
the application can generate error messages on the application layer
to inform the other end and/or the higher layer, which can eventually
reset the QUIC connection.
Mapping of application data to streams is application-specific and
described for HTTP/3 in [QUIC-HTTP]. In general, data that can be
processed independently, and therefore would suffer from head of line
blocking if forced to be received in order, should be transmitted
over separate streams. If the application requires certain data to
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be received in order, that data should be sent on the same stream.
If there is a logical grouping of data chunks or messages, streams
can be reused, or a new stream can be opened for each chunk/message.
If one message is mapped to a single stream, resetting the stream to
expire an unacknowledged message can be used to emulate partial
reliability on a message basis. If a QUIC receiver has maximum
allowed concurrent streams open and the sender on the other end
indicates that more streams are needed, it doesn't automatically lead
to an increase of the maximum number of streams by the receiver.
Therefore it can be valuable to expose maximum number of allowed,
currently open and currently used streams to the application to make
the mapping of data to streams dependent on this information.
While a QUIC implementation must necessarily provide a way for an
application to send data on separate streams, it does not necessarily
expose stream identifiers to the application (see, for example,
[QUIC-HTTP], Section 6) either at the sender or receiver end, so
applications should not assume access to these identifiers.
4.1. Stream versus Flow Multiplexing
Streams are meaningful only to the application; since stream
information is carried inside QUIC's encryption boundary, no
information about the stream(s) whose frames are carried by a given
packet is visible to the network. Therefore stream multiplexing is
not intended to be used for differentiating streams in terms of
network treatment. Application traffic requiring different network
treatment should therefore be carried over different five-tuples
(i.e. multiple QUIC connections). Given QUIC's ability to send
application data in the first RTT of a connection (if a previous
connection to the same host has been successfully established to
provide the respective credentials), the cost of establishing another
connection is extremely low.
4.2. Prioritization
Stream prioritization is not exposed to either the network or the
receiver. Prioritization is managed by the sender, and the QUIC
transport should provide an interface for applications to prioritize
streams [QUIC]. Further applications can implement their own
prioritization scheme on top of QUIC: an application protocol that
runs on top of QUIC can define explicit messages for signaling
priority, such as those defined for HTTP/2; it can define rules that
allow an endpoint to determine priority based on context; or it can
provide a higher level interface and leave the determination to the
application on top.
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Priority handling of retransmissions can be implemented by the sender
in the transport layer. [QUIC] recommends to retransmit lost data
before new data, unless indicated differently by the application.
Currently, QUIC only provides fully reliable stream transmission,
which means that prioritization of retransmissions will be beneficial
in most cases, by filling in gaps and freeing up the flow control
window. For partially reliable or unreliable streams, priority
scheduling of retransmissions over data of higher-priority streams
might not be desirable. For such streams, QUIC could either provide
an explicit interface to control prioritization, or derive the
prioritization decision from the reliability level of the stream.
4.3. Flow Control Deadlocks
Flow control provides a means of managing access to the limited
buffers endpoints have for incoming data. This mechanism limits the
amount of data that can be in buffers in endpoints or in transit on
the network. However, there are several ways in which limits can
produce conditions that can cause a connection to either perform
suboptimally or deadlock.
Deadlocks in flow control are possible for any protocol that uses
QUIC, though whether they become a problem depends on how
implementations consume data and provide flow control credit.
Understanding what causes deadlocking might help implementations
avoid deadlocks.
Large messages can produce deadlocking if the recipient does not
process the message incrementally. If the message is larger than
flow control credit available and the recipient does not release
additional flow control credit until the entire message is received
and delivered, a deadlock can occur. This is possible even where
stream flow control limits are not reached because connection flow
control limits can be consumed by other streams.
A common flow control implementation technique is for a receiver to
extend credit to the sender as a the data consumer reads data. In
this setting, a length-prefixed message format makes it easier for
the data consumer to leave data unread in the receiver's buffers and
thereby withhold flow control credit. If flow control limits prevent
the remainder of a message from being sent, a deadlock will result.
A length prefix might also enable the detection of this sort of
deadlock. Where protocols have messages that might be processed as a
single unit, reserving flow control credit for the entire message
atomically ensures that this style of deadlock is less likely.
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A data consumer can read all data as it becomes available to cause
the receiver to extend flow control credit to the sender and reduce
the chances of a deadlock. However, releasing flow control credit
might mean that the data consumer might need other means for holding
a peer accountable for the state it keeps for partially processed
messages.
Deadlocking can also occur if data on different streams is
interdependent. Suppose that data on one stream arrives before the
data on a second stream on which it depends. A deadlock can occur if
the first stream is left unread, preventing the receiver from
extending flow control credit for the second stream. To reduce the
likelihood of deadlock for interdependent data, the sender should
ensure that dependent data is not sent until the data it depends on
has been accounted for in both stream- and connection- level flow
control credit.
Some deadlocking scenarios might be resolved by cancelling affected
streams with STOP_SENDING or RST_STREAM. Cancelling some streams
results in the connection being terminated in some protocols.
5. Packetization and Latency
QUIC provides an interface that provides multiple streams to the
application; however, the application usually cannot control how data
transmitted over one stream is mapped into frames or how those frames
are bundled into packets.
By default, many QUIC implementations will try to maximally pack
packets with one or more stream data frames to minimize bandwidth
consumption and computational costs (see section 13 of [QUIC]). If
there is not enough data available to fill a packet, an
implementation might wait for a short time, to optimize bandwidth
efficiency instead of latency. This delay can either be pre-
configured or dynamically adjusted based on the observed sending
pattern of the application.
If the application requires low latency, with only small chunks of
data to send, it may be valuable to indicate to QUIC that all data
should be send out immediately. Alternatively, if the application
expects to use a specific sending pattern, it can also provide a
suggested delay to QUIC for how long to wait before bundle frames
into a packet.
Similarly, an application has usually no control about the length of
a QUIC packet on the wire. QUIC provides the ability to add a
PADDING frame to arbitrarily increase the size of packets.
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Padding is used by QUIC to ensure that the path is capable of
transferring datagrams of at least a certain size, both during the
handshake and for connection migration. Padding can also be used by
an application to reduce leakage of information about the data that
is sent. A QUIC implementation can expose an interface that allows
an application layer to specify how to apply padding.
6. Port Selection and Application Endpoint Discovery
In general, port numbers serves two purposes: "first, they provide a
demultiplexing identifier to differentiate transport sessions between
the same pair of endpoints, and second, they may also identify the
application protocol and associated service to which processes
connect" [RFC6335]. The assumption that an application can be
identified in the network based on the port number is less true today
due to encapsulation, mechanisms for dynamic port assignments, and
NATs.
As QUIC is a general purpose transport protocol, there are no
requirements that servers use a particular UDP port for QUIC. For
applications with a fallback to TCP that do not already have an
alternate mapping to UDP, the registration (if necessary) and use of
the UDP port number corresponding to the TCP port already registered
for the application is RECOMMENDED. For example, the default port
for HTTP/3 [QUIC-HTTP] is UDP port 443, analogous to HTTP/1.1 or
HTTP/2 over TLS over TCP.
Applications could define an alternate endpoint discovery mechanism
to allow the usage of ports other than the default. For example,
HTTP/3 ([QUIC-HTTP] Sections 3.2 and 3.3) specifies the use of ALPN
[RFC7301] for service discovery which allows the server to use and
announce a different port number. Note that HTTP/3's ALPN token
("h3") identifies not only the version of the application protocol,
but also the binding to QUIC as well as the version of QUIC itself;
this approach allows unambiguous agreement between the endpoints on
the protocol stack in use.
Given the prevalence of the assumption in network management practice
that a port number maps unambiguously to an application, the use of
ports that cannot easily be mapped to a registered service name might
lead to blocking or other interference by network elements such as
firewalls that rely on the port number for application
identification.
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7. Connection Migration
QUIC supports connection migration by the client. If a lower-layer
address changes, a QUIC endpoint can still associate packets with an
existing connection using the Destination connection ID field (see
also Section 9) in the QUIC header, unless a zero-length value is
used. This supports cases where address information changes, such as
NAT rebinding, intentional change of the local interface, or based on
an indication in the handshake of the server for a preferred address
to be used.
Use of a non-empty connection ID for the server is strongly
recommended if any clients are behind a NAT or could be. A non-empty
connection ID is also strongly recommended when migration is
supported.
Currently QUIC only supports failover cases. Only one "path" can be
used at a time, and only when the new path is validated all traffic
can be switched over to that new path. Path validation means that
the other endpoint in required to validate the new path before use in
order to avoid address spoofing attacks. Path validation takes at
least one RTT and congestion control will also be reset on path
migration. Therefore migration usually has a performance impact.
Probing packets, which cannot carry application data, can be sent on
multiple paths at once. Probing packets can be used to perform
address validation, measure path characteristics as input for the
switching decision, or prime the congestion controller in preparation
for switching to the new path.
Only the client can actively migrate. However, servers can indicate
during the handshake that they prefer to transfer the connection to a
different address after the handshake. For instance, this could be
used to move from an address that is shared by multiple servers to an
address that is unique to the server instance. The server can
provide an IPv4 and an IPv6 address in a transport parameter during
the TLS handshake and the client can select between the two if both
are provided. See also Section 9.6 of [QUIC].
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8. Connection Closure
QUIC connections are closed either by expiration of an idle timeout,
as determined by transport parameters, or by an explicit indication
of the application that a connection should be closed (immediate
close). While data could still be received after the immediate close
has been initiated by one endpoint (for a limited time period), the
expectation is that an immediate close was negotiated at the
application layer and therefore no additional data is expected from
both sides.
An immediate close will emit an CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. This frames
has two sets of types: one for QUIC internal problems that might lead
to connection closure, and one for closures initiated by the
application. An application using QUIC can define application-
specific error codes (see, for example, [QUIC-HTTP], Section 8.1).
The CONNECTION_CLOSE frame provides an optional reason field, that
can be used to append human-readable information to an error code.
Note that QUIC RESET_STREAM and STOP_SENDING frames also include an
error code, but no reason string. Application error codes are
expected to be defined from a single space that applies to all three
frame types.
Alternatively, a QUIC connection can be silently closed by each
endpoint separately after an idle timeout. If enabled as indicated
by a transport parameter in the handshake, the idle timeout is
announced for each endpoint during connection establishment and the
effective value for this connection is the minimum of the two values
advertised by client and server. An application therefore should be
able to configure its own maximum value as well as have access to the
computed minimum value for this connection. An application may
adjust the maximum idle timeout based on the number of open or
expected connections as shorter timeout values may free-up memory
more quickly.
If an application desires to keep the connection open for longer than
the announced timeout, it can send keep-alive messages, or a QUIC
implementation may provide an option to defer the time-out to avoid
unnecessary load, as specified in Section 10.1.2 of [QUIC]. See
Section 3.3 for further guidance on keep-alives.
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9. Information Exposure and the Connection ID
QUIC exposes some information to the network in the unencrypted part
of the header, either before the encryption context is established,
because the information is intended to be used by the network. QUIC
has a long header that is used during connection establishment and
for other control processes, and a short header that may be used for
data transmission in an established connection. While the long
header always exposes some information (such as the version and
connection IDs), the short header exposes at most only a single
connection ID.
Aside from the destination connection ID field of the first packets
sent by clients, the connection ID can be zero length. This is a
choice that is made by each endpoint individually.
An endpoint that selects a zero-length connection ID will receive
packets with a zero-length destination connection ID. The endpoint
needs to use other information, such as its IP address and port
number to identify which connection is referred to. An endpoint can
choose to use the source IP address and port on datagrams, but this
could mean that the endpoint is unable to match datagrams to
connections successfully if these values change, making migration
effectively impossible.
9.1. Server-Generated Connection ID
QUIC supports a server-generated connection ID, transmitted to the
client during connection establishment (see Section 7.2 of [QUIC]).
Servers behind load balancers may need to change the connection ID
during the handshake, encoding the identity of the server or
information about its load balancing pool, in order to support
stateless load balancing.
Server deployments with load balancers and other routing
infrastructure need to ensure that this infrastructure consistently
routes packets to the correct server instance. This might require
coordination between servers and infrastructure. One method of
achieving this involves encoding routing information into the
connection ID. This ensures that there is no need to for servers and
infrastructure to coordinate routing information for each connection.
See further [QUIC-LB].
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9.2. Mitigating Timing Linkability with Connection ID Migration
QUIC requires that endpoints generate fresh connection IDs for use on
new network paths. Choosing values that are unlinkable to an outside
observer ensures that activity on different paths cannot be trivially
correlated using the connection ID.
While sufficiently robust connection ID generation schemes will
mitigate linkability issues, they do not provide full protection.
Analysis of the lifetimes of six-tuples (source and destination
addresses as well as the migrated CID) may expose these links anyway.
In the limit where connection migration in a server pool is rare, it
is trivial for an observer to associate two connection IDs.
Conversely, in the opposite limit where every server handles multiple
simultaneous migrations, even an exposed server mapping may be
insufficient information.
The most efficient mitigation for these attacks is operational,
either by using a load balancing architecture that loads more flows
onto a single server-side address, by coordinating the timing of
migrations to attempt to increase the number of simultaneous
migrations at a given time, or through other means.
9.3. Using Server Retry for Redirection
QUIC provides a Server Retry packet that can be sent by a server in
response to the Client Initial packet. The server may choose a new
connection ID in that packet and the client will retry by sending
another Client Initial packet with the server-selected connection ID.
This mechanism can be used to redirect a connection to a different
server, e.g. due to performance reasons or when servers in a server
pool are upgraded gradually, and therefore may support different
versions of QUIC. In this case, it is assumed that all servers
belonging to a certain pool are served in cooperation with load
balancers that forward the traffic based on the connection ID. A
server can choose the connection ID in the Server Retry packet such
that the load balancer will redirect the next Client Initial packet
to a different server in that pool. Alternatively the load balancer
can directly offer a Retry services as further described in
[QUIC-LB].
[RFC5077] Section 4 describes an example approach for constructing
TLS resumption tickets that can be also applied for validation
tokens, however, the use of more modern cryptographic algorithms is
highly recommended.
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10. Quality of Service (QoS) and DSCP
QUIC assumes that all packets of a QUIC connection or at least with
the same 5-tuple {dest addr, source addr, protocol, dest port, source
port} will receive similar network treatment as feedback about loss
or delay of each packet is used as input to the congestion
controller. Therefore it is not recommended to use different
DiffServ Code Points (DSCPs) [RFC2475] for packets belonging to the
same connection. If differential network treatment, e.g. by the use
of different DSCPs, is desired, multiple QUIC connections to the same
server may be used. However, in general it is recommended to
minimize the number of QUIC connections to the same server, to avoid
increased overheads and, more importantly, competing congestion
control.
11. Use of Versions and Cryptographic Handshake
Versioning in QUIC may change the protocol's behavior completely,
except for the meaning of a few header fields that have been declared
to be invariant [QUIC-INVARIANTS]. A version of QUIC with a higher
version number will not necessarily provide a better service, but
might simply provide a different feature set. As such, an
application needs to be able to select which versions of QUIC it
wants to use.
A new version could use an encryption scheme other than TLS 1.3 or
higher. [QUIC] specifies requirements for the cryptographic
handshake as currently realized by TLS 1.3 and described in a
separate specification [QUIC-TLS]. This split is performed to enable
light-weight versioning with different cryptographic handshakes.
12. Enabling New Versions
QUIC provides integrity protection for its version negotiation
process. This process assumes that the set of versions that a server
supports is fixed. This complicates the process for deploying new
QUIC versions or disabling old versions when servers operate in
clusters.
A server that rolls out a new version of QUIC can do so in three
stages. Each stage is completed across all server instances before
moving to the next stage.
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In the first stage of deployment, all server instances start
accepting new connections with the new version. The new version can
be enabled progressively across a deployment, which allows for
selective testing. This is especially useful when the new version is
compatible with an old version, because the new version is more
likely to be used.
While enabling the new version, servers do not advertise the new
version in any Version Negotiation packets they send. This prevents
clients that receive a Version Negotiation packet from attempting to
connect to server instances that might not have the new version
enabled.
During the initial deployment, some clients will have received
Version Negotiation packets that indicate that the server does not
support the new version. Other clients might have successfully
connected with the new version and so will believe that the server
supports the new version. Therefore, servers need to allow for this
ambiguity when validating the negotiated version.
The second stage of deployment commences once all server instances
are able accept new connections with the new version. At this point,
all servers can start sending the new version in Version Negotiation
packets.
During the second stage, the server still allows for the possibility
that some clients believe the new version to be available and some do
not. This state will persist only for as long as any Version
Negotiation packets take to be transmitted and responded to. So the
third stage can follow after a relatively short delay.
The third stage completes the process by enabling authentication of
the negotiated version with the assumption that the new version is
fully available.
The process for disabling an old version or rolling back the
introduction of a new version uses the same process in reverse.
Servers disable validation of the old version, stop sending the old
version in Version Negotiation packets, then the old version is no
longer accepted.
13. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA; however, note that Section 6
recommends that application bindings to QUIC for applications using
TCP register UDP ports analogous to their existing TCP registrations.
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14. Security Considerations
See the security considerations in [QUIC] and [QUIC-TLS]; the
security considerations for the underlying transport protocol are
relevant for applications using QUIC, as well. Considerations on
linkability, replay attacks, and randomness discussed in [QUIC-TLS]
should be taken into account when deploying and using QUIC.
Application developers should note that any fallback they use when
QUIC cannot be used due to network blocking of UDP should guarantee
the same security properties as QUIC; if this is not possible, the
connection should fail to allow the application to explicitly handle
fallback to a less-secure alternative. See Section 2.
Further [QUIC-HTTP] provides security considerations specific to
HTTP. However, discussions such as on cross protocol attacks,
traffic analysis and padding, or migration might be relevant for
other applications using QUIC as well.
15. Contributors
Igor Lubashev contributed text to Section 9 on server-selected
connection IDs.
16. Acknowledgments
This work is partially supported by the European Commission under
Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 688421 Measurement and Architecture
for a Middleboxed Internet (MAMI), and by the Swiss State Secretariat
for Education, Research, and Innovation under contract no. 15.0268.
This support does not imply endorsement.
17. References
17.1. Normative References
[QUIC] Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
and Secure Transport", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-quic-transport-34, 14 January 2021,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-
transport-34.txt>.
[QUIC-INVARIANTS]
Thomson, M., "Version-Independent Properties of QUIC",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-quic-
invariants-13, 14 January 2021, <http://www.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-invariants-13.txt>.
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[QUIC-TLS] Thomson, M. and S. Turner, "Using TLS to Secure QUIC",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-quic-tls-34,
14 January 2021, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
draft-ietf-quic-tls-34.txt>.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
[TLS13] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
17.2. Informative References
[ALPN] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[Edeline16]
Edeline, K., Kuehlewind, M., Trammell, B., Aben, E., and
B. Donnet, "Using UDP for Internet Transport Evolution
(arXiv preprint 1612.07816)", 22 December 2016,
<https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.07816>.
[Hatonen10]
Hatonen, S., Nyrhinen, A., Eggert, L., Strowes, S.,
Sarolahti, P., and M. Kojo, "An experimental study of home
gateway characteristics (Proc. ACM IMC 2010)", October
2010.
[HTTP-REPLAY]
Thomson, M., Nottingham, M., and W. Tarreau, "Using Early
Data in HTTP", RFC 8470, DOI 10.17487/RFC8470, September
2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8470>.
[I-D.nottingham-httpbis-retry]
Nottingham, M., "Retrying HTTP Requests", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nottingham-httpbis-retry-
01, 1 February 2017, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
draft-nottingham-httpbis-retry-01.txt>.
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[PaaschNanog]
Paasch, C., "Network Support for TCP Fast Open (NANOG 67
presentation)", 13 June 2016,
<https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/
Paasch_Network_Support.pdf>.
[QUIC-HTTP]
Bishop, M., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 3
(HTTP/3)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
quic-http-33, 15 December 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-http-33.txt>.
[QUIC-LB] Duke, M. and N. Banks, "QUIC-LB: Generating Routable QUIC
Connection IDs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-quic-load-balancers-05, 30 October 2020,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-load-
balancers-05.txt>.
[RFC2475] Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z.,
and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated
Services", RFC 2475, DOI 10.17487/RFC2475, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2475>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
[RFC5382] Guha, S., Ed., Biswas, K., Ford, B., Sivakumar, S., and P.
Srisuresh, "NAT Behavioral Requirements for TCP", BCP 142,
RFC 5382, DOI 10.17487/RFC5382, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5382>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC8085] Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,
March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.
[Swett16] Swett, I., "QUIC Deployment Experience at Google (IETF96
QUIC BoF presentation)", 20 July 2016,
<https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/96/slides/slides-96-
quic-3.pdf>.
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[Trammell16]
Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "Internet Path
Transparency Measurements using RIPE Atlas (RIPE72 MAT
presentation)", 25 May 2016, <https://ripe72.ripe.net/wp-
content/uploads/presentations/86-atlas-udpdiff.pdf>.
Authors' Addresses
Mirja Kuehlewind
Ericsson
Email: mirja.kuehlewind@ericsson.com
Brian Trammell
Google
Gustav-Gull-Platz 1
CH- 8004 Zurich
Switzerland
Email: ietf@trammell.ch
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